# Anders v. Cuevas

> District Court, E.D. Michigan · September 12, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212556

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Michigan
- **Decided:** September 12, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212556

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting employment decisions “are quite often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHANE ANDERS, STAR TOWING
AND RECOVERY, LLC, and
AREA TOWING AND RECOVERY, INC.,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 19-10989
v.
Hon. George Caram Steeh
TONY CUEVAS, in his individual capacity
as Post Commander for the Michigan State
Police, DARZEIL HALL, in his individual
Capacity as a Michigan State Trooper,
CITY OF TAYLOR, HERMAN “BUTCH”
RAMIK, in his individual and official
Capacities as an elected member of the Taylor
City Council, and RICK SOLLARS, in his individual
and official capacities as the elected Mayor
of the City of Taylor,

Defendants.
______________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING
IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF. NOS. 10, 12)

Before the court are two motions to dismiss, one filed by Defendants
Tony Cuevas and Darzeil Hall and one filed by the City of Taylor, Herman
“Butch” Ramik, and Rick Sollars (“City of Taylor Defendants”). The court
heard oral argument on September 5, 2019, and took the matter under
advisement. For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motions are
granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff Shane Anders is the owner of Star Towing and Recovery,
LLC, and Area Towing and Recovery, Inc., which are also plaintiffs in this
action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants retaliated against them for
exercising their First Amendment rights. See Doc.1.
Star Towing was on the Michigan State Police’s non-preference tow
rotation list for the Monroe Post for approximately fifteen years. In

December 2015, Anders cooperated in a Michigan State Police internal
affairs investigation regarding tickets he had given to state troopers to
sporting events. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. Anders provided investigators with a list

of approximately eighteen troopers to whom he had given tickets. Id. at ¶¶
22-23. Each of these troopers received verbal or written reprimands for
accepting the tickets. Id. at ¶ 25. As a result, the post commander, Tony

Cuevas, was displeased with Anders. Id. at ¶ 26. Soon after Anders met
with investigators, Cuevas removed Star Towing from the non-preference
tow rotation list for the Monroe Post. Id. at ¶¶ 27-33.
Plaintiffs contend that Star Towing was removed from the tow list in

retaliation for Anders’ cooperation with the internal affairs investigation.
Doc. 1 at ¶ 35. Plaintiffs further allege that Star Towing was removed in
retaliation for Anders’ refusal to comment in published media reports about

the federal criminal investigation of Gasper Fiore.1 Id. at ¶ 36. Plaintiffs
contend that Cuevas “wrongfully assumed that Plaintiff Anders was
involved in possibly unlawful or unethical conduct, and unfairly removed

Plaintiff Star Towing from the non-preference tow rotation list.” Id. at ¶ 37.
One of the troopers who received a reprimand as a result of
accepting tickets from Anders was Defendant Darzeil Hall, who was angry
with Anders for revealing his name to internal affairs. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 52-53.

Since then, Hall has “constantly pressured” Area Towing to hold auctions
during the week when it is only able to conduct them on weekends. Id. at
¶¶ 54-59. Anders is concerned that Hall “is attempting to create a situation

by which the Michigan State Police could somehow remove Plaintiff Area
Towing from the towing rotation.” Id. at ¶ 59.
Plaintiffs assert a First Amendment retaliation claim against Hall and
a First Amendment retaliation claim and equal protection claim against

Cuevas. Based upon a separate set of facts, Plaintiffs also assert a First

1 Gasper Fiore owns a towing company and was indicted in 2017 as part of a bribery
conspiracy involving Dean Reynolds, a Clinton Township trustee. Fiore pleaded guilty
to bribing Reynolds by providing cash in exchange for a towing contract with Clinton
Township. See Case No. 16-20732 (E.D. Mich.).
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Rick Sollars, who is the
mayor of the City of Taylor. (The complaint also names Herman “Butch”

Ramik as a Defendant, but it does not allege he engaged in wrongdoing.)
Plaintiffs allege that Sollars wanted to steer city towing business to
Gasper Fiore and away from Area Towing. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 104-105. Anders

was required to use Fiore’s company for heavy-duty tows at the direction of
Sollars. Although Anders complained to the city police chief and
corporation counsel that he did not feel comfortable using Fiore’s company,
he was advised that it would be “in his best interest” to do so and that if he

did not, his contract would not be renewed. Id. at ¶¶ 120-24. After Fiore
was indicted, Anders cooperated in the investigation of the FBI and the
U.S. Attorney’s office.

