# CAVANAGH v. IDEXX LABORATORIES INC

> District Court, D. Maine · May 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212186

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** May 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212186

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) simply requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and explaining that plaintiffs need not prove their entire cases in their pleadings
- finding that employee’s strong performance evaluation while managing major depression supported conclusion that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job
- describing the contours of a retaliatory hostile work environment claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

JAMIE CAVANAGH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Docket No. 2:23-cv-00273-NT
)
IDEXX LABORATORIES, INC., )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before me is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Jamie Cavanagh’s First Amended
Complaint brought by Defendant IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. (ECF No. 11). For the
reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jamie Cavanagh began working for IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. (“IDEXX”) in
May 2011. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶ 10 (ECF No. 10). IDEXX specializes
in veterinary diagnostics, software, and water microbiology testing. Compl. ¶ 4.
Cavanagh worked primarily in the IDEXX human resources (“HR”) department.
Compl. ¶¶ 10–13. She was a dedicated and hardworking employee, and for much of
her time with the company she received “Exceeded Expectations” performance
ratings. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17. In May 2015, IDEXX promoted Cavanagh from a “grade
500” to “grade 600” position. Compl. ¶¶ 11–12. IDEXX promoted her again in March
2016, this time to a “grade 700” position. Compl. ¶ 12. The company identified her as
a “high performer” with “high potential.” Compl. ¶ 53.
In the fall of 2017, Cavanagh began reporting to Zach Nelson. Compl. ¶ 18.
During that time, Cavanagh had interactions with a male colleague in her IDEXX
client group that she viewed as “potentially flirtatious and distracting from her

professional goals.” Compl. ¶ 21. Other members of Cavanagh’s team noticed these
interactions and commented on them. Compl. ¶ 22. One team member suggested that
Cavanagh ask to be moved to a different client group. Compl. ¶ 22. Cavanagh did not
consider the interactions unwelcome or inappropriate, but she thought switching to
a different client group would ensure that she maintained her professional reputation
within the company. Compl. ¶ 24. Part of Cavanagh’s motivation was that “she had
witnessed other female IDEXX employees being stereotyped and discriminated

against, and she wanted to avoid suffering the same fate.” Compl. ¶ 27.
Cavanagh asked Nelson if she could move to a different client group. Compl.
¶ 25. This request was only to work with a different client group within her leader’s
portfolio, not to change jobs, job levels, managers, or duties. Compl. ¶ 23. Nelson
responded by demanding details about the interactions between Cavanagh and the
male colleague. Compl. ¶ 26. Cavanagh explained that she did not want to identify

the male colleague or initiate an HR investigation, she just wanted to move to a
different client group. Compl. ¶ 26.
Nelson failed to take action on Cavanagh’s request to move to a different client
group. Compl. ¶ 28. Instead, he gossiped about the request with other IDEXX
employees who were outside her reporting chain and had no reason to know the
information. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29. This gossip was harmful to Cavanagh’s professional
reputation. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 30. By spreading this information unnecessarily, Nelson
was trying to ruin Cavanagh’s reputation with senior leaders, “significantly limiting
her opportunities for advancement and merit increases at IDEXX.” Compl. ¶ 30. This

behavior was consistent with Cavanagh’s view of Nelson’s biases, namely that he
“harbored extremely discriminatory attitudes about women who he deemed
emotional, as well as women who stood up to him.” Compl. ¶ 19. In her view, he would
have handled this request differently if a male employee made a similar request.
Compl. ¶ 31.1
Cavanagh made a formal complaint about Nelson’s gossip campaign to
employee relations. Compl. ¶ 34. This was “an explicit report of sex-based

discrimination” by Nelson. Compl. ¶ 78. After that, his behavior towards Cavanagh
got worse. Compl. ¶ 35. He gave her a negative performance evaluation, which
included his view that she was “too emotional.” Compl. ¶ 36. This review caused
Cavanagh to receive a lower merit increase than she would have otherwise. Compl.
¶ 38. Nelson continued to badmouth Cavanagh and spread false information about
her, including to IDEXX’s senior leaders. Compl. ¶ 39. He began to “layer” Cavanagh

under other HR professionals, so that she would have less visibility and opportunity
for advancement. Compl. ¶ 40.

