# FARRINGTON v. FAIRFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT

> District Court, D. Maine · May 20, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212153

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** May 20, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212153

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing the collective knowledge doctrine

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

ROBERT FARRINGTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:23-cv-00362-LEW
)
FAIRFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

In the early morning hours of November 23, 2019, Augusta Police Officer Sabastian
Guptill shot Robert Farrington in his home through a sliding glass door that was not the
primary entrance to the home. On September 26, 2023, Farrington filed this civil action
not only against Officer Guptill but also against personnel of the Fairfield and Augusta
Police Departments and the Somerset Regional Communications Center based on their
entry of and/or action upon a temporary felony want prior to the shooting.
The matter is currently before the court on a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) filed
by Officer Guptill and Sergeant Tori Tracy and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
(ECF No. 20) filed by Fairfield Chief of Police Thomas Gould and Fairfield Police Officer
Dakota Willhoite. The Motions are not dispositive of the entire case, but instead focus on
certain claims and defendants. For reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
18) is GRANTED and the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No 20) is
GRANTED.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The facts are drawn from the allegations in Plaintiff Robert Farrington’s Complaint.
Farrington’s allegations are assumed to be true for purposes of evaluating the Defendants’
Motions.
After midnight on the morning of November 23, 2019, Defendant Police Officer
Guptill shot Farrington through a sliding glass door that served as a side or rear entrance

to his home in Augusta. Farrington was unarmed, though Guptill could see that a firearm
was resting on a side table near Farrington. Prior to the shooting, Farrington’s fiancée
awakened to the sound of pounding on the doors of the house. Frightened by the sounds,
she alerted Farrington, who is hard of hearing. Farrington instructed his fiancée to call
911, which she did, and then he left the bedroom to investigate and turned on the lights in

the house. Farrington and his fiancée never heard anyone announce that they were
members of law enforcement. Farrington came downstairs with a handgun and set it on a
side table so he could use both hands to remove a board securing the sliding glass door.
Because of the lighting, Farrington was in plain view of Officer Guptill, while, based on a
plausible inference from the pleadings, Guptill was outside in the dark and was not visible

to Farrington.
Prior to the shooting, in the late evening of November 22, about an hour or so before
Farrington was shot, a complainant went into the Fairfield Police Department and reported
that Farrington had assaulted her at her home in Fairfield. After speaking with the
complainant and reassuring himself that the complainant was not in immediate danger,
Fairfield Police Officer Dakota Willhoite sent the complainant home. Officer Willhoite

searched through downtown Fairfield to determine if Farrington was still in the area. Upon
concluding that Farrington had left the area, and understanding that Farrington was a
resident of Augusta, Officer Willhoite contacted Somerset County Dispatch to request that
a temporary felony want be lodged with the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”).
A temporary felony want informs other members of law enforcement that the person who
is targeted by the want is suspected of committing a felony and should be apprehended. As

alleged, Willhoite’s request for entry of a felony want was improper because reasonable
grounds were lacking to conclude that the reported domestic incident was a felony. County
Dispatch complied with Willhoite’s request and lodged the temporary felony want with the
NCIC.
After speaking with County Dispatch, Willhoite called the Augusta Police

Department to tell them that Farrington was wanted on a temporary felony want. The
recipient of his call, Augusta Police Sergeant Tori Tracy, acted on the information and
instructed Augusta Police Officers Sabastian Guptill, Brett Lowell, and Aaron Paradis to
arrest Farrington at his home in Augusta. The officers drove to Farrington’s residence in
three separate police cruisers, but they did not activate their cruisers’ light bars or sirens,

even upon arrival at the residence, and two of the three officers turned off their headlights
as they approached the driveway.
Upon arrival, Officers Lowell and Paradis (neither of whom is a defendant in this
case) approached the home’s main entrance and knocked on the door. Meanwhile, Officer
Guptill went around the side of the home and saw a glass door entrance around the back
corner of the residence and knocked on that. After several minutes passed without any

response from inside the home, all of the officers returned to their cruisers and planned to
leave. However, just as they planned to leave, one or more lights came on in the house.
Two of the officers got out of their cruisers and returned to the front door of the residence,
but they allegedly did not make it clear that they were members of law enforcement or
announce themselves. Officer Guptill proceeded directly back to the glass side (or back)
entry door rather than joining the other officers at the main entrance. Upon seeing

