# Benford v. Dowd

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · May 19, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10238749

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** May 19, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10238749

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”
- stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- explaining that “[a] pleading that merely pleads labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice”
- stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer’

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JESSIE SAMUEL RUFUS BENFORD, )
Plaintiff,
V. No. 4:23-ev-00261-SRW
JAMES M. DOWD, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Jessie Samuel Rufus Benford
for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No.
2). Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action
without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a
“mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678. Determining whether
a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Jd. at 679. The court must “accept as
true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir.
2016). See also Brown y. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8" Cir. 2016) (stating
that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true
any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines y. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should
construe the plaintiffs complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8" Cir. 2015). However, even
pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of
law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914-15 (8 Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are
not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not
mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Background
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant and frequent filer in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri. Going back to 2000, he has twenty-seven closed cases, with
two more cases — including this one — currently pending. More recently, plaintiff has filed a series
of four cases that all arise from the end of his employment with Schneider National Carriers, Inc
(Schneider).

The first of these cases was an employment discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, filed on March 21, 2019. Benford v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc., No.
4:19-cv-550-MTS (E.D. Mo.). In the complaint, plaintiff asserted that he had been “deprived of
[a] normal work environment” by his supervisor, Jack Filina. According to plaintiff, he was a truck
driver for Schneider, and required to report to Filina for approval to work each day. During a
seven-day period when Filina was on leave, plaintiff could not reach him. When plaintiff
ultimately made contact with Filina, Filina expressed the opinion that plaintiff was not committed
to the job. During a conversation in which plaintiff accused Filina of speaking to him
disrespectfully, Filina told plaintiff that “he had no more work for” him. Plaintiff insisted that his
discharge from Schneider resulted from his religious beliefs.
After initial review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the district court dismissed
the Title VII claims relating to race, color, and gender discrimination, as well as the hostile work
environment and retaliation claims. The religious discrimination claim was allowed to proceed.
On July 19, 2021, however, the district court granted Schneider’s motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, the district court determined that plaintiff had not supported his claim of religious
discrimination, and that Schneider had demonstrated that plaintiff failed to meet their reasonable
requirements for employment after failing to report to work on multiple occasions. Plaintiff filed
a notice of appeal, but on January 10, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Benford v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc.,
No. 21-2717 (8" Cir. 2022).
Upon conclusion of this case, plaintiff filed three similar cases on January 13, 2022, all of
them contesting how the end of his employment at Schneider unfolded.

In Benford v. Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District, No. 4:22-cv-52-HEA (E.D. Mo
Jan. 13, 2022), plaintiff alleged that he had been discriminated against by the Missouri Court of
Appeals when a ruling was made “claiming that [he] quit [his] job when [his] employer (Schneider
Nat. [and] Jack Filina) admitted to terminating [him] in federal court.” On January 19, 2022, the
district court granted plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reviewed his
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to that review, the district court determined that
plaintiff actually intended to sue the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
had affirmed the district court’s earlier dismissal of his employment discrimination complaint. The
district court then dismissed the complaint without prejudice, as the Court of Appeals was entitled
to sovereign immunity.
Next, in Benford v. Missouri Division of Employment Security, No. 4:22-cv-56-SRW (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 13, 2022), plaintiff sued the Missouri Division of Employment Security, stating that he
had been terminated from his employment with Schneider by Jack Filina, but that Filina
“maliciously lied and claimed” that he had “quit.” Later, Filina “confessed to terminating [him] in
federal court.” Nevertheless, the “Missouri Division of Employment falsely ruled in favor of Jack
Filina, although Jack Filina confessed to terminating” plaintiff. On January 19, 2022, the Court
granted plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reviewed his complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915. Following that review, the district court dismissed plaintiffs complaint without
prejudice. To the extent that plaintiff brought the case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court
explained that the Missouri Division of Employment Security was not a “person,” and that the
claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Meanwhile, to the extent he was suing under Title VII,
the district court noted that plaintiff was employed by Schneider, not the Missouri Division of
Employment Security.

