# Sutton v. Dunklin County Jail

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · June 21, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10237186

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** June 21, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10237186

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding plaintiff’s exhausted grievances did not relate to, and therefore did not exhaust, plaintiff’s federal claims
- finding Eighth Amendment has no application until there has been a formal adjudication of guilt
- discussing “key admission” that arrestee was not handcuffed when tased

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

RONALD LAMONT SUTTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:18-CV-00063-JAR
)
PAM BUCHANAN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Bob Holder, Allen Edwards, and Pam
Buchanan’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 163) and Defendant Marishia
(Wheeler) Sandefur’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 170).1 The Court will
consider both motions in the same Memorandum and Order because they concern related issues.
For the reasons discussed below, both motions will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging two incidents of excessive use
of force at Dunklin County Adult Detention Center (“Dunklin County”) on November 22, 2015
(the “November 2015 Incident”)2 and October 1, 2016 (the “October 2016 Incident”)
respectively. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on March 19, 2018 (Doc. 1) and an Amended
Complaint on July 11, 2018. (Doc. 15). Performing an initial review of Plaintiff’s Amended

1 Defendant Marishia Wheeler remarried after commencement of this action, and her name is now Marishia Sandefur.
(Doc. 170 at 1 n.1).

2 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and subsequent filings refer to both November 8, 2015 and November 22, 2015.
Defendants consistently state that the November 2015 Incident occurred on November 22, 2015. The precise date of
the November 2015 Incident is not material, as the parties are clearly referring to the same events. At his deposition,
Plaintiff confirmed there is only one relevant incident in this time period. (Doc. 165-5 at 2).
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), Judge Perry dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against
Dunklin County Jail, his official capacity claims against all Defendants, and other federal claims.
(Doc. 20 at 16-17; Doc. 21). Judge Perry allowed Plaintiff to proceed, however, on certain
excessive use of force, deliberate indifference, and failure to intervene claims.

On April 6, 2020, Judge Perry denied cross-motions for summary judgment filed by both
Plaintiff and Defendants. (Doc. 108). Consistent with this decision, the following claims remain
active pending resolution of the instant motions for summary judgment:
• Excessive use of force against Defendant Edwards (“Officer Edwards”)
• Failure to intervene and deliberate indifference against Defendant Buchanan
(“Officer Buchanan”)

• Deliberate indifference against Defendant Holder (“Sheriff Holder”)
• Excessive use of force against Defendant Sandefur (“Officer Sandefur”)
Upon denying summary judgment, Judge Perry indicated that the case would “be set for trial
after the current national emergency because of the COVID[-]19 pandemic has ended.” (Id. at
13). Plaintiff was appointed counsel (Doc. 126),3 and the matter was reassigned to this Court on
June 10, 2021. (Doc. 130). The Court issued an Amended Case Management Order which
allowed the parties to complete additional discovery and file renewed motions for summary
judgment if appropriate. (Doc. 135).
On March 15, 2022, Sheriff Holder, Officer Edwards, and Officer Buchanan
(collectively, the “November 2015 Defendants”) filed their Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment and associated Statement of Uncontested Material Facts. (Docs. 163-65). Officer

3 On February 14, 2022, after extensive briefing, the Court granted appointed counsel’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw.
(Doc. 158). Based on representations made in appointed counsel’s ex parte filings, it became apparent that there had
been a “fundamental breakdown in cooperation and communication” with Plaintiff. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff is therefore
proceeding pro se.
Sandefur filed her Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Uncontroverted
Facts in Support on April 4, 2022. (Docs. 170-72). On April 6, 2022, “[i]n deference to
Plaintiff’s pro se status and to ensure Plaintiff has sufficient time to respond,” this Court granted
Plaintiff until April 27, 2022 to respond to both motions. (Doc. 173). On May 2, 2022, after