Farrington through the glass door and the firearm on the side table near his person, Guptill
yelled, “He’s got a gun! Augusta police!” and immediately opened fire, discharging 12
rounds into the residence, one of which struck Farrington in the hip.
DISCUSSION
To avoid dismissal, Farrington must plead in his complaint “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief” against each defendant. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court
will accept all factual allegations as true and consider whether the facts, along with
reasonable inferences that may arise from them, describe a plausible, as opposed to merely

conceivable, claim. Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011);
Sepúlveda–Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). Plausible
“means something more than merely possible.” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership
Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). “[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even
if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to

allege that a defendant acted unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that
identify why it would be reasonable to find it plausible that the defendant subjected the
plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
Farrington’s Complaint recites nine counts. In Count I, Farrington alleges a
deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights by Officer Guptill and cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In Count II, Farrington alleges a conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights involving
Officers Guptill and Willhoite, Sergeant Tracy, and an unknown member of County
Dispatch and cites 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In Count III, Farrington asserts a “Monell liability”
claim1 against the City of Fairfield Police Department and its Police Chief Thomas Gould.
In Count IV, he alleges a “Monell liability” claim against Somerset County and certain

members of the Somerset Regional Communications Center. In Count V, he asserts a
“Monell liability” claim against the City of Augusta Police Department, its Chief of Police
Jared Mills, and Sergeant Tori Tracy. In Counts VI–VIII, he asserts claims against,
respectively, the Augusta Defendants, the Fairfield Defendants, and the Somerset County
Defendants for violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4682(1-A) (“MCRA”).

1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Monell, the Supreme Court “held that although a
municipality may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior for an employee’s constitutional
violation, it may be held liable when ‘execution of [the municipality’s] policy or custom ... inflicts the
injury’ and is the ‘moving force’ behind the employee’s constitutional violation.” Saldivar v. Racine, 818
F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
In Count IX, Farrington asserts a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(“IIED”) against Officer Guptill.

The challenged counts include Count II (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, 42
U.S.C. § 1985), Count III (Monell liability against Fairfield defendants), Count V (Monell
liability as to Augusta Sergeant Tracy), Count VI (MCRA as to Augusta defendants), Count
VII (MCRA as to Fairfield defendants), and Count IX (intentional infliction of emotional
distress). The moving parties are Officer Guptill and Sergeant Tracy, see Defendant
Sabastian Guptill’s Partial Motion to Dismiss and Sergeant Tori Tracy’s Motion to Dismiss

the Complaint (ECF No. 18), and the Fairfield defendants, see Defendants Fairfield Police
Department, Chief Thomas Gould, and Officer Dakota Willhoite’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (ECF No. 20). Because the motions overlap to an extent, I discuss the
arguments for dismissal of the challenged counts on a count-by-count basis.2
A. Count II

Both Motions challenge the plausibility of the conspiracy claim in Count II.
Farrington concedes that the dismissal of Count II is proper. Pl.’s Ans. to Mots. at 2 (ECF
No. 25). Count II will be dismissed as to all defendants.
B. Count III–V
In Counts III, IV, and V, Farrington asserts a theory of “Monell liability” based on

the allegedly unlawful use of the temporary felony want tool in the context of an

2 The Augusta and Fairfield defendants observe that a municipal police department is not a separate legal
entity subject to suit. They are correct. Although the claims against the police departments (Counts III, V,
VI, and VII) will be dismissed for other reasons explained herein, the claims are also subject to dismissal
as moot because a municipal police department lacks the capacity to be sued. Dwan v. City of Boston, 329
F.3d 275, 278 n.1 (1st Cir. 2003); Henschel v. Worcester Police Dept., 445 F.2d 624, 624 (1st Cir. 1971).
investigation of what Farrington alleges was a report of a misdemeanor domestic violence
assault. Count III is against the Fairfield defendants; Count IV is against the Somerset