4°

Finally, in Benford v. Labor and Industrial Relations Comm., No. 4:22-cv-58-SEP (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 13, 2022), plaintiff brought suit against the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission,
asserting a violation of the First Amendment and Title VII. As with this other cases, plaintiff □
argued that he had been fired from Schneider by Jack Filina, but that the Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission indicated that he had quit. On August 23, 2022, the district court granted
plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and reviewed his case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, the district court dismissed plaintiff's constitutional claim
because the State of Missouri’s Labor and Industrial Relations Commission was not a “person”
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because the claim was barred by sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. The district court also observed that plaintiff had failed to state a Title VII
claim, as he had not presented any facts regarding workplace discrimination. Instead, the district
court noted that plaintiff was “repackaging old claims and bringing them against different
defendants.”
Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 1, 2023.!
The Complaint
Plaintiff's complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1 at 4). He
names James M. Dowd, Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., and Robin Ransom as defendants. (Docket No. 1
at 2-3), All three are judges. Plaintiff does not indicate the capacities in which they are sued.
In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that he “was falsely charged with quitting
[his] job with Schneider National, via James M. Dowd, Gary M. Gaertner, [and] Robin Ransom.”
(Docket No. 1 at 6). He states that this false charge occurred on October 8, 2019, at One Post

1 On the same date, plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit which has been docketed as Benford v. Stimson, 4:23-cv-263-SEP
(E.D. Mo.). In the complaint, plaintiff states that on February 4, 2019, plaintiff “was falsely charged by S. Stimson of
quitting [his] job with Schneider National.” The case remains pending.

Office Square, 815 Olive Street, St. Louis, Missouri.” By way of explanation, plaintiff alleges that
defendants “failed to properly [investigate] Jack Filina’s...statement that [plaintiff] quit his job.”
Rather, Filina “confessed” on June 7, 2019 that he terminated plaintiff.
Plaintiff neglects to provide any further context for his claims. Based on the Court’s review
of Case.net,? though, it appears that plaintiff is referring to a state court proceeding docketed as
Benford v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc., No. ED107701 (Mo. App. 2019). This case is an
appeal from the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, in which plaintiff contested
the denial of “unemployment benefits after his separation from Schneider National Carriers, Inc.”
On October 8, 2019 — the date referenced in the “Statement of Claim” — the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Commission’s determination that plaintiff “was disqualified from receiving benefits
because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his work or
employer.” The appeal came before Judges Dowd, Gaertner, and Ransom, the defendants in this
action.
As a result of this “false charge,” plaintiff claims that he has suffered emotional distress
and deprivation. He seeks $300,000 in compensatory damages, and $5,000,000 in punitive
damages.
Discussion -
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, accusing three judges of failing to properly investigate his case. Because he is proceeding in

2 This appears to be a reference to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.
3 Case.net is Missouri’s online case management system. The Court takes judicial notice of this public record. See
Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 Cir. 2007) (explaining that district court may take judicial notice of public state
records); and Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8" Cir. 2005) (stating that courts “may take judicial notice
of judicial opinions and public records”).

forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that
review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.
A. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff brings this action against three individuals, but does not indicate the capacity in
which they are sued. In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually
“against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8" Cir. 2017).
Thus, a “suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the
public employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8" Cir. 1999). See also
Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8 Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit
against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly v. City of
Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8 Cir. 2016) (stating that a “plaintiff who sues public
employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer’); and
Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8 Cir. 2006) (stating that a “suit against a public
Official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent”).
In this case, defendants are Missouri appellate judges. As such, the official capacity claims
against them are treated as claims against the State of Missouri itself, their employer. The claim
fails for two reasons.
i. State is Not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “Person”
First, the Court notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides for an action against a ‘person’ for
a violation, under color of law, of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618
(8"" Cir. 2008). See also Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8" Cir. 1986)
(stating that “[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against persons only”). However, “neither a State
nor its officials acting in their official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan □□□□□

