# Brown v. Kijakazi

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · September 29, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10237693

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** September 29, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

REBECCA ANN BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) Case No. 4:21-CV-1-NAB
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 )
)
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the final
decision of Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (the
“Commissioner”) denying the application of Plaintiff Rebecca Ann Brown (“Plaintiff”) for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401
et seq., and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. (the “Act”). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned
magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 8). Because I find the decision denying
benefits was supported by substantial evidence, I will affirm the Commissioner’s denial of
Plaintiff’s applications.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2018 and October 2018, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that she had
been unable to work since May 2018 due to severe chronic migraines, rheumatoid arthritis,

1 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Kilolo Kijakazi should be substituted, therefore, for Andrew Saul as the
defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Sjogren’s disease, 3 bulging discs in low back, large hemangioma in T4 of spine, interstitial
cystitis, anxiety, bilateral carpal tunnel (syndrome), slurred speech occasionally, and CCP
antibody/CRP reactive antibody. (Tr. 66, 180). Her applications were initially denied. (Tr. 76-80).
Plaintiff filed a Request for Hearing by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 81-82). After a
hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on February 27, 2020. (Tr. 19-31). Plaintiff filed
a Request for Review of Hearing Decision with the Social Security Administration’s Appeals
Council (Tr. 140-42), but the Appeals Council declined to review the case on November 6, 2020.

(Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ stands
as the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
II. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ACT
To be eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must prove he or she
is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec’y of Health
& Hum. Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). Under the Social Security Act, a person is
disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A). Accord Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010). The

impairment must be “of such severity that he [or she] is not only unable to do his [or her] previous
work but cannot, considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he [or she] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him [or her], or whether he [or she] would be hired if he [or she] applied for work.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a five-step
evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d
605, 611 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the five-step process). At Step One, the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant is currently engaging in “substantial gainful activity”; if so, then
the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i); McCoy, 648 F.3d at
611. At Step Two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has “a severe medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the [twelve-month duration requirement in

§ 404.1509 or § 416.909], or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration
requirement”; if the claimant does not have a severe impairment, the claimant is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(ii); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. To be severe, an impairment
must “significantly limit[] [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At Step Three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the
claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (the “listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); McCoy, 648
F.3d at 611. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will find the claimant
disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds with the rest of the five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(d), 416.920(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.

Prior to Step Four, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4), which is “the most [a claimant] can still do
despite [his or her] limitations,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). See also Moore v.
Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009). At Step Four, the Commissioner determines whether
the claimant can return to his or her past relevant work, by comparing the claimant’s RFC with the
physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. If the
claimant can perform his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled; if the claimant
cannot, the analysis proceeds to the next step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f),
416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Five, the Commissioner considers
the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can
make an adjustment to other work in the national economy; if the claimant cannot make an
adjustment to other work, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
404.1520(g), 404.1560(c)(2), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 416.1560(c)(2); McCoy, 648 F.3d at

611.
Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he or she is disabled.
Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that,
given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are a significant number of
other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d
1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2).
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ in this case found, at step one, that
Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 15, 2018, the alleged onset date.
(Tr. 21). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Migraine

headaches; rheumatoid arthritis; body tremors of unspecified etiology; degenerative disc disease
in the lumbar and cervical spine; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; leukocytosis; Sjogren’s disease;
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); and obesity. (Tr. 21). The ALJ also found the
following medically determinable impairments: obstructive sleep apnea and anxiety. (Tr. 22). At
step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 23).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following RFC:
She can lift and carry 5 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally. In an 8-hour
workday with normal breaks, she can sit about 6 hours and stand and/or walk about
2 hours. She should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and never work at
unprotected heights or around dangerous machinery. She should not drive
vocationally. She should not work in high concentrations of dust, fumes, gasses, or
similar pulmonary irritants. She can frequently but not continuously handle and
finger bilaterally. She can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, and occasionally
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl.

(Tr. 23-24). Moving to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant
work. (Tr. 29). At the fifth and final step of the sequential inquiry, after considering Plaintiff’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ relied on the testimony of the vocational expert
and found that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
[Plaintiff] can perform[,]” (Tr. 29), such as Document Preparer, Ampule Sealer, and Surveillance
System Monitor, (Tr. 30). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . .
from May 15, 2018, through the date of th[e] decision[.]” (Tr. 30).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on two grounds: (1) the RFC is not supported by
substantial evidence; and (2) the ALJ’s decision improperly evaluates the opinion evidence.
A. Standard for Judicial Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it “complies with the relevant legal
requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Pate-Fires v.
Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 58 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir.
2008)); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a
court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’
to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Substantial evidence is less
than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the
Commissioner’s conclusion.” Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942 (quotation marks omitted). See also
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (“Substantial evidence . . . means—and means only—’such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”) (quoting
Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
court considers both evidence that supports that decision and evidence that detracts from that
decision. Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 2012). However, the court “‘do[es]

not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ, and [it] defer[s] to the ALJ’s determinations
regarding the credibility of testimony, as long as those determinations are supported by good
reasons and substantial evidence.’” Id. at 1064 (quoting Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894
(8th Cir. 2006)). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two
inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings,
the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.” Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005)).
B. RFC Assessment
Plaintiff’s first argument is that her RFC assessment is not supported by substantial
evidence because 1) the ALJ improperly drew inferences from the medical reports and relied on

non-treating, non-examining medical consultants; and 2) the decision lacks rationale describing
how the evidence supports the RFC findings. Responding, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence.
An ALJ determines the RFC “based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical
records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of
[her] limitations.” Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
“Because a claimant’s RFC is a medical question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by
some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Combs v. Berryhill,
878 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2017). But an ALJ “is not limited to considering medical evidence
exclusively,” as even though the “RFC assessment draws from medical sources for support, it is
ultimately an administrative determination reserved to the Commissioner.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d
614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007).
The Court recognizes that an ALJ “may not draw upon [her] own inferences from medical
reports.” Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has held that the