County Defendants; and Count V is against the Augusta defendants. As to Count III,
Fairfield Police Chief Gould challenges the claim. As to Count V, only Augusta Police
Sergeant Tori Tracy challenges the claim, not Augusta Police Chief Mills.3
Chief Gould argues that the mere entry of the temporary felony want in the NCIC
cannot serve as a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Maine law
independently authorized the arrest of Farrington on a charge of domestic violence assault,

see 17-A M.R.S. § 15(1)(A)(5-B), so the use of the temporary felony want did not deprive
Farrington of a federal right, such as the right not to be arrested in the absence of probable
cause of an arrestable offense.4

3 Because of the dismissal of the “police department” defendants, see note 2, supra, the Police Chiefs and
Sergeant Tracy are the remaining defendants on these claims. The Somerset County defendants answered
the Complaint (ECF No. 16) without filing a motion to dismiss to challenge the parallel “Monell liability”
claim in Count IV.

4 Augusta Sergeant Tori Tracy challenges Count V (“Monell liability”) to the extent it is asserted against
her, individually. Tracy argues, among other things, that it makes no sense to assert a Monell claim against
her given that a sergeant is not a final policymaker of the City of Augusta, even as to police department
matters, and the allegations fail to state facts that would run counter to this basic understanding. Farrington
responds that “the claim against Tracy can also lie on the basis of supervisory liability,” urges the court to
“read the claim in the context not just of the heading,” and goes on to theorize about ways in which a reader
might construe his Complaint to state a supervisory, deliberate indifference claim that it does not actually
state (neither “supervisory” nor “deliberate indifference” appear anywhere in the Complaint, though failure
to train Officer Willhoite and the Somerset County Defendants about proper use of a temporary felony want
is alleged). Ans. to Mots. at 5–8. Farrington’s request for a judicial reimagining of the Complaint is
contrary to prudence and ordinary practice. It is a plaintiff’s obligation to state claims in his complaint, not
the Court’s burden to imagine their existence. In any event, the Monell theory that it is unconstitutional to
use a temporary felony want on an arrestable misdemeanor offense is rejected and would be no more viable
as a supervisory liability claim. The failure to train about or follow a regulatory standard applicable to the
NCIC might be improper, but it is not unconstitutional simply because the system is used to communicate
that a suspect is wanted. If Farrington’s intent is to allege that Officer Guptill acted the way he did based
on his personal failure to appreciate what a felony want is, and that the City of Augusta or Chief Mills might
bear liability for a failure to train him, that more focused claim is not stated in the Complaint. Instead,
In response, Farrington argues that the Monell claim should proceed because he
plausibly alleged not only misuse of the temporary felony want tool, but also a custom or

policy of doing so that, in this case, led to a constitutional violation. In his view, use of the
tool “lends the imprimatur of constitutionality to a process that does not comply with the
[C]onstitution.” Ans. to Mot. at 3. What he appears to mean is that some police officers
might believe that they can make a warrantless felony arrest5 based on the NCIC entry even
though the circumstances might not support it. Farrington also argues that the possible
existence of probable cause to arrest him should not be taken as true at this early stage of

the proceedings. Id. at 4. He alleges that there was “no legal basis” to arrest him. Id. at
4–5.
The Fairfield defendants’ argument that the allegedly inappropriate entry of the
temporary felony want in the NCIC is not a freestanding deprivation of a constitutional
right is convincing. After all, the officers were neither more nor less authorized to go to

Farrington’s home to make an arrest whether Willhoite’s probable cause determination6

Farrington attempts to impose municipal liability based on the mere use of the want, and that theory of
liability is a non-starter for the reasons related herein.

5 No one has attempted to define what is meant by a “felony arrest” as opposed to a “misdemeanor arrest.”
The distinction between misdemeanors and felonies in relation to warrantless arrests, or what Farrington
seems to mean by drawing the distinction, is that it has some bearing on the legal analysis related to the
officers’ presence at his home in the middle of the night when the lights were off. Ordinarily, the distinction
might pertain to an officer’s authority to force entry into a home without a warrant, as the exigencies of a
situation might create a compelling need for a warrantless entry and odds are that felony offenses would be
more likely to give rise to exigencies. See Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2021). But even
probable cause of a felony offense is ordinarily not enough to justify a warrantless entry into the home. Id.
In this case, based on the allegations, there was neither authority to force an entry nor any actual attempt to
force entry. Recall that the officers were preparing to leave the residence until the lights came on.