1 In this factual background section, I have included allegations from the Complaint that, like
this one, fall into the category of speculation, legal conclusions, labels, or recitations of the elements
of a cause of action. Here, for example, Cavanagh does not identify an instance where Nelson handled
a similar request from a male employee differently, she simply speculates that he would have. In the
discussion section below, I address which allegations I consider and which I set aside, as they are
relevant to the parties’ legal arguments.
In April 2018, IDEXX promoted Cavanagh to a “grade 800” position. Compl.
¶ 13. Cavanagh earned this promotion despite Nelson’s efforts to obstruct her
advancement. For example, Nelson told IDEXX employee Gio Twigge that Cavanagh

was overly emotional and bad at her job. Compl. ¶ 41. Twigge, like Nelson, had a
reputation for “discriminating against and gaslighting women.” Compl. ¶ 42. Twigge
made Cavanagh interview and prepare presentations for all six partner leaders for
the new role, just to be considered for an interview for the promotion. Compl. ¶ 44.
Twigge did not require that similarly situated male employees take these sorts of
predicate steps in order to interview or be considered for promotion. Compl. ¶ 45.
Moreover, the requirement that Cavanagh interview at all for the promotion was

unusual, as “IDEXX rarely requires internal candidates to interview for promotions
within the natural progression of their career growth.” Compl. ¶ 14. Female senior
leaders within Cavanagh’s organization had recommended her for promotion based
on her strong work performance, but Nelson and Twigge ignored their feedback,
“despite their superior experience and knowledge” of Cavanagh’s work. Compl. ¶ 46.
From there, Cavanagh’s career stalled out. Nelson encouraged IDEXX to place

her in roles she did not want, in an effort to get her to resign. Compl. ¶¶ 47–48. In
January 2020, she watched IDEXX promote equally or less qualified colleagues
within her business unit. Compl. ¶ 49. Cavanagh did not advance because Nelson
discouraged the company from promoting her any further. Compl. ¶ 49. Then in April
2020, Nelson gratuitously complained to others, including the CEO, about
Cavanagh’s performance on a project he had nothing to do with. Compl. ¶ 50. This
conduct further damaged her reputation and opportunity for advancement. Compl.
¶ 50. In November 2020, she once again watched similarly experienced and skilled
colleagues receive “exorbitant three-grade-level promotions,” while she received only

a 4% raise. Compl. ¶ 52.
By late 2020, Nelson had succeeded in placing Cavanagh in a role she did not
want. Compl. ¶ 55. While her counterparts were promoted, Cavanagh was repeatedly
“layered” under an increasing number of managers, including one who was less
qualified than Cavanagh. Compl. ¶¶ 54–55. Two of these managers, Jennifer
Stickney and Katie Wellman, treated Cavanagh “in a cruel and demeaning manner.”
Compl. ¶ 57. Stickney berated Cavanagh for things she did not do and tasked her

with work significantly below her pay grade, in violation of IDEXX’s policies. Compl.
¶ 58.
The weight of these events over time caused Cavanagh to become severely
depressed. Compl. ¶ 59. Moreover, Cavanagh is a survivor of domestic violence with
a longstanding post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) diagnosis. Compl. ¶ 60.
Nelson and other managers at IDEXX knew about Cavanagh’s diagnosis. Compl.

¶ 61.
On May 26, 2021, Stickney held “a hostile and abusive meeting” with
Cavanagh. Compl. ¶ 65. Stickney designed this meeting to force Cavanagh out of
IDEXX. Compl. ¶ 65. That same day, Stickney “failed to accommodate what she knew
or reasonably should have known was a disability that Cavanagh suffered from.”
Compl. ¶ 66. On May 27, 2021, Cavanagh went out on a medical leave of absence.
Compl. ¶ 67. That same day, Cavanagh felt compelled to leave her job at IDEXX.
Compl. ¶ 68.
Cavanagh filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) and the Maine Human Rights Commission (“MHRC”). Compl.
¶ 6. She received right to sue letters on April 15, 2023 and October 10, 2023,
respectively. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7. Cavanagh filed a Complaint in this Court on July 13,
2023, which she amended on November 28, 2023. Pl.’s Compl. and Demand for Jury
Trial (ECF No. 1); see Compl. The Amended Complaint has four counts: (1) “sex-based
discrimination in violation of Title VII”; (2) “opposing a practice made unlawful by
Title VII”; (3) “disability discrimination under the ADA”; and (4) “violation of the

