# Michael Frisbey v. Salem Pointe Capital, LLC

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · June 24, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10239332

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** June 24, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the rules for interpreting corporate charters are “generally the same as those that govern the construction and interpretation of statutes, contracts, and other written instruments”
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## Opinion text

06/24/2024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
April 10, 2024 Session

MICHAEL FRISBEY ET AL. v. SALEM POINTE CAPITAL, LLC ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Monroe County
No. 21,579 Jerri Bryant, Chancellor
___________________________________

No. E2023-01233-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

The company holding developer’s rights to a subdivision and the company’s principal
member used the developer’s rights to unilaterally remove a board member from the board
of the subdivision’s homeowners’ association. The aggrieved board member and his wife
filed suit, asking for an injunction allowing the plaintiff to remain a board member. The
trial court granted the plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction and later held that the
defendant company lacked the authority to remove the plaintiff as a board member. The
trial court reasoned that the bylaw on which the company relied in removing the board
member was contrary to state law and improper. Defendants appealed to this Court. We
reverse in part and affirm in part, affirming the trial court’s ultimate ruling that the plaintiff
is entitled to his seat on the homeowners’ association board.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed
in part; Affirmed in part; Case remanded

KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY and
THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ., joined.

Thomas M. Hale, Brandon L. Morrow, and Adam G. Russell, Knoxville, Tennessee, for
the appellants, Michael Ayres and Salem Pointe Capital, LLC.

Melanie E. Davis and Joel P. Reeves, Maryville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Michael
Frisbey and Jamie Frisbey.

OPINION

BACKGROUND

This appeal stems from a homeowners’ association board membership dispute.
Rarity Bay is a large subdivision located in Monroe County and Loudon County. Rarity
Bay Community Association, Inc. (the “HOA”) is a nonprofit corporation operating as the
subdivision’s homeowners’ association. The HOA formed in 1998 and executed its charter
(the “Charter”) on September 24, 1998. The original bylaws (the “Bylaws”) were adopted
on September 28, 1998.1 The Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions was registered in Loudon County on October 14, 1998. Membership in the
HOA is mandatory for Rarity Bay residents.

Salem Pointe Capital, LLC (“Salem”), principally controlled by Michael Ayres and
his wife, became involved with Rarity Bay in early 2015 when Salem acquired several
assets associated with the subdivision from a court-appointed receiver (the “Receiver”).
Salem purchased, inter alia, the subdivision’s golf course, country club, some residential
units, and vacant land. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee approved the sale as part of the receivership. Salem also purchased the
“Declarant’s rights” to the subdivision. On May 18, 2015, the Receiver executed a
document titled “Fifth Amendment of Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions for Rarity Bay Amendment of Bylaws for Rarity Bay Community Association,
Inc., and Assignment of Declarant’s Rights Under Master Declaration” (the “Fifth
Amendment”). Declarant’s rights originally belonged to the subdivision’s developer, and
the Bylaws defined “Declarant” as “Tellico Lake Properties, L.P., a Tennessee limited
partnership, or any successors, successor-in-title, or assigns.” In the Fifth Amendment,
however, the Receiver transferred the Declarant’s rights to Salem. Specifically, the
Receiver “set over, assign[ed], and transfer[red] the Declarant Rights to [Salem], without
representations, warranties, or recourse of any kind.”

Then, also on May 18, 2015, Salem executed the “Sixth Amendment of Master
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Rarity Bay” (the “Sixth
Amendment”). In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment provides:

WHEREAS, Section 1.12 of the Master Declaration, as amended, and
Section 2.10 of the Bylaws, as amended, define Declarant as Salem Pointe
Capital, LLC, a Tennessee limited liability company; and

WHEREAS, Section 13.2 of the Master Declaration, as amended, and
Section 13.10(a) of the Bylaws, as amended, provide that until the end of the
Development Period (as that term is defined in the Master Declaration and
the Bylaws, respectively), the Declarant may unilaterally amend the Master
Declaration and the Bylaws for any purpose; and

1
The parties and trial court hyphenate “by-laws” throughout the record, which corresponds with
many of the pertinent documents in this particular case. Consistent with the Tennessee Nonprofit
Corporation Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-51-101 et seq., however, we do not.

