# Corley v. Blair

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · June 29, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10238891

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** June 29, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JERROD CORLEY, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00250-SRC
)
PAUL BLAIR, )
)
Respondent. )

Memorandum and Order
Petitioner Jerrod Corley, proceeding pro se, seeks to have his sentence vacated under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Corley asserts four ineffective-assistance claims against trial counsel: 1) counsel
advised Corley not to testify at trial, 2) counsel allegedly failed to investigate potential witnesses,
3) counsel allegedly failed to investigate one of Corley’s codefendants, and 4) counsel did not
request a mistrial after a juror hesitated when the judge polled the jury. Additionally, Corley
says that appellate counsel failed to argue that the State presented insufficient evidence to
convict Corley. The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected these arguments on postconviction
review, and the Court finds that the Missouri Court of Appeals’ holdings did not contradict or
unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent and that the state court adjudicated the facts
reasonably. Accordingly, § 2254(d) does not entitle Corley to relief.
I. Statement of facts
The Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the relevant facts as follows:
The following facts adduced at trial are presented in the light most favorable to the
verdict. In the underlying incident, Corley was driving a stolen vehicle on Interstate
270[,] while his three passengers (collectively, “Co-defendants”) shot four victims,
killing one (collectively, “Victims”). Co-defendant John Stith (“Stith”) initially sat
in the driver’s seat of the stolen vehicle but switched places with Corley who then
drove. Trial testimony indicated Corley maneuvered the vehicle alongside Victims’
Jeep so that Co-defendants could fire on Victims, and that Corley knew Co-
defendants planned to shoot the targeted victim, who was believed to have been
involved in the death of one of the Co-defendant’s cousins. During the incident,
Co-defendants Stith and Tony Bailey (“Bailey”) fired weapons at Victims. Bailey
testified that earlier in the evening, he had a .380 caliber gun, Leroy Coleman
(“Coleman”) had a nine-millimeter gun, and Stith had a .40 caliber gun. Bailey
testified that he placed the guns in Jamie McCloud’s (“McCloud”) truck prior to
the shooting. Bailey also testified that he and Stith shot Victims, specifically noting
that he fired the nine-millimeter gun and Stith fired the .40 caliber gun. Trial
evidence further showed that as he drove away[,] Corley said that it appeared the
intended victim had been hit. When the stolen vehicle was recovered, evidence of
Corley’s DNA was found on the key fob and interior door handle.

The State charged Corley under accomplice-liability theory with murder in the first
degree, three counts of assault in the first degree, five counts of armed criminal
action, and unlawful use of a weapon. The State tried Corley jointly with Coleman.
At trial, Corley did not testify in his own defense. The trial court asked Corley if he
understood his right to testify and if his decision not to testify was his own free and
voluntary decision. Corley answered that he understood and was choosing to waive
his right to testify.

When the jury returned to render its verdicts and was individually polled, one juror
(“Juror”) stated she needed a moment, which the trial court gave her. Juror took
approximately four minutes to render her verdicts, ultimately confirming that the
guilty verdicts were unanimous. Co-defendant Coleman sought a mistrial on the
basis of the Juror’s apparent reluctance to acknowledge the guilty verdicts and
whether it meant the verdicts were not unanimous. The trial court declined to grant
a mistrial.

The trial court sentenced Corley to life imprisonment without the possibility of
probation or parole for first-degree murder and concurrent sentences of life
imprisonment and fifteen years on the other charges. Corley directly appealed his
guilty verdicts. Appellate counsel did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
for accomplice liability on direct appeal. This Court affirmed Corley’s judgment
and sentence in State v. Corley, 563 S.W.3d. 855 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).

Subsequently, Corley moved for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15.

Doc. 13-10 at pp. 4–6. Both the postconviction motion court and the Missouri Court of Appeals
denied Corley’s requests for postconviction relief. Id. Corley now requests relief from this
Court. Doc. 1.
II. Standard of review
Section 28 U.S.C. § 2254 creates the statutory basis for habeas petitions from state-court
convictions. A state prisoner who seeks relief under § 2254 must prove that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). To

