# Gatewood v. City of O'Fallon, Missouri

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · June 29, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10237236

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** June 29, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10237236

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a state tribunal was incompetent for the purpose of Younger abstention where there was “ample evidence of bias” on the part of a state motor vehicle commissioner, including a financial interest

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KATIE GATEWOOD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00089-AGF
)
CITY OF O’FALLON, MISSOURI, et al., )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 24) to dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief pursuant
to the Court’s prior Order of Abstention (ECF No. 16) under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and on the grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel, deference to state final
judgments, and/or waiver. Further, Defendants argue that any claims against those
Defendants named in their individual capacities should be dismissed for the additional
reason that they are entitled to absolute immunity.
Plaintiff failed to file a timely opposition to Defendants’ motion, so on April 25,
2022, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing why Defendants’ motion should
not be granted. ECF No. 25. Plaintiff has responded to the Order to Show Cause and
argues that the Court should reconsider its Order of Abstention or, alternatively, dismiss this
matter so that Plaintiff may appeal of the Order of Abstention. As to the individual
Defendants’ immunity claims, Plaintiff acknowledges that Eighth Circuit precedent supports
Defendants’ arguments but contends that the precedent was wrongly decided.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Katie Gatewood filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction preventing the City of

O’Fallon (“City”), Missouri from impeaching her and removing her from office as a
member of the City Council. Plaintiff asserted constitutional claims against the City, the
City’s Board of Impeachment (“Board”), Mayor Bill Hennessy in his official capacity
(“Mayor”), and City Council members Dale Kling, Dave Hinman, and Jeff Keuhn in their
individual capacities.

On January 27, 2022, the Court issued a written Order of Abstention, holding that it
was abstaining from deciding this case, including the motion for a TRO, under Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). ECF No. 16. In that Order, the Court noted that Younger
abstention ordinarily requires dismissal of the federal court action but that when claims for
damages are raised, a stay is usually preferable to dismissal, subject to certain exceptions.

See id. at 14. Plaintiff’s complaint, in addition to seeking injunctive and declaratory relief,
sought certain forms of monetary relief. Id. at 14-15. Because the parties had not addressed
the issue of how, if at all, the requests for monetary relief impacted the procedure that
should be used by the Court in abstaining, the Court gave the parties until February 10,
2022, to brief these issues before the Court determined whether to dismiss or stay this case.

Id. at 15.
On February 9, 2022, the day before her brief was due, Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint, which she asserts was filed as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(a). See
ECF No. 17. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on February 7, 2022, the
Board in fact voted to impeach her and the Mayor removed her from office. Id. Plaintiff
also amended her requests for relief to request that the Court: (a) declare that Defendants
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying Plaintiff a fair trial; (b) declare that the City

and the Board violated the First Amendment by subjecting Plaintiff to an impeachment
proceeding and removing her from office; (c) order the Board and Mayor to restore Plaintiff
to her office; (d) assess the amount of taxpayer money expended in pursuing the
impeachment action; (e) assess attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the impeachment
action; (f) award monetary damages to compensate Plaintiff for losses she suffered as a

consequence of her removal from office; (g) award attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this
litigation; and (h) order the individual Defendants to pay to the City a proportional
percentage of the taxpayer money and attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the impeachment
action and this litigation. Id. at 30-31.
On February 10, 2022, the parties filed their briefs with respect to whether a stay or

dismissal was appropriate. ECF Nos. 18 & 19. Upon review of their briefs, the Court
concluded that a stay rather than dismissal was appropriate in light of the monetary relief
requested, and the Court stayed this action pending final resolution of the impeachment
proceeding, including judicial review of that proceeding. ECF No. 20.
Defendants thereafter advised the Court that Plaintiff failed to seek judicial review

under the state’s Administrative Procedure Act, that the time to do so had passed, and that
the complaint should now be dismissed based on Younger or various preclusion doctrines.
See ECF No. 21. The Court thereafter lifted the stay and set a deadline for Defendants to
answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 22.
Defendants then timely filed the instant motion to dismiss. As noted above,
Defendants assert that dismissal is appropriate based on Younger or, alternatively, based on

various preclusion theories because Plaintiff could have but failed to pursue judicial review
of the impeachment decision; and that the individual Defendants are in any event entitled to
absolute immunity.
Plaintiff requests that the Court either reconsider its Order of Abstention or dismiss
this matter so that Plaintiff may appeal the abstention order. Plaintiff “expresses no opinion

as to what theory the Court might rely upon to dismiss the action.” ECF No. 26 at 3.
Plaintiff also disputes that the individual defendants are entitled to immunity and indicates a
desire to seek overruling of Eighth Circuit precedent on this issue.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration

