# Jeude v. Ste. Genevieve Memorial Hospital

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · May 5, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10238705

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** May 5, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

TODD JEUDE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:22-CV-151-SNLJ
)
STE. GENEVIEVE MEMORIAL )
HOSPITAL, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motions to dismiss filed by defendants Ste.
Genevieve County Memorial Hospital, ECF No. 52, and Dr. Teena Sharrock, ECF No. 64. Plaintiff
Todd Jeude has filed responses. ECF Nos. 56, 67. The motions are fully briefed and ready for
disposition. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant defendant Ste. Genevieve
County Memorial Hospital’s motion in part, and deny defendant Dr. Teena Sharrock’s motion.
Background
On November 2, 2022, plaintiff filed this action pursuant to the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986 (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, against Ste.
Genevieve Memorial Hospital (the “Hospital”). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff stated he was transported to
the Hospital on September 21, 2022 after he was attacked by multiple inmates at the Ste. Genevieve
Detention Center (the “Jail”). Plaintiff alleged that although he was brought to an examination
room and questions were asked of him by an attending nurse and doctor, he was ultimately denied
appropriate screening and treatment.
On November 14, 2022, this Court reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
and determined plaintiff had adequately pled an EMTALA claim at this stage of the litigation. ECF
No. 4. Consequently, the Court ordered the Clerk to serve process on the defendant Hospital. Id.
On December 19, 2022, the Hospital filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign

immunity, ECF No. 16, and a separate motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
EMTALA, ECF No. 18. On December 28, 2022, plaintiff mailed to the Court a motion to amend
his original complaint with a proposed amended complaint. ECF No. 28. The Court granted
plaintiff’s request. ECF No. 41. The amended filing is now the operative complaint. See ECF No.
42.
Amended Complaint
The amended complaint names the original defendant, the Hospital, and adds a second
defendant, Dr. Teena Sharrock, M.D. ECF No. 42. Plaintiff alleges that on September 21, 2022,
he was brought to the Hospital after he was “punched, kicked, stomped on, knocked uncon[s]cious,
and cut and stabbed with a home-made razor ‘shank.’” He claims he had “open wounds on his face

with a large laceration approximately 1½” in length and ¼” deep.” Plaintiff asserts the attack
reinjured a previously dislocated and torn rotator cuff on his right shoulder and agitated a gunshot
wound causing his skin to bubble.
After the escorting officers provided his information to the Hospital’s intake personnel,
plaintiff was directed to an examination room where he was triaged by a registered nurse. Dr.
Sharrock subsequently entered the room. Plaintiff described her as “agitated from a previous
encounter,” “abrasive,” and “rude.” Plaintiff claims that as he was explaining his injuries to Dr.
Sharrock, she stated: “There will be no x-rays, no images, no sutures, no observation, take him
back to your facility and treat him there. I’ll grant him a tetanus vaccine.” Plaintiff asserts that
although he was “bleeding, in obvious pain, and fearful of his head and neck injuries,” Dr. Sharrock
discharged him without examination. Plaintiff further claims that Dr. Sharrock did not provide the
Jail with post-discharge instructions and, as a result, the Jail did not know how to treat his injuries.
On September 29, 2022, plaintiff was seen by a doctor contracted by the Jail who ordered

“an MRI and medications.” Plaintiff asserts his facial laceration continued to bleed and did not
close for four days post-incident, that he required stronger glasses due to blurred vision, and he
continued to suffer from “tremendous” neck and shoulder pain. Plaintiff received the MRI on
December 7, 2022, which revealed “a fractured shoulder, 3 compressed vertebrae in his neck, and
2 herniated discs, one specifically pressing the spinal cord.” He was provided with a sling due to
the shoulder fracture. On December 22, 2022, he was brought back to the Hospital to see an
orthopedic specialist who provided him with a Cortisone injection. Plaintiff asserts the doctor told
him that “so much time ha[d] lapsed from the initial injury that all he could do without invasive
surgery was ease the pain” and monitor his condition.
Count I of plaintiff’s amended complaint is against the Hospital pursuant to EMTALA.