obtain relief under § 2254, a petitioner must establish that the state court proceedings:
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
To warrant relief, a state court’s decision must be “more than incorrect or erroneous,” but
“must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). A petitioner
must also show that equitable considerations favor relief. “[E]ven a petitioner who prevails
under AEDPA must still today persuade a federal habeas court that ‘law and justice require’
relief.” Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022) (citations omitted); see also 28
U.S.C.A. § 2243 (“A court, justice, or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas
corpus . . . shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and
justice require.”). Historically, “the States’ ‘powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the
guilty,’” stands as the most important of these equitable considerations. Id. at 1523; see also
Crawford v. Cain, 55 F.4th 981, 994 (5th Cir. 2023) (“Law and justice do not require habeas
relief—and hence a federal court can exercise its discretion not to grant it—when the prisoner is
factually guilty.”).
In each ground for relief, Corley alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed on
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that “counsel’s
performance was deficient” and that “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy
task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). Counsel should be “strongly presumed to
have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of

reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. For federal courts reviewing
state proceedings, “the pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland
standard was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). “This is different
from asking whether defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Id. To
grant relief, a federal habeas court cannot simply disagree with a state court but must find the
state court’s adjudication objectively unreasonable. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75. Review is thus
“doubly deferential,” requiring a “highly deferential look at counsel’s performance through
deferential lens of § 2254(d).” Cullen, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).
To prevail on Strickland’s performance prong, a petitioner must overcome the ‘“strong
presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable

professional assistance” and must establish that counsel’s performance “amounted to
incompetence.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104—05 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688—89).
Further, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S at 690–91.
To prevail on Strickland’s prejudice prong, a petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Id. at 694. For a petitioner to succeed on the prejudice prong, counsel’s errors
must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “[T]he difference between Strickland’s prejudice standard and a
more-probable-than-not standard is slight and matters only in the rarest case.” Dorsey v.
Vandergriff, 30 F.4th 752, 757 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111–12 (citation

omitted)).
III. Discussion
A. Ground One: Ineffective assistance for advising petitioner not to testify
In his first ground for relief, Corley says that his counsel rendered him ineffective
assistance by advising him not to testify on his own behalf. Doc. 1 at p. 5. Corley claims his
counsel stated Corley was “winning at trial and his testimony was unnecessary” and but for this
advice “the outcome of his trial would have been different.” Doc. 1 at p. 5. However, his
argument fails.
The Missouri Court of Appeals denied this claim, holding that trial counsel advised
Corley reasonably and “the record conclusively refutes Corley’s claim that counsel was

ineffective for advising him not to testify at trial.” Doc. 13-10 at p. 7. First, the Missouri Court
of Appeals noted that Corley knowingly and voluntarily decided not to take the stand. Id. at p. 8.
Because Corley made this decision himself, he cannot demonstrate that prejudice resulted from
his attorney’s conduct. Id. Second, Corley’s own briefing states that counsel gave “strategic
advice against taking the stand.” Id. (emphasis added). Third, “given that Corley was not
disputing that he was driving the vehicle during the shooting and ample testimony at trial refuted
his claim that he was unaware Co-defendants intended to shoot at Victims, Corley fails to
overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable.” Id. So, the Missouri
Court of Appeals rejected Corley’s argument.
To this, Corley gives nothing beyond a conclusory argument that he should have taken
the stand, his attorney advised him not to, and his trial ended in conviction. Doc. 1 at p. 5. His
argument does not show that the Missouri Court of Appeals contradicted or misapplied Supreme
Court precedent or that it unreasonably adjudicated the facts. See § 2254(d). The state court’s

three reasons for rejecting Corley’s argument stand. First, Corley offers no reason to think that,
but for his attorney’s advice, he was reasonably likely to testify. See Doc. 1 at p. 5; Doc. 13-7 at
pp. 23–32. Without this, he cannot demonstrate prejudice. Second, counsel made a strategic
decision, meriting a high level of deference. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Third, because
Corley’s testimony would not have undermined the State’s case and would have resulted in his
impeachment, counsel had good reason to advise Corley not to testify. The Court deems
reasonable the Missouri Court of Appeals’ adjudication of the issue. See § 2254(d).
Further, Corley has not convinced the Court that law and justice require habeas relief.
See § 2243. Corley’s argument does not subvert the reliability of the jury’s deliberations or the
Missouri criminal justice system. The jury found that Corley acted as an accomplice to murder