As the Court explained in response to Plaintiff’s prior request for reconsideration, the
Court carefully considered the arguments raised by the parties in each round of briefing, and
nothing in Plaintiff’s more recent filings changes the Court’s analysis that Younger
abstention was appropriate. Plaintiff asserts that the Court should reconsider its decision to
abstain under Younger because, in her amended complaint filed after the Court entered its

Order of Abstention,1 she alleges that the Mayor was in fact biased in that he prejudged the

1 Plaintiff has not cited, and the Court has not found, any legal authority suggesting that
Plaintiff could circumvent the Court’s Order of Abstention by amending her federal complaint
purportedly as a matter of right under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, the
issues before him, he was incapable of acting impartially due to Plaintiff’s accusations
against the Board, and he issued rulings that were contrary to federal law.
But the Court considered and rejected a bias-based exception to Younger in its Order
of Abstention. The Court recognized that “bad faith, harassment, or some extraordinary

circumstance [may] make abstention inappropriate.’” ECF No. 16 at 12 (quoting Aaron v.
Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 778 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, the Court noted that the Eighth
Circuit has suggested that the bad faith exception may only apply in criminal cases and, in
any event, must be construed very narrowly and invoked only in extraordinary
circumstances. Id. at 12-13 (citing Aaron, 357 F.3d at 778; Tony Alamo Christian

Ministries, 664 F.3d at 1254).
The Court further noted that Plaintiff had the chance to litigate the question of bias
before an impartial adjudicator, the Mayor; Plaintiff had not argued at that time that the
Mayor was biased; and Plaintiff had not shown or even suggested that the process by which
the Mayor decided her motions for disqualification was unfair. Id. at 13. Indeed, Plaintiff

was able to present a full record with respect to her motions to disqualify during the
impeachment proceeding, including submitting legal briefing through counsel, examining
witnesses, and presenting evidence. Thus, the operative complaint and record on which the
Court decided to abstain under Younger did not reflect or even suggest the Mayor’s bias.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint—the validity of which is questionable at best, as it

was filed after the Court abstained—does not impact the Court’s conclusion. Even if the

applicable legal authorities suggest that issues related to abstention are determined at the time
the federal complaint was first filed. See, e.g., Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664
F.3d 1245, 1250 (8th Cir. 2012).
Younger exception on which Plaintiff relies could apply in this non-criminal context,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated the level of bias recognized by federal courts as rising to the
level warranting intervention in state proceedings. Cf. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.
Riney, 21 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a state tribunal was incompetent for

the purpose of Younger abstention where there was “ample evidence of bias” on the part of a
state motor vehicle commissioner, including a financial interest). Missouri’s Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) provided an adequate forum to litigate Plaintiff’s claim of bias. See
Brown v. City of O’Fallon, 728 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (reviewing under the
state’s APA the impeachment of a city mayor and reversing impeachment on the ground that

board members were biased). And as discussed below, Plaintiff’s intentional failure to
pursue relief in that forum precludes her from doing so now in this Court.
Younger Abstention and Preclusion
“[T]he Supreme Court long ago held that parties may not avoid Younger by
withholding defenses from the state proceeding and commencing the federal suit as soon as

the state case ends.” Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607–11 (1975)). “Federal post-trial intervention, in a fashion
designed to annul the results of a state trial, . . . deprives the States of a function which quite
legitimately is left to them, that of overseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional issues
which arise in civil litigation over which they have jurisdiction.” Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609;

see also Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1144 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying
Huffman to an administrative action from which judicial review was not timely sought and
holding that because “a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party must exhaust his
state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court, . . . a party cannot avoid
Younger by choosing not to pursue available state appellate remedies”).2 Plaintiff seeks to
do exactly what Huffman precluded—to annul the result of her impechment proceeding
without exhausting the available state remedies to do so. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 610

(“[C]onsiderations of comity and federalism which underlie Younger permit no truncation of
the exhaustion requirement merely because the losing party in the state court of general
jurisdiction believes that his chances of success on appeal are not auspicious.”).
Plaintiff’s failure to seek judicial review in the state courts also bars her
constitutional claims under the preclusion doctrines. See id. at 607 n.19 (noting overlap

between Younger’s restrictions after entry of a state trial court judgment and the res judicata
implications of such a judgment). “Res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel
(issue preclusion) are fully applicable under § 1983.” Nelson, 44 F.3d at 503; see also
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973).
These preclusion doctrines prevent a party from litigating claims and issues that have

been previously adjudicated, including claims that have been adjudicated in administrative

