# Brown v. Great Circle

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · December 10, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10241349

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** December 10, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10241349

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the cause of action only where a child has been abducted or induced not to return to the custodial parent

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
MARIA PYUL BROWN, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 2:19-cv-04135-NKL

GREAT CIRCLE, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER
Defendant Joshua Turner moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Doc. 59. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges eight
counts, including five counts against Turner for Conspiracy, Tortious Interference with Parental
Relationship, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Defamation, and Malicious Prosecution.
Doc. 50. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of an alleged conspiracy between the Defendants to interfere
with the parental relationship between Maria Brown and her son, P.A.T., a minor. For the reasons
set forth below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I. Alleged Facts
Plaintiffs state that Plaintiff Maria Brown and Defendant Joshua Turner are the parents of
Plaintiff P.A.T., a ten-year-old child. Doc. 50, at ¶ 1, 17. Plaintiffs and Turner have litigated the
custody of their child in state court, and have been subject to multiple investigations by the
Children’s Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services. Id., at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs allege that
Turner repeatedly and consistently interfered with Plaintiffs’ parent-child relationship, that he has
influenced the investigations by the Children’s Division, and that Plaintiffs have been investigated
or subject to the services of the Children’s Division as a result of Turner’s “incorrect, false, and/or
malicious complaints.” Id., at ¶¶ 28.i. (interference with parent-child relationship), 7 (interference
with investigations), 2 (undue investigations or services). Plaintiffs specifically allege that Turner
has made false allegations in Court documents against Brown, has manufactured evidence, and
has conspired with others against Plaintiffs. Id., at ¶¶ 28.d., 44.i., 60.
Plaintiffs assert that Turner worked in coordination with Detmer with the goal to “cover up

Defendant Turner’s nefarious conduct, destroy his son’s mother . . . and thereby save money on
litigation and child support.” Id., at ¶ 51. The complaint asserted that “[a]ny and/or all of the
Turner-Detmer family have . . . knowingly and/or unknowingly acted with reckless regard for
Plaintiffs’ rights, making false reports, manipulating the legal system (both judicial and
administrative process, and related entities), and inter alia acting with malice toward Plaintiff
Brown.” Id., at ¶ 26.
Specifically, the pleadings allege that Turner and Detmer “instituted one or more legal
proceeding(s) against Plaintiff in which complaints were made, by Defendant without probable
cause and with malice.” Id., at ¶ 84; that Turner has used Defendant Detmer’s “past and current

connections to influence the Children’s Division’s investigation,” Id., at ¶ 28.h; that Turner and
Detmer “directly interfered with Court ordered custody and Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights to a
parent-child relationship,” Id., at 44.e.; that “Turner and/or Detmer made one or more false hotline
reports,” Id., at ¶ 44.k.; “and that “Defendants Turner and/or Detmer worked in coordination with
and/or leveraged, threatened, and intimidated Defendant Gatewood into conducting the
investigation and making findings consistent with what Defendants Turner and Detmer wanted in
the results.” Id., at ¶ 38.f.; see also id., at ¶¶ 60.b., d., 66. As evidence of their allegations, Plaintiffs
additionally assert that hundreds of text messages exist which illustrate that Detmer coached
Defendant Turner how to address the Children’s Division investigation. Id., at ¶¶ 37, 38.a.
Plaintiffs additionally assert that Turner used Johnston Paint’s business resources “to
influence or otherwise alter investigations and/or reports concerning abuse of Plaintiff P.A.T. to
ward custody of the child.” Id., at ¶¶ 7, 38.g. (alleging use of business resources including phones
to discuss Social Services investigation), 44 (alleging use of time, money, and resources). The
complaint added to Turner’s involvement with Johnston Paint, stating that “Defendant Johnston

Paint in coordination, and/or by and through Defendants Turner and Detmer used their professional
capacity and connections to create a conflict of interest by obtaining personal services of law
enforcement whom willing colluded with Defendant Johnston Paint to circumvent the custody
court order for their employee, Defendant Joshua Turner.” Id., at ¶ 46.
II. Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim has facial plausibility when its allegations rise above the

“speculative” or “conceivable,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007), and
where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Such a complaint
will be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp.,
514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. Discussion
A. Count I – Conspiracy
Defendant Turner argues that Plaintiffs have only stated legal conclusions and have
therefore not sufficiently pleaded the elements required to prove a claim of conspiracy. In order to
state a claim for civil conspiracy under Missouri law a plaintiff must plead that there were “(1)
two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or
course of action, (4) one or more unlawful overt acts, and (5) resulting damages.” Aguilar v. PNC

Bank, N.A., 853 F.3d 390, 402–03 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Mackey v. Mackey, 914 S.W.2d 48, 50
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
Plaintiffs’ pleadings assert that there were multiple individuals working towards the joint
goal of interfering with Social Services investigations to affect the custody determinations which
resulted in the claimed harm to Brown’s parental relationship with her child. What is not alleged
in the pleadings other than through conclusory legal statements, however, is what specific actions
Turner actually took and whether any of those actions were done in furtherance of a conspiracy.
To show that a meeting of the minds occurred, Plaintiffs must show that the alleged conspirators
had “a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding.” Rosemann v. St. Louis Bank, 858