Plaintiff alleges the Hospital violated EMTALA by not appropriately screening or stabilizing him
before discharging him back to the Jail, and not providing him with “equal emergency care” as
others would have received by the Hospital.
Count II is against Dr. Sharrock in her individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff identifies Dr. Sharrock as the attending physician and asserts she was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff alleges she was acting under color of law when
she violated his constitutional rights because the Jail contracted with her employer to provide
medical services to inmate detainees.
Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in damages in Count I and the same for Count II, as well as punitive
damages.
Motions to Dismiss
A. Motion to Dismiss Filed by Ste. Genevieve County Memorial Hospital

On February 17, 2022, the Hospital filed a motion to dismiss Count I of the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 52. The Hospital argues the amended complaint
fails to state a claim because it fulfilled its duties pursuant to EMTALA by screening plaintiff and
determining he did not have an emergency medical condition. The Hospital points to the amended
complaint in which plaintiff admits he was visited by a registered nurse for “triage,” was asked a
series of questions by Dr. Sharrock for the purpose of medically examining him, and was provided
with a tetanus vaccine. Because plaintiff was deemed to not have an emergency medical condition
(i.e., be in serious jeopardy or have a serious impairment or disfunction), the Hospital did not have
an obligation to “stabilize” him. The Hospital points to his subsequent treatment – a sling, cortisone
shot, and no recommendation for surgery – to support he did not have an emergency medical

condition when Dr. Sharrock examined him on September 21, 2022. The Hospital further contends
that plaintiff’s argument of being denied “equal emergency care” is conclusory and does not
adequately allege disparate treatment.
Plaintiff filed an opposition arguing Count I should not be dismissed because the fact he
received a tetanus vaccine for an open wound on his right cheek, a fractured shoulder, compressed
vertebrae, and herniated discs shows he was inappropriately screened in violation of EMTALA.1
Plaintiff asserts he is slowly receiving the care he should have received on the night he sustained

1 The Court notes that to the extent plaintiff argues the motion to dismiss should be denied because his complaint
passed initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, such a contention fails. The Court’s prior initial review was not a
determination of the merits of his claim or potential defenses thereto.
his injuries. Plaintiff argues the Hospital is erroneously construing his subsequent medical
treatment “as some sort of admission that his needs were not serious,” when, to the contrary, it
evidences that the proper screening procedure required an X-ray and CT scan. Plaintiff also argues
he was subject to disparate treatment because other patients would have received such radiological

examinations as part of their emergency room screening.
B. Motion to Dismiss Filed by Dr. Teena Sharrock

On March 28, 2023, plaintiff Dr. Teena Sharrock filed a motion to dismiss Count II of the
amended complaint for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 64. Dr. Sharrock argues the amended
complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she was not a state actor
when she treated him at the Hospital. She asserts her employer, Ste. Genevieve County Memorial
Hospital, was not alleged to maintain a contract to provide substantially all necessary medical care
to inmates of the Jail, and she is not a state actor merely because she works for a county hospital.
Dr. Sharrock further argues, even if she was acting under color of state law, she was not
deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. First, she contends his complaints
regarding right shoulder, neck, and upper back pain, skin which bubbles, and a cut on the check
were not objectively serious. Second, her decision to not order radiological exams, at most,
represents medical negligence, not an Eighth Amendment violation of cruel and unusual
punishment.
Plaintiff filed an opposition arguing Count II should not be dismissed because the Hospital
provides all of the Jail’s emergency services, whether by contract or custom, and Dr. Sharrock
was, as a result, acting under color of law. ECF No. 67. Additionally, plaintiff argues he has
sufficiently alleged more than a negligence claim against Dr. Sharrock. To the contrary, plaintiff
points out that the allegations within his amended complaint included a statement that Dr. Sharrock
acted knowingly and intentionally to deny him proper treatment for his injuries.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency

of the complaint. As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), a complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A plaintiff need not provide specific facts in support of his
allegations, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam), but must include sufficient
factual information to provide the “grounds” on which the claim rests, and “to raise a right to relief
above a speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 597 n.3. See also Schaaf v. Residential
Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint “must contain either direct or inferential

allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable
legal theory.” Id. at 562 (quoted case omitted). On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true
all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and reviews the complaint to determine
whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
Discussion
A. Defendant Ste. Genevieve County Memorial Hospital
1. EMTALA Claims
Congress enacted EMTALA to “address a distinct and rather narrow problem – the

‘dumping’ of uninsured, underinsured, or indigent patients by hospitals who did not want to treat
them.”2 Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 1996).
EMTALA imposes two requirements on hospitals with emergency departments: (1) to provide “an
appropriate medical screening examination” for any individual who comes to its emergency room
seeking treatment to determine whether the individual has an emergency medical condition; and
(2) if such serious medical condition does exist, stabilization of the medical condition prior to
transferring or discharging the patient. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a).
EMTALA defines an “emergency medical condition” as one that “manifest[s] itself by
acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate
medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in,” the following:

(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,

(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or

(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part[.]