6 Contrary to his suggestion, Farrington’s Complaint does not plead away the probable cause determination.
As alleged, Officer Willhoite “took an in-person report from an alleged victim claiming that Plaintiff Robert
Farrington had committed domestic abuse assault against her in her Fairfield home over an hour earlier.”
pertained to a misdemeanor or a felony. See 17-A M.R.S. § 15(1)(A)(5-B) (authorizing
officers with probable cause to believe that someone committed domestic violence assault

to make a warrantless arrest of that person); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,
370 (2003) (“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a
misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause.”). And in neither case could they
force entry to the home to effectuate an arrest absent exigent circumstances. See Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980); United States v. Winchenbach, 31 F. Supp. 2d 159,

165–66 (D. Me. 1998).
Nonetheless, the officers could go to Farrington’s residence to investigate the
alleged assault. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (“[A] police officer not armed
with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no more than
any private citizen might do.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, based on

the complainant’s report that Farrington assaulted her, Willhoite had probable cause to
arrest Farrington without a warrant outside of his residence. See 17-A M.R.S.
§ 15(1)(A)(5-B); Forest v. Pawtucket Police Dep’t, 377 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2004)
(explaining “that police officers can justifiably rely upon the credible complaint by a victim
to support a finding of probable cause”). Because Willhoite asked the August Police

Department to arrest Farrington, his probable cause determination is attributable to the

Compl. ¶ 17. Also as alleged, Willhoite called the Augusta Police Department to communicate that he had
grounds for Farrington’s arrest. Compl. ¶ 41. Farrington complains that the Augusta personnel did not
“investigate the allegations,” and he alleges that the report was untrue. Id. ¶¶ 19, 42. However, he does
not cite any authority that the Augusta officers were constitutionally required to do so and could not act on
Willhoite’s probable cause determination.
officers that went to Farrington’s residence, so they could arrest Farrington without a
warrant, provided that the arrest occurred outside of his residence. United States v. Balser,

70 F.4th 613, 621–22 (1st Cir. 2023) (discussing the collective knowledge doctrine);
Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance
to the house.”). It is, therefore, something of a tortured inference to find that Willhoite’s
data entry of a temporary felony want was a freestanding violation of the Constitution such
that every defendant who left a fingerprint on or followed up on that NCIC data entry might
be liable for any resulting harm (or, even more outlandish, regardless of any resulting

harm).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff may state a plausible claim even if
it appears “that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
However, in this scenario Farrington fails to identify any legal authority to support the
proposition that use of the temporary felony want system to report probable cause for at

least a misdemeanor arrest is unconstitutional. The felony want, standing alone, does not
possess talismanic powers of constitutional deprivations. The felony want did not
authorize entry into the home and did not authorize a trespass into the curtilage of
Farrington’s home.7 Accepting for present purposes that Officer Guptill subjected
Farrington to some sort of constitutional deprivation, that deprivation was not the

ministerial entry of the temporary felony want into the NCIC but rather the result of Officer

7 As alleged, Officer Guptill might have violated the Fourth Amendment based exclusively on his invasion
of the curtilage. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–8 (2013); French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 128–33
(1st Cir. 2021), reh’g denied, 24 F.4th 93 (1st Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 301 (2022).
Guptill’s decision making at the scene, resulting in firing several rounds through a sliding
patio door in the direction of Farrington and thereby causing him injuries. And to be sure—

contrary to Farrington’s argument—the allegations in the Complaint in fact do set forth a
probable cause scenario for a felony as they plainly relate the report by the female
complainant who accused Farrington of assaulting her in her home shortly before. See note
6, supra. Finally, Farrington has not offered any persuasive authority to support his effort
to incorporate into § 1983 litigation the sort of negligence, causation, and supplemental
policy considerations that typify the imprecise pleadings and argumentation of state court

tort claims. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[I]ssues adverted to
in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are
deemed waived.”).
For these reasons, Police Chief Gould’s request for dismissal of Count III is granted.
Sergeant Tracy’s request for dismissal from Count V is likewise granted, based both on the