On March 20, 2018, the Taylor City Council voted to approve a three-
year contract for Area Towing to serve as the primary towing contractor for
the city. Sollars vetoed the resolution. Plaintiffs contend that Sollars
vetoed the resolution because Anders refused to give him campaign

contributions, Anders complained about being forced to use Fiore for
heavy-duty tows, and Anders provided information to the FBI and the U.S.
Attorney about Sollars’ conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 145-47. Plaintiffs assert a First
Amendment retaliation claim against Sollars in his individual and official
capacities.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), based upon Plaintiffs’ failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. In reviewing such a motion, the
court must “accept all the . . . factual allegations as true and construe the
complaint in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Gunasekera v. Irwin,
551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To

survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to
sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Advocacy Org. for

Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F.3d 315, 319 (6th
Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven though a complaint
need not contain ‘detailed’ factual allegations, its ‘factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.’” Ass'n of
Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th
Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

The complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning that
the plaintiff has pleaded “factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
I. City of Taylor Defendants’ Motion
The City of Taylor Defendants make two arguments in support of their

motion to dismiss. First, they argue that Anders lacks standing to assert a
retaliation claim because he did not suffer an injury. One of the
requirements of standing is that the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact. See
generally Cranpark, Inc. v. Rogers Group, Inc., 821 F.3d 723, 730 (6th Cir.

2016). Area Towing was injured when Sollars vetoed the council resolution
to award it the city towing contract. Anders has not alleged an injury that is
separate from the injury to Area Towing. Although Anders is the owner of

Area Towing, he does not have standing to bring a claim on behalf of the
company. “[A] shareholder of a corporation does not have a personal or
individual right of action for damages based solely on an injury to the
corporation.” Gaff v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 814 F.2d 311, 315 (6th Cir.),

on reh'g in part, 828 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir. 1987). “This rule applies even in
cases where the person seeking redress is the corporation’s sole
shareholder.” Old Blast, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Local 324 Pension

Fund, 663 Fed. Appx. 454, 457 (6th Cir. 2016). Because Anders has not
alleged an injury separate from Area Towing’s injury, he does not have
standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim. See also Williams

v. City of Detroit, 2019 WL 2410719 at *3-5 (E.D. Mich. June 7, 2019)
(Michelson, J.) (dismissing claims brought by individual members for
injuries to a limited liability company because the individuals lacked

standing and were not the real parties in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P.
17(a)). The court will dismiss Anders’ First Amendment retaliation claim
against the City of Taylor Defendants.
Defendants also seek dismissal of Area Towing’s First Amendment

retaliation claim. The elements of a retaliation claim are (1) the plaintiff
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) defendant took adverse
action against the plaintiff that would chill a person of ordinary firmness

from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was
motivated by the protected activity. See Lucas v. Monroe Cty., 203 F.3d
964, 973 (6th Cir. 2000).2 Defendants argue that Area Towing did not
engage in any protected activity because Plaintiffs allege that it was Anders

who refused to contribute to Sollars’ campaign, complained about being

2 A corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and is
entitled to First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d
896, 918 n.9 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
forced to use Fiore for heavy-duty tows, and provided information to the
FBI and the U.S. Attorney about Sollars’ conduct.

