# Mostarlic-Ikanovic v. Kijakazi

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · March 11, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236675

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** March 11, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

JASMINA MOSTARLIC-IKANOVIC )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:20-CV-00866-SEP
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of
Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, in which the Social
Security Administration (SSA) redetermined Plaintiff Jasmina Mostarlic-Ikanovic’s eligibility
for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq., and concluded that she was no longer eligible to receive them. Because
there is substantial evidence to support the decision denying benefits, the Court will affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 14, 2010, Plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging that she had been unable to
work due to disability since April 1, 2003. (Tr. 392-95). In a fully favorable decision dated
December 2, 2011, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that as of September 14, 2010,
Plaintiff was disabled due to major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 108-12).
Subsequently, a continuing disability review determined that Plaintiff was no longer disabled as
of August 18, 2017, due to medical improvement related to her ability to work. (Tr. 130).
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ on the non-renewal decision. (Tr. 213-16). On
January 9, 2019, the ALJ held a hearing on Plaintiff’s claim. (Tr. 46-74). In an opinion dated
February 28, 2018, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Tr. 131-

1 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. Pursuant to Rule
25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she is substituted as the Defendant in this case. No further
action is needed for this action to continue. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (last sentence).
152). Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing Decision with the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA) Appeals Council, which reviewed and remanded the decision to the ALJ
for further proceedings (Tr. 153-59). Upon remand, the ALJ held a supplemental hearing on
May 9, 2019. (Tr. 75-103).
In an opinion dated September 30, 2019, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled as
defined in the Act, because medical improvement related to her ability to work occurred as of
August 1, 2017. (Tr. 13-33). Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing Decision with the
Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Appeals Council, and on April 30, 2020, the SSA’s
Appeals Council denied her Request for Review. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff has exhausted all
administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
As to Plaintiff’s testimony and medical records, the Court accepts the facts as provided
by the parties.
II. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ACT
To be eligible for benefits under the Act, a claimant must prove he or she is disabled.
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Act defines as disabled a person who is unable
“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A);
1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010). The impairment
must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he
would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Where, as here, a claimant has previously been determined disabled, their continued
entitlement to benefits must be periodically reviewed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.994. If there has
been medical improvement related to the ability to work, and the claimant is now able to engage
in substantial gainful activity, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate. Id. See also Phillips
v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 623, 626; Nelson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 1314, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991). In order
to determine whether a claimant continues to be disabled, the ALJ must engage in a multi-step
evaluation process that may involve up to the following eight steps:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity, (2) if
not, whether the disability continues because the claimant's impairments meet or
equal the severity of a listed impairment, (3) whether there has been a medical
improvement, (4) if there has been medical improvement, whether it is related to the
claimant's ability to work, (5) if there has been no medical improvement or if the
medical improvement is not related to the claimant's ability to work, whether any
exception to medical improvement applies, (6) if there is medical improvement and
it is shown to be related to the claimant's ability to work, whether all of the claimant's
current impairments in combination are severe, (7) if the current impairment or
combination of impairments is severe, whether the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform any of his past relevant work activity, and (8) if the
claimant is unable to do work performed in the past, whether the claimant can
perform other work.

Koch v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 656, 661–62 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Dixon v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 997,
1000–01 (8th Cir. 2003).
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
Applying the foregoing analysis, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, and right knee
patellofemoral syndrome with Baker’s cyst (Tr. 19); and that Plaintiff does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 15). The ALJ found that
medical improvement occurred on August 1, 2017, and that such improvement was related to her
ability to work. (Tr. 18-19). The ALJ determined that after that date, Plaintiff had the RFC to
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), except that she should avoid
jobs that require the use of her bilateral upper extremities for work above shoulder level; she
should avoid jobs that require ambulating on unimproved terrain (such as open fields and
construction sites, though normal office flooring surfaces would be acceptable); that would
expose her to whole body vibration (such as operating heavy equipment either on-road or off-
road, including the use of jack hammers), and should avoid operation of any foot controls with
her bilateral lower extremities. (Tr. 22-23). Furthermore, the RFC limited Plaintiff to simple
and/or repetitive work in jobs that do not require close interaction with the public (in the sense
that she should not perform jobs in which a significant part of her job duties would be to meet or
greet or be in contact with the general public – such as would be required in customer service or
retail sales jobs – though incidental, infrequent contact with the public would be acceptable). Id.
She was also limited to jobs that do not require close interaction with coworkers (in the sense
that she should not perform jobs that require coworkers to get together to determine work duties,
or related matters). Id. Finally, the RFC limited her to jobs that generally could be performed
after demonstration. Id.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (Tr. 32). But considering
Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience, and in reliance on the testimony of a vocational
expert (VE), the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be able to perform occupations including egg
processor (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) No. 559.687-034, sedentary exertion level,
27,000 jobs in the national economy), lens inserter (DOT No. 713.687-026, sedentary exertion
level, 12,000 jobs in the national economy), and circuit board assembler (DOT No. 726.684-110,
sedentary exertion level, 68,000 jobs in the national economy). (Tr. 23). Consequently, the ALJ
concluded that due to medical improvement related to her ability to work, Plaintiff was no longer
disabled, as defined in the Act, from August 1, 2017, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 24).
IV. STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it complies with the relevant legal
requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Pate-Fires v. Astrue,
564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). “Under
the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks
whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.”
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough
that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Pate-
Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. See also Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (“Substantial evidence . . . means—
and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’”) (quoting Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court considers both evidence that supports that decision and evidence that detracts from that
decision. Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 2012). However, the Court “‘do[es]
not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ, and [it] defer[s] to the ALJ’s determinations
regarding the credibility of testimony, as long as those determinations are supported by good
reasons and substantial evidence.’” Id. at 1064 (quoting Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890,
894 (8th Cir. 2006)). “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two
inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s
findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.” Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 860, 863 (8th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005)).
V. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision, asserting that the ALJ failed to properly consider
the longitudinal medical evidence regarding her mental health and related limitations, and that
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was no longer disabled as
of August 1, 2017. Defendant argues that the ALJ’s analysis was consistent with the Act and all
applicable regulations, policies, and caselaw, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination that medical improvement had occurred.
As described above, this Court’s role is to determine whether the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g);
1383(c)(3); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Pate-Fire, 564 F.3d at 942; Estes, 275 F.3d at 724. As
long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the decision, this Court may not
reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a
contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v.
Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001).
The Court has reviewed the entire transcript and the parties’ briefs. Based on a careful
review of the record, and for the reasons stated in the ALJ’s lengthy and well-reasoned opinion
and in the Government’s brief, the Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal to be without
merit and further finds that the record as a whole reflects substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s decision. See Sledge v. Astrue, 364 Fed. App’x 307 (8th Cir. 2010) (district court
summarily affirmed the ALJ).
The Court acknowledges that the record contains conflicting evidence, and the ALJ could
have reached a different conclusion. However, this Court’s task is not to reweigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ. The ALJ’s weighing of the evidence here fell within the available “zone of
choice,” and the Court cannot disturb that decision merely because it might have reached a
different conclusion. See Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011).
VI. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ made a proper
determination based on a fully and fairly developed record. Consequently, the Court determines
that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.

Dated this 11™ day of March, 2022.

til Ly □□
SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236675. Public record. Not legal advice.