2 Although the ongoing state proceeding at the time of the abstention decision here was
administrative rather than judicial, the Eighth Circuit and most other circuits to consider the
issue have held that the distinction makes no difference in this context, where the
administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial, or coercive in nature, in that it declares or enforces
liabilities based on existing facts and law. See Alleghany, 896 F.2d at 1144; accord Maymo-
Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2004); O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia,
32 F.3d 785, 790–91 (3d Cir. 1994); Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 166
(4th Cir. 2008); Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 1998). Only the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits have held otherwise. See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio,
926 F.2d 567, 572–73 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that Younger abstention does not apply if
administrative proceedings have been completed and the agency’s ruling has not been
appealed); Thomas v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 807 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir.1987)
(same).
hearings, so long as the administrative hearing provided procedural protections akin to a
judicial proceeding. “When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.”

Johnson v. Vilsack, 833 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
“Whether the agency is acting in a judicial capacity, in turn, depends in part on the
procedural protections it provides . . . .” Id. at 954. Although there is no “litmus test” for
determining what procedural protections are required to give an administrative proceeding
preclusive effect, courts have concluded that safeguards such as representation by counsel,

the opportunity for discovery and witness examination, the opportunity to present
memoranda of law, and the opportunity for judicial review are sufficient. Cf. id. at 956-58
(determining that the lack of any such protections in an agency proceeding rendered the
proceeding too bare bones to warrant preclusion). Each of those safeguards was present in
the impeachment proceeding here. See ECF No. 16 at 6-7 (describing proceedings); see

also Brown v. Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[I]mpeachment proceedings
[in the City of O’Fallon, Missouri] are essentially judicial or adjudicatory in nature, even
though the decision-making body and the form of the proceedings are legislative.”).
As the Court noted in its prior Orders, Plaintiff in fact raised her constitutional claims
in the impeachment proceeding, she failed to seek state-court judicial review of the adverse

rulings on those claims, and she is precluded from relitigating those claims now.3 See

3 In a prior brief, Plaintiff indicated that, if she sought judicial review in the state court,
“she would simply assert a reservation as authorized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), to preserve her right to have
Nelson, 44 F.3d at 503 (“Plaintiffs had, and did not use, a state forum in which they could
have presented the arguments they now urge. Their deliberate bypass of the opportunity to
litigate in state court forecloses them from litigating in federal court.”); see also Mueller v.
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y, No. 12-0283-CV-ODS, 2012 WL 4957087, at *2

(W.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2012) (“Missouri courts generally afford preclusive effect to
administrative determinations to prevent parties from relitigating issues or claims resolved
in administrative proceedings.”) (citing Bresnahan v. May Dep't Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d
327, 329–30 (Mo. 1987)).
Each of Plaintiff’s claims, including her claims for damages, depend on finding a

constitutional violation, and such a finding is foreclosed by the preclusion doctrines
described above. Therefore, each of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.
Moreover, as Plaintiff appears to concede, Eighth Circuit precedent makes clear that
her claims for damages against the individual defendants separately fail under the doctrine

her constitutional claims resolved by this Court.” ECF No. 19 at 9. In England, the Supreme
Court held when a federal court has abstained under Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) and returned a case to state court, the litigant may explicitly reserve
her federal claim for future litigation in federal court after the state court has resolved the
state-law claims. See England, 375 U.S. at 421-22. It is questionable whether an England
reservation would apply here, where the Court abstained under Younger and not Pullman.
Several circuits have held that it would not. See, e.g., Duty Free Shop, Inc. v. Administracion
de Terrenos de Puerto Rico, 889 F.2d 1181, 1183 (1st Cir. 1989) (“England, and its
reservations, are not relevant here, in the Younger context, where the purpose of abstention is
not clarification of state law, but reluctance to interfere with an ongoing state judicial
proceeding.”); Temple of Lost Sheep Inc. v. Abrams, 930 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1991) (same);
Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 246 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); but see Los Altos El Granada
Invs. v. City of Capitola, 583 F.3d 674, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The mere fact that a district
court abstains under Younger does not require us to ignore the England reservation . . . .”).
Regardless, Plaintiff did not seek such a reservation, instead opting to forego judicial review
in the state court entirely. Under these circumstances, she is precluded from raising her
constitutional claims in federal court. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609.
of absolute immunity. See Brown, 970 F.2d at 439 (“[W]e hold that defendants acted in a
judicial capacity in voting to impeach the mayor and that their function as a board of
impeachment was sufficiently comparable to ‘classic’ adjudication so as to justify absolute
immunity from personal liability for damages.’’).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
ECF No. 24.
A separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 29th day of June, 2022.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10237236. Public record. Not legal advice.