“interpretation of physicians’ findings is a factual matter left to the ALJ’s authority.” Mabry v.
Colvin, 815 F.3d 386, 391 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In this case, the ALJ performed an
extensive review of relevant evidence, including Plaintiff’s substantial medical records, before
concluding Plaintiff was capable of sedentary work with certain additional limitations. This
analysis was entirely consistent with the requirements of SSR 96-8p and other applicable
regulations. The ALJ assessed objective medical evidence, carefully described various objective
findings, and cited numerous sources of medical evidence from Plaintiff’s many physician visits
and tests. (Tr. 24-29). This includes the impairments that Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to
adequately address and explain the impact on her RFC. (Tr. 25-26) (discussing rheumatoid
arthritis, degenerative disc disease in the lumbar and cervical spine, and carpal tunnel syndrome);

(Tr. 26) (discussing Plaintiff’s COPD and obesity); (Tr. 27) (discussing Plaintiff’s diagnosis of
leukocytosis and obesity). Based on these notations, the ALJ satisfied his requirement and “a
deficiency in opinion-writing is not a sufficient reason for setting aside an administrative finding
where the deficiency had no practical effect on the outcome of the case.” Sloan v. Saul, 933 F.3d
946, 951 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Senne v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1999)). An ALJ’s
reasoning need only be “clear enough to allow for appropriate judicial review.” Id. The ALJ’s
decision satisfies this standard.
Additionally, the ALJ’s consideration of the State agency physicians’ opinions was not
itself an error because the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence. See Tellez v. Barnhart, 403
F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2005). Further, the SSA regulations recognize that state agency medical
consultants are “highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1513a(b)(1); see also Collins v. Kijakazi, No. 6:20-CV-3237-MDH, 2021 WL 3909670, at *4
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2021) (“The new regulations require the ALJ to consider the opinions of state
agency medical consultants because they are highly qualified experts in Social Security disability

evaluation.”). As discussed above, the ALJ did consider all relevant evidence as shown throughout
his Decision, which includes discussion of the medical records, noncompliance with some medical
treatment, and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living (“ADLs”). (Tr. 24-29). The ALJ also discussed
how the objective medical evidence supported some of Plaintiff’s complaints and incorporated
those into the RFC.
The Court acknowledges that the record contains conflicting evidence, and the ALJ could
have reached a different conclusion. However, this Court’s task is not to reweigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ. The ALJ’s weighing of the evidence here fell within the available “zone of
choice,” and the Court cannot disturb that decision merely because it might have reached a
different conclusion. See Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011). Based on the

foregoing, the Court finds the ALJ’s Decision is supported by substantial evidence.
C. Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s decision by arguing that the ALJ failed to properly
evaluate the opinion evidence.
Because Plaintiff filed her applications after March 27, 2017, this Court applies 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c. Under the new regulations, an ALJ is no longer required to “defer to give any specific
evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s), including those from [claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).
Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of such opinions by considering five factors:
supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors that
tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c). The most important factors
are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ acknowledged
application of these new regulations in his opinion. (Tr. 27-28).
Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly articulate the “supportability” and

“consistency” factors when evaluating the opinion evidence, specifically Dr. Malo’s opinion who
treated Plaintiff’s chronic migraines. Responding, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly
evaluated the opinion evidence and that the ALJ’s Decision as a whole shows he properly
considered the (supportability and consistency) factors.
The ALJ’s Decision reflects that he considered the opinion evidence of record. The Eighth
Circuit has held that an ALJ’s rejection of a medical provider’s conclusory checklist statement was
appropriate. See Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1104 (8th Cir. 2014) (no error in ALJ’s
discounting of “cursory checklist statement” which included “significant impairments and
limitations that are absent from [provider’s] treatment notes and [claimant’s] medical records”).
Even assuming, arguendo, that it was reversible error for the ALJ to discount Dr. Malo’s brief

opinion, that error is harmless. “The paragraph concerning the ALJ’s evaluation of [a medical]
opinion cannot be read in isolation but must be read as part of the overall discussion of plaintiff’s
RFC assessment.” Wilcox v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-1285-SRW, 2021 WL 6196834, at *13 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 30, 2021) (quoting Trosper v. Saul, No. 1:20-CV-51-DDN, 2021 WL 1857124, at *5 (E.D.
Mo. May 10, 2021)). When read in context, as part of the overall discussion of Plaintiff’s RFC,
the Court finds the ALJ appropriately considered the medical and nonmedical evidence in the
record. The ALJ specifically noted that Plaintiff saw Dr. Malo for her migraines, which weighed
in her favor. (Tr. 25). The ALJ then went on to state that Dr. Malo noted Plaintiff no longer
experienced severe headaches since receiving injections although she still continued to suffer from
mild-to-moderate headaches, which were partially alleviated from Plaintiff's prescribed
medications. (Tr. 25). Thus, it is clear that the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff's treatment with Dr.
Malo and gave some credit to it. Based on the foregoing, the ALJ did not commit reversible error
in finding Dr. Malo’s opinion unpersuasive.
As discussed above, it was not error for the ALJ to rely on the State agency consultant’s
opinion, and the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt by adding more limitations stemming
from her physical ailments. The ALJ’s thorough review of the record supports his evaluation of
the opinion evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the relief requested in Plaintiff's Complaint and Brief is
DENIED. (Docs. 1, 26).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
□□ [S_
NANNETTE A. BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of September, 2022.

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