# Stewart v. Stanfeld

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · March 9, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236701

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** March 9, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236701

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's rights
- stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint’
- explaining that inadequate training may serve as the basis for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference”
- explaining that municipal liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
JAMES STEWART, )
Plaintiff,
V. No. 1:21-cv-00183-ACL
BILLY JOLE STANFELD, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff James Stewart for leave to
commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having
reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined
that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing
fee of $37.10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court
will dismiss this action without prejudice.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her
prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial
partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s
account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month
period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00,
until the filing fee is fully paid. /d.
In support of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff has submitted a
copy of his inmate account statement. (Docket No. 5). The account statement shows an average
monthly deposit of $185.50. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $37.10,
which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. /d. at 679. The
court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820
F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8 Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not
required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8" Cir. 2015). However, even
pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of
law. Martin y. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914-15 (8" Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are
not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint’). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not
mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The Complaint
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Pemiscot County
Jail in Caruthersville, Missouri. He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming
the following six defendants: (1) Police Chief Billy Jole Stanfeld; (2) Officer Larry Jared; (3)
Officer John R. Trimm; (4) Nurse Christian Tate; (5) the City of Steele Police Department; and
(6) Correctional Officer Nakita Vower. (Docket No. 1 at 2-4). Defendants Stanfeld, Jared, Trimm,
Tate, and Vower are sued in both their official and individual capacities.
The complaint is on a Court-provided 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form. In the “Statement of Claim”
section, plaintiff has used the space provided to name some of the defendants in this action. His
allegations are presented on three additional sheets of paper that have been attached to the
complaint. To better understand the nature of plaintiff's claims, the Court will go through each of
the pages below.
On the first page, plaintiff asserts that he is “writing due to...passing out” because of his
“diabetics.” (Docket No. ] at 11). When he passed out, he hit his head and “was unresponsive.”

Plaintiff states that “[t]hey then threw me in the holding cell B-6,” and that he cannot provide the
date and time because “[Pemiscot] County deleted [his] grievance form.” There is no indication as
to which defendants were involved in this incident.
On the second page, plaintiff asserts that defendant Jared ran him “off the [road] at gun
point at 3 a.m. for no reason,” and that he robbed him for “300 bucks on” his birthday. (Docket
No. 1 at 12). Plaintiff further states that Jared “put fake” gun charges on him that were later thrown
out by a judge. He also alleges that Jared has been “going around town looking for” him, that Jared
has been “texting [plaintiff's] inbox” and “calling [him] all types of names,” and that Jared has
also been calling his wife and mother looking for him.
As to defendant Trimm, plaintiff asserts that Trimm charged him “with fake [charges] as
well.” He speculates that this occurred because Trimm and “[plaintiff’s] step father have [a drug
business] going” on, and that Trimm “came up short [and] put the blame on” him. Plaintiff also
alleges that Trimm “‘bust[ed] [his] head and burn[ed] down [his] house.” He insists that “[i]t got to
the point that the mayor call[ed] [him] down town [to] ask [him] why” he had not filed “a lawsuit
on them because if not they [were going] to kill” him.
On the third page, plaintiff lists the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of four
purported witnesses for his case. (Docket No. | at 13). He provides no indication as to what they
witnessed.
Plaintiff has left the “Injuries” section of his form complaint blank. (Docket No. 1 at 3).
Nevertheless, he seeks $1 million “or mor[e]” in damages “for unusual punishment and false
imprisonment.” (Docket No. | at 5). Plaintiff also feels that defendants “need to be in jail for the
[false] statement[s]” they made, and for lying in his case.

Discussion
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court must dismiss
this action without prejudice.
A. Steele Police Department
Plaintiff has named the Steele Police Department as a defendant in his action. A police
department, however, is not a distinctly suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Ketchum v. City
of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8 Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of West Memphis
Police Department and West Memphis Paramedic Services because they were “not juridical
entities suable as such”). See also Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8" Cir. 2003)
(stating that “county jails are not legal entities amenable to suit”); and De La Garza v. Kandiyohi
Cty. Jail, 18 Fed. Appx. 436, 437 (8" Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail
and sheriff's department as parties because they are not suable entities). Because it is not suable,
plaintiff's claim against the Steele Police Department must be dismissed.
B. City of Steele
Even if the City of Steele is substituted as a defendant in place of the Steele Police
Department, plaintiff has still failed to state a claim. A local governing body such as the City of
Steele can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To prevail on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish
the governmental entity’s liability for the alleged conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d
1070, 1075 (8 Cir. 2016). Such liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from
(1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure

to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8" Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v.
Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8" Cir. 2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional
policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the
same”). Thus, there are three ways in which plaintiff can prove the liability of the City of Steele.
First, plaintiff can show the existence of an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to
“official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal
official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829
F.3d 695, 700 (8"" Cir. 2016). For a policy that is unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no
other evidence than a statement of the policy and its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, Minn.,
486 F.3d 385, 389 (8" Cir. 2007). However, when “a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is
asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its
employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the
inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by the policymakers.” Jd. at 390.
“A policy may be either a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body.” Angarita v. St. Louis Cty., 981 F.2d 1537,
1546 (8" Cir. 1992).
Second, plaintiff can establish a claim of liability based on an unconstitutional “custom.”
In order to do so, plaintiff must demonstrate:
1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s
employees;
2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct
by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice
to the officials of that misconduct; and

3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental
entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind
the constitutional violation.
Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8" Cir. 2013).
Finally, plaintiff can assert a municipal liability claim by establishing a deliberately
indifferent failure to train or supervise. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989) (explaining that inadequate training may serve as the basis for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability
only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference”). To show deliberate
indifference, a plaintiff must prove that the municipality “had notice that its procedures were
inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights.” See Jennings v. Wentzville
R-IV Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1118, 1122 (8" Cir. 2005). Ordinarily, this is done by a plaintiff alleging
a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” See S.M. v. Lincoln □□□□□
874 F.3d 581, 585 (8 Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or
custom. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8" Cir. 2004).
However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an
unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d
605, 614 (8 Cir. 2003). In this case, plaintiff presents no facts whatsoever to support the
proposition that the City of Steele violated his constitutional rights due to an unconstitutional
policy, custom, or failure to train.
First, with regard to policy, plaintiff has not pointed to any “policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the [City of Steele’s] governing
body” as being at issue in this case, let alone harming him by violating his constitutional rights.
Certainly, he has not alleged facts demonstrating that his rights were violated due to “a deliberate

choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority
regarding such matters.” Instead of presenting facts supporting the inference that the City of Steele
is somehow liable to him, plaintiff's facts — such as they are — focus on the actions of two
individuals.
Second, as to custom, plaintiff has not alleged the “existence of a continuing, widespread,
persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by” City of Steele employees, much less that
Steele policymaking officials were deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized such
misconduct. Rather than a persistent pattern of misconduct, plaintiff has presented vague,
fragmentary, and conclusory facts regarding the actions of two individuals who are supposedly
police officers for the City of Steele. This is not sufficient to assert an unconstitutional custom
attributable to the city.
Third, regarding a failure to train, plaintiff has not shown that the City of Steele was
deliberately indifferent. That is, he has not asserted that the City of Steele “had notice that its
procedures were inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights.” Typically,
this is done by alleging a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” As
noted above, however, plaintiff has not established any sort of pattern of constitutional violations.
Finally, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to hold the City of Steele liable for the actions of
its employees, the Court notes that a municipality cannot be held liable merely because it employs
a tortfeasor. A.H. v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 891 F.3d 721, 728 (8 Cir. 2018) (“In an action under
§ 1983, a municipality...cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory”).
For all these reasons, plaintiff has not stated a claim against the City of Steele. Therefore,
any claim against the City of Steele must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715 F.3d 1054,
1061 (8" Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged

no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused
the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's rights).
C. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has sued defendants Stanfeld, Jared, Trimm, Tate and Vower in their official
capacities. In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the
governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8" Cir. 2017). Thus, a
“suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public
employer.” Johnson y. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8" Cir. 1999). See also
Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8" Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit
against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly, 813 F.3d at
1075 (stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual,
capacities sues only the public employer”); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8"" Cir.
2006) (stating that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against
the entity for which the official is an agent’).
Defendants Stanfeld, Jared, and Trimm are alleged to be employed by the City of Steele.
Thus, the official capacity claims against them are treated as claims against the city itself, their
employer. To prevail, plaintiff must establish the City of Steele’s liability for the alleged conduct.
As discussed at length above, however, plaintiff has not stated a claim against the City of Steele.
Therefore, the official capacity claims against defendants Stanfeld, Jared, and Trimm must be
dismissed.
Meanwhile, defendants Tate and Vower are alleged to be employed by Pemiscot County.
Accordingly, the official capacity claims against them are treated as being made against the county.
To prevail, plaintiff must demonstrate that he was harmed due to a Pemiscot County policy,

