# McGinnis v. Monroe

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · July 2, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10233316

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** July 2, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10233316

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights
- stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- explaining that official capacity suit against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”
- stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”
- stating that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

MATTHEW MCGINNIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:20-cv-00228-JAR
)
UNKNOWN MONROE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Matthew McGinnis for leave
to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 3).
Having reviewed the motion, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay
the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s complaint without
prejudice.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her
prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial
partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s
account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month
period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly
payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00,
until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has not submitted a prison account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(2). Nevertheless, having reviewed the information contained in the motion, the Court will
require plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481,

484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his
prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever
information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”). If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial
partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his prison account statement in support of his claim.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The
court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820
F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not
required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit
of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction”
means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the
plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints

are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th
Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just
because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition,
affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural
rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The Complaint
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant currently incarcerated at the Warren County Jail in

Warrenton, Missouri. He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint names
Nurse Unknown Monroe, Lieutenant Unknown Schleuter, and the County of Warren as
defendants. Nurse Monroe is sued in both her official and individual capacities. (Docket No. 1 at
2). Lieutenant Schleuter, however, is sued in an official capacity only. (Docket No. 1 at 3).
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs. He states that he has been detained at the Warren County Jail for two months, and
that he has serious medical conditions including: chronic pain, seizures, migraine headaches, and
high blood pressure. Plaintiff alleges that his medication has been brought to the jail, but that “the
nurse refuses to dispense [it].” He also asserts that he has released his medical records to the staff
at the jail but that “they refuse to treat [him].”
Plaintiff further states that the “powers that be at the Warren County Jail have employed a
money saving strategy of using a nurse as gatekeeper to medical care.” (Docket No. 1 at 4).
According to plaintiff, this nurse is not licensed to diagnose or prescribe medication, yet medical

care can only be gained through her. Plaintiff states that he needs medical care, particularly his
blood pressure medication. (Docket No. 1 at 5).
Discussion
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He alleges that defendants Monroe, Schleuter, and the County of Warren have been
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Having reviewed the complaint, and for the reasons
discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
A. Defendant County of Warren
A local governing body such as the County of Warren can be sued directly under § 1983.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In order to prevail
on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish the governmental entity’s liability for the alleged
conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb., 813 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2016). Such liability may
attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an
unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,
883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir.
2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a
theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Thus, there are three ways in
which plaintiff can prove the liability of the County of Warren.
First, plaintiff can show the existence of an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to
“official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal
official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo., 829
F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Russell v. Hennepin Cty., 420 F.3d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“A policy is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action made from among various alternatives

by the official or officials responsible…for establishing final policy with respect to the subject
matter in question”). For a policy that is unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no other
evidence than a statement of the policy and its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, Minn., 486
F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 2007). However, when “a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is
asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its
employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the
inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by the policymakers.” Id. at 390.
“A policy may be either a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body.” Angarita v. St. Louis Cty., 981 F.2d 1537,
1546 (8th Cir. 1992).

Second, plaintiff can establish a claim of liability based on an unconstitutional “custom.”
In order to do so, plaintiff must demonstrate:
1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s
employees;

2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct
by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice
to the officials of that misconduct; and

3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental
entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind
the constitutional violation.
Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2013).
Finally, plaintiff can assert a municipal liability claim by establishing a deliberately
indifferent failure to train or supervise. To do so, plaintiff must allege a “pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees.” S.M. v. Lincoln Cty., 874 F.3d 581, 585 (8th Cir.
2017).

Plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or
custom. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004).
However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an
unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d
605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003).
In this case, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the County of Warren. He has not
presented any facts to support the proposition that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists. That
is, he has not pointed to any “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body” to establish that the County of Warren

has an unconstitutional policy. He has also failed to show the existence of widespread
unconstitutional misconduct, much less that the County of Warren’s policymakers were
deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized such conduct, which is necessary to demonstrate an
unconstitutional custom. Finally, plaintiff has alleged no facts regarding a failure to train its
employees on the part of the County of Warren. In particular, he has not alleged a “pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” For these reasons, plaintiff’s claim
against the County of Warren must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cty., 715 F.3d 1054, 1061
(8th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no
facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the
alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights).
B. Official Capacity Claims Against Nurse Monroe and Lieutenant Schleuter
In an official capacity claim against an individual, the claim is actually “against the
governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a

“suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public
employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999). See also
Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit
against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly, 813 F.3d at
1075 (stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual,
capacities sues only the public employer”); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir.
2006) (stating that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against
the entity for which the official is an agent”).
Here, Nurse Monroe and Lieutenant Schleuter are alleged to be employed by the County

of Warren. As such, plaintiff’s official capacity claims against them are actually claims against the
County of Warren itself. In order to prevail on such a claim, plaintiff must establish the County of
Warren’s liability for the alleged conduct. See Kelly, 813 F.3d at 1075. However, as discussed
above, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the County of Warren had an unconstitutional policy
or custom, or that it failed to train or supervise its employees. Therefore, the official capacity
claims against Nurse Monroe and Lieutenant Schleuter must be dismissed.
C. Individual Capacity Claim Against Nurse Monroe
Plaintiff has alleged that Nurse Monroe was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
Under the Eighth Amendment, the government has an obligation to provide medical care to those
whom it is punishing by incarceration. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). To demonstrate
constitutionally inadequate medical care, the inmate must show that a prison official’s conduct
amounted to deliberate indifference. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1997).
In order to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove that he suffered from an
objectively serious medical need, and that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded that

need. Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2019). See also Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d
1171, 1177 (8th Cir. 2019). “A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997). Deliberate
indifference can include the intentional denial or delay of access to medical care, or the intentional
interference with treatment or prescribed medication. Vaughn v. Lacey, 49 F.3d 1344, 1346 (8th
Cir. 1995).
To prevail under this standard, an inmate must demonstrate that a prison health care
provider’s actions were “so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to
provide essential care.” Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 2014). As such,

“deliberate indifference requires a highly culpable state of mind approaching actual intent.” Kulkay
v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a showing of deliberate indifference requires more
than a mere disagreement with treatment decisions and is greater than gross negligence. Gibson v.
Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2006).
Here, plaintiff has not presented sufficient facts to demonstrate that Nurse Monroe was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The sole allegation against Nurse Monroe is
plaintiff’s assertion that the “nurse refuses to dispense” his medications. Plaintiff does not state
when this occurred, or how often, and he does not indicate the potential consequences of his not
receiving the medications. More pertinently, the Court is left to speculate as to the reason behind
Nurse Monroe’s alleged inaction. That is, plaintiff states that medications were brought to the jail,
and that he released his medical records. However, because he does not establish when the
medications were brought, or who they were given to, or when he signed a release, or whether his
medical records had actually been received by Nurse Monroe, so that she could review them, the

Court is left to speculate as to whether Nurse Monroe was intentionally interfering with his
treatment, or whether there was some other cause in the delay. In other words, plaintiff’s single
vague assertion does not show that Nurse Monroe’s actions were “so inappropriate as to evidence
intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care,” and he does not provide enough
factual matter for the Court to draw that inference. Therefore, plaintiff’s individual capacity claim
against Nurse Monroe must be dismissed.
D. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Docket No. 2). The motion will be denied
as moot as this action is being dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 3) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within
twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable
to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison
registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original
proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Docket
No. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered
herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated this 2™4 day of July, 2020.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10233316. Public record. Not legal advice.