Plaintiffs respond that Anders was acting on behalf of Area Towing
when he engaged in the protected conduct. See generally Innotext, Inc. v.
Petra’Lex USA Inc., 694 F.3d 581, 591 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is well known

that companies act through their agents.”). Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged
that at least a portion of Anders’ protected activity was done on behalf of
Area Towing. For example, he complained to city officials about having to
use Fiore’s company for heavy-duty tows. A reasonable inference is that

he complained as an agent of Area Towing.3 The court will deny
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Area Towing’s First Amendment retaliation
claim.

The court will grant the City of Taylor Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims against Herman Ramik, because the complaint is devoid
of allegations against him. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to assert claims
against Ramik, they may amend their complaint.

3 Defendants’ argument that Anders was speaking in his “official capacity” as owner of
Area Towing and not as a “citizen” misses the mark. The cases upon which Defendants
rely apply to government employees, which Anders is not. See Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes.”).
II. Defendants Cuevas and Hall’s Motion
A. Anders’ Standing

Similar to the City of Taylor Defendants, Defendants Cuevas and Hall
argue that Anders does not have standing to assert a retaliation claim
because he did not suffer an injury. Plaintiffs allege that Cuevas removed

Star Towing from the tow rotation list and that Hall harassed Area Towing
in retaliation for Anders’ cooperation with the internal affairs investigation.
Consistent with the above discussion, Anders does not have standing to
assert a claim based upon an injury suffered by Star Towing or Area

Towing. See Gaff, 814 F.2d at 315. Accordingly, the court will dismiss
Anders’ First Amendment retaliation claims against Cuevas and Hall.
B. The Towing Companies’ Protected Activity

Defendants also argue that the towing companies cannot state a
retaliation claim because Anders, rather than the towing companies,
engaged in the protected activity. Plaintiffs respond that Anders was acting
as the agent and sole owner of Star Towing and Area Towing when he

cooperated in the investigation. It is not clear from the complaint whether
Anders engaged in the protected activity as an agent of the towing
companies. Plaintiffs have indicated, however, that they intend to amend

their complaint to clarify these allegations. Accordingly, the court will deny
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the towing companies’ retaliation claim on
this basis.

C. Elements of First Amendment Retaliation Claim
In addition to the standing arguments, Defendants Cuevas and Hall
contend that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for First Amendment retaliation.

In order to establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) the
defendant took adverse action against him that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the

adverse action was taken at least in part because of the protected conduct.
Lucas, 203 F.3d at 973.
1. Protected Conduct

Defendants argue that Anders did not engage in protected activity by
cooperating in the internal affairs investigation. However, “[p]ublic policy
strongly supports and encourages protecting speech made at the behest of
law enforcement officials.” Marohnic v. Walker, 800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir.

1986). In Marohnic, the Sixth Circuit determined that a public employee’s
cooperation in a state investigation was conduct entitled to First
Amendment protection. Anders’ cooperation with a police internal affairs
investigation is no different and is protected conduct.4 See also See v. City
of Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (officer’s statements to FBI

disclosing corruption within police department were protected activity).
Anders also alleges that he engaged in protected activity by declining
to comment on published news reports about the Gasper Fiore

investigation. “As the First Amendment protects freedom of association
and the corollary right not to associate, so too does it protect freedom of
speech and the corollary right not to speak.” Wilkins v. Daniels, 744 F.3d
409, 414 (6th Cir. 2014). As a general matter, Anders has alleged he

engaged in protected conduct by exercising his right not to speak.5
2. Adverse Action
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claim against Hall should be

dismissed because Plaintiffs do not allege that he took an adverse action
against them. An adverse action is one that “would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage” in the protected activity.
Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2005). “We emphasize

that while certain threats or deprivations are so de minimis that they do not

4 Defendants argue that Anders’ cooperation is not protected because he was a
participant in the activity being investigated. Defendants do not cite authority for the
proposition that this distinction makes a difference.
5 Under the facts alleged, however, the contours of this right are not clearly established,
as discussed infra.
rise to the level of being constitutional violations, this threshold is intended
to weed out only inconsequential actions, and is not a means whereby