custom, or failure to train. See Mick, 883 F.3d at 1079 (explaining that municipal liability may
attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an
unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise”). Plaintiff has not
presented facts supporting the proposition that Pemiscot County had an unconstitutional policy or
custom, or was deliberately indifferent in failing to train or supervise its employees. More to the
point, Pemiscot County is not mentioned anywhere at all in the complaint, other than to note that
defendants Tate and Vower worked at the Pemiscot County Jail. Therefore, the official capacity
claims against Tate and Vower must be dismissed.
D. Individual Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has also sued defendants Stanfeld, Jared, Trimm, Tate and Vower in their
individual capacities. Individual liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. Frederick v.
Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8" Cir. 2017). In other words, “[g]overnment officials are
personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8" Cir.
2015). As such, § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the
deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8" Cir. 2006) (quoting
Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8"" Cir. 1990)). See also Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141,
1149 (8"" Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff's excessive bail claims because none of the defendants
set plaintiff's bail, and therefore, “there can be no causal connection between any action on the
part of the defendants and any alleged deprivation” of plaintiff's rights). To that end, plaintiff must
allege facts connecting each defendant to the challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d
716, 717 (8" Cir. 2019).

10

i. Defendants Stanfeld, Tate, and Vower
Plaintiff has not adequately alleged the personal responsibility of defendants Stanfeld, Tate,
and Vower for violating his constitutional rights. More precisely, plaintiff has not presented any
factual allegations against them at all. Though they appear listed as defendants, they are nowhere
mentioned in plaintiff's “Statement of Claim.” Simply listing an individual as a defendant is not
sufficient to assert their responsibility. See Allen v. Purkett, 5 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8" Cir. 1993)
(agreeing with district court dismissal of two defendants who were named as defendants in the
complaint, but who had no factual allegations made against them); and Krych v. Hvass, 83 Fed.
Appx. 854, 855 (8" Cir. 2003) (agreeing with district court dismissal of defendants who were
merely listed in the complaint, and who were not alleged to have been personally involved in the
constitutional violations). Therefore, the claims against defendants Stanfeld, Tate, and Vower must
be dismissed.
ii. Defendants Jared and Trimm
Plaintiff has made allegations of a sort against defendants Jared and Trimm. However, the
facts he has presented are not sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for the following three
reasons.
a. Failure to Establish Defendants Acted Under Color of Law
First, plaintiff has not demonstrated that Jared and Trimm were acting under color of law.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show (1) that
the defendant(s) acted under color of state law, and (2) that the alleged wrongful conduct deprived
the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected federal right.” Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 848 (8"
Cir. 2010). “Generally speaking, a public employee acts under color of law when he exercises
power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed

11

with the authority of state law.” Johnson v. Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 239-40 (8" Cir. 2011). This
element of a § 1983 claim is satisfied if a defendant acts or purports to act in the performance of
his official duties, even if he oversteps his authority and misuses his power. Dossett v. First State
Bank, 399 F.3d 940, 948 (8" Cir. 2005). However, “[a]cts of officials in the ambit of their personal
pursuits are plainly excluded from Section 1983 liability.” Magee v. Trustees of Hamline Univ.,
Minn., 747 F.3d 532, 535 (8" Cir. 2014).
In this case, plaintiff asserts that both Jared and Trimm are police officers. “[W]hether a
police officer is acting under color of state law turns on the nature and circumstances of the
officer’s conduct and the relationship of that conduct to the performance of his official duties.”
Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213, 1216 (8" Cir. 1997). Without an “actual or purported relationship
between the officer’s conduct and his duties as a police officer, the officer cannot be acting under
color of state law.” Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 900 (8" Cir. 2009). Factors as to
whether a police officer is acting under color of state law include: “whether the officer is on duty
and in uniform, the motivation behind the officer’s actions, whether the officer had access to the
victim because of his position, and whether the officer threatened official conduct in the future.”
Magee, 747 F.3d at 535.
Here, plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated that Jared and Trimm were acting under
color of law when they interacted with him. That is to say, he has not alleged that they were acting
in the performance of their official duties as police officers. For example, plaintiff accuses Jared
of robbing $300 from him on his birthday, but presents no facts to show that Jared took this action
under color of law. Specifically, he does not assert that Jared was on duty and in uniform when the
robbery took place; makes no mention of Jared’s potential motivations; does not assert that Jared

