# Brown v. Adams and Associates, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · December 15, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10234161

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** December 15, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10234161

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting, in an ADEA case, that a defendant’s explanation, if not worthy of credence, is “probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.” (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000))
- discussing Missouri’s shift from the contributing to motivating factor standard
- noting that evidence showing the defendant’s explanation for adverse action is not credible can serve as support for a retaliatory motive

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

MARILYN BROWN, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 4:19-cv-01864-MTS
)
ADAMS AND ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., )
)
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff LaShanté Wade was hired by Defendant Adams and Associates (“Adams”) in
October 2016. Adams is a Job Corps Center Operator, contracting with the United States
Department of Labor to run various Job Corps Centers in the United States. Adams operated the
St. Louis Job Corps Center (the “Center”) for the entirety of Wade’s employment there. In June
2017, Wade played a role in reporting a claim of sexual harassment against Timothy Chambers,
the Center’s director at the time. She was fired in August 2017 because, her supervisors claim,
she was insubordinate and her work performance was unsatisfactory. Wade then filed this action,
claiming that Adams and Defendant Timothy Chambers violated the Missouri Human Rights Act
(“MHRA”), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010–213.137, by firing her in retaliation for reporting the sexual
harassment claim against Chambers. Defendants now move for summary judgment on Wade’s
retaliation claim. The Motion is fully briefed and ready for adjudication. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion.
I. Background
Job Corps Centers provide educational and career-oriented services for young individuals.
On October 10, 2016, Adams hired Wade to the position of admissions supervisor at the Center.
Wade’s tasks in that position included improving enrollment, meeting arrival goals, recruiting the
Center’s students, and supervising admissions counselors. Docs. [73-3], [78] ¶¶ 7, 9. In this
position, Wade reported to both the admissions director and the Center director. Dwayne Barefield
served as the admissions director from the date Wade was hired until he left the Center in July
2017, after which Crystal Frizzell Heimback assumed the same role for the remainder of Wade’s

employment at Adams. Timothy Chambers was hired as the Center director in January 2017 and
remained in that role through the time of Wade’s firing.
Around early June 2017, an admissions counselor supervised by Wade made a complaint
to Wade and Barefield that Chambers had inappropriately harassed her. Doc. [78] ¶ 35. Barefield
reported the employee’s complaint to Rodney Butler, a corporate executive director at Adams,
around June 1, 2017. Id. ¶ 36. Shortly thereafter, Butler came to the Center and asked Barefield
and Wade to prepare a jointly written statement about the employee’s complaint, which they did.
Id. ¶ 37. Butler additionally spoke with the employee and Chambers about the complaint. After
Butler collected this information, Adams apparently conducted an investigation of the employee’s

claims against Chambers but could not “substantiate the complaint.” Doc. [67-6]. Chambers was
unaware of Wade’s involvement in the complaint against him at this time. Docs. [81-4] at 107:11–
108:21, [91] ¶¶ 180–81.
In July 2017, Adams looked to hire a replacement for Barefield, who had been planning to
leave the Center since early 2017. Doc. [78] ¶ 40. Barefield agreed to work at Adams until his
replacement was found. Wade interviewed to replace Barefield as admissions director, but
Chambers instead selected Heimback, an outside hire, for the position. Id. ¶¶ 44–45. Heimback
started in mid-July 2017. Barefield stayed at the Center for at least two weeks after Heimback’s
hiring to help transition Heimback into her new role. Id. ¶ 47. Afterward, though Barefield left
the Center, he remained an Adams employee and currently works at a different Job Corps Center
run by Adams. Id. ¶ 48.
After starting at Adams, Heimback felt that Wade and the admissions counselors Wade
supervised were unprofessional, apparently leading Heimback to believe Wade was not setting a
good example. Docs. [67-4] at 33–36, [78-2] at 5–6. Specifically, Heimback testified that (1) one

employee slammed an office door in her face; (2) another refused to shake Heimback’s hand and
suggested he or she would not report to her; (3) she led a meeting where admissions team members
were disrespectful to her in a variety of ways; and (4) one counselor mocked Heimback for being
a vegetarian. Doc. [73] ¶¶ 50–55. According to Heimback, Wade did not reprimand her
counselors for any of these actions. Id. ¶¶ 52–53, 55–56. Wade, meanwhile, contends that none
of this occurred, or in any case, she did not observe any such behavior. See Docs. [78-7] ¶¶ 7–9,
14–15, 17–19, [78] ¶¶ 50–51. In her deposition, she further claimed that “[w]hen Ms. Heimback
asked for my help, I provided it,” and she never refused to do anything Heimback asked her to do.
Id. ¶¶ 5, 12; see also Doc. [78-2] at 43:12–44:2.