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8" Cir.
2017) (explaining that a “State is not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d
295, 301 (8 Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money
damages under § 1983”).
Here, the official capacity claims against defendants are treated as being made against the
State of Missouri. As noted above, a state is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a suit for
money damages, which is what plaintiff is seeking. Because plaintiff is missing an essential
element of a § 1983 claim, the official capacity claims against defendants must be dismissed.
ii. Claim Against State Barred by Sovereign Immunity
Second, plaintiff's official capacity claims against these state employees are barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. “Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be
sued without its consent.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).
The Eleventh Amendment has been held to confer sovereign immunity on an un-consenting state
from lawsuits brought in federal court by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d
483, 485 (8" Cir. 2018) (“The Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and
instrumentalities from suit in federal court”); and Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615,
618-19 (8" Cir. 1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its
agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment”).
The Eleventh Amendment also bars official capacity claims against state officials for monetary
damages. See Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8" Cir. 1999) (“A claim for
damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred under the Eleventh
Amendment’).

There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the
Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8 Cir. 1992). “The first
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such
immunity by clear and unmistakable language.” Jd. The second exception is when a state waives
its immunity to suit in federal court. Jd. at 65. A state will be found to have waived its immunity
“only where stated by the most express language or by such’ overwhelming implications from the
text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). Neither exception is applicable in this case.
The first exception is epoca because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — under which this case arises

— does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Will,
491 U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established
immunity of a State from being sued without its consent”); and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to believe...that Congress intended by the general
language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States”). The second
exception does not apply because the State of Missouri has not waived its immunity in this type of
case. See RSMo § 537.600 (explaining that sovereign immunity is “in effect,” and providing
exceptions relating to the “negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the
operation of motor vehicles...within the course of their employment,” and regarding “[i]njuries
caused by the condition of a public entity’s property”).
Here, defendants are alleged to be state judges, meaning that the official capacity claims
against them for monetary damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Furthermore, neither
exception to sovereign immunity is applicable to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Therefore,
for this reason as well, plaintiff's official capacity ene must be dismissed.

B. Individual Capacity Claims
As already noted, plaintiff has failed to indicate the capacity in which defendants are sued.
Thus, the claims are treated as being made in an official capacity only. Even if plaintiff had sued
defendants in their individual capacities, the claims would be subject to dismissal for the following
two reasons.
i. Individual Capacity Claims Barred by Judicial Immunity
In order to allow judicial officers to exercise their vested authority and to act upon their
own convictions, judges are provided with judicial immunity from suit. See Hamilton v. City of
Hayti, Missouri, 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8™ Cir. 2020). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial
immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously or corruptly. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See also Woodworth y.
Hulshof, 891 F.3d 1083, 1090 (8 Cir. 2018) (stating that “judicial immunity is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice”). Moreover, “a judge will not be deprived of his immunity
because the action he took was in error or was in excess of his authority.” Justice Network, Inc. v.
Craighead Cty., 931 F.3d 753, 760 (8 Cir. 2019).
A judge’s immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions bars a plaintiff’s recovery in all but
two narrow sets of circumstances. Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8" Cir. 2012). First, a
judge does not have immunity for non-judicial actions. Duty v. City of Springdale, Ark., 42 F.3d
460, 462 (8" Cir. 1994). “An act is a judicial act if it is one normally performed by a judge and if
the complaining party is dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Birch v. Mazander, 678
F.2d 754, 756 (8" Cir. 1982). See also Justice Network, Inc., 931 F.3d at 760 (stating “that to