F.3d 488, 500 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Though Plaintiffs allege that Turner may have
colluded with the Defendants for a common goal, Plaintiffs did not specifically plead that there
was coordination between the Defendants, nor are there facts that would show there was
coordination between these parties.
Even if Plaintiffs were to succeed in establishing that there was a meeting of the minds,
Plaintiffs have not asserted facts which could support a finding that the underlying alleged actions
taken by Turner were unlawful. Plaintiffs complaint offered only conclusory statements as to the
unlawfulness of the actions allegedly committed by Turner as part of the conspiracy. These
claimed actions include Turner’s being coached by Detmer on how to handle the Children’s
Division investigation, use of Detmer’s contacts to affect the investigation, and use of Johnston
Paint resources to affect the investigation. But conclusory statements that these actions were
unlawful or resulted in interference with Plaintiffs’ parent-child relationship are insufficient to
successfully plead that an unlawful act occurred. Without specific facts stating what actions were
taken and why these acts are unlawful, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Turner or the other

Defendants took any action that was forbidden to them. To the extent that Plaintiffs do allege
actions that could be presumed to be unlawful, such as where Plaintiffs allege that Turner made
false statements in court documents and that Turner manufactured evidence, these conclusory
assertions still fail to plead a claim against Turner. Plaintiffs have not identified what the alleged
false statements where or what they were regarding, nor have they asserted any details about what
the alleged manufactured evidence was. A pleading is insufficient if it provides only “naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without any factual support, Plaintiffs have
not pleaded a plausible claim of conspiracy on these allegations. Accordingly, this claim must also

be dismissed.
Plaintiffs also separately allege that “Defendant Johnston Paint in coordination, and/or by
and through Defendants Turner and Detmer used their professional capacity and connections to
create a conflict of interest by obtaining personal services of law enforcement whom willing
colluded with Defendant Johnston Paint to circumvent the custody court order for [Defendant
Turner].” Doc. 50, at ¶ 46. Here as above, Plaintiffs have not provided specific facts that show that
the Defendants were aware of each other’s actions and acted in coordination. Plaintiffs’ pleadings
do not state how the alleged creation of a “conflict of interest” rises to the level of being an
unlawful act, nor do they state what this conflict was and how it relates to this case. The allegations
of collusion with law enforcement would relate to a potential separate conspiracy between
Johnston Paint and those providing the law enforcement services, a claim that Plaintiffs have not
argued and which is separate from the claims against Turner. The pleadings’ conclusory statement
that Johnston Paint may have colluded with law enforcement to “circumvent the custody court
order” does not state what activity was taken, how this action circumvented the court order,

whether that activity was unlawful in any way, and whether Turner was aware of this alleged
collusion.
Having not pleaded the facts necessary to plead that Detmer was aware of the conspiracy
to interfere with Plaintiffs’ parental relationship, Plaintiff cannot prove a claim of conspiracy. This
claim must therefore be dismissed.
B. Count II – Tortious Interference with Parental Relationship
Defendant Turner argues that a claim of tortious interference with parental relationship
fails in a case such as this where the claimed interference was not accomplished by the abduction
of the child.

Plaintiffs rely on Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. App. S.D. 1982) to assert
this claim against Turner for his alleged involvement in a conspiracy that resulted in interference
of the parental relationship between Brown and her child.1 But in Meikle v. Van Biber, the court
expressly limited Kramer, and held that “Missouri case law has only allowed recovery in damages
for interference with a parent’s right to custody of a minor child where it was alleged and proved

1. Plaintiffs cite as additional support Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700. Reliance
on this is also inapt as § 700 defines a cause of action for “[o]ne who, with knowledge that the
parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent
legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to
liability to the parent.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700. As above, Plaintiffs have not pleaded
such a claim.
that the tort committed was accomplished by abduction of the child.” Meikle v. Van Biber, 745
S.W.2d 714, 715 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987). Plaintiffs supported their claim using only case law
consistent with this limitation. See Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. App. S.D. 1982)
(involving abduction of a child); Kipper v. Vokolek, 546 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App. 1977) (applying
the cause of action only where a child has been abducted or induced not to return to the custodial

parent); Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App.2d 431 (Cal. App. 1963) (involving abduction);
Brown v. Brown, 61 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. 1953) (same).
As above, Plaintiffs have not specifically pleaded facts to support that Turner interfered
with Plaintiffs’ parental relationship either directly or through a conspiracy. But even if such
interference were established, Plaintiffs have asserted that Brown has been limited in her parental
relationship due to an allegedly inappropriate custody order, not through the abduction or physical
removal of the child. Having not alleged specifics facts necessary to plead a plausible claim of
tortious interference with parental relationship, this claim must be dismissed.
C. Count III – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant Turner argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded the elements required
to prove a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Under Missouri law, to state a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must plead (1) a legal duty of the
defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, (4)
injury to plaintiff, (5) that the defendant “should have realized that his conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing distress,” and (6) that “the emotional distress or mental injury must
be medically diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant.”
Couzens v. Donohue, 854 F.3d 508, 518 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Thornburg v. Fed. Express Corp.,
62 S.W.3d 421, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)).
Plaintiffs allege generally that they suffered emotional distress and emotional hardship as
a result of the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiffs, however, have not specifically identified what the
actions taken by Defendant Turner were, nor have they provided support showing that those
actions caused distress to Plaintiffs. Instead, the complaint includes only vague language that does
not attribute responsibility to any particular defendant. See e.g., Doc. 50, ¶ 71.c. (alleging that

