# Wess v. Dunn

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · February 17, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236540

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** February 17, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236540

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that police officer had duty to intervene to prevent the excessive use of force where the officer was aware of the abuse and the duration of the episode was sufficient to permit an inference of tacit collaboration
- affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights
- stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- explaining that inadequate training may serve as the basis for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

KOREY MAURICE WESS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:21-cv-01281-HEA
)
SCOT DUNN, )
)
Defendant. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff Korey Maurice Wess’s amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below,
the Court will dismiss the claim against the Maryland Heights Police Department. However, the
Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue process on Sergeant Scot Dunn and Officer Andrew
Heimberger in their individual capacities.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The
court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820
F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not
required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should
construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even
pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of
law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are
not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not
mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes

by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Background
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Eastern Reception,
Diagnostic and Correctional Center in Bonne Terre, Missouri. On October 25, 2021, he filed a
civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Sergeant Scot Dunn of the Maryland Heights
Police Department as the sole defendant. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff alleged that Sergeant Dunn
committed excessive force against him during the course of his arrest. Sergeant Dunn was sued in
an official capacity only. (Docket No. 1 at 2).
In his “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserted that on September 2, 2021, he was inside of
a residence when Sergeant Dunn kicked in the door, pointed his service weapon at him, and ordered
him to get on the ground. (Docket No. 1 at 3). Initially, plaintiff refused to comply with Sergeant
Dunn’s command. (Docket No. 1 at 4). Officer Andy Heimberger then “appeared at the door to
back Sergeant Dunn up,” whereupon Sergeant Dunn again ordered plaintiff to get on the ground.

At this point, plaintiff stated that he put his “hands up in surrender, turned [his] back on
the two officers and [lay] on the kitchen floor of the [residence].” According to plaintiff, “Sergeant
Dunn then acted as if he were handcuffing [him] and put [his] right arm behind [his] back until it
crossed the back of [his] body and forced [his] upper body to face him.” Sergeant Dunn then
allegedly “punched [plaintiff] 3 times in the face, knocking out 2 of [his] teeth and [splitting his]
upper lip,” which required stitches. Next, Sergeant Dunn “turned [plaintiff] back over and began
trying to slam [his] face into the concrete floor.”
As a result of this incident, plaintiff stated that he lost two teeth and required two stitches
for his split lip. He sought total damages of $10,075,000. (Docket No. 1 at 6).
Along with the complaint, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

(Docket No. 2). The Court granted the motion and assessed an initial partial filing fee. (Docket
No. 11). Because plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court also reviewed his complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, the Court determined the complaint was subject to
dismissal, as plaintiff had not stated an official capacity claim against Sergeant Dunn.
Taking into consideration plaintiff’s status as a self-represented litigant, the Court did not
dismiss the case outright. Rather, plaintiff was instructed to file a written supplement to his
complaint indicating whether or not he intended to sue Sergeant Dunn in an individual capacity.
He was advised to sign the supplement and return it to the Court within thirty days. Plaintiff was
told that his failure to comply would result in the Court proceeding with its 28 U.S.C. § 1915
review and treating Sergeant Dunn as being sued in his official capacity only.
Plaintiff complied with the Court’s order by filing a signed, written supplement to the
complaint. (Docket No. 15). In the supplement, plaintiff explained that he “misunderstood the
capacity question” and that he intended to sue Sergeant Dunn “in his individual capacity only.”