-2-
WHEREAS, the end of the Development Period has not yet occurred; and

WHEREAS, the Declarant wishes to amend the Master Declaration and the
Bylaws as set forth herein below.

The Sixth Amendment also contains the following, as pertinent:

2.(b) The first paragraph of Section 8.5 is hereby deleted and the
following text is inserted in lieu thereof:

Removal of Directors and Vacancies. Any director may be removed,
with or without cause, by Members holding a Majority of the total votes in
the Association, or by the Declarant. Any director whose removal is sought
shall be given notice prior to any meeting called for that purpose. Upon
removal of a director, a successor shall be elected by the Members to fill the
vacancy for the remainder of the term of such director, which successor must
also be approved by the Declarant.

The above amendment to the Bylaws effectively gave Salem final say over HOA’s
board membership, which is the crux of the present dispute. Also relevant to this appeal is
section 13.10 of the original Bylaws, which deals with amendments to the Bylaws and
provides:

13.10. Amendment.
(a) By Declarant. Until termination of the Development Period, the Declarant
may unilaterally amend these By-Laws for any purpose.[2] Thereafter, the
Declarant may unilaterally amend these By-Laws at any time and from time
to time if such amendment is necessary (i) to bring any provision into
compliance with any applicable governmental statu[t]e, rule, regulation, or
judicial determination; (ii) to enable any reputable title insurance company
to issue title insurance coverage on the Units; (iii) to enable any institutional
or governmental lender, purchaser, insurer or guarantor of Mortgage loans,
including, for example, the Federal National Mortgage Association or
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, to make, purchase, insure or
guarantee Mortgage loans on the Units; or (iv) to satisfy the requirements of
any local, state, or federal governmental agency. However, any such
amendment shall not adversely affect the title to any Unit unless the Member
shall consent thereto in writing.

2
It is undisputed that the “Development Period” as defined in the Bylaws is ongoing.

-3-
Plaintiffs Michael Frisbey and Jamie Frisbey (together, the “Frisbeys,” or
“Appellees”) are Rarity Bay residents. At an HOA board meeting in February of 2022,
several board members were elected. The newly-elected members included Mr. Frisbey.
Mr. Ayres ran for but was not elected to the HOA board. After this election, Mr. Ayres,
on Salem’s behalf, sent an email to the board on February 24, 2022. This email reiterated
Salem’s right, under the amended Bylaws, to remove with or without cause any board
members. The email also states, “please consider this correspondence from [Salem] as
official ‘notice’ of the special called meeting for the pending removal of one and/or more
Members from the” HOA board.

At the special-called meeting on March 1, 2022, Mr. Ayres announced that Salem,
as Declarant, was exercising its right under the amended Bylaws to remove Mr. Frisbey
and another individual3 as board members. The Frisbeys allege in their complaint that the
other board members initially objected to Salem’s actions but eventually capitulated in the
face of threatened legal action. Thus, Salem removed Mr. Frisbey as a board member.

The Frisbeys filed their complaint against Salem and Mr. Ayres (together,
“Defendants” or “Appellants”) and the HOA4 in the Chancery Court for Monroe County
(the “trial court”) on June 13, 2022. In general, the Frisbeys claimed that Mr. Ayres, acting
on Salem’s behalf, illegally removed Mr. Frisbey from the HOA board. The Frisbeys
alleged that Salem failed to provide Mr. Frisbey proper notice prior to his removal. They
also claimed that the removal violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-58-108,
which applies to Tennessee nonprofit corporations and provides that a director may be
removed from a board only under certain circumstances. In that vein, the Frisbeys claimed
that “State law trumps Section 8.5 of the Bylaws.” They also alleged that Mr. Ayres and
Salem violated fiduciary duties owed to the HOA and its members. As for relief, the
Frisbeys asked for: 1) an injunction maintaining Mr. Frisbey as a board member pending a
final hearing; 2) the trial court to lift the ban Mr. Ayres and Salem placed on the Frisbeys’
Rarity Bay social club membership; 3) a ruling that Mr. Frisbey is a duly elected and
serving board member; and 4) court costs to be taxed to Defendants.