Plaintiffs endured “[c]onsistent and/or repeated harassment and/or angry and/or hostile conduct by
one or more of the Defendants . . . .”).
Even if presumed that Turner was responsible for some conduct that resulted in Plaintiffs’
emotional distress, this claim could not succeed because Plaintiffs did not plead that Defendant
owed a duty to Plaintiff. The complaint asserts that Defendents should have known that their
actions were likely to breach “duties of civility, fairness, human nature . . . and/or fiduciary duties.”
Doc. 50, ¶ 71.e. While Turner concedes that he owes a duty to protect his child, he argues that the
allegations by Plaintiffs in this count address only emotional distress by Plaintiff Brown. Other
than the conclusory assertion that “Plaintiffs have suffered emotional distress as a result of

Defendants’ actions,” Id., at 69, the complaint specifies only emotional hardship relating to
Plaintiff Brown. See id., at 69-72. Plaintiffs have not provided any factual basis or legal argument
supporting the claim that Turner owed Plaintiff Brown a legally cognizable duty. Indeed, Plaintiffs
did not oppose these issues in their response to Defendant’s motion. Plaintiffs have offered only
conclusory statements to support their broad assertion that at least one of the Defendants in this
case caused them emotional injuries. Having failed to allege the facts necessary to plead a plausible
case of negligent infliction of emotional distress against Turner, this claim must be dismissed.
D. Count V – Defamation
Defendant Turner argues that Plaintiffs’ pleadings fail to state a claim of defamation
because they do not identify any specific statements made by Turner. Under Missouri law, to state
a claim for defamation a plaintiff must plead “1) publication, 2) of a defamatory statement, 3) that
identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault, and 6)
damages the plaintiff’s reputation.” Cockram v. Genesco, Inc., 680 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Missouri ex rel. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc. v. Ross, 163 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Mo. 2005) (en
banc)). “[A] claim for defamation will survive a motion to dismiss if the communication alleged
in the petition, together with matters of inducement and innuendo alleged in the petition, is capable
of a defamatory meaning.” Klein v. Victor, 903 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (citations
omitted).
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint only that Defendant “orally communicat[ed] false,
defamatory, and reckless statements to third-parties, including, but not limited to, Defendants,
Defendant’s employees, and the public about any allegations against Plaintiff Maria P. Brown.”
Doc. 50, ¶ 80. Plaintiffs did not identify any specific statements that may have been made against

Plaintiff Brown, nor have they provided any legal argument to support the sufficiency of the
pleading of this claim. Without any factual support, Plaintiffs have not pleaded a plausible claim
of defamation. Accordingly, this claim must also be dismissed.
E. Count VI – Malicious Prosecution
Defendant Turner argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded the elements required
to prove a claim of malicious prosecution. Under Missouri law, to state a claim for malicious
prosecution a plaintiff must plead “1) commencement of an earlier suit against plaintiff; 2)
instigation of the suit by defendant; 3) termination of the suit in plaintiff's favor; 4) lack of probable
cause for the suit; 5) malice by defendant in instituting the suit; and 6) damage to plaintiff resulting
from the suit.” Zike v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., 646 F.3d 504, 509
(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting State ex rel. Police Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. Mummert, 875 S.W.2d 553,
555 (Mo.1994) (en banc)).
Plaintiffs allege that Turner “instituted one or more legal proceeding(s) against Plaintiff in
which complaints were made, by Defendant without probable cause and with malice.” Doc. 50. at

¶ 84. Plaintiffs do not identify any particular lawsuit brought by Turner against Plaintiffs, nor do
they provide any further support for the allegations that Defendant brought these proceedings
without probable cause and with malice. Even if the entirety of this allegation is taken as true,
Plaintiffs have still failed to plead the third and sixth elements of a claim for malicious prosecution.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the previous lawsuit(s) where terminated in favor of Plaintiffs, a
determination not supported by the facts as the only court decision noted by Plaintiffs are pending
cases and a decision allowing joint custody. Additionally, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts
supporting the assertion that damages were sustained as a result of the alleged malicious
prosecution. Having not alleged specifics facts necessary to plead a plausible claim malicious

prosecution, this claim must be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant Turner’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The
complaint against Defendant Joshua Turner is dismissed without prejudice.
/s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge

Dated: December 10, 2019
Jefferson City, Missouri

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10241349. Public record. Not legal advice.