solely egregious retaliatory acts are allowed to proceed past summary
judgment.” Id. at 701 (citation omitted).
Hall was one of the state troopers who received a reprimand as a

result of accepting sporting event tickets from Anders. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 52-53.
“Since that time, Defendant Hall has constantly pressured staff of Plaintiff
Area Towing to schedule and hold an auction during the week. . . .” Id. at ¶
54. Area Towing contends that it is unable to hold auctions during the

week, but only on weekends. Anders asserts that Hall is attempting to
create a pretext for removing Area Towing from the towing rotation by
demanding that it hold the auctions during the week. Id. at ¶¶ 52-59.

Defendants argue that Hall’s alleged actions are too inconsequential
to be actionable. However, “since there is no justification for harassing
people for exercising their constitutional rights, [the deterrent effect] need
not be great in order to be actionable.” Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 701

(citation omitted). At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs’ allegations of
Hall’s “constant pressure” and “badgering” of Area Towing to hold auctions
when it is unable to do so are not so de minimis as to require dismissal as

a matter of law. See also Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir.
2002) (“[U]nless the claimed retaliatory action is truly ‘inconsequential,’ the
plaintiff's claim should go to the jury.”).

D. Equal Protection Claim
Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which

either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally
treats one differently than others similarly situated without any rational
basis for the difference.” TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Hamilton Cty.,
Ohio, 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005). “Equal protection claims can be

brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that the state treated
the plaintiff differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for such difference in treatment.” Warren v. City of Athens,

Ohio, 411 F.3d 697, 710 (6th Cir. 2005). A class-of-one plaintiff may
demonstrate that the governmental action lacks a rational basis by either
rebutting “every conceivable basis” supporting the action or by showing that
the action was motivated by animus or ill will. Id. at 711. “To survive a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that applies to
government classifications.” Bower v. Vill. of Mount Sterling, 44 Fed. Appx.

670, 677 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that because inclusion on the tow rotation list is
“discretionary,” Plaintiffs cannot state a class-of-one equal protection claim.

Defendants rely upon Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591
(2008), in which the Supreme Court held that a class-of-one theory may not
be brought by public employees to challenge employment decisions, which

are inherently discretionary. “To treat employees differently is not to
classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is
simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the
employer-employee relationship.” Id. at 605.

Engquist does not necessarily preclude a class-of-one claim involving
other types of discretionary state action, however. Id. at 607 (“[T]he class-
of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public

employment context – and that is all we decide [in this case].”) (emphasis
added). See also Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135,
141-42 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting split of authority but deciding that “Engquist
does not bar all class-of-one claims involving discretionary state action”).

Moreover, the extent to which Cuevas had discretion to remove Star
Towing from the tow rotation list is not discernable from the complaint.
Such a decision is not so inherently discretionary – akin to an employment

decision – so as to preclude Plaintiffs’ class-of-one claim as a matter of law
at this stage of the proceedings. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 604 (noting
employment decisions “are quite often subjective and individualized, resting

on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify”).
Plaintiffs allege that Cuevas removed Star Towing from the towing
rotation list because he was angry that Anders cooperated with the internal

affairs investigation. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to overcome the
presumption of rationality accorded Cuevas’ actions. The court will deny
Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
E. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Cuevas and Hall argue that, even if Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity because the rights were not clearly established at the

time of the alleged conduct.
“When the qualified immunity defense is raised at the pleading stage,
the court must determine only whether the complaint ‘adequately alleges
the commission of acts that violated clearly established law.’” Rondigo,

L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 2011). “A right is
‘clearly established’ if ‘[t[he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.’” Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). In other words, “the unlawfulness must be apparent” in light of
pre-existing law. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).