Plaintiff failed to timely file any response, the Court gave Plaintiff an additional 14 days but
indicated that “[i]f Plaintiff does not file a response by such deadline, the Court will rule on the
unopposed motions.” (Doc. 175). The Court also ordered Defendants to “use best efforts to again
serve Plaintiff copies of their pending Motions for Summary Judgment and this Scheduling
Order.” (Id.). The Court’s extended deadline has now passed still without any response by
Plaintiff, and the Court must accordingly issue a decision on Defendants’ unopposed motions for
summary judgment.
E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E) provides that “[a]ll matters set forth in the moving party’s
Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts shall be deemed admitted for purposes of summary
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.” Because Plaintiff has offered

no response whatsoever, he is deemed to have admitted all statements of uncontroverted material
facts offered by Defendants. (Docs. 165, 172). See Johns v. City of Florissant, No. 4:18-CV-
1121-AGF, 2020 WL 7695416, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2020) (deeming defendant’s statement
of material facts admitted despite pro se status of plaintiff); Clayton v. DeJoy, No. 4:18-CV-1039
JAR, 2020 WL 6822641, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2020). The Court notes that pro se
litigants are not excused from complying with substantive and procedural rules. Burgs v. Sissel,
745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). Plaintiff’s failure to respond, however, does not
mean this Court must automatically grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Instead,
Defendants must still establish that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wagner v.
Brown, No. 4:15-CV-1277-JAR, 2017 WL 3433630, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2017).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary Judgment
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), a movant is entitled to summary judgment if they can
“show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and they are “entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” See Meier v. City of St. Louis, 934 F.3d 824, 827-28 (8th Cir.
2019). This Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Osborn v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 853 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1988). The nonmovant, however, “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). In considering whether Plaintiff can avoid summary judgment, this Court
construes his filings liberally. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

42 U.S.C. § 1983
A valid claim under § 1983 includes two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation of
that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988). The statute offers a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). § 1983 is “not itself a source of
substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
III. ANALYSIS
Abandonment
At the outset, the Court finds that Plaintiff has abandoned all claims in this case. The
Eighth Circuit recognizes that “failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes

waiver of that argument.” Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th
Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit recently affirmed that a plaintiff waives his or her claim by failing
to oppose arguments on summary judgment “because the non-moving party is responsible for
demonstrating any genuine dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment.”
Paskert v. Kemna-ASA Auto Plaza, Inc., 950 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see
also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Though Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, he is “not excused from compliance with substantive and procedural law.” Brown v. Frey,
806 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1986).
The November 2015 Defendants filed their Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on
March 15, 2022. (Doc. 163). Officer Sandefur filed her Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment

on April 4, 2022. (Doc. 170). This Court, acting on its own motion, granted Plaintiff multiple
extensions and set clear deadlines for responses. (Docs. 166, 173). On May 2, 2022, the Court
gave Plaintiff a final opportunity to respond within 14 days, and Plaintiff did not file any
response. (Doc. 175). As required by the Court, Defendants have delivered copies of their
motions and this Court’s Scheduling Orders to Plaintiff by Certified U.S. Mail with return
receipts evidencing delivery. (Docs. 177-79).4 It appears to the Court that Plaintiff has not

4 On May 31, 2022, multiple Orders previously entered by this Court and mailed to Plaintiff’s last known address
were returned as undeliverable. (Docs. 180-83). The Court remains satisfied, however, that Plaintiff has had ample
opportunity to prosecute his case. Plaintiff did not file any notice of change of address, and the parties have
successfully served Plaintiff copies of their motions via certified mail at the same last known address. (Docs. 177-79).
It appears that Plaintiff personally signed upon receiving one of the packages on May 13, 2022. (Doc. 179-1).
actively participated in this litigation since July 23, 2021, when he filed a Pro Se Motion for
Memorandum and Order incorrectly claiming that he already won this case. (Doc. 138 at 3). In
early 2022, the Court allowed Plaintiff’s appointed counsel to withdraw after Plaintiff declined
multiple opportunities to file any response or objection. (Docs. 144-49, 152-58). In these

circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff has waived all of his claims by failing to oppose
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Paskert, 950 F.3d at 540. The Court will proceed in
the alternative, however, and evaluate the merits of Defendants’ arguments.

November 2015 Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 163)
Officer Edwards – Excessive Use of Force
Officer Edwards was a corrections officer with the Dunklin County Sheriff’s Department
when the November 2015 Incident occurred. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 3). All parties agree that Officer
Edwards tased Plaintiff in the back after placing Plaintiff in Room 125 (the “Holding Cell”) (Id.
at ¶ 20; Doc. 15 at 8). Plaintiff claims that this caused him to “hit[] the floor hard” and suffer
“severe back injuries to lower and middle back area.” (Doc. 15 at 8). Plaintiff brings a claim
against Officer Edwards under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force in violation of the
United States Constitution. Officer Edwards seeks summary judgment on the grounds that his
use of force was objectively reasonable.
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at Dunklin County. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 1; Doc. 165-1 at ¶ 9).

