# Thompson v. Berryhill

> District Court, W.D. Missouri · August 23, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10240781

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** August 23, 2018
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEPHEN L. THOMPSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 6:17-CV-03181-DGK-SSA
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Stephen L. Thompson (“Plaintiff”) petitions for review of an adverse decision by
Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). Plaintiff applied for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1381 et
seq. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as
hand packager and laundry worker.
After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court finds the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
Procedural and Factual Background
The complete facts and arguments are presented in the parties’ briefs and are repeated here
only to the extent necessary.
Plaintiff filed her application on June 6, 2014, alleging a disability onset date of August
15, 2013. The Commissioner denied the application at the initial claim level, and Plaintiff appealed
the denial to an ALJ. The ALJ held a hearing, and on April 22, 2016, found Plaintiff was not
disabled. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for a review on April 17, 2017. Plaintiff
has exhausted all administrative remedies and judicial review is now appropriate under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
Standard of Review
A federal court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability benefits is
limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole. Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2015). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough evidence that a reasonable mind would find it
sufficient to support the Commissioner’s decision. Id. In making this assessment, the court
considers evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision, as well as evidence that
supports it. Id. The court must “defer heavily” to the Commissioner’s findings and conclusions.
Wright v. Colvin, 789 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2015). The court may reverse the Commissioner’s
decision only if it falls outside of the available zone of choice, and a decision is not outside this
zone simply because the evidence also points to an alternate outcome. Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d
549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011).

Discussion
The Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process1 to determine whether
a claimant is disabled, that is, unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a
medically determinable impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

1 “The five-step sequence involves determining whether (1) a claimant’s work activity, if any, amounts to substantial
gainful activity; (2) his impairments, alone or combined, are medically severe; (3) his severe impairments meet or
medically equal a listed impairment; (4) his residual functional capacity precludes his past relevant work; and (5) his
residual functional capacity permits an adjustment to any other work. The evaluation process ends if a determination
of disabled or not disabled can be made at any step.” Kemp ex rel. Kemp v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 630, 632 n.1 (8th Cir.
2014); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)–(g). Through Step Four of the analysis the claimant bears the burden of showing
that he is disabled. After the analysis reaches Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are
other jobs in the economy that the claimant can perform. King v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 978, 979 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred because: (1) the ALJ improperly weighed the medical
evidence. After reviewing, the Court finds this argument is without merit.
I. The ALJ did not err by giving Dr. Mausmare’s opinion little weight.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the evidence in formulating
Plaintiff’s RFC. An RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the combined effect of all credible
limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is the ALJ’s responsibility to resolve
inconsistencies and make a RFC finding based on all the relevant evidence, including medical
records, observation of treating physicians and others, and Plaintiff’s own testimony. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.945 and 416.946. With respect to medical opinion evidence, the determination of
a claimant’s RFC at the administrative hearing level is the responsibility of an ALJ, and is distinct
from a medical source’s opinion. See Kamman v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2013).
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff maintained the RFC to perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels, but limited to simple and routine tasks. R. at 24. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
failed to provide good reasons for giving little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating

physician, Usha Manusmare, M.D. The amount of weight given a treating medical source opinion
depends upon support for the opinion found in the record; its consistency with the record; and
whether it rests upon conclusory statements. Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1132 (8th Cir.
2015). An ALJ must give controlling weight to a treating medical source opinion if it is well-
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence. Id. The opinion may be given “limited weight if
it provides conclusory statements only, or is inconsistent with the record.” Id. (citations omitted).
The ALJ “may discount or even disregard the opinion . . . where other medical assessments are
supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders
inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Dr. Manusmare opined the Plaintiff’s ability do to the following tasks were markedly
limited: maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of time; perform activities
within a schedule; maintain regular attendance and be punctual; sustain an ordinary routine without
special supervision; complete a normal workday without interruptions from psychologically based
symptoms; and perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods. R. at 304, 340. The ALJ noted that Dr. Manusmare’s examination notes, as well as
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, did not support her opinion. R. at 26, 28-30. Throughout the
time that Dr. Manusmare treated Plaintiff, she noted that he dressed appropriately, had adequate
hygiene and grooming, was alert and well-oriented, had logical goal-oriented thoughts, answered
questions promptly, had normal speech rate and rhythm, had adequate concentration and attention,
and had adequate recent and remote memory. R. at 271-72. 307, 310, 313, 316, 319, 321-22, 325-
26, 329, 331, 335. Dr. Manusmare noted that Plaintiff took care of a mentally ill woman in
exchange for room and board, where he did housework and laundry, went grocery shopping,
attended church, kept his doctor’s appointments, and utilized Medicaid transportation. See
Chismarich v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 978, 979 (8th Cir. 2018) (evidence that claimant performed
housekeeping tasks, managed sale of family home, and negotiated with builders of new house
supporting finding of not disabled). Dr. Manusmare also noted that Plaintiff appeared to
overestimate his depression. R. at 318. Plaintiff also testified about his activities, which included:
performing janitorial work for his church two days per week, attending church services and a
divorce support group, shopping for food, and preparing meals. R. at 44-45, 54-65, 200-03. The
ALJ’s evaluation and consideration of Dr. Manusmare’s opinion was not error. See id.; Papesh,
786 F.3d at 1132.
The ALJ also cited the opinion of Brandan Gremminger, Psy.D., who treated Plaintiff from
August 2014 through December 2015. Dr. Gremminger’s notes indicate that Plaintiff was alert
and oriented, functionally intact, and interactive. R. at 350, 354, 357, 360, 371, 374, 377, 387,
390, 438, 442, 446. The notes also indicate that Plaintiff improved when he complied with
treatment recommendations. R. at 374, 407-09, 426; see Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 846
(8th Cir. 2009) (“Impairments that are controllable or amenable to treatment do not support a
finding of disability.”).
The ALJ presented a hypothetical question to a qualified vocational expert that reflected
Plaintiff’s age, education, work history, and RFC. R. at 70-71. A vocational expert’s testimony

to a properly formed hypothetical constitutes substantial evidence. See Robson v. Astrue, 526 F.3d
389, 392 (8th Cir. 2008). The vocational expert testified that that hypothetical individual could
perform unskilled work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as hand
packager and laundry worker. The ALJ properly concluded that the vocational expert’s testimony
was sufficient to satisfy the Commissioner’s burden. See Weiler v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1107, 1110-11
(8th Cir. 1999).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Mansumore’s opinion and the
ALJ’s RFC.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: August 23, 2018 /s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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