Defendants argue that there are no cases holding that “participation
as a witness in a police internal affairs investigation or declining to
comment on an on-going criminal investigation is protected activity covered

by the First Amendment.” Doc. 12 at 19. However, an official “can still be
on notice that [his] conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. “There does not need to be ‘a
case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the . . .

constitutional question beyond debate.’” Morgan v. Fairfield Cty., Ohio, 903
F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1377 (2019) (quoting
Ashcroft v.al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

At least two Sixth Circuit cases have found that cooperating in an
investigation and reporting wrongdoing to law enforcement are protected
activities under the First Amendment. See Marohnic v. Walker, 800 F.2d
613, 616 (6th Cir. 1986) (cooperating in a state investigation); See v. City of

Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (officer’s statements to FBI
disclosing corruption within police department). It is also clear that
“[r]etaliation by public officials against the exercise of First Amendment

rights is itself a violation of the First Amendment.” Zilich v. Longo, 34 F.3d
359, 364 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A reasonable government
official would understand that retaliating against an individual for

cooperating with law enforcement in an investigation is a violation of clearly
established First Amendment rights. This includes the adverse actions of
removing Star Towing from the tow list and the alleged harassment by Hall.

See Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 701 (“since there is no justification for
harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights, [the deterrent
effect] need not be great in order to be actionable”); Lucas, 203 F.3d at
972-75 (removal of tow company from municipal list because of owner’s

criticism of sheriff stated a claim of First Amendment retaliation).
It is not as clear that a reasonable government official would
understand that taking action against an individual for failing to comment on

a newspaper story would violate the First Amendment. The “freedom not to
speak” cases arise in the context of a government-compelled message,
which is not the case here. “The Supreme Court has only ever found a
violation of the First Amendment right against compelled speech in the

context of forced speech that requires the private speaker to embrace a
particular government-favored message.” C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.,
430 F.3d 159, 188 (3d Cir. 2005). See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,

714-16 (1977) (state of New Hampshire may not require display of state
motto on license plates); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (school district may not require students to salute flag); Wilkins

v. Daniels, 744 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2014) (A “general principle of
compelled speech jurisprudence . . . is that a violation of the First
Amendment right against compelled speech occurs only in the context of

actual compulsion.”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs are not alleging that Cuevas directed Anders to comment on
the newspaper article or to otherwise make any particular statement.
Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Cuevas made an unfair inference from Anders’

silence. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 38 (“Cuevas chose to rely upon the unpublished
media reports in which Plaintiff Anders chose to exercise his right to remain
silent and not make a public comment about the allegations.”). Under

these facts, this portion of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim does not
implicate a clearly established right. See generally Burns v. Martuscello,
890 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2018) (First Amendment right of prisoner “not to
snitch” not clearly established; defendants entitled to qualified immunity).

Cuevas is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claim that he
retaliated against Plaintiffs as a result of Anders’ failure to comment to the
media.
Cuevas is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’
equal protection claim. “[A] ‘class of one’ plaintiff can demonstrate that the

challenged government action was motivated by animus or ill-will.” Klimik
v. Kent Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 91 Fed. Appx. 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2004). It is an
equal protection violation if a “powerful public official picked on a person

out of sheer vindictiveness.” Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir.
1995). Plaintiffs allege that Star Towing was removed from the towing
rotation list because Cuevas was angry that Anders cooperated with the
internal affairs investigation. Based upon clearly established law, a

reasonable official would understand that such an action was
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION

With respect to the City of Taylor Defendants’ motion, the court will
dismiss Anders’ retaliation claim for lack of standing, but deny the motion
with respect to Area Towing’s retaliation claim. The court will also dismiss
Defendant Herman Ramik without prejudice.

With respect to Cuevas and Hall’s motion, the court will dismiss
Anders’ retaliation claim for lack of standing and grant Cuevas qualified
immunity with respect to the First Amendment retaliation claim based upon
Anders’ failure to comment to the media. In all other respects, the court will
deny Cuevas and Hall’s motion.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 10,
12) are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with this
opinion and order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs may amend their complaint
within 30 days of the date of this order.
Dated: September 12, 2019
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
September 12, 2019, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212556. Public record. Not legal advice.