Id. at § 1395dd(e)(1).
In the event a hospital determines an individual to be experiencing an emergency medical
condition, it must provide either: “(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for

2 By its terms, EMTALA applies to “participating hospitals,” meaning hospitals that have Medicare provider
agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(2); Hunt ex rel. Hunt v. Lincoln
County Mem. Hosp., 317 F.3d 891, 893 n. 4 (8th Cir. 2003). Defendant Hospital does not appear to dispute that it is a
participating hospital under EMTALA.
such further medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical
condition, or (B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with
subsection (c) [restricting transfers until individual stabilized].” Id. at § 1395dd(b). If a hospital
fails to meet these requirements, EMTALA contains a civil enforcement provision which provides

a harmed individual with a private right of action to recover those damages available for personal
injury under the law of the state where the hospital is located. Id. at § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
Importantly, EMTALA does not “create[ ] a general federal cause of action for medical
malpractice in emergency rooms.” Summers, 91 F.3d at 1137. “EMTALA is not a federal
malpractice statute and it does not set a national emergency health care standard; claims of
misdiagnosis or inadequate treatment are left to the state malpractice arena.” Id. “Rather, . . .
EMTALA focuses on uniform treatment of patients presented in hospital emergency
departments.” Hunt ex rel. Hunt v. Lincoln Cty. Mem. Hosp., 317 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 2003).
“Patients are entitled under EMTALA, not to correct or non-negligent treatment in all
circumstances, but to be treated as other similarly situated patients are treated, within the hospital’s

capabilities.” Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138. See also Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139,
144 (4th Cir. 1996) (“disparate treatment of individuals perceived to have the same condition is
the cornerstone of an EMTALA claim”). Therefore, “a claim under EMTALA requires a showing
of a lack of uniform treatment with other similarly situated patients.” Mead v. Salem Memorial
Dist. Hosp., 2008 WL 205273, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2008) (citing Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138).
In the instant motion to dismiss, defendant Hospital argues the allegations in plaintiff’s
amended complaint do not support a claim that he was not provided with an appropriate medical
screening examination, that he had an emergency medical condition that needed to be stabilized,
or that he received different treatment than other similarly situated patients.
2. Duty to Screen
“While EMTALA does not define the term appropriate medical screening examination,
‘[m]ost of the courts that have interpreted the phrase have defined it as a screening examination
that the hospital would have offered to any other patient in a similar condition with similar

symptoms.’” Pennington-Thurman v. Christian Hosp. Northeast., 2019 WL 5394500, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. Oct. 22, 2019) (quoting Marshall v. East Carroll Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist., 134 F.3d 319, 323
(5th Cir. 1998)) (collecting cases). See also Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138 (“An inappropriate
screening examination is one that has a disparate impact on the plaintiff”). The Eighth Circuit has
recognized three types of improper screenings that are actionable under EMTALA: (1) “failure to
screen at all”; (2) “improper screening of patients for a discriminatory reason”; (3) and “screening
a patient differently from other patients perceived to have the same condition.” Summers, 91 F.3d
at 1139.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged that he was “triaged” by a registered nurse, spoke
with an attending physician who questioned him regarding his condition, and received a tetanus

shot as ordered by the physician. These factual allegations establish that the Hospital’s staff did
not completely fail to screen him. See e.g., Pennington-Thurman, 2019 WL 5394500, at *4
(screening occurred when plaintiff had the opportunity to describe his injuries to a nurse, a doctor
reviewed plaintiff’s chart, and he received bloodwork).
As to an improper screening based on a discriminatory reason or disparate treatment,
plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint:
64. [The Hospital] has a duty to provide EQUAL Emergency Care to ALL who are
presented to their Emergency Department and treat each individual as it would
another individual, presented with the same or similar circumstances, within their
capability.
65. [The Hospital’s] failure to provide that duty and equal standard of care, caused
plaintiff further injury. Contributing to pain and suffering and emotional distress.

. . .

73. [Plaintiff] was not given the same care that other individuals have, and would
receive under the same or similar circumstance, causing a disparate impact to the
plaintiff in the form of further pain and injury and emotional distress.