The trial court held a hearing on the request for a temporary injunction on July 21,
2022. On July 29, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting the temporary injunction
and allowing Mr. Frisbey to remain a board member pending a final hearing. The trial
court reasoned that Mr. Frisbey may not have had proper notice, pursuant to the Bylaws,
prior to the meeting at which he was removed. The trial court set the case for final hearing
in February of 2023. Salem filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court’s July 29, 2022
order, arguing that the trial court made several errors of fact and law. The trial court denied
3
The other board member Salem removed initiated a separate legal action that is not at issue in this
appeal.
4
The HOA is not listed in the notice of appeal and did not file a brief in this Court.

-4-
that motion. Salem also asked for the final hearing to be continued, but the trial court
denied that request.

The trial court held a bench trial on February 7, 2023, at which it heard testimony
from Mr. Frisbey and Mr. Ayres. The trial court entered an order on March 16, 2023,
concluding that Defendants wrongfully and without proper authority removed Mr. Frisbey
as an HOA board member. In general, the trial court reasoned that Defendants’ actions
were contrary to state law and that the Bylaws could not be contrary to state law. The trial
court reinstated the Frisbeys as club members, dissolved any suspension of their social club
membership, and ruled that Mr. Frisbey could serve as a duly elected HOA board member
pending the final hearing. The trial court found that Defendants violated no fiduciary duties
and dismissed that claim. On April 13, 2023, Defendants filed a timely motion to alter or
amend the trial court’s ruling, arguing that the Bylaws are not inconsistent with either the
Charter or state law. The trial court entered a brief order on August 24, 2023, denying the
motion to alter or amend. Defendants then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

ISSUES

Defendants raise the following issues for review which we restate slightly:

I. Whether the trial court’s March 16, 2023 order should be
reversed because it violates the party-presentation principle?

II. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Declarant’s
right to amend the Bylaws, as set forth in § 13.10(a) of the Bylaws, was “not
allow[ed]” by the Charter?

III. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Declarant’s
right to amend the Bylaws, as set forth in § 13.10(a) of the Bylaws, was not
allowed by state law?

IV. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Declarant’s
right to remove directors, as set forth in § 8.5 of the Bylaws, was inconsistent
with the Charter?

V. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Declarant’s
right to remove directors, as set forth in § 8.5 of the Bylaws was inconsistent
with state law?

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VI. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Mr. Frisbey did
not receive proper notice of his removal from the Association’s Board of
Directors?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case was tried by the trial court sitting without a jury. Accordingly, we review
the trial court’s factual findings de novo with a presumption of correctness, unless the
preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Cross v. City of Memphis, 20 S.W.3d 642,
644 (Tenn. 2000); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court’s legal conclusions,
however, are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness, and we must “reach
[our] own independent conclusions regarding these issues.” Rawlings v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Further, this case involves issues of statutory interpretation, as well as construction
of the HOA’s Bylaws and Charter. When construing statutes, “we review the trial court’s
decision de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas and Water, 578 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Wade v.
Jackson-Madison Cnty. Gen. Hosp. Dist., 469 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)). The
polestar of statutory interpretation is the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting
the statute. Nationwide, 578 S.W.3d at 30. We begin by “reading the words of the statutes
using their plain and ordinary meaning in the context in which the words appear.” Id.
When the language is clear and unambiguous, we look no further than the language of the
statute itself to determine its meaning. Id. With regard to the Charter and Bylaws, the
rules of construction “are generally the same as those that govern the construction and
interpretation of statutes, contracts, and other written instruments.” Hughes v. New Life
Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 468 (Tenn. 2012) (citing 7A William Meade Fletcher et al.,
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 3640 (perm.ed., rev.vol.2006)).
Consequently, Charter and Bylaw construction is an issue of law we review de novo,
“giv[ing] effect to the intent of the parties as revealed by the language of the charter and
the circumstances surrounding its creation.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The Party-Presentation Principle

Defendants first argue that the trial court erred by violating the party-presentation
principle. Under the party-presentation principle, a court’s review is limited to the issues
presented by the parties. State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917, 924 (Tenn. 2022). The principle
serves several important functions, including promoting fairness by ensuring the court’s
role as neutral arbiter, and ensuring that the parties have a meaningful opportunity to
consider and respond to the issues raised. Id. at 924.