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determine whether an act is judicial, courts look to the particular act’s relation to the general
function normally performed by a judge”).
Second, a judge is not immune from lawsuits based on actions taken in the complete
absence of jurisdiction. Duty, 42 F.3d at 462. This is the case even if the judge’s actions were
judicial in nature. Schottel, 687 F.3d at 373. In the context of judicial immunity, however, the
scope of the judge’s jurisdiction is construed broadly. Justice Network, Inc., 931 F.3d at 762. “[A]n
action — taken in the very aid of the judge’s jurisdiction over a matter before him — cannot be said
to have been taken in the absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13.
In this case, defendants are clearly entitled to judicial immunity. There is no indication that
plaintiff is suing them for anything other than finding against him. More particularly, he is upset
that defendants — Missouri Court of Appeals judges — affirmed an adverse decision made by the
Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. Obviously, this constitutes a judicial act. That is to
say, the issuing of an opinion that affirms the ruling of an inferior tribunal is an act normally
performed by appellate judges, and is undertaken in a judicial capacity. Further, there is no
suggestion whatsoever that defendants acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction when they
issued their ruling. Instead, plaintiff merely claims that their decision is wrong. Regardless of the
correctness of the decision, judicial immunity bars suit against faioee who are exercising their
vested authority. Therefore, even if plaintiff had sued defendants in their individual capacities, the
claims would be subject to dismissal.
ii. Failure to State an Individual Capacity Claim
Individual liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. See Frederick v. Motsinger, 873
F.3d 641, 646 (8 Cir. 2017). In other words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only
for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8" Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983

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liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga
v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8" Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203,
1208 (8 Cir. 1990)). See also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8 Cir. 1993) (dismissing
plaintiff's excessive bail claims because none of the defendants set plaintiff's bail, and therefore,
“there can be no causal connection between any action on the part of the defendants and any
alleged deprivation” of plaintiff's rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the
defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8" Cir. 2019).
Here, plaintiff has failed to make any effort connecting each individual defendant to a
constitutional violation. His brief, broadly-worded “Statement of Claim” does not sufficiently
allege what each defendant personally did or did not do, much less establish that their actions or
inactions resulted in the violation of his rights. To the contrary, plaintiff relies entirely on labels
such as “false charge,” and unsupported conclusions, such as the contention that defendants “failed
to properly” investigate. This does not present a plausible claim for relief. See Johnson v. Precythe,
901 F.3d 973, 977 (8" Cir. 2018) (explaining that to state a plausible claim for relief, a plaintiff is
required to “offer more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action”); and Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817-18 (8" Cir. 2010) (explaining that “[a]
pleading that merely pleads labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice”). Therefore,
for this reason as well, even if plaintiff had sued defendants in their individual capacities, the
claims would be subject to dismissal.
C. Pre-Service Dismissal
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis
if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

12

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). As discussed above, plaintiff brings this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but
has not indicated the capacities in which defendants are sued. Thus, plaintiff's claims against
defendants are construed as being made in their official capacities only. An official capacity claim
against an individual is actually made against the individual’s governmental employer, which in
this case is the State of Missouri. Under § 1983, a state is not a “person.” Moreover, plaintiff's
claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Therefore, the official capacity claims must be
dismissed.
Even if the Court assumed that plaintiff intended to sue defendants in their individual
capacities, they are protected by judicial immunity for actions taken in their capacity as judges.
Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish each separate defendant’s personal responsibility for
violating one of his constitutional rights.
The Court notes that this is the fifth case that plaintiff has filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging the same operative facts, to wit: that plaintiff
did not quit his employment from Schneider, but was fired by Jack Filina. Three of those cases
have been dismissed without prejudice, while a fourth remains pending. The instant case represents
yet another attempt by plaintiff to advance the same arguments against different defendants. As
set forth above, plaintiff has failed to state a claim that is sufficient for purposes of pre-service
review. Consequently, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.
D. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Docket No. 3). The motion will be denied
as moot as this case is being dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel (Docket
No. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this order of dismissal would not be
taken in good faith.
Dated this 19" day of May, 2023.

on He he
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10238749. Public record. Not legal advice.