Shortly after assuming her new position, Heimback provided Wade with a letter detailing
her expectations. Doc. [80] ¶ 338. Wade wrote “unrealistic” next to one of the listed expectations,
id., which Heimback claims she found “very unprofessional.” Doc. [67-4] at 27–28. Heimback
also testified that Wade “refused to sign or acknowledge” the letter of expectations. Doc. [73]
¶ 67. But Wade disputes this, saying that she never refused to sign the letter and in fact discussed
it with Heimback. Doc. [78] ¶ 67, [79-2] at 133:10–25. Then, around August 2, 2017, Chambers
gave Wade a written warning because of a “continued failure to achieve assigned file submittal
quotas,” which was, according to the letter, adversely affecting the Center. Doc. [73-9]. The
warning made no mention of any of the claimed insubordination issues. See id. A week later, on
August 9, Wade responded to the written warning, sending a copy of her response to Chambers
and Kim LaGrand-Moorehead, an Adams HR manager who started working at Adams in July
2017. Docs. [73-10], [91] ¶ 23. In the response, Wade suggested that understaffing played a role
in the file deficit cited in the warning. In doing so, she noted that one of her employees “abruptly
resigned on June 5th” due to sexual harassment in the workplace, disclosing that she and Barefield

had reported the complaint to Butler, though not mentioning who the employee had accused or
any other details. Id.
There was an incident on August 10, 2017 where Wade left the Center for four hours.
Heimback testified that Wade did not answer her cell phone and that when she returned she could
not provide a reason explaining her absence. Wade disputes this, asserting that she was at a
required outreach event with another employee, which she told Heimback when she arrived back
at the Center. Compare Doc. [67-4] at 57:23–58:6 with Doc. [79-2] at 177:14–178:16. Wade
further testified that her shared calendar reflected the outreach event, which would have provided
Heimback with advance notice that she would be at the event. Doc. [79-2] at 177:14–178:16.

Another disputed incident occurred on August 15, 2017, when numerous former Job Corps
students who were reapplying to the program did not show up for required meetings with
Chambers. Doc. [78] ¶ 80. There is a disagreement as to how Wade explained these absences.
Heimback testified that Wade simply told her that the counselors “didn’t know about the meetings”
and thus did not schedule them; however, Heimback claimed that the admissions counselors told
her the students were just no shows. Doc. [67-4] at 58:7–2, 130:6–15. Heimback apparently
viewed Wade’s explanations for the absences as Wade “lying” and “being deceitful,” as it was her
responsibility to ensure the students showed up for these meetings. Id. at 128:11, 130:19–131:17.
But Wade testified that her explanation for the absences was consistent with what the admissions
counselors told Heimback. Doc. [79-2] at 179:19–180:19.
In a memorandum dated August 15, 2017 and sent to LaGrand-Moorehead, Heimback
requested to fire Wade. Doc. [73-11]. In support of the request, Heimback stated Wade was
“insubordinat[e]” in front of other staff and specifically noted the following disputed events: (1)

her claim that Wade “refused to sign the letter of expectation;” (2) Wade’s August 10 absence, for
which Heimback claimed Wade “was unable to provide substantive accountability as to her
whereabouts and activities;” and (3) Wade’s explanations for the August 15 incident, which
Heimback called “intentionally deceitful.” Id. Around the same time, Heimback, Chambers, and
LaGrand-Moorehead jointly submitted a recommendation to the corporate office to fire Wade,
grounding the recommendation in Wade’s lack of improvement in performance and stating that
Wade was “not a good fit” for the Center. Doc. [73-12]. It appears that the recommendation to
fire Wade was a joint effort among Heimback, Chambers, and LaGrand-Moorehead, see Docs.
[78] ¶ 91 and [80-2] at 65:4–7, though Heimback initiated the decision, Doc. [91] ¶ 354.