ECF No 42 at 16, 22. Within his opposition brief to the instant motion, plaintiff does not clarify
how he was treated differently from other patients. Instead he states that “he can prove these
allegations through discovery with material evidence in the form of hospital records, video,
incident reports, deputy statements, doctor statements and affidavits.” ECF No. 56-1 at 7.
Plaintiff does not allege any non-conclusory facts to support his assertion that other
patients, assumingly non-inmate patients, appearing with the same medical conditions were
screened or treated differently than he was. Nothing in the complaint suggests that the Hospital’s
emergency department provided more thorough screenings to non-inmate patients with the same
reported issues. Construing his pleadings liberally, the Court finds plaintiff did not plead facts to
support a claim either that the Hospital screened him differently from other patients with similar
conditions or failed to appropriately screen him for a discriminatory reason.
In short, plaintiff does not plead factual allegations demonstrating a connection between
his incarcerated status and the screening he received. Plaintiff’s allegations that the Hospital
applied disparate treatment does not raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See
e.g., Brown v. Providence Med. Servs., 2010 WL 4534407, at *4 (D. Neb. Nov. 1, 2010); Prickett
v. Hot Springs Cty. Med. Ctr., 2007 WL 2926862, at *3-4 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 5, 2007). Thus, the
Court dismisses plaintiff’s claim that the Hospital failed to provide appropriate medical screening
in violation of EMTALA.
3. Duty to Stabilize
EMTALA requires that if, after screening a patient, a hospital determines the patient has
“an emergency medical condition,” the hospital must stabilize the patient before discharging or
transferring him. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). See also Summers, 91 F.3d at 1136. The statute defines

an emergency medical condition as one with acute symptoms of sufficient severity, including
severe pain, such that the absence of immediate attention could reasonably be expected to result
in placing the health of the individual in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions,
or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). To “stabilize” an
emergency medical condition, a hospital must “provide such medical treatment of the condition as
may be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration
of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a
facility[.]” Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
Plaintiff claims he presented to the Hospital exhibiting right shoulder, neck, and upper back
pain and an open facial laceration after being physically assaulted and stabbed by several inmates.

He indicated he explained his injuries to a registered nurse and attempted to also relay the
information to Dr. Sharrock, the attending doctor, until she interrupted him. Plaintiff asserts the
only treatment he received was a tetanus shot. Plaintiff claims Dr. Sharrock did not provide the
Jail with post-discharge instructions and, as a result, they did not know how to treat his condition.
The Hospital, in its motion to dismiss, does not dispute plaintiff had an open facial laceration and
was exhibiting pain when he was discharged from the hospital.
On September 29, 2022, he was seen by a doctor at the Jail who ordered an MRI and
prescribed medications. Plaintiff asserts his facial laceration continued to bleed and did not close
for four days post-incident, that he required stronger glasses due to blurred vision, and he continued
to suffer from “tremendous” neck and shoulder pain. Plaintiff received an MRI on December 7,
2022, which revealed a fractured shoulder, three compressed vertebrae in his neck, and two
herniated discs, one specifically pressing the spinal cord. He was provided with a sling due the
shoulder fracture. It appears plaintiff had to be without a sling for approximately two months after

the alleged injury occurred. On December 22, 2022, he was brought back to the Hospital to see an
orthopedic specialist who provided him with a Cortisone injection. Plaintiff asserts the doctor told
him that so much time had lapsed from the initial injury that all he could do without invasive
surgery was ease the pain and monitor his condition.
The Court declines to find on a motion to dismiss that continued bleeding and pain, which
was later revealed to be caused by a fracture, compressed vertebrae, and herniated discs, was not
an “emergent medical condition” and did not need to be “stabilized.” At this stage of the litigation,
plaintiff’s amended complaint appears to adequately allege that he had a “serious dysfunction” of
a body part. Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court finds plaintiff sufficiently alleged that he

had an emergent medical condition and defendant Hospital failed to stabilize his condition prior
to discharge. See e.g., Pennington-Thurman, 2019 WL 5394500, at *5-6 (declining to grant a
motion to dismiss on a EMTALA stabilization claim where plaintiff was discharged after he
vomited and relayed that he “felt ill”).
B. Defendant Dr. Teena Sharrock
As a preliminary matter, defendant Dr. Sharrock seeks the Court to strike plaintiff’s
response to her motion to dismiss as untimely because it was three days overdue. See ECF No. 68
at 2. Self-represented litigants are required to follow the Court’s rules and deadlines despite their
pro se status, and the Court “may strike procedurally improper or untimely filings from the docket
under the Court’s inherent power to control the cases on its docket[.]” Hall v. Bilskey, 2020 WL
6868253, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 23, 2020). The Court will, however, decline to strike plaintiff’s
response here as a three-day delay cannot be said to have prejudiced the defendant or improperly
delayed the instant litigation. Thus, the Court will consider the plaintiff’s response, regardless of

its untimeliness.
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incidents alleged in the amended
complaint. A claim brought by a pretrial detainee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are analyzed under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th
Cir. 2007). “This makes little difference as a practical matter, though: Pretrial detainees are entitled
to the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as imprisoned convicts receive under the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. “[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quotations and citation omitted). “Deliberate
indifference has both an objective and a subjective component.” Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904,