Though Plaintiff cites the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, §
1983 claims by pretrial detainees held in local jails are analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 341 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted); see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp. 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (finding Eighth
Amendment has no application until there has been a formal adjudication of guilt). The
Constitution affords pretrial detainees protections which are “at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109,
1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Critically, pretrial detainees “cannot be punished at all.”
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court has held the Due Process Clause “protects a pretrial detainee from
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment,” and the “appropriate standard for a
pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one.” Id. at 397-98 (citations
omitted). The reasonableness of a particular use of force depends on the totality of the
circumstances. The Eighth Circuit, following Supreme Court precedent, has encouraged courts to
consider “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the
extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of
force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer;
and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 427 (8th Cir.
2017) (quoting id.); see also Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 141 S. Ct. 2239, 2241 (2021).

On November 22, 2015, Officer Edwards entered Plaintiff’s cell when Plaintiff would not
line up for mealtime. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 10). In his deposition, Officer Edwards states that Plaintiff
“g[o]t up in [his] face, and he bumped into [him],” at which point Officer Edwards told Plaintiff
he was “going up front.” (Id. at ¶ 10-11; Doc. 165-3 at 6). At this point, Plaintiff claims that he
“grabbed the table to freeze [his] hands there to cover [himself].” (Doc. 165-5 at 3). Officer
Edwards and Plaintiff eventually left the cell and proceeded to the Holding Cell, which also held
other inmates. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 13-14).
Officer Edwards claims that Plaintiff “start[ed] trouble with” the other inmates as soon as
he entered the Holding Cell. (Id. at ¶ 14; Doc. 165-3 at 7). Officer Edwards requested that
another officer retrieve the taser. (Id. at ¶ 16; Doc. 165-3 at 7). Officer Edwards insists that he
told Plaintiff to sit down more than 10 times, but Plaintiff refused to comply. (Id. at ¶ 17; Doc.
165-3 at 10). After shouting taser three times, Officer Edwards tased Plaintiff in the back. (Id. at
¶ 20; Doc. 165-3 at 7). Officer Edwards acknowledged that Plaintiff was not likely to attack him,

but also knew Plaintiff “was not going to comply.” (Doc. 165-3 at 13). Officer Edwards
explained that he ultimately deployed the taser because Plaintiff was a “loose cannon,” had
“bumped into [Officer Edwards]” previously, and Officer Edwards needed to “diffuse the
situation” and maintain “physical control.” (Id. at 13, 15, 17; Doc. 165 at ¶ 27). Officer Edwards
expressed that he “knew [Plaintiff] was stronger” than him, as “he’s a good sized guy.” (Id. at
14). At his deposition, Plaintiff claimed he weighed 365 pounds at the time of the incident. (Doc.
165-5 at 9). Soon after the tasing, Officer Buchanan assisted Plaintiff with removing the prongs,
and Officer Edwards cleaned the site of Plaintiff’s injury and placed a band-aid. (Doc. 165 at ¶
21; id. at 7). Plaintiff claims that he “crushed [his] back” and “almost busted [his] head against
the concrete slab,” while Officer Edwards states that Plaintiff did not fall but merely “went

down” and “took a knee.” (Doc. 165-5 at 7; Doc. 165-3 at 11).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that Officer Edwards is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive use of force claim. The Eighth Circuit has
held that “prisoners have a clearly established right to be free from a Taser shock or its
equivalent in the absence of a security threat.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491,
500 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). A review of precedent demonstrates that use of a taser is
justified “when there was a concern for the safety of the institution, the jailers, and the inmates.”
Id. Numerous undisputed facts demonstrate that Officer Edwards acted objectively reasonably
under the circumstances:
• The entire incident began with Plaintiff refusing to line up for mealtime, getting
into Officer Edwards’ face, and bumping him. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 10).

• Upon entering the Holding Cell, Plaintiff began bullying other inmates and
generally causing trouble. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15).

• Officer Edwards instructed Plaintiff to sit down over 10 times, and Plaintiff
refused. (Id. at ¶ 17).

• Officer Edwards audibly asked another officer to obtain the taser, and shouted a
taser warning multiple times before deploying it. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17).

• At the time of this incident, Plaintiff weighed 365 pounds, was bigger and
stronger than Officer Edwards, and was not handcuffed. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30).