Elizabeth McSweyn, a corporate HR manager, received the recommendation to fire Wade.
In an August 16 email, she asked LaGrand-Moorehead to amend the recommendation to clarify
that Wade’s firing was based on insubordination. Doc. [73-14] at 1–2. This was apparently
because the recommendation originally summarized that Wade “ha[d] not improved her
performance,” which, according to McSweyn’s email, may not alone have warranted firing Wade,
while insubordination did. Id. In that email, McSweyn articulated that she did not “want to open
the door for performance concerns and a second chance.” Id. That same day, Chambers,
Heimback, LaGrand-Moorehead, and McSweyn signed a revised recommendation providing
insubordination as the basis for the decision. Corporate approved the request to fire Wade on
August 17, 2017. Docs. [73-13], [78] ¶ 100. Wade subsequently brought this suit, arguing that
Defendants violated the MHRA by firing her for reporting the employee’s sexual harassment
complaint.
II. Legal Standards
“A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party shows that there

are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Bedford v. Doe, 880 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The movant
bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and must
identify the portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.” Id. at 996; accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude” summary judgment. Wierman v. Casey’s

Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 1002 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248).
The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Where
there is sufficient evidence supporting a factual dispute, it is up to the jury to resolve the dispute
at trial. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248–49. A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of
the suit under governing law.” Id. “Under Missouri law, ‘[s]ummary judgment seldom should be
used in employment discrimination cases, because such cases are inherently fact-based and often
depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence.’” Wierman, 638 F.3d at 1002 (alteration in
original) (quoting Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 664–65 (Mo. banc 2009)). But there
is no “discrimination case” exception to summary judgment, and such cases are not immune from
summary judgment. Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Although
employment discrimination cases are ‘often fact intensive and dependent on nuance in the
workplace, they are not immune from summary judgment.’” (quoting Trierweiler v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 639 F.3d 456, 459 (8th Cir. 2011))).

For summary judgment purposes, the Court’s attention is focused on the legal elements of
the claims at issue. Retaliation under the MHRA requires that Wade show (1) she complained of
discrimination, (2) her employer took adverse action against her, and (3) there is a causal
relationship between the complaint and the adverse action. Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 930 F.3d
1015, 1023 (8th Cir. 2019). The legal validity of the underlying discrimination complaint is
immaterial to the success of the retaliation claim. See Holmes v. Kansas City Pub. Sch. Dist., 571
S.W.3d 602, 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
Previously, Missouri courts reviewed the causal element of MHRA claims on a
“contributing factor” basis. This means that a plaintiff could succeed in her MHRA claim if the

prohibited act was merely one contributing part of the adverse action against her. See, e.g.,
Holmes, 571 S.W.3d at 611; Porter v. City of Lake Lotawana, 651 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 2011)
(articulating the Missouri “contributing factor” standard as permitting a plaintiff to recover as long
as “her complaint of discrimination was ‘a reason’ for” dismissal, compared to the federal-law
requirement that it be “the reason”).1 However, on August 28, 2017, an amended version of the
MHRA took effect that changed the standard to the more-demanding “motivating” factor
approach, similar to the federal standards under Titles VII. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(2)
(defining “[b]ecause” or “because of” as “the motivating factor” behind an adverse employment

1 The “contributing factor” standard applies to both retaliation and discrimination claims under the MHRA. See
Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 563 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Hill, 277 S.W.3d at 665).
decision); see also Bram v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 787, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018)
(discussing Missouri’s shift from the contributing to motivating factor standard). In cases similar
to this one, Missouri courts have applied the version of the law in effect at the time of the claimed
discriminatory act. See, e.g., Wiedner v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 607 S.W.3d 231, 237–39 (Mo. Ct. App.
2020); Folsom v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 645, 650 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019); Bram,