On February 16, 2022, the Court received an amended complaint. (Docket No. 16).
The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and names the
Richmond Heights Police Department, Sergeant Scot Dunn, and Officer Andrew Heimberger as
defendants. (Docket No. 16 at 1). Sergeant Dunn and Officer Heimberger are sued in their
individual capacities only. (Docket No. 16 at 2-3). The amended complaint raises Fourth
Amendment claims of excessive force and failure to intervene.
In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that on September 2, 2021, Sergeant Dunn
kicked in the door of the residence at 176 Plum, and “pointed his service weapon at” plaintiff.
(Docket No. 16 at 3). Sergeant Dunn “advised [plaintiff] to lay on the floor,” but plaintiff refused

due to “broken glass on the floor” in the area where he was standing. (Docket No. 16 at 3-4).
Immediately after plaintiff’s refusal, Officer Heimberger appeared in the door to back up
Sergeant Dunn. (Docket No. 16 at 4). Sergeant Dunn again advised plaintiff to get on the floor.
Plaintiff “put [his] hands up in surrender with [his] palms facing the two officers, turned [his] back
on the two officers, and [lay] on the kitchen floor.”
According to plaintiff, Sergeant Dunn “acted as if he were handcuffing [plaintiff] and
placed [plaintiff’s] right arm behind [his] back until it crossed the back of [his] body and forced
the right side of [his] upper body to turn and face [Dunn].” Sergeant Dunn then allegedly “punched
[plaintiff] three times in the face,” which knocked out two upper teeth, loosened two more, and
split his upper lip, requiring stitches. Next, Sergeant Dunn tried “to slam [plaintiff’s] face into the
concrete floor,” though plaintiff “used [his] neck muscles as long as [he] could to prevent [his]
face from hitting the floor.” (Docket No. 16 at 5). Eventually, plaintiff was able to move his left
arm under his forehead, allowing Sergeant Dunn to slam his “forehead into [his] forearm instead

of the concrete floor.”
While plaintiff was being punched by Sergeant Dunn, he alleges that Officer Heimberger
stood about two feet away and watched. (Docket No. 16 at 6). Plaintiff claims that Officer
Heimberger did not make any verbal or physical attempts to prevent Sergeant Dunn from punching
him. (Docket No. 16 at 6-7). When Sergeant Dunn began trying to slam plaintiff’s head into the
floor, Officer Heimberger “again stood by and did nothing,” even though he “was very well aware
that excessive force was being used.” (Docket No. 16 at 7).
As a result of this incident, plaintiff states that he sustained the loss of two upper front
teeth, that two of his upper teeth were loosened, and that his lip was split, requiring two stitches.
(Docket No. 16 at 4). He is seeking a total of $1,275,000 in damages. (Docket No. 16 at 10).

Discussion
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, accusing defendants of excessive force and failure to intervene. Because he is proceeding
in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Based
on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss the claim against the
Maryland Heights Police Department. However, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue
process on Sergeant Dunn in his individual capacity as to plaintiff’s claim of excessive force, and
on Officer Heimberger in his individual capacity as to plaintiff’s claim of failure to intervene.
A. Claim Against Maryland Heights Police Department
It is not entirely clear whether plaintiff intended to name the Maryland Heights Police
Department as a defendant in this action. While the Maryland Heights Police Department is listed
in the case caption, plaintiff does not mention it in the section of the form complaint for identifying

the parties. In any event, to the extent that plaintiff is suing the Maryland Heights Police
Department, the claim must be dismissed. A police department is a department or subdivision of
local government, and not a distinctly suable entity. See Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark.,
974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of West Memphis Police Department and West
Memphis Paramedic Services because they were “not juridical entities suable as such”). See also
Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that “county jails are not
legal entities amenable to suit”); and De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 Fed. Appx. 436, 437
(8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department as parties
because they are not suable entities). Therefore, any claim against the Maryland Heights Police
Department must be dismissed.

Even if the City of Maryland Heights was substituted as the proper party, plaintiff has not
stated a municipal liability claim. A local governing body such as the City of Maryland Heights
can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, a municipality cannot be held liable merely because it
employs a tortfeasor. A.H. v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 891 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2018) (“In an action
under § 1983, a municipality…cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory”). Rather, to
prevail on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish the governmental entity’s liability for the
alleged conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016). Such liability
may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an
unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,
883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir.
2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a
theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Thus, there are three ways in

which plaintiff can prove the liability of the City of Maryland Heights.
First, plaintiff can show the existence of an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to
“official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal
official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829
F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2016). For a policy that is unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no
other evidence than a statement of the policy and its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, Minn.,
486 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 2007). However, when “a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is
asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its
employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the
inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by the policymakers.” Id. at 390.