under Missouri law, and this Court sees no reason why the federal government should “intrude[]
on state sovereignty” by granting habeas to a guilty party. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. at 1523. Thus,
the equities do not weigh in favor of relief. The Court denies ground one.
B. Ground Two: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate
potential witnesses
In his second claim, Corley states counsel unreasonably failed to “investigate and
subpoena material witnesses Ms. Jamie (Thorpe) McCloud and Ms. Daisha Houston. According
to Corley’s Argument to the Missouri Court of Appeals:
Ms. McCloud and Ms. Houston would have testified that on the night of February
21, 2016, before the shooting that resulted in Emma Wallace’s death, Mr. Tony
Bailey placed his guns, a .40 caliber and a .380 caliber, in Ms. McCloud’s vehicle
for safe keeping before he entered Jay’s Classic Bar and Grill []. This testimony
was necessary to impeach Mr. Bailey’s testimony that he never possessed a .40
caliber weapon but John Stith did, and he only had a .380 caliber weapon and was
handed a .9mm [sic] weapon that he used to fire shots. . . . Specifically, had the jury
heard testimony from Ms. McCloud and Ms. Houston, it may have disbelieved Mr.
Bailey’s trial testimony that he fired a .9mm [sic] weapon from the front passenger
seat of the car, and instead, believed he fired the .40 caliber gun.

Doc. 13-7 at pp. 36–37. At trial, Bailey said that he and his compatriots stole a car and
found three guns inside: a 9mm, a .380 caliber, and a .40 caliber. Doc. 13-1 at p. 805.
Bailey, Stith, and Coleman divided the guns among themselves, Bailey taking the .380
caliber. Id. at p. 806. Bailey says they placed the guns in a car and then retrieved them
before the shooting. Id. at p. 806. Corley did not explain to the Missouri Court of
Appeals where the conflict lies between Houston and McCloud’s statements and Bailey’s
own account of these events. Id. at pp. 33–39. Further, Corley did not explain how this
supposed conflict bears any relation to his conviction. Id.
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected this argument:
The record at trial unambiguously shows that McCloud and Houston’s
testimonies would have been merely cumulative to Bailey’s own testimony that he
put the .40 and .380 caliber guns in McCloud’s truck prior to the shooting. . . .
Moreover, McCloud and Houston’s testimonies could not have impeached Bailey’s
account of what happened during the shooting incident because neither witness was
present at the scene, and their testimonies would not have offered the jury any
evidence bearing on Corley’s role in the shooting incident. . . . Corley fails to
explain how disagreement about whether Bailey or Stith fired which gun has any
impact on Corley’s guilt under accomplice-liability theory as the driver of the
vehicle from which Co-defendants shot Victims.

Doc. 13-10 at pp. 10–11.

The Court finds this adjudication of the facts reasonable. Even if the jury took
McCloud and Houston’s testimony to prove that Bailey used a 9mm weapon rather than a
.40 caliber—and the Court cannot see how their testimony could prove this—the question
of which gun Bailey used has no relation to Corley’s guilt. Because this testimony could
not have contributed to Corley’s defense, his counsel’s decision not to present this
testimony cannot qualify as unreasonable or incompetent. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.
Additionally, Corley has not shown that law and justice favor habeas relief. See § 2243.

Law and justice counsel in favor of habeas relief where the petitioner is innocent. See Crawford,
55 F.4th at 994. Whether Bailey fired a 9mm weapon or a .40 caliber weapon makes no
difference to whether Corley drove the car to assist Bailey and Stith commit murder. Thus, the
equities do not weigh in favor of relief. The Court denies ground two.
C. Ground Three: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate
codefendant
In his third claim for relief, Corley asserts trial counsel unreasonably “fail[ed] to
interview, properly investigate and subpoena codefendant John Stith.” Doc. 1 at p. 8. The
Missouri Court of Appeals found that Corley failed “to show that Stith’s potential impeachment
of portions of other witness testimony would have provided Corley with a viable defense.” Doc.

13-10 at p. 11. The decision not to call codefendants is a matter of trial strategy, which is
‘“virtually unchallengeable’ even if that decision later proves unwise.” Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d
1547, 1556 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690) (collecting cases). Even if trial
counsel’s decision not to call a codefendant to testify falls below the standard for reasonable
performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that this decision prejudiced his or her trial. Id. If
“the record is replete with evidence that [the petitioner] was involved in the crime” and a
codefendant’s testimony would not clearly negate this evidence, a petitioner cannot show
counsel’s decision unfairly prejudiced his or her trial. Id.
The Missouri Court of Appeals found that the record was replete with evidence of
Corley’s guilt:
[E]ven if Stith’s testimony would have impeached Bailey’s testimony that Corley
specifically said he would drive the car in a way to allow Bailey to shoot Victims,
Corley still would not have a viable defense to any of the elements supporting the
charged offenses under accomplice-liability theory. See id. As the motion court
noted, the overall strength of the testimony adduced at trial aptly demonstrated
Corley’s role in driving the vehicle from which the shooting occurred, showing he
drove it in a manner that brought it alongside the Victim’s Jeep and enabled Co-
defendants to shoot victims, and he commended upon driving away that the
intended victim had been hit.