564 S.W.3d at 794–95. The timing of Wade’s claims narrowly precedes the August 2017
amendment; as such, the Court will apply the “contributing factor” standard here.
III. Discussion
The parties grapple primarily over the third element of Wade’s retaliation claim: the
existence of a causal relationship between Wade’s role in reporting the sexual harassment and the
decision to fire her, subject to the “contributing factor” standard. Weighing that standard along
with the relevant evidence before it, the Court finds that Wade has provided sufficient evidence to
create a genuine dispute of facts material to her retaliation claim.
First, though Wade and Barefield reported the sexual harassment claim in June 2017, Wade

argues that Chambers was not aware of her involvement in the report until her August 9 response
to the written warning. Doc. [83] at 10. Both Heimback and LaGrand-Moorehead began working
at Adams in July 2017, after the June complaint, and it appears clear that neither was aware of
Wade’s involvement in the sexual harassment report until Wade’s response to the warning.
Defendants argue that Wade’s response to the warning does not qualify as her complaint, see Doc.
[72] at 29, but this is irrelevant. What matters instead is Wade’s ability to show a causal connection
between her complaint and her firing, and when her superiors discovered Wade’s role in the
complaint is relevant to whether such a connection exists. There is some dispute as to whether
Heimback, Chambers, or LaGrand-Moorehead reviewed Wade’s response to the warning and
whether they thereby learned of her involvement in the complaint against Chambers. See Docs.
[72] at 24, [73-10] at 1, [83] at 10, [91] ¶¶ 346–50. Taking the facts most favorably to Wade, the
Court will assume that each of Heimback, LaGrand-Moorehead, and Chambers read Wade’s
response to the warning and that doing so informed them of Wade’s role in reporting the alleged
harassment. Defendant’s attempts to use Barefield as a comparator to Wade are therefore inapt.

Barefield and Wade made the harassment report together, and Barefield indeed remains employed
by Adams, see Doc. [78] ¶ 48. But Wade clearly alleges that Chambers retaliated against her for
the harassment complaint, and Chambers was not in position to fire Barefield when he discovered
who forwarded the complaint in August 2017—by then, Barefield had left the Center. See Doc.
[91] ¶ 26; see also Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 956 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting that,
when assessing alleged pretext, “individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same
supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any
mitigating or distinguishing circumstances” (quoting Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir.
2000))).

Defendants devote much attention to Wade’s claimed insubordination, but Wade disputes
nearly all the facts underlying Heimback’s insubordination claims. To begin with, Wade contests
the claims regarding misbehavior and unprofessionalism by the employees she supervised,
asserting that she never observed them doing or saying any of the things Heimback claims. Doc.
[78-7] ¶¶ 7–9, 14–18. Wade also disputes that she “refused” to sign Heimback’s letter of
expectations. Doc. [79-2] at 133:10–25. The August 10 incident, where Wade was apparently
absent from the Center for four hours, particularly gives rise to credibility questions. Heimback
claims that Wade could not substantiate her whereabouts whatsoever, while Wade testified that
she not only explained clearly where she was but that Heimback had access to the Outlook calendar
reflecting that Wade was attending the outreach event that day. Docs. [79-2] at 177:14–178:16,
[67-4] at 57:23–58:6. Finally, the August 15 incident is also in dispute, as Wade and Heimback
disagree on how Wade explained the students’ absences and whether it was consistent with what
the admissions counselors subsequently told Heimback. Docs. [79-2] at 179:19–180:19, [67-4] at
58:7–2, 130:6–15.

These disputes are significant. Heimback specifically cited each of these allegations in her
request to fire Wade; in fact, they make up the bulk of the proffered reasons justifying the request.
See Doc. [73-11]. Chambers and LaGrand-Moorehead also submitted requests to fire Wade, and,
like Heimback, similarly cited Heimback’s disputed claims as warranting Wade’s dismissal. See
Docs. [73-17], [73-18]. Furthermore, McSweyn requested that the original recommendation to
fire Wade, Doc. [73-12], be amended to specifically provide insubordination as the reason for
dismissal on the grounds that “insubordination warrants termination.” Doc. [73-14] at 1. And the
amended recommendation is the one that ultimately was approved. See Doc. [73-13]. Wade’s
claimed insubordination, which was based largely on Heimback’s claims, thus appears to have

played a substantial role in her dismissal.
While Defendants rightly point out that Heimback’s honestly held, good-faith belief that
Wade was being insubordinate would undermine any retaliation claim, see Doc. [72] at 21–22 and
Chivers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 641 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2011), Wade’s factual challenges to
the bases for much of Heimback’s insubordination claims call into question Heimback’s
credibility. Heimback played a significant role in the decision to fire Wade and was aware of
Wade’s involvement in the sexual harassment complaint. The credibility of the reasons she put
forth for firing Wade is therefore significant to whether Wade’s complaint “contributed to” the
decision to fire her. See Soto v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 502 S.W.3d 38, 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)
(noting that evidence showing the defendant’s explanation for adverse action is not credible can
serve as support for a retaliatory motive); Turner v. Kansas City Pub. Schs., 488 S.W.3d 719, 724
(Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (“Another form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of retaliatory
motive is ‘[p]roof that the defendant’s [proffered] explanation is unworthy of credence.”
(alterations in original) (quoting Lomax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 243 S.W.3d 474, 483 (Mo. Ct.