“A policy may be either a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body.” Angarita v. St. Louis Cty., 981 F.2d 1537,
1546 (8th Cir. 1992).
Second, plaintiff can establish a claim of liability based on an unconstitutional “custom.”
In order to do so, plaintiff must demonstrate:
1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s
employees;

2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct
by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice
to the officials of that misconduct; and
3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental
entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind
the constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2013).
Finally, plaintiff can assert a municipal liability claim by establishing a deliberately
indifferent failure to train or supervise. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989) (explaining that inadequate training may serve as the basis for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability
only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference”). To show deliberate
indifference, a plaintiff must prove that the municipality “had notice that its procedures were
inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights.” See Jennings v. Wentzville
R-IV Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1118, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005). Ordinarily, this is done by a plaintiff alleging
a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” See S.M. v. Lincoln Cty.,
874 F.3d 581, 585 (8th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or
custom. See Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004).
However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an
unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d
605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003). Here, plaintiff has not presented facts sufficient to support the proposition
that he was harmed due to an unconstitutional policy, custom, or failure to train on the part of the
City of Maryland Heights.
First, plaintiff does not point to any “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body” as being at issue in this
case. Certainly, he does not allege that excessive force was used against him due to “a deliberate
choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the [City of Maryland Heights] official who
has final authority regarding such matters.” Instead, plaintiff’s facts concern the personal actions
of two law enforcement officers during a single incident of alleged excessive force. The Court
cannot infer the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom from a single occurrence. See
Wedemeier v. City of Ballwin, Mo., 931 F.2d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1991).

Second, plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of an unconstitutional custom, as his
facts do not show “a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by”
City of Maryland Heights employees, much less that policymaking officials have been deliberately
indifferent to or tacitly authorized such misconduct. Rather than a persistent pattern, plaintiff has
described only a solitary incident. As noted above, the Court cannot infer the existence of an
unconstitutional custom from one occurrence.
Third, plaintiff has not shown that the City of Maryland Heights was deliberately
indifferent in training or supervising its employees, as he has not shown that the city “had notice
that its procedures were inadequate and likely to result in a violation of constitutional rights.”
Typically, notice is demonstrated by alleging a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees.” Plaintiff has not established the presence of any sort of pattern, but has
confined his facts to a single occurrence.
Finally, to the extent that plaintiff might seek to hold Maryland Heights responsible for the
actions of one of its employees, the Court notes that respondeat superior is not available in a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action. See A.H., 891 F.3d at 728 (“In an action under § 1983, a
municipality…cannot be liable on a respondeat superior theory”).
For all these reasons, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the liability of the City of Maryland
Heights. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff is attempting to sue the City of Maryland Heights,
the claim must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2013)
(affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his
complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the alleged
deprivation of plaintiff’s rights).
B. Individual Capacity Claim Against Sergeant Dunn

Plaintiff has sued Sergeant Dunn in his individual capacity, alleging that Dunn used
excessive force against him during the course of his arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
“The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from being seized through excessive force by law
enforcement officers.” Thompson v. City of Monticello, Ark., 894 F.3d 993, 998 (8th Cir. 2018).
See also Andrews v. Fuoss, 417 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The right to be free from excessive
force is included under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the
person”); and Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000) (“The Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person applies to excessive-force claims that arise
in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen”). The violation of this right is
sufficient to support an action under § 1983. Crumley v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 324 F.3d 1003,
1007 (8th Cir. 2003).