-6-
Our Supreme Court recently extrapolated on this concept in Bristol. In that case, a
defendant was tried by a jury for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child. Id. at 921.
“At the close of evidence, the trial court delivered its oral jury charge[,]” and the defendant
made no objections. Id. Nor did the defendant object to the written jury instructions. Id.
After the defendant was convicted and sentenced, he moved the trial court for a new trial,
raising no issues as to the jury instructions. Id. When the trial court denied his motion for
new trial, the defendant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. Although the
defendant raised a host of issues, none of them dealt with a discrepancy between the oral
and written jury instructions. Id.

The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the defendant was not entitled to relief
on any of his enumerated issues, but nonetheless determined that the trial court committed
plain error and reversed. Id. at 922. The Court held that the oral and written instructions
“were ‘vastly different and d[id] not track one another.’” Id. (quoting State v. Bristol, No.
M2019-00531-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 1697914, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2021)).
Applying the party-presentation principle, our Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Criminal Appeals and reinstated the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 930. The High Court
reasoned that “the Court of Criminal Appeals gave the parties no warning that it intended
to consider whether there was a discrepancy between the oral and written jury instructions.”
Id. at 928. The Court further opined that the Court of Criminal Appeals abused its
discretion by considering the jury-instruction issue without providing the parties notice and
opportunity to be heard on same.

Here, Defendants claim that the trial court violated the party-presentation principle
because its ruling purportedly goes outside the issues the parties raised. Specifically,
Defendants take issue with the trial court finding not only that section 8.5 of the Bylaws is
inconsistent with state law, but also that Salem lacked the authority to amend the Bylaws
at all. As relevant, the trial court’s final order provides:

In this case, the Charter requires a 2/3 vote of the members to amend it. The
By-Laws in Section 13 provide they may be amended by (1) the Declarant
until termination of the “Development Period”, or (2) by the members
holding 67% of the votes in the Association. T.C.A. § 48-60-301 allows a
specified person to amend By-Laws if the charter has provided it. It did not
here; therefore the question then becomes “May the Declarant amend the
By-Laws without the approval of the Board?” This Court answers this in the
negative. T.C.A. § 48-60-201 et seq provides that any amendments to the
By-Laws are to be amended by the Board of Directors or the members. Since
this power was not reserved in the Charter, it is inconsistent with state law
and therefore, state law prevails. Members do not need the approval of the
Declarant to amend unless the Charter provides it pursuant to T.C.A.
§ 48-60-202(c). Here it does not. Further, the By-Laws may not allow an

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amendment to increase or decrease the number of memberships authorized
for another class without a vote by the members.

According to Defendants, “the issue concerning the enforceability of Declarant’s right to
amend the By-Laws pursuant to § 13.10(a), was not an issue that Plaintiffs raised in the
litigation. Indeed, that issue was not part of the case until the trial court sua sponte
addressed it in the March 16 Order.”

Nonetheless, the scenario now before us is distinguishable from Bristol. In that
case, our Supreme Court clarified that the parties had no idea a discrepancy between the
oral and written jury instructions was before the Court. In this case, however, whether the
amended Bylaws, particularly section 8.5, are valid has always been the central issue.
While the trial court may have taken a route of analysis slightly different from that of the
parties, the trial court was not whole cloth considering a different issue, as the Court of
Criminal Appeals did in Bristol. The trial court’s ultimate conclusion here was that Salem
lacked the authority to remove Mr. Frisbey from the HOA board, an issue the parties all
had ample opportunity to brief and argue. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion because it reasoned its way to that conclusion in a manner not exactly the
same as the Plaintiffs. Rather, Bristol provides that courts should proceed cautiously when
addressing entirely unpled and unpreserved issues sua sponte, not that courts are strictly
bound to the analyses offered by the parties when reaching an issue that both parties have
had opportunity to address.