• A nurse at Dunklin County visited on December 2, 2015 and prescribed Plaintiff
Tylenol for 5 days for his back. (Id. at ¶ 39).

In short, a strong and unrestrained pretrial detainee bumped an officer, bullied other inmates, and
refused to comply with numerous orders to sit down before being tased after multiple warnings.
These facts demonstrate that Plaintiff presented a threat to the safety of the institution, officer,
and other inmates.
The Eighth Circuit has “allowed the use of tasers on detainees in handcuffs in appropriate
circumstances.” Franklin v. Franklin Cty., Ark., 956 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted). In Brossart v. Janke, the Eighth Circuit approved the tasing of a handcuffed arrestee in
the back of a police car who refused to move to the middle seat. 859 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir.
2017); compare McManemy v. Tierney, 970 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 2020) (discussing “key
admission” that arrestee was not handcuffed when tased). In Hollingsworth v. City of St. Ann, the
Eighth Circuit found that it was not clearly established that using a taser against an inmate who
refused to change into a jumpsuit violated the inmate’s constitutional rights. 800 F.3d 985, 988
(8th Cir. 2015).
Assessing the actions of Officer Edwards “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene,” the Court concludes that Officer Edwards’ deployment of the taser did not constitute
excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Kingsley, 576
U.S. at 397. Plaintiff was unrestrained, posed a threat to Officer Edwards along with other

inmates, and refused to comply with numerous orders to sit down after having already “bumped”
Officer Edwards. Considering the legitimate need for force, extensive efforts by Officer Edwards
to obtain compliance, serious security threat posed by Plaintiff, and limited injuries suffered by
Plaintiff, the Court finds that Officer Edwards’ actions were objectively reasonable as a matter of
law. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Officer Edwards on
Plaintiff’s excessive use of force claim.

Officer Buchanan – Failure to Intervene & Deliberate Indifference
Officer Buchanan was a deputy sheriff with the Dunklin County Sheriff’s Department in
November 2015. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that Officer Buchanan was “on the [scene]”
when Officer Edwards tased him and “could have stopped the serious and outrageous assault”
but instead “turned her head the other way.” (Doc. 15 at 12). Plaintiff also contends that Officer
Buchanan was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.5 For the reasons discussed
below, both claims fail as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts.
The Eighth Circuit recognizes that a jail official violates the Due Process Clause when

she is “deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to a pre-trial detainee and
fails to protect the detainee.” Glaze v. Byrd, 721 F.3d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
A failure to protect claim “requires a detainee to make two showings, one objective – that he

5 The Court has liberally construed the Amended Complaint as raising this claim, consistent with Judge Perry’s prior
decision addressing Defendants’ earlier motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 108 at 7).
faced a substantial risk of serious harm – and one subjective – that the official knew of and
disregarded the risk to the inmate’s safety.” Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2014);
see also Blackmon v. Lombardi, 527 F. App’x 583, 585 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (noting
failure to protect claim has both objective and subjective components).

First, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his failure to protect claim against Officer Buchanan
because he cannot demonstrate that Officer Edwards used excessive force, as discussed above.
To establish his claim against Officer Buchanan, Plaintiff must show that she “observed or had
reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used.” Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d
604, 612 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). But Plaintiff cannot make this objective showing
where Officer Edwards did not use excessive force in the first place. See Hollingsworth, 800
F.3d at 991 (“[B]ecause it was not clearly established McCallum’s actions constituted excessive
force, a reasonable officer was not on fair notice that his failure to intervene when McCallum
deployed the Taser violated [plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights.”).
Second, the undisputed material facts establish that Officer Buchanan neither knew of nor

disregarded a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Officer Buchanan only arrived at the Holding
Cell after Plaintiff was tased by Officer Edwards. (Doc. 165 at ¶¶ 23-25). At her deposition,
Officer Buchanan stated that she “didn’t witness the tasering, [] didn’t witness what prompted
the tasering or what happened beforehand.” (Doc. 165-2 at 3). By failing to respond to the
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, Plaintiff
has admitted that Officer Buchanan was not aware of any substantial risk to his safety. In short,
Officer Buchanan did not have the “duty, opportunity, or ability to intervene” before the tasing.
Grider v. Bowling, 785 F.3d 1248, 1253 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
The facts also completely contradict Plaintiff’s claim that Officer Buchanan was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Pretrial detainees are “protected under the
Constitution from a state actor’s deliberate indifference towards the inmate’s serious medical
needs.” Corwin v. City of Indep., Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). A