Whether force is excessive under the Fourth Amendment requires a determination of
whether or not law enforcement officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Ellison v. Lesher, 796 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2015). Factors that are relevant to the reasonableness
of an officer’s conduct include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Burnikel v. Fong, 886 F.3d 706, 710 (8th Cir. 2018).
In this case, plaintiff states that Sergeant Dunn kicked in the door to a residence, pointed
his gun at plaintiff, and ordered plaintiff on the ground. Plaintiff initially refused, but complied
with Sergeant Dunn’s second command. While plaintiff was on the floor, Sergeant Dunn acted as
though he was going to handcuff him, but instead crossed plaintiff’s arm behind his back until it

forced plaintiff to turn and face Dunn. At that point, plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Dunn punched
him three times in the face, knocking out two of his teeth. Then, Sergeant Dunn tried to slam
plaintiff’s face into the floor, though plaintiff asserts that he was able to cushion these blows with
his forearm. According to plaintiff, all this occurred after he had put his hands in the air,
surrendered himself, and lowered himself to the ground in compliance with Sergeant Dunn’s
command. The Court must accept these facts as true, and make all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor. See Jones v. Douglas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 915 F.3d 498, 499 (8th Cir. 2019).
Therefore, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue process on Sergeant Dunn in his
individual capacity as to plaintiff’s claim of excessive force.
C. Individual Capacity Claim Against Officer Heimberger

Plaintiff has sued Officer Heimberger in his individual capacity, alleging that Heimberger
failed to intervene to stop Sergeant Dunn from using excessive force. Under the Fourth
Amendment, a police officer may be held liable for failing to intervene to prevent the
unconstitutional use of force by another officer. Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 612 (8th Cir.
2009). “To establish a failure to intervene claim, however, the plaintiff must show that the officer
observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used.” Hollingsworth
v. City of St. Ann, 800 F.3d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 2015). See also Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557,
565 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that police officer had duty to intervene to prevent the excessive
use of force where the officer was aware of the abuse and the duration of the episode was sufficient
to permit an inference of tacit collaboration); and White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1081 (8th Cir.
2017) (stating that in Fourth Amendment excessive force context, a police officer may be liable
for failing to intervene “where the officer is aware of the abuse and the duration of the episode is
sufficient to permit an inference of tacit collaboration”).

In this case, plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Dunn ordered him to the floor, acted as though
he was going to handcuff him, punched him in the face three times, and tried to slam his head into
the ground. While this occurred, plaintiff asserts that Officer Heimberger was only two feet away,
that Officer Heimberger witnessed Sergeant Dunn’s actions, and that Officer Heimberger did not
say or do anything to stop Sergeant Dunn, even though he was in a position to do so. The Court
must accept these allegations as true, and make all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See
Jones, 915 F.3d at 499. Therefore, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue process on
Officer Heimberger in his individual capacity as to plaintiff’s claim of failure to intervene.
D. Motion to Reassess Initial Partial Filing Fee
The Court has received a letter from plaintiff that has been construed as a motion to reassess

his initial partial filing fee. (Docket No. 14). In the motion, plaintiff states that he only receives
$5.00 a month now that he has been transferred to the Missouri Department of Corrections. As
such, he cannot afford to pay the initial partial filing fee. In support of the motion, plaintiff has
submitted a Department of Corrections account summary. (Docket No. 17). Having reviewed the
motion, the Court will order plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1).
E. Motion for Extension of Time
Plaintiff has filed a motion for an extension of time in which to file his inmate account
statement. (Docket No. 18). The motion will be denied as moot as plaintiff has submitted an
account statement to the Court and an initial partial filing fee has been assessed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to reassess his initial partial filing fee
(Docket No. 14) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time in which to
submit his inmate account statement (Docket No. 18) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s claim against the Maryland Heights Police
Department is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order
of partial dismissal will be entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process
to issue on defendant Scot Dunn in his individual capacity as to plaintiff’s claim of excessive force,
and on defendant Andrew Heimberger in his individual capacity as to plaintiff’s claim of failure
to intervene.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this partial dismissal would not be
taken in good faith.
Dated this 17" day of February, 2022. 2 ip

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10236540. Public record. Not legal advice.