Moreover, as discussed below, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that
Salem lacks the authority to amend the Bylaws and reverse that holding. Thus, while the
trial court did not violate the party-presentation principle here, the ruling itself is erroneous
and warrants reversal; consequently, any error in this regard is harmless as to Defendants.

II. The Bylaws

Next, Defendants raise several issues regarding the trial court’s decision that Salem
improperly removed Mr. Frisbey as a board member. These issues ultimately turn on
tensions between the Charter, the Bylaws, and Tennessee’s Nonprofit Corporation Act (the
“Act”). “The [Act], Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-51-101 et seq., regulates the operation of
nonprofit corporations in this state.” Wellesley Builders, LLC v. Vill. of Cherry Glen Ass’n,
Inc., No. M2002-03102-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 367646, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26,
2004). As such, it is undisputed that the Act applies here. Although case law construing
the Act is limited, at least one of our Attorneys General has opined that the Act “attempts
to provide a flexible approach to nonprofit corporations.” Amending a Nonprofit
Corporation’s Charter, Tenn. Op. Att’ys Gen. No. 00-029 (2000). As such, “[m]any of the
provisions in the Act include the language, ‘unless its charter or bylaws provide otherwise,’
so that a nonprofit corporation has the flexibility to structure and to operate the corporation

-8-
in the manner that it deems best suited to further its purposes.” Id. That said, “some of the
Act’s provisions are mandatory and are not subject to modifications or variations.” Id.

First, Defendants claim that the trial court erred in concluding that Salem lacks the
authority as Declarant to amend the Bylaws at all. To reiterate, the trial court found that
“the Charter does not allow a third party to amend or repeal the By-Laws and, under T.C.A.
§ 48-60-301, that power was not reserved in the Charter for the declarant.” Applying plain-
meaning review to the Charter, as we must, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding
that Salem’s right to amend the Bylaws is inconsistent with the Charter. All that the Charter
provides regarding Bylaw amendment is that “[t]he By-Laws of the Association shall be
adopted by the Board and may be altered, amended, or rescinded in the manner provided
in the By-Laws. The quorum requirements for meetings of Members, and directors shall be
set forth in the By-Laws.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the Charter simply points back
to the Bylaws regarding how said Bylaws may be amended. The Charter does not limit
Bylaw amendment to one particular process, nor does the Charter explain how the Bylaws
may be amended. While the trial court makes much of the fact that the Charter does not
specifically lay out the Declarant’s right to unilaterally amend the Bylaws, this point is
inapposite in light of the Charter’s plain language. See Hughes, 387 S.W.3d at 468
(explaining that the rules for interpreting corporate charters are “generally the same as
those that govern the construction and interpretation of statutes, contracts, and other written
instruments”). From the very beginning of the subdivision’s development, the Declarant’s
rights have included the right to amend the Bylaws. Indeed, the Bylaws adopted on
September 28, 1998 provide that “[u]ntil termination of the Development Period, the
Declarant may unilaterally amend these By-Laws for any purpose.” See id. (providing that
when interpreting a corporate charter, we must “give effect to the intent of the parties as
revealed by the language of the charter and the circumstances surrounding its creation”).
As it is undisputed that the development period is ongoing and that Salem validly
purchased the Declarant’s rights in 2015, nothing in the Charter limits or is inconsistent
with Salem’s right to unilaterally amend the Bylaws.