908 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoted case omitted). “The objective component requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate an objectively serious medical need.” Id. “The subjective component requires a
plaintiff to show that the defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, such need.” Id.
Dr. Sharrock argues plaintiff failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because she
was not functioning as a state actor when she screened plaintiff. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. “It is the
physician’s function within the state system, not the precise terms of his employment, that
determines whether his actions can fairly be attributed to the State.” Id. at 55-56. When making
this determination, courts should consider the “degree to which the work of the private medical
provider is controlled or influenced by the state,” the nature of “the contractual relationship
between the state and the medical care provider,” and the degree to which the private entity

replaces the State’s provision of medical care to prisoners, as opposed to simply assisting the State.
See id. 50-58; Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 825-29 (7th Cir. 2009).
The fact that the healthcare provider does not exclusively provide medical services to a prison does
not make it “less a state actor than if [it] performed those duties as a full-time, permanent member
of the state prison medical staff.” Id.
Whether a private party may be characterized as a state actor turns on the circumstances of
the case. The Supreme Court has recognized a private party may be considered a state actor where
“the state has delegated to a private party a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the state,”
where the private actor “is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,” and
“where there is pervasive entwinement between the private entity and the state.” Wickersham v.

City of Columbia, 481 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2007). In any circumstance, there must be “a close
nexus not merely between the state and the private party, but between the state and the alleged
deprivation itself.” Id.
In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges he needed emergency medical treatment after
he was attacked by fellow inmates. Plaintiff states Jail employees transported him to the defendant
Hospital where he was triaged and seen by defendant Dr. Sharrock. Plaintiff states he received
subsequent care and treatment at the Hospital by an orthopedic surgeon when he was still a pre-
trial detainee at the Jail. He claims the Jail had a “contract” with the Hospital “to provide a medical
service to a pre-trial detainee.” ECF No. 42 at 25-26. Plaintiff asserts in his opposition to the
motion to dismiss that he “can provide that the defendant [H]ospital does, in fact, provide ALL of
Ste. Genevieve County Detention Center’s emergency services. Whether or not this is by custom
or contract remain[s] to be proven. (Including care provided by Sharrock).”3 ECF No. 67 at 3. The
Courts finds at this stage of the litigation, there is a question of fact as to whether the Hospital had

a contract with the Jail to provide emergency services, or if the Hospital provided regular
emergency treatment of Jail inmates. Consequently, the Court will decline to dismiss defendant
Sharrock at this time as it is unclear whether she was functioning as a state actor.
Dr. Sharrock further argues that even if she was a state actor at the time she screened
plaintiff, she was not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs because his
ailments were not objectively serious and her decision to not order radiological exams was, at
most, medical negligence. The Court cannot agree, and finds that plaintiff’s allegations against Dr.
Sharrock are sufficient to survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
As discussed above, plaintiff asserts he presented to the Hospital with shoulder, neck, and
back pain, an open facial laceration, and bubbling skin after being assaulted and stabbed by several

inmates with a shank. He claims his laceration continued to bleed for four days after the hospital
visit, and was without a sling for two months after he sustained a shoulder fracture from the attack.
An MRI revealed he had also sustained three compressed vertebrae in his neck and two herniated
discs, one specifically pressing the spinal cord. These allegations show his medical conditions
were objectively serious. Additionally, his amended complaint further indicates that Dr. Sharrock
interrupted him as he was attempting to explain the scope of his injuries, and declined to perform

3 Defendant Dr. Sharrock asks the Court to strike this statement from the Opposition for the reason that it “improperly
pleads allegations not within the First Amended Petition.” See ECF No. 68 at 2-3. The Court will decline to strike this
statement. The allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint, standing alone, makes it sufficiently plausible that Dr.
Sharrock was a state actor due to her employer’s relationship with the Jail. Whether the Hospital does or does not have
a contract or custom for the provision of emergency medical services with the Jail will be determined during the
discovery phase of this litigation.
a physical examination, which included radiological exams, despite his complaints of severe pain
in his shoulder, upper back, and neck, active bleeding, and bubbling skin. As a result, the Court
will not dismiss plaintiff's medical claims at this time.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Ste. Genevieve County Memorial Hospital’s
motion to dismiss [ECF No. 52] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's claims for failure to screen in violation
of EMTALA is DISMISSED without prejudice. The case will proceed on plaintiff's claim for
failure to stabilize his medical condition in violation of EMTALA.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dr. Teena Sharrock’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 64]
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this partial dismissal shall not be taken
in good faith.
Dated this 5" day of May, 2023.

f Lfine 5 erste 7. J.

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10238705. Public record. Not legal advice.