deliberate indifference claim also has both objective and subjective components. Jackson v.
Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). As to the subjective
component, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Officer Buchanan “actually knew of but
disregarded his serious medical need,” a mental state “akin to criminal recklessness.” Scott v.
Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). At his deposition, Plaintiff
acknowledged that Officer Buchanan “is the one that took [the taser prongs] out.” (Doc. 165-5 at
8). The undisputed material facts further indicate that Plaintiff received medical care shortly after
the tasing incident. (Doc. 165 at ¶¶ 38-39). Plaintiff has not come forward showing there is a
genuine issue for trial on whether Officer Buchanan was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs. See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Officer Buchanan on all claims
raised by Plaintiff.

Sheriff Holder – Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Holder, in his capacity as Sheriff of Dunklin County,
repeatedly exhibited deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. (Doc. 15
at 10-11). Plaintiff specifically claims that he requested medical attention but Sheriff Holder
simply responded that he “doesn’t care about [Plaintiff’s] pains” and Plaintiff should “lay the
fuck down and shut up before [he] comes up missing.” (Id. at 10). As indicated above, the
Constitution protects pretrial detainees from a state actor’s deliberate indifference to their serious
medical needs. Corwin, 829 F.3d at 698 (citation omitted). A deliberate indifference claim has
both objective and subjective components. First, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he had an
objectively serious medical need. “To be objectively serious, a medical need must have been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or must be so obvious that even a layperson

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Jackson, 756 F.3d at 1065
(internal quotations omitted). Second, Plaintiff must establish that Sheriff Holder “actually knew
of but deliberately disregarded his serious medical need,” which requires a mental state “akin to
criminal recklessness.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 425 (8th
Cir. 2017) (applying criminal recklessness standard to subjective component of deliberate
indifference claim).
The Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff can satisfy the objective element and in
fact had an objectively serious medical need. He was tased by Officer Edwards and alleges in the
Amended Complaint that he screamed out for medical attention. See Armstrong, 850 F.3d at 425
(district court reasonably assumed serious medical need where inmate screamed and yelled for

hours). But Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Sheriff Holder – who held a supervisory position as
Sheriff (Doc. 165 at ¶ 2) – actually knew of and disregarded this need. The Eighth Circuit has
recognized that a supervisor can only be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference
when they are “personally involved in the situation or when the supervisor’s corrective inaction
constitutes deliberate indifference towards the violation. The supervisor must know about the
conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what [he or she]
might see.” Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 275 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has not alleged that Sheriff Holder was present for the November 2015 Incident.
Sheriff Holder “did not know of [Plaintiff], never met him, never spoke to him nor received any
correspondence or letters from him.” (Doc. 165 at ¶ 35; Doc. 165-4 at 8). Sheriff Holder only
became aware of the November 2015 Incident after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. (Id. at ¶ 37; Doc.
165-4 at 9). In short, Sheriff Holder had no personal involvement with Plaintiff.
There is no evidence to suggest, moreover, that Sheriff Holder practiced corrective

inaction which amounted to deliberate indifference. The undisputed material facts show Dunklin
County had a medical services contract with Advanced Correctional Health Care (“ACH”). (Doc.
165 at ¶ 32-33; Doc. 165-1 at ¶¶ 6-7). Plaintiff made a sick call request on November 30, 2015,
stating that he “got tased the other day [and] fell” and his “back is hurting.” (Doc. 165-1 at 3, 6).
Plaintiff promptly received care from an ACH nurse on December 2, 2015. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 38).
The nurse prescribed Tylenol for Plaintiff’s back pain. (Id. at ¶ 39). Plaintiff was released from
Dunklin County eight days later. (Id. at ¶ 40). Based on the undisputed material facts before the
Court, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Sheriff Holder was deliberately indifferent
to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The Court will accordingly grant summary judgment in
favor of Sheriff Holder.