Likewise, we cannot conclude that Salem’s delineated right to amend the Bylaws is
inconsistent with Tennessee law as reasoned by the trial court. The trial court found that
“T.C.A. § 48-53-102[(a)](3) provides that By-Laws for a non-profit corporation must not
be inconsistent with the Charter of the corporation or the laws of the State of Tennessee.”
The trial court correctly noted section 48-53-102(a)(3), which provides that a nonprofit
corporation has the power to “[m]ake and amend bylaws, not inconsistent with its charter
or with the laws of this state, for regulating and managing the affairs of the corporation[.]”
The trial court also relied on section 48-60-301, which provides that “[t]he charter may
require an amendment to the charter or bylaws to be approved in writing by a specified
person or persons other than the board or members. Such a charter provision may only be
amended with the approval of such person or persons in the form of a document.” Based
on the foregoing, the trial court reasoned that the power of a third person to amend or repeal

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the Bylaws was not specifically laid out in the Charter and that Salem’s Declarant rights
are thus inconsistent with the above statutes. This reasoning, however, is circular. Again,
the Charter simply provides that the Bylaws may be amended in any manner provided in
the Bylaws, and there is nothing inconsistent between that Charter provision and section
48-60-301. While the trial court interpreted section 48-60-301 to mean that the Charter
must explicitly provide if a specified person other than the board may amend the Bylaws,
section 48-60-301 does not go so far.5 Rather, section 48-60-301 merely provides that a
charter may require the approval of a specified person other than the board members to
amend bylaws. Again, however, this is inapposite because here, the Charter simply points
back to the Bylaws regarding how to effectuate amendments, and the Bylaws have always
allowed for amendments by the Declarant.

Thus, neither the Charter nor the statutes cited by the trial court are inconsistent with
Salem’s right, as Declarant, to amend the Bylaws generally. The trial court erred in holding
otherwise, and we reverse that portion of the trial court’s ruling.

Our inquiry does not end here, however, because whether Salem has the authority
to amend the Bylaws in general is a different question than whether section 8.5 of the
amended Bylaws is inconsistent with the Charter or Tennessee law. Stated differently,
Salem’s right to amend the Bylaws does not give the Declarant carte-blanche authority to
implement any bylaw it wants if said bylaw is prohibited by the Act.

The trial court found that section 8.5 of the Bylaws on which Salem relied in
removing Mr. Frisbey is inconsistent with both the Charter and Tennessee law. The trial
court reasoned that “T.C.A. § 48-58-108 provides that directors are to be elected by the
members of a non-profit corporation and provides the method for removal. Further, T.C.A.
§ 48-58-108(e) provides that a director elected by the members may be removed only by
the members and only at a meeting called for that purpose.” The trial court also reasoned
that “[t]he By-Laws further provide in Section 13.11 that any conflict between Tennessee
law, the By-Laws, the Charter, and the Declarations shall be resolved in accordance with
Tennessee law first, the Charter second, the By-Laws third, and the Declarations fourth.”

Accordingly, the crux of the parties’ dispute is whether section 8.5 of the Bylaws is
allowed under the Charter and the Act. The Charter merely provides that “[t]he method of
election, removal, and filling of vacancies on the board of directors and the term of office
of directors and officers shall be as set forth in the By-Laws.” Once again, the Bylaws are
not inconsistent with the Charter in this regard, as the Charter simply points back to the
Bylaws.

5
There is no case law construing section 48-60-301.

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The trial court correctly noted, however, that section 8.5 of the amended Bylaws is
inconsistent with the Act’s provision on removing directors. While the Act explicitly
provides the means by which a director can be removed at Tennessee Code Annotated
section 48-58-108,6 the HOA’s amended Bylaws provide that Salem may unilaterally
remove any board member with or without cause. Accordingly, the salient question is
whether the Bylaws may provide a removal procedure inconsistent with the pertinent

6
The Act provides that board members may be removed in the following manner:

(a) The members may remove one (1) or more directors elected by them with or without
cause, unless the charter provides that directors may be removed only for cause. The charter
or bylaws may specify what constitutes cause for removal.

(b) If a director is elected by a class, chapter or other organizational unit or by region or
other geographic grouping, the director may be removed only by the members of that class,
chapter, unit or grouping.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (i), a director may be removed under subsection (a) or
(b) only if the number of votes cast to remove the director would be sufficient to elect the
director at a meeting to elect directors.

(d) If cumulative voting is authorized, a director may not be removed if the number of
votes, or if the director was elected by a class, chapter, unit or grouping of members, the
number of votes of that class, chapter, unit or grouping, sufficient to elect the director under
cumulative voting is voted against the director’s removal.