Maine Human Rights Act.” Compl. ¶¶ 70–95. IDEXX has moved to dismiss them all.
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) (ECF No. 11).
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),

‘a complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, with enough factual detail to make the asserted claim
plausible on its face.’ ” Legal Sea Foods, LLC v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 36 F.4th 29, 33
(1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st
Cir. 2015)). To evaluate whether a complaint meets this standard, I must “first,
‘isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and

conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements,’ then ‘take the complaint’s
well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable
inferences in the pleader’s favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.’ ”
Zell v. Ricci, 957 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Zenon v. Guzman, 924 F.3d 611,
615–16 (1st Cir. 2019)). In this process, I may employ my “judicial experience and

common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
DISCUSSION
IDEXX argues that Cavanagh’s Complaint should be dismissed because the
applicable statute of limitations bars her claims. IDEXX further contends that even

if her claims were timely, Cavanagh has otherwise failed to state claims upon which
relief may be granted. I take each argument in turn.
I. Administrative Exhaustion and Statute of Limitations
IDEXX’s first line of argument is that Cavanagh’s claims are time-barred
because Cavanagh’s administrative complaint was filed more than 300 days after the
acts of discrimination alleged in the Complaint. MTD 6–9. An employee alleging
discrimination must file an administrative complaint with the EEOC or parallel state

agency before filing suit in court. Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27,
31 (1st Cir. 2009). Under Title VII, an aggrieved employee who files with a state
agency must file the administrative complaint within 300 days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Carey v. AB Car
Rental Servs., Inc., 1:20-cv-00117-GZS, 2021 WL 431745, at *6 (D. Me. Feb. 8, 2021)
(300-day period applies where litigant files with both EEOC and state agency). “[T]he
timeliness requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) is ‘mandatory,’ and failure to

file within the time period means a potential plaintiff ‘loses the ability to recover for
the alleged discrimination.’ ” Frederique-Alexandre v. Dep’t of Nat. & Env’t Res. P.R.,
478 F.3d 433, 437 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109
(2002)).2

Determining when the discrimination “occurred” depends on the type of claim.
In National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, the United States Supreme
Court differentiated between “discrete acts” of discrimination and hostile work
environment claims. 536 U.S. at 114–15. Discrete acts, like a termination, denial of
a promotion, or refusal to transfer are “easy to identify” and occur on a particular day.
Id. at 110, 114. An employee with a discrimination claim based on, for example, the
termination of her employment, will know that her employment was terminated and

when it happened. But hostile work environment claims are different. By “[t]heir very
nature,” they typically “involve[ ] repeated conduct.” Id. at 115. So unlike claims
based on a discrete act, a hostile work environment claim may occur “over a series of
days or perhaps years” and cannot be pinned to a particular day. Id. An employee
subject to a series of lewd remarks, for example, may not know with certainty when
the remarks cross the line from annoying to unlawful. Because of this difference, the

deadline to file an administrative complaint is 300 days after “any act that is part of
the hostile work environment” claim. Id. at 118. This concept is known as the
“continuing violation doctrine.” See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 47
(1st Cir. 2018).

2 Under the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), failure to administratively exhaust a
complaint before filing in court limits a plaintiff’s damages, but does not bar suit. 5 M.R.S. § 4622(1);
Scamman v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2017 ME 41, ¶ 4 n.3, 157 A.3d 223.
Here, IDEXX maintains that based on when Cavanagh filed her administrative
complaints, “only those allegations and events occurring on or after May 22, 2021 are
properly before the Court.” MTD 6. Cavanagh does not directly address this

particular assertion. Instead, she asserts that her hostile work environment claims
are timely under the continuing violation doctrine, Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss (“Opp’n”) 11–13 (ECF No. 14), and that she has alleged an “ongoing,
continuous adverse employment action up to and including May of 2021.” Opp’n 15.
At this stage of the proceedings, dismissal is appropriate only “when the
pleader’s allegations ‘leave no doubt that an asserted claim is time-barred.’ ” Gorelik
v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 121 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins.

Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509 (1st Cir. 1998)). Here, although Cavanagh alleges that she
received a notice of right to sue letter from the EEOC on April 15, 2023 and from the
MHRC on October 10, 2023, she does not allege when she filed her administrative
complaints. Compl. ¶¶ 6–7. For its part, IDEXX proffers conflicting dates. In its
motion to dismiss, IDEXX asserts that Cavanagh filed her EEOC complaint “on or
about March 22, 2022” and her MHRC complaint “on or about April 8, 2022.” MTD 6.

But then in its reply, IDEXX asserts that Cavanagh filed her EEOC and MHRC
complaints on March 18, 2022. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 4 n.5 (ECF
No. 15).3 Because the critical date is not alleged in Cavanagh’s Complaint or any

3 IDEXX did not attach the administrative complaints to its motion. If it had, I likely could have
properly considered them on the motion to dismiss. See Johnson v. Amherst Nursing Home, Inc., No.
14-30100-MGM, 2015 WL 4750932, at *3 n.3 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2015).
document that I can appropriately consider on a motion to dismiss, this issue cannot
be decided at this time.
II. Failure to State a Claim
I turn next to IDEXX’s claim that Cavanagh’s Complaint fails to state claims

upon which relief can be granted. As noted above, Cavanagh’s Complaint lists four
counts: sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count I), retaliation in
violation of Title VII (Count II), disability discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count III), and violation of unspecified
sections of the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) (Count IV). Compl. ¶¶ 70–95.
Cavanagh appears to be pursuing multiple theories of liability within each count. For

the sex discrimination and retaliation counts, she is pursuing a hostile work
environment theory, as well as a discrete act disparate treatment theory. For the
disability discrimination count, she is pursuing a failure to accommodate theory and
seemingly also a discrete act disparate treatment theory.4 And for the MHRA count,

4 IDEXX proceeds as if Cavanagh is pursuing sex and disability-based hostile work environment
theories of liability. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) 12 (ECF No. 11). Cavanagh clearly
articulates a sex-based hostile work environment theory in her pleading. Compl. ¶ 2 (“This case
challenges Defendant’s . . . creation of a hostile and abusive work environment based on Plaintiff’s
gender.”). I do not, however, read her Complaint as also articulating a disability-based hostile work
environment claim. Nor does Cavanagh’s opposition brief make any mention of a disability-based
hostile work environment theory. Thus, to the extent Cavanagh meant to pursue a disability-based
hostile work environment claim within Count III, it is dismissed. A closer question is whether the
Complaint articulates a retaliatory hostile work environment theory of liability; meaning, retaliation
against Cavanagh for speaking up about sex discrimination. See generally Rivera-Rivera v. Medina &
Medina, Inc., 898 F.3d 77, 95–96 (1st Cir. 2018) (describing the contours of a retaliatory hostile work
environment claim). IDEXX does not appear to read the Complaint as pursuing this theory, based on
its treatment of Cavanagh’s retaliation claim. MTD 21–22. However, the retaliation-based claim
(Count II) does refer to a “continuing violation,” Compl. ¶ 82, a term associated with hostile work
environment claims. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). And Cavanagh’s
factual allegations do describe worsening treatment after she reported Nelson for sex-based
discrimination. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 34–35, 39–41, 50, 78. I thus interpret the Complaint as alleging a
retaliatory hostile work environment theory of liability.
I read her Complaint as pursuing parallel state law claims for the theories of liability
in the first three counts.
I first analyze whether Cavanagh has stated sex or retaliation-based

discrimination claims. Next, I turn to whether she has stated a disability
discrimination claim.
A. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex or Protected Conduct
(Counts I, II, and IV)
I begin by addressing the Defendant’s argument that Cavanagh has failed to
state a hostile work environment claim. The elements of a hostile work environment
claim are: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subject to
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon her membership in that
protected class; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) the
harassment was both objectively and subjectively offensive; and (6) some basis for

employer liability has been established. Nieves-Borges v. El Conquistador P’ship,
L.P., S.E., 936 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2019).5 “The point at which a work environment
becomes hostile or abusive does not depend on any ‘mathematically precise test.’ ”
Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)). “[A]ll attendant circumstances” must be considered,
“including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it