Officer Sandefur’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 170)6
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Sandefur used excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution during the October 2016 Incident. Plaintiff
specifically claims that Officer Sandefur pushed him to the booking room floor and “began to
push and swing at” him before placing him in a padded cell. (Doc. 15 at 9). On December 9,
2015, Plaintiff pled guilty to a Class C felony and received a Suspended Execution of Sentence

6 Also pending before the Court is Officer Sandefur’s Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Responses
to Defendant Sandefur’s Requests for Admission. (Doc. 159). Because the Court is granting summary judgment in
favor of Officer Sandefur on all claims raised by Plaintiff, it will deny this motion as moot.
for a five-year prison sentence. (Doc. 172 at ¶¶ 2-4). At the time of the October 2016 Incident,
Plaintiff was confined to Dunklin County on an arrest warrant relating to a suspected violation of
his supervised probation. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-8). Because Plaintiff was a convicted and sentenced
prisoner at the time of the October 2016 Incident, this Court analyzes his excessive force claim
under the Eighth Amendment.7

The Supreme Court has explained that “whenever prison officials stand accused of using
excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the core judicial
inquiry is . . . whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1992); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)
(“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.”). In applying this test, the Eighth Circuit has suggested that courts consider
“the need for the application of physical force; the relationship between the need for physical
force and the amount of force applied; and the extent of injury suffered by the inmate.” Jones v.

Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Officer Sandefur worked as a jailer at Dunklin County from February 2015 to December
2019. (Doc. 172 at ¶ 1). Officer Sandefur was working the 10:00 P.M. – 6:00 A.M. shift on the
night of the October 2016 Incident. (Id. at ¶ 19). That evening, another officer escorted Plaintiff
to the booking room so that Plaintiff could write a statement regarding an altercation with
another inmate. (Id. at ¶ 45). After Plaintiff completed his written statement, Officer Sandefur
ordered him to enter Cell 118, which is adjacent to the booking room. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47). Plaintiff
did not comply despite multiple orders by Officer Sandefur. (Id. at ¶¶ 48-50). Instead, Plaintiff

7 This Court would reach the same conclusion if it were to treat Plaintiff as a pretrial detainee and apply the standard
for excessive force claims raised under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
intentionally handcuffed himself to a metal bar in the booking room and sat on a stool next to
Cell 118. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-57; Doc. 160-1 at 7). An altercation ensued as Plaintiff physically resisted
Officer Sandefur’s attempts to unlock the handcuffs, and Plaintiff still had one free hand during
this altercation. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-67).

Plaintiff slid off the stool, and Officer Sandefur eventually unlocked the handcuffs. (Id. at
¶¶ 69-70). Officer Sandefur ordered Plaintiff to enter Cell 118, but Plaintiff refused and stuck his
chest out toward Officer Sandefur in an aggressive manner. (Id. at ¶¶ 73-74). Officer Sandefur
pushed Plaintiff into Cell 118, but Plaintiff resisted by stiffening his body and placing his foot in
the doorjamb. (Id. at ¶¶ 76-78). Officer Sandefur eventually got Plaintiff into Cell 118 and
locked the door without ever punching, hitting, or kicking him. (Id. at ¶¶ 79-81).
These undisputed facts undoubtedly demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his
excessive force claim against Officer Sandefur as a matter of law. Officer Sandefur applied the
limited force necessary to restore discipline and did not maliciously or sadistically cause harm.
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). Plaintiff clearly posed a threat to Officer Sandefur and

the general orderly operation of the facility when he refused to enter Cell 118, handcuffed
himself to the booking desk, and again refused to enter Cell 118 while physically resisting
Officer Sandefur’s efforts. See Perry v. Martin, No. 4:10-CV-2436 SNLJ, 2013 WL 6331474, at
*3-4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 5, 2013) (granting summary judgment on similar claim where plaintiff
failed to respond to motion or dispute material facts). Officer Sandefur’s use of force was
necessary and appropriate given her objectives and Plaintiff’s recalcitrance. The fact that one of
Plaintiff’s hands was cuffed, by his own doing and contrary to Officer Sandefur’s orders, did not
preclude Officer Sandefur from using appropriate force. See United States v. Pope, 910 F.3d 413,
417 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Handcuffs limit but do not eliminate a person’s ability to perform harmful
acts.”); see also Tubbs v. Tarrant Cty. Sherriff’s Dept., No. 4:97-CV-696-A, 1998 WL 50462, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1998) (holding officers did not use excessive force where inmate
handcuffed himself to desk).
The Court further notes that Plaintiff has not identified any injuries resulting from the