App. 2007))); see also Ferguson v. Curators of Lincoln Univ., 498 S.W.3d 481, 491 (Mo. Ct. App.
2016) (noting, in an ADEA case, that a defendant’s explanation, if not worthy of credence, is
“probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.” (quoting Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000))). And it is not the Court’s role on a
summary judgment motion to weigh evidence or credibility. See Wierman, 638 F.3d at 993 (citing
Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
Under the contributing factor standard, Wade could succeed in her retaliation claim by
simply showing that her harassment complaint played any role at all in the decision to fire her,
even if there were other legitimate reasons for doing so. Soto, 502 S.W.3d at 48 (“A contributing

factor is a condition that contributes a share in anything or has a part in producing the effect.”
(quoting Turner, 488 S.W.3d at 723)). Heimback’s insubordination claims played a significant
role in firing Wade, and Wade disputes the grounds on which those claims rest; it is a matter of
Heimback’s word against Wade’s. There are no documents or evidence reflecting Heimback’s
views on Wade’s insubordination other than those Heimback prepared after learning of Wade’s
role in the complaint against Chambers.2 Notwithstanding any other legitimate reasons for firing
Wade, it is plausible that a jury could hear the evidence and determine that the claimed
insubordination lacks a factual foundation, giving rise to an inference of pretext for Wade’s firing.

2 This includes the August 2 warning, which said nothing about insubordinate behavior. See Doc. [73-9].
See Denn v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 816 F.3d 1027, 1033 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Although the MHRA does
not require an employee to show than an employer’s stated reasons for taking an adverse action
were pretextual, evidence undermining the credibility of those reasons can give rise to a factual
issue as to whether a discriminatory reason was a contributing factor to an employer’s conduct.”).
Chambers too was involved in Wade’s dismissal, and Heimback testified that she was

“sure” she, Chambers, and LaGrand-Moorehead met numerous times to discuss firing Wade before
actually doing so. Doc. [80-2] at 65:4–11. Additionally, Chambers, Heimback, and LaGrand-
Moorehead—the three individuals primarily involved in firing Wade—all discovered Wade’s
involvement in the sexual harassment complaint only days before deciding to fire her. While
temporal proximity alone cannot create a genuine dispute of fact sufficient to defeat summary
judgment, it “can create an inference of retaliation,” particularly where the proximity is “very
close.” See Sevege v. City of Independence, Mo., No. 07-481-cv-W-DW, 2009 WL 10671881, at
*5 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2009) (holding temporal proximity alone was insufficient to create a
reasonable inference of retaliation where the time between the protected activity and plaintiff’s

dismissal was seven months and the plaintiff conceded many of the issues listed in his disciplinary
record). Coupled with the disputed grounds for Wade’s insubordination, the proximity of
Chambers, LaGrand-Moorehead, and Heimback’s discovery of Wade’s involvement in the
complaint could permit a reasonable jury to find that Wade’s sexual harassment complaint played
a part—even if it was only “the straw that broke the camel’s back”—in the decision to fire her.
Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate on Wade’s retaliation claim.
Conclusion
There remain disputes of fact material to Wade’s retaliation claims in this case. That being
so, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment against Wade. As with its
concurrent ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Tambra Cross,
the Court need not reference the “report cards” Defendant provided to conclude that summary
judgment is inappropriate here. The Court will therefore deny Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike as moot.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Claim
Brought by Plaintiff LaShanté Wade, Doc. [71], is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, consistent with the corresponding Memorandum and
Order denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Tambra Cross, filed
this same date, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Contract Report Cards from Summary Judgment
Record, Doc. [84], is DENIED as moot.

Dated this 15th day of December, 2020.
}
ah
_ PES
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10234161. Public record. Not legal advice.