12

had access to him because of Jared’s position; and does not allege that Jared threatened him with
official conduct in the future.
Likewise, plaintiff's allegations against Trimm do not show that Trimm was acting in the
performance of his duties. Quite to the contrary, he suggests that Trimm took action against him
because Trimm “came up short” in his “drugs business.” Furthermore, without further factual
support, the Court cannot find any relationship between Trimm’s purported burning of plaintiff's
house and his duties as a police officer.
Taken as a whole, plaintiff's “Statement of Claim” regarding Jared and Trimm is
fragmentary, conclusory, and lacks any explanatory context. Thus, there is no indication that the
accusations leveled against these defendants — including being run off the road, robbed, assaulted,
and having his house burned — occurred while defendants were in uniform, on duty, and performing
their functions as law enforcement officers. As such, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the first
element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
b. Failure to Establish that Defendants Violated His Constitutional Rights
Relatedly, plaintiff has failed to establish a causal link between the actions taken by Jared
and Trimm and the violation of his federally protected constitutional rights. The paucity of his
facts simply do not plausibly state the existence of a constitutional violation. For instance, without
any additional enhancement, plaintiff writes that “Larry Jared ran [him] off the road at gun point
at 3 a.m. for no reason.” Because plaintiff makes no effort to describe the circumstances, it is
unclear if this took place in the context of a police chase, with Jared driving a patrol car and
attempting to effect an arrest, or whether this was a personal matter having nothing to do with the
execution of Jared’s law enforcement duties. In any event, without additional allegations, plaintiff
has not shown that a potential Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

13

Similarly, plaintiff accuses Trimm of busting him on the head. Aside from this statement,
there is not a single other fact describing the situation in which this occurred. Thus, plaintiff has
not adequately described an act of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
Because plaintiff has not established a causal link demonstrating the liability of Jared and
Trimm, he has failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.
c. Claim Regarding False Charges and False Arrest
Plaintiff has accused both Jared and Trimm of placing false charges against him. With
regard to these particular allegations, the Court can assume that Jared and Trimm were acting under
color of state law. However, plaintiff has provided absolutely no support for his conclusion that
Jared and Trimm indeed falsely accused him, leading to a subsequent false arrest and
imprisonment. That is, plaintiff has not provided even the most minimal factual allegations
showing that Jared and Trimm had him arrested or charged without any supporting probable cause,
or that explains why he believes they put “fake” charges on him.
Instead of providing such facts, plaintiff relies solely on labels and legal conclusions. This
is not sufficient to state a claim. See Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8" Cir.
2002) (“While the court must accept allegations of fact as true...the court is free to ignore legal
conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions
cast in the form of factual allegations”); and Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8" Cir.
2017) (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement”). For this reason as well, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
defendants Jared and Trimm.

14

E. Deliberate Indifference Claim
Aside from the claims against Jared and Trimm, plaintiff also notes that he passed out due
to his diabetes, hit his head, and was placed into a holding cell. To the extent that he is attempting
to state a deliberate indifference claim, however, he has not provided sufficient factual allegations
to demonstrate that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and that any of the
defendants actually knew of and disregarded that need. See Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042
(8 Cir. 2019). See also Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1177 (8" Cir. 2019). That is, plaintiff
has not indicated that any defendants intentionally denied or delayed his access to medical care,
intentionally interfered with his treatment, or intentionally interfered with his prescribed
medication. See Vaughn v. Lacey, 49 F.3d 1344, 1346 (8" Cir. 1995). While he asserts that he
passed out, he does not allege that he passed out because of anything that defendants did or did not
do. Likewise, plaintiff appears to complain that he was placed in a holding cell, but does not
suggest that any required medical treatment was denied to him. For these reasons, plaintiff's
deliberate indifference claim must be dismissed.
F. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Docket No. 3). The motion will be denied
as moot as this case is being dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket
No. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $37.10
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance

15

payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Docket
No. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated this YG day of J a.ne kK , 2022.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236701. Public record. Not legal advice.