October 2016 Incident. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an “inmate who complains of
a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive
force claim.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38 (internal quotations omitted). Considering all the
undisputed facts before the Court, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Officer
Sandefur applied force “maliciously or sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7
(1992). The Court will accordingly grant Officer Sandefur’s Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment.
In the alternative, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has not administratively exhausted his
claims relating to the October 2016 Incident. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the PLRA exhaustion requirement applies to “particular
episodes” including allegations of excessive use of force. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532
(2002). The exhaustion requirement is “mandatory.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006);
see also Muhammad v. Mayfield, 933 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019).
The “boundaries of proper exhaustion depend on the prison’s specific administrative
requirements.” Townsend v. Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)). At Dunklin County, the Inmate Grievance Process requires that an
inmate (i) complete and sign a grievance form; (ii) appeal if necessary by resubmitting the
grievance to the Jail Administrator; and (iii) file a final appeal if necessary with the Sheriff of
Dunklin County. (Doc. 172 at ¶¶ 82-87; Doc. 172-5 at 3). Every grievance filed by an inmate is
saved in their jail file. (Id. at ¶ 88). Plaintiff filed 31 grievances between August 11, 2016 and

November 21, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 89). None of these grievances concerned the October 2016
Incident. (Id. at ¶¶ 89-90). Therefore, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
relating to the October 2016 Incident and his claims are subject to dismissal under the PLRA.
See Muhammad, 933 F.3d at 1002-03 (holding plaintiff’s exhausted grievances did not relate to,
and therefore did not exhaust, plaintiff’s federal claims).

Qualified Immunity
Each Defendant contends they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 164 at 8-9; Doc.
171 at 18-22). Qualified immunity “protects government officials performing discretionary
functions from liability for damages so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Jenkins v.
Univ. of Minn., 838 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (2016)); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (qualified immunity protects
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”). A claim of qualified
immunity requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a

violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established
at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 989 (8th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted). Defendants “are entitled to qualified immunity unless the answer to
both of these questions is yes.” McCaster v. Clausen, 684 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted).
After careful consideration, the Court has determined that Plaintiff cannot make out a
claim for violation of a constitutional or statutory right by any Defendant. Accordingly,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims raised by Plaintiff, and summary
judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate. See Williams v. Mannis, 889 F.3d 926, 931 (8th

Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (“Qualified immunity is appropriate where no reasonable fact finder
could conclude that the facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff show that the
officers’ conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.”).

IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff filed this suit concerning the November 2015 Incident and October 2016
Incident in March 2018. After substantial developments and a delay caused by the COVID-19
pandemic, Plaintiff ceased participating in this litigation at some point in the second half of
2021. Plaintiff has failed to offer any response to Defendants’ Renewed Motions for Summary
Judgment. (Docs. 163, 170). Consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has therefore waived his claims. The Court has proceeded in the alternative, however,
and substantively considered Defendants’ arguments. Because Plaintiff did not file any response,
Defendants’ Statements of Uncontroverted Material Facts were deemed admitted pursuant to
E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E).
Based on the undisputed facts before the Court, a reasonable factfinder could not

conclude that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated during the October 2015 Incident.
Officer Edwards tased Plaintiff once after Plaintiff bullied other inmates and refused multiple
orders to sit down all while posing a substantial threat to institutional safety. Officer Buchanan
arrived after the tasing occurred and assisted in removing the prongs from Plaintiff’s back.
Plaintiff received medical care from an ACH nurse shortly after placing a request for medical
services. Sheriff Holder had absolutely no involvement with the incident, nor did he have any
relationship with Plaintiff. In these circumstances, Plaintiff has no plausible claim that any of the
November 2015 Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional
rights.

A reasonable factfinder also could not find that Officer Sandefur used excessive force
during the October 2016 Incident. Plaintiff refused various orders before handcuffing himself to
the booking area while maintaining one free hand. Officer Sandefur applied a limited amount of
force necessary to restore order and did not act maliciously or sadistically to cause harm, nor did
she cause Plaintiff meaningful injuries. Plaintiff’s claim against Officer Sandefur is also subject
to dismissal under the PLRA because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Finally, the Court holds that all Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they did
not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Marishia Sandefur’s Motion to Determine
the Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Responses to Defendant Sandefur’s Requests for Admission (Doc.
159) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Bob Holder, Allen Edwards, and Pam
Buchanan’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 163) is GRANTED.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendant Marishia Sandefur’s Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 170) is GRANTED.
A separate Judgment will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 21st day of June, 2022.

/ J OHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10237186. Public record. Not legal advice.