5 The parties have not distinguished between the state and federal claims, so I follow suit and
address them together.
unreasonably interfered with an employee’s work performance.” Pomales v. Celulares
Telefónica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2006). “[I]ncidents of nonsexual conduct—
such as work sabotage, exclusion, denial of support, and humiliation—can in context

contribute to a hostile work environment.” O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d
713, 730 (1st Cir. 2001).
Here, Cavanagh has alleged that in her first five years with IDEXX, she
established herself as a strong performer with high potential for advancement.6 Her
performance reviews and regular promotions reflected the strong reputation she had
built. However, this changed when Nelson became her manager and she asked for his
help navigating a potentially distracting workplace flirtation.

Instead of granting Cavanagh’s modest request to switch client groups to avoid
any appearance of a lack of professionalism, Nelson probed for details about
Cavanagh’s interactions with her male colleague. Cavanagh refused to discuss the
potential flirtations, and Nelson did not let her switch client groups. Instead, he
began gossiping about Cavanagh’s request with IDEXX employees who had no reason
to know the information, which was harmful to her professional standing within the

company. Because of this harm, Cavanagh reported what she viewed as Nelson’s sex-
based discriminatory conduct to the employee relations people at IDEXX.
From there, Nelson’s treatment of Cavanagh got worse. He continued to
badmouth her, including to IDEXX’s top management. This time, his campaign also

6 This recitation includes Cavanagh’s well-pled facts with inferences drawn in her favor, and
excludes labels, conclusions, and cause of action elements. See Zell v. Ricci, 957 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2020).
included spreading false information about her. He gave Cavanagh a negative
performance evaluation that described her as “too emotional,” which meant she
received a disproportionately low raise. Nelson began “layering” Cavanagh under

other human resources professionals, so that her work and accomplishments were
obscured and she would be unlikely to advance.
Nelson’s campaign succeeded in souring other IDEXX employees’ opinions of
Cavanagh. Due to this souring, IDEXX made Cavanagh jump through hoops not
required for her male colleagues when she sought a promotion. Nelson and another
male employee disregarded positive feedback about Cavanagh when it came from
senior female leaders. The campaign of negativity continued all the way up to

IDEXX’s CEO, to whom Nelson gratuitously complained about Cavanagh’s
performance on a project Nelson had nothing to do with. Cavanagh ended up buried
under more and more managers, including one who gave her tasks below her pay
grade and unfairly berated her. This treatment over a period of years caused
Cavanagh to become depressed and take a medical leave of absence.
On these allegations, I find that Cavanagh has stated claims for both a

retaliatory and sex-based hostile work environment. Importantly, because this is a
motion to dismiss, I am necessarily evaluating an incomplete record. See Bodman v.
Me. Dept. of Health and Hum. Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (D. Me. 2010) (noting
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) simply requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and explaining
that plaintiffs need not prove their entire cases in their pleadings). For that reason,
the numerous summary judgment decisions IDEXX cites in its briefs are of limited
use at this stage, since “the determination of whether an issue is trialworthy simply
is not the same as the determination of whether a plaintiff states a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Id.7
The record here plausibly alleges sustained mistreatment over a period of
years—mistreatment that began by inappropriately sharing information related to
Cavanagh’s potential workplace romance, and intensified after she complained about
sex-based mistreatment. This campaign of mistreatment included instances of
professional sabotage and denials of support, including setting artificial barriers for
Cavanagh (but not male employees) when she wanted to apply for a promotion.

Moreover, Nelson’s conduct soured Cavanagh’s reputation throughout IDEXX, which
caused others to mistreat her as well. This conduct interfered with her work,
transforming Cavanagh from a high-potential employee to one whose career had
stalled out. For present purposes, Cavanagh has plausibly alleged sustained
mistreatment on the basis of sex and protected conduct. IDEXX’s motion to dismiss
her sex and retaliation-based hostile work environment claims is denied.