Doc. 13-10 at p. 11. This analysis demonstrates that the Missouri Court of Appeals reasonably
concluded that counsel’s decision not to call Stith did not prejudice Corley. The Court defers to
this reasonable finding of fact. See § 2254(d).
Again, law and justice do not favor relief. See § 2243. Because Corley cannot support an
argument for his actual innocence, and Corley is factually guilty, hence law and justice do not
require habeas relief. Crawford, 55 F.4th at 994. So, Corley satisfies neither § 2254(d) nor
§ 2243, and the Court denies ground three.
D. Ground Four: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to request a
mistrial
Corley’s fourth claim asserts that trial counsel incompetently failed to request a mistrial
after a juror hesitated in stating her decision when the judge polled the jury. Doc. 1 at p. 9. The
Missouri Court of Appeals held that such a request would have been denied, noting that the trial
court denied the same request from one of Corley’s codefendants. Doc. 13-10 at p. 13. Thus,
Corley suffered no prejudice. Id. Turning to the performance prong of Strickland, the Missouri
Court of Appeals found that counsel reasonably chose not to make a request identical to the
request the trial court had just denied. Id.
The Missouri Court of Appeals reasonably determined that a request for a mistrial could
not have succeeded and that counsel knew this. Id. Further, the state court did not contradict or
unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent when it judged that counsel reasonably decided not
to make a meritless request. See Sittner v. Bowersox, 969 F.3d 846, 853 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Failure

to raise a meritless objection cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance.”). Pursuant to
§ 2254(d), this Court must accept the Missouri Court of Appeals’ reasonable adjudication of this
claim.
As with Corley’s previous arguments, law and justice do not support relief. See § 2243.
Corley does not impugn the reliability of the jury’s guilty verdict. See Crawford, 55 F.4th at
994. The Court denies ground four.
E. Ground Five: Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
In his fifth and final ground for relief, Corley claims that appellate counsel unreasonably
failed to argue that the State presented “insufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror
could find he acted with others to commit the charged crimes.” Doc. 1 at p. 9. The Missouri

Court of Appeals dismissed this claim, finding Corley’s argument “is merely conclusory and
fails to offer any argument or legal authority to support his claim.” Doc. 13 at p. 40.
Because Corley presented only a conclusory argument, see Doc. 13-7 at p. 59, the
Missouri Court of Appeals had no reason to find that Corley’s appellate counsel gave up a key
argument for the defense. According to the United States Supreme Court: “Effective appellate
counsel should not raise every nonfrivolous argument on appeal, but rather only those arguments
most likely to succeed. Declining to raise a claim on appeal, therefore, is not deficient
performance unless that claim was plainly stronger than those actually presented to the appellate
court.” Davila v. Davis, 584 U.S. 521, 533 (2017) (internal citations omitted).
Reviewing, Corley’s argument to the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Court agrees
that Corley offered no argument or authority to support the notion that counsel performed
deficiently or that the evidence against Corley had too little substance to persuade a
reasonable juror. See Doc. 13-7 at pp. 54-60. Since Corley could not articulate an
argument to the Missouri Court of Appeals in support of this ground for relief, the state
court had no reason to find that this argument presented a plainly stronger claim than the
case actually presented on appellate review. See Davila, 584 U.S. at 533. Therefore, the
Missouri Court of Appeals did not contradict or unreasonably apply federal law and did
not unreasonably adjudicate the facts. § 2254(d). Further, for the same reasons Corley’s
previous arguments failed to show that law and justice require habeas relief, this ground
for relief also fails. See § 2243. The Court denies ground five.
F. Certificate of appealability
The Court finds that Corley has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253. Therefore, the Court does not issue a certificate of
appealability as to any of Corley’s claims in his § 2254 petition.
IV. Conclusion
The Court denies Corley’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus
and dismisses the Petition with prejudice. The Court does not issue a certificate of appealability.
So Ordered this 29th day of June 2023.
sur. CL
STEPHENR.CLARK ts”
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10238891. Public record. Not legal advice.