(e) A director elected by members may be removed by the members only at a meeting
called for the purpose of removing the director and the meeting notice must state that the
purpose, or one (1) of the purposes, of the meeting is removal of the director.

(f) In computing whether a director is protected from removal under subsections (b)-(d), it
should be assumed that the votes against removal are cast in an election for the number of
directors of the class to which the director to be removed belonged on the date of that
director’s election.

(g) An entire board of directors may be removed under subsections (a)-(e).

(h) The board of directors of a corporation may remove a director without cause who has
been elected by the board by the vote of two thirds ( 2/3 ) of the directors then in office or
such greater number as is set forth in the charter or bylaws.

(i) If at the beginning of a director’s term on the board, the charter or bylaws provide that
the director may be removed for missing a specified number of board meetings, the board
may remove the director for failing to attend the specified number of meetings. The director
may be removed only if a majority of the directors then in office vote for the removal.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-58-108.

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statute. More specifically, we must determine whether section 48-58-108 is a mandatory
or permissive section of the Act.

While our research revealed no case law dealing specifically with this question, the
existing authority persuades us that the trial court correctly deemed section 8.5 of the
Bylaws inconsistent with section 48-58-108 of the Act and thus improper. As noted supra,
the Act “attempts to provide a flexible approach to nonprofit corporations[,]” and “[m]any
of the provisions in the Act include the language, ‘unless its charter or bylaws provide
otherwise,’ so that a nonprofit corporation has the flexibility to structure and to operate the
corporation in the manner that it deems best suited to further its purposes.” Tenn. Op.
Att’ys Gen. No. 00-029 (2000). Section 48-58-108 does not contain the language, “unless
its charter or bylaws provide otherwise,” or any other similar language. To the extent
section 48-58-108 is intended to be a permissive section, the legislature certainly could
have included such language. Many other sections of the Act provide that its provisions
apply unless the charter or bylaws provide otherwise. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-
57-202; 48-58-111; 48-58-201; 48-58-203; 48-62-101; see also Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher,
312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010) (explaining that in statutory construction, courts may
assume that the General Assembly understands the “state of the law” and the manner in
which courts have construed enacted statutes) (citing Murfreesboro Med. Clinic, P.A. v.
Udom, 166 S.W.3d 674, 683 (Tenn. 2005); Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tenn.
1997)). Consequently, we echo the sentiment that “some of the Act’s provisions are
mandatory and are not subject to modifications or variations.” Tenn. Op. Att’ys Gen. No.
00-029 (2000). In the absence of any language whatsoever providing that section 48-58-
108 is a permissive section of the Act, we must conclude that it is mandatory. Because
section 8.5 of the Sixth Amendment conflicts with section 48-58-108, the trial court
correctly determined that section 8.5 is contrary to state law and improper. This portion of
the trial court’s ruling is affirmed.

Finally, Defendants challenge the trial court’s ruling that Mr. Frisbey did not receive
adequate notice prior to his removal as a board member. However, having already
determined that Salem lacks the authority to unilaterally remove board members, it is
irrelevant whether Salem gave Mr. Frisbey notice of its intent to remove him, and this issue
is pretermitted.

To summarize, we reverse the trial court’s ruling that Salem lacks the authority as
Declarant to amend the HOA’s Bylaws, as there is nothing in the Charter or state law
prohibiting same. Salem’s authority to amend the Bylaws, however, is not an unrestricted
authority to enact any amendment it wants. Rather, Salem remains constrained by the Act
and its mandatory provisions when it comes to the specific amendments it wishes to enact.
In this particular case, the amendment at issue allowing Salem to unilaterally remove any
board members with or without cause was contrary to a mandatory provision of the Act,
and thus disallowed by same. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s ruling deeming

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section 8.5 improper and reinstating Mr. Frisbey as an HOA board member. The issue
regarding notice is pretermitted.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Chancery Court for Monroe County is reversed in part and
affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed to the defendants, Michael Ayres and Salem Pointe
Capital, LLC.

_________________________________
KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10239332. Public record. Not legal advice.