Because Cavanagh has plausibly alleged a theory of liability that survives the
motion to dismiss under Counts I, II and IV, I need not decide whether her allegations
of a constructive discharge (which are heavy on conclusions and light on specifics) are

7 Moreover, my review of the few motion to dismiss cases in IDEXX’s brief reveals that none
resulted in dismissal of a hostile work environment claim. MTD 9–15 (citing Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of
P.R., 676 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2012); Luka v. Bard Coll., 263 F. Supp. 3d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Adkins v.
Atria Senior Living, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 399 (D. Me. 2012); Bodman v. Me. Dept. of Health and Hum.
Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Me. 2010)).
sufficient to state a claim. In any event, Cavanagh concedes that her constructive
discharge theory does not form the basis for an independent claim, and for that
reason, the issue does not need to be decided now. See Opp’n 17 (citing Johnson v.

Amherst Nursing Home, Inc., No. 14-30100-MGM, 2015 WL 4750932, at *7–8 (D.
Mass. Aug. 11, 2015); see also Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669
F.3d 50, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2012) (courts may properly consider concessions in a
plaintiff’s response on a motion to dismiss). Similarly, I do not reach whether other
potential discrete adverse actions—such as the failure to promote in January 2020,
disproportionately low raise in November 2020, or job placement in late 2020—form
the basis for claims within Counts I, II, or IV.8

B. Disability Discrimination – Count III
I next address IDEXX’s argument that Cavanagh has failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a claim for disability discrimination, and I begin with Cavanagh’s
failure to accommodate theory of liability. Under the ADA, an employer must make
“reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To
establish a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that (1) she

was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she was a qualified individual, and
(3) the defendant, despite knowing of her disability, did not reasonably accommodate

8 The administrative exhaustion and timeliness issues may ultimately resolve whether these
claims are actionable or what relief may be available to Cavanagh.
it.” Pena v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 923 F.3d 18, 31 (1st Cir. 2019) (internal quotations
omitted).
IDEXX challenges each element. Specifically, IDEXX argues that Cavanagh’s

allegations fail to “establish[ ]” (1) that she was disabled during her IDEXX
employment, (2) that she “was unable (or able) to perform any essential functions of
her job,” or (3) that she requested or was denied an accommodation. MTD 21. As an
initial matter, this is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, so Cavanagh does not have to
“establish” the elements of her claim; she must simply plead facts that plausibly
allege that she was subjected to illegal discrimination. See Frith v. Whole Foods
Market, Inc., 38 F.4th 263, 271 (1st Cir. 2022).

First, Cavanagh has plausibly alleged that she was disabled. “Major depressive
disorder” is a specifically enumerated disability in the MHRA. 5 M.R.S. § 4553-
A(1)(B). And Cavanagh alleges that “she became severely depressed” while working
at IDEXX. Compl. ¶ 59. Moreover, she alleges that she had a longstanding diagnosis
of PTSD. While she does not identify what “major life activities” this mental
impairment “substantially limits,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); 5 M.R.S. § 4553-

A(1)(A)(1), or what “record” exists of her condition, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B); 5 M.R.S.
§ 4553-A(1)(C), using common sense, I can reasonably infer that PTSD and
depression qualify as disabilities under the relevant statutes.
Second, Cavanagh has plausibly alleged that she was able to perform the
essential functions of her job. During her ten years with the company, she earned
three promotions and multiple “Exceeded Expectations” performance ratings. Compl.
¶¶ 11–13, 17. She alleges that her PTSD diagnosis was “longstanding.” Compl. ¶ 60.
From this I can infer that her promotions and strong performance evaluations
occurred while she had this diagnosis. Thus, she has plausibly alleged that she was

able to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable
accommodation. See Calero-Cerezo, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 355 F.3d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 2004)
(finding that employee’s strong performance evaluation while managing major
depression supported conclusion that she was able to perform the essential functions
of her job).
IDEXX’s third contention presents a closer question. Employers are required
to make reasonable accommodations for “known” limitations. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(b)(5)(A). “Because an employee’s disability and concomitant need for
accommodation are often not known to the employer until the employee requests an
accommodation, the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement usually does not
apply unless” the employee makes a request. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d
254, 261 (1st Cir. 2001). An employee does not have to use any special words, but the
request “must be specific enough that two things are clear to the employer: (1) the

