# Engel v. ERDCC

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · February 3, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10234404

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** February 3, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10234404

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- stating that district court erred in allowing plaintiff to proceed against state university for injunctive relief, and remanding matter to district court for dismissal

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSEPH MICHAEL DEVON ENGEL, )
Plaintiff,
Vv. No. 4:20-cv-01817-ACL
ERDCC, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Joseph Michael Devon Engel for
leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 3).
Based on the financial information provided by plaintiff, the motion will be granted, and the Court
will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the
reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her
prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial
partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s
account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month
period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 -

U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00,
until the filing fee is fully paid. Jd.
Plaintiff has not submitted a prison account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2). Nevertheless, having reviewed the information provided by plaintiff, the Court will
require him to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484
(8 Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison
account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever
information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”). If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial
partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his prison account statement in support of his claim.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of mieconiices Asherofty. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Jd. at 679. The
court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820
F.3d 958, 964 (8" Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8" Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not
required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit
of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction”
means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the
plaintif?s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d777, 787 (8" Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints
are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8%
Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just
because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition,
affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural
rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The Complaint
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Eastern Reception,
Diagnostic, and Correctional Center (ERDCC) in Bonne Terre, Missouri. Since September 9,
2020, he has filed over 130 cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri.
Plaintiff brings the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint is
handwritten on a Court-provided form, and names the ERDCC and the Missouri Department of
Corrections as defendants. (Docket No. 2 at 1). In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff alleges that
his right to religious freedom under the First Amendment was violated on November 4, 2020,
because he was not given his religious diet and certain unspecified religious material. (Docket No.
2 at 3). By way of explanation, he states that he practices “Astru/Odinism/Catholicism,” and that

3 \

requires “big meals[,] healthy meals[,] white meats, wheats, regular food [and] fresher food.”
He further notes that he has a “bad digestive system,” and cannot “do beans.”
Due to this, plaintiff asserts that he has suffered injuries to his freedom, mental health, and
physical health. He is seeking $650 billion in damages, along with 1,000,000 in stocks in various
countries, corporations, and commodities. (Docket No. 2 4).
Discussion
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
naming the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC as defendants. The Missouri
Department of Corrections is a department of the State of Missouri, while the ERDCC is a state
correctional facility. Thus, the claims against these defendants are treated the same as claims
against the State of Missouri itself. The claims fail for two reasons. First, the State of Missouri is
not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, the State of Missouri is protected by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
i. State is Not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “Person”
“Section 1983 provides for an action against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law,
of another’s civil rights.” McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8" Cir. 2008). See also Deretich
v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8 Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides
a cause of action against persons only”). However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacity are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989). See also Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8 Cir. 2017) (asserting that a “State
is not a person under § 1983”); and Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8" Cir. 2016)
(explaining that “a state is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”).

Here, as noted above, plaintiff has sued both the Missouri Department of Corrections and
the ERDCC. These claims are treated as being made against the State of Missouri. However, a
state is not a “person” for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for money damages, which is what
plaintiff is seeking. Because the state is not a “person,” plaintiff is missing an essential element of
a § 1983 action. Therefore, the claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections and the
ERDCC must be dismissed.
ii. Sovereign Immunity
“Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent.”
Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh Amendment
has been held to confer immunity on an un-consenting state from lawsuits brought in federal court
by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63
(1974). See also Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8" Cir. 2018) (“The Eleventh
Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal court”); Dover
Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars
private parties from suing a state in federal court’’); and Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d
615, 618-19 (8 Cir. 1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one
of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment”). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind of
relief, not merely monetary damages. Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8" Cir.
2007) (stating that district court erred in allowing plaintiff to proceed against state university for
injunctive relief, and remanding matter to district court for dismissal).
There are two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the
Eleventh Amendment. Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8 Cir. 1992). “The first

exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such
immunity by clear and unmistakable language.” Jd. The second exception is when a state waives
its immunity to suit in federal court. Jd. at 65. A state will be found to have waived its immunity
“only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the
text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987). Neither exception is applicable in this case.
The first exception is inapplicable, because the Supreme Court has determined that § 1983
does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Will, 491
U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established
immunity of a State from being sued without its consent”); and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to believe...that Congress intended by the general
language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States”). The second
exception is also inapplicable, because the State of Missouri has not waived its sovereign immunity
in this type of case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.600 (explaining that sovereign immunity is in effect,
and providing exceptions).
Here, plaintiff has named the Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC as
defendants. As noted above, however, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its
agencies for both monetary and injunctive relief. Furthermore, no exceptions to sovereign
immunity are present in this case. Therefore, for this reason as well, plaintiff's claims against the
Missouri Department of Corrections and the ERDCC must be dismissed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 3) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00
within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance
payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated this day of [ebrmens , 2021,

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10234404. Public record. Not legal advice.