foregoing discussion and the discussion in note 4, supra. Additionally, because it is
ineluctable, the dismissal will also extend to the non-moving Defendant Mills (Count V)
and Somerset County Defendants (Count IV).
C. Count VI and VII
In Counts VI and VII, Farrington asserts claims under the MCRA against,

respectively, the Augusta defendants and the Fairfield defendants. The Fairfield
Defendants and Augusta Sergeant Tracy argue that Farrington fails to state a claim because
the MCRA requires a showing that the defendant in question interfered or attempted to
interfere with the exercise of the plaintiff’s civil rights by means of physical force or
violence or the threat thereof.8 Farrington responds “that the threat of an unlawful seizure
of one’s person constitutes a sufficient threat of violence for MCRA’s purposes.” Ans. to

Mot. at 8.
Farrington’s MCRA theory does not have any actual grounding in the language of
the statute, which requires an individualized assessment of a defendant’s actual alleged
conduct, which for all of the defendants but Guptill did not involve any violence or threat
of violence. Farrington is improperly attempting to expand the reach of the MCRA based
on a pseudo supervisory liability assessment borrowed from § 1983 law or a foreseeability

assessment borrowed from tort law. See 5 M.R.S. § 4682. But the effort does not add up.
The officers were authorized to go to Farrington’s premises to attempt to make a
consensual arrest, not a forced entry arrest, since there was no exigency or other exception
to the warrant requirement that would permit them to enter the home, regardless of whether
the offense was a felony or a misdemeanor, and, in fact, they did not attempt to enter the

home when at first no one responded to their knocking. Given this reality, the moving
defendants’ conduct associated with logging the temporary felony want or authorizing
officers to attempt an arrest did not amount to an act of violence or a threat of violence.
Consequently, the MCRA claims are not well stated and will be granted as to all defendants
except for Officer Guptill.9

8 Sergeant Tracy is the only one of the Augusta defendants to request dismissal of the MCRA claim in
Count VI. The Somerset County defendants did not request the dismissal of the MCRA claim in Count
VIII.

9 Farrington cites Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr., 81 A.3d 567 (Me. 2014) in support of his MCRA
claims. He argues that the Superior Court order under review in Clifford establishes that “the threat of an
unlawful seizure of one’s person constitutes a sufficient threat of violence for MCRA’s purposes.” Ans. to
D. Count IX
Officer Guptill challenges Count IX (intentional infliction of emotional distress)

based on the expiration of the statute of limitation. Farrington fails to respond in any
manner concerning Count IX. The failure to respond is deemed a waiver of objection. D.
Me. Loc. R. 7(b). Count IX will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED and the Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED.

The City of Augusta Police Department and the City of Fairfield Police Department
are DISMISSED as they are not legal entities subject to suit.
Count II (Conspiracy § 1985) is DISMISSED.
Count III (Monell–Fairfield Defendants) is DISMISSED.
Count IV (Monell–Somerset County Defendants) is DISMISSED.

Count V (Monell–Augusta Defendants) is DISMISSED.
Counts VI (MCRA-Augusta Defendants) is DISMISSED as to Defendants Mills
and Tracy. Count VI remains as to Defendant Guptill.

Mots. at 8. In Clifford, the Superior Court determined that a physician could be found to have deprived a
patient of her liberty when she was involuntarily committed to hospitalization and subjected to a strip
search, and that the physician’s conduct could be considered a threat of violence since hospital orderlies
stood by to ensure the patient’s compliance. Id. at 580 n.14. This case is unlike Clifford, as Farrington was
never in the custody or power of the moving defendants who challenge the MCRA claims. Furthermore,
even the officers who went to Farrington’s home did not have any authorization to use violence in the
absence of exigent circumstances that might justify it. If adopted, Farrington’s view of the upstream
causational reach of the MCRA would be governed by a rule of radical foreseeability, and any officer or
law enforcement entity who communicated the existence of probable cause to make an arrest would become
potentially liable for whatever might go wrong during an arrest made by a law enforcement officer.
Count VII (MCRA–Fairfield Defendants) is DISMISSED.
Count VIII (MCRA–Somerset County Defendants) is DISMISSED.

Count IX (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 20th day of May, 2024.
/s/ Lance E. Walker
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10212153. Public record. Not legal advice.