individual has a disability that is causing a work-related limitation; and (2) the
individual believes an accommodation is needed in order to do the job.” B. Lindemann
& P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law ch. 13.VI.D.4 (7th ed. 2020); see
also EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship under the ADA, at Question 1 (Oct. 17, 2022),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html (last visited May 24, 2024).
While failure to accommodate claims thus typically start with a request from
the employee, they do not have to. In situations where an “employee’s disability may
prevent the employee from requesting an accommodation” or “the employee’s need for

an accommodation [is] obvious” the employee may not have to make a specific request.
Reed, 244 F.3d at 261 n.7; see, e.g., Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d
1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (disability of employee with diagnoses of paranoid
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder called for employer to engage in additional
communication “if it appear[ed] that the employee may need an accommodation but
[didn’t] know how to ask for it.”); Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135
(2d Cir. 2008) (disability of employee with cerebral palsy “obviously known to the

employer,” so employee did not have to make a specific request for an
accommodation).
Here, Cavanagh alleges that Nelson and other IDEXX managers knew about
her PTSD diagnosis. Compl. ¶¶ 60–61. She further alleges she went out on a medical
leave of absence on May 27, 2021. Compl. ¶ 67.9 She does not allege what, if any,
specific accommodation she requested before or after her medical leave that IDEXX

denied. Her theory must then be that it was obvious that her disability was causing
a work-related limitation,10 or that there was something about her PTSD or

9 Cavanagh also alleges that “on May 26, 2021, Stickney failed to accommodate what she knew
or reasonably should have known was a disability that Cavanagh suffered from.” Compl. ¶ 66. This
allegation is a recitation of a legal standard. Although it mentions a date and the person involved it
does not tell what happened. I cannot plausibly infer from this statement what action Stickney took
or did not take, what request Cavanagh made or did not make, what work-related limitation her
disability caused, or what accommodation would have addressed that limitation.
10 The Complaint includes: “IDEXX knew or reasonably should have known that Cavanagh
suffered from a disability that required accommodation in order to perform the essential functions of
depression conditions that prevented her from making a specific request for
accommodation. See Reed, 244 F.3d at 261 n.7. But her Complaint does not identify
what work-related limitations her disabilities caused. Nor does it articulate what, if

anything, about her particular condition prevented her from requesting an
accommodation.
And, perhaps more fundamentally, her pleading does not identify what
accommodation would have enabled her to perform which essential functions of her
job. In other words, her Complaint is missing key facts about the accommodation she
needed from IDEXX but did not get.11 Due to these shortcomings, I agree with IDEXX
that Cavanagh has failed to allege an actionable failure to accommodate claim.

That leaves Cavanagh’s allegation that IDEXX’s “stated reasons for changing
the conditions of [her] employment were pretext for disability discrimination” and
that at some point Nelson wrote that she was “too emotional” in a performance
review. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 87. These allegations do not plausibly allege a claim for
disparate treatment on the basis of disability. They are largely conclusory and do not
impart sufficient factual information to meet the plausibility standard. Count III is

therefore dismissed.

her job, which she would be able to do with reasonable accommodations.” Compl. ¶ 64. But this is
simply a recitation of the legal standard; it does not articulate any facts.
11 As noted above, I can infer from the Complaint that she requested and received a leave of
absence, a recognized type of reasonable accommodation. See 5 M.R.S. § 4553(9-A)(B); Criado v. IBM
Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444–45 (1st Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the denied accommodation request must refer
to something else. But, as noted above, the Complaint lacks any details about what other
accommodation Cavanagh needed but did not get.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11)
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Defendant’s motion to dismiss
is DENIED as to Count I (sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII), Count

II (opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII), and Count IV (violation of the
MHRA) and GRANTED as to Count III (disability discrimination under the ADA).

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy Torresen
United States District Judge
Dated this 28th day of May, 2024.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212186. Public record. Not legal advice.