# IN RE: SCOTT L. FENSTERMAKER, ESQ.

> District Court, D. Maine · June 16, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211835

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** June 16, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211835

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that a judge was not required to recuse despite the fact that the defendant in that case had, in his political career, treated an associate of the judge favorably
- concluding that a judge’s acquaintance with a witness was not a sufficient basis for mandatory recusal
- noting that due process is satisfied “if a state adopts procedures that collectively ensure the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary proceedings”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

In Re: Scott L. Fenstermaker, Esq. )
)
) Civil No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL
)
)

ORDER
On March 17, 2023, a single Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
(“SJC”) suspended Attorney Scott L. Fenstermaker from the practice of law in Maine
on an interim basis (No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 1-1). Pursuant to Local Rule
83.3(c)(2), I immediately suspended Fenstermaker from the practice of law in this
Court and ordered him to show cause as to why this identical discipline should not be
imposed (No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 1). After a case management conference
and with the leave of the Court, Fenstermaker filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
the suspension (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3), as well as a Motion for Recusal,
which argues that I should recuse myself from presiding over this matter (No. 2:23-
cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4).
For the following reasons, I conclude that Fenstermaker has failed to show that
identical discipline should not be imposed and I deny his Motion for Recusal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. State Court Proceedings
On March 16, 2023, the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar (“the Board”) filed
with the SJC an ex parte petition to immediately suspend Fenstermaker from the
practice of law in Maine on an interim basis. The petition was supported by an
affidavit from Assistant Bar Counsel Suzanne E. Thompson, which described two Bar
Complaints that had been made against Fenstermaker and the factual basis for those
complaints.1

The first Bar Complaint was made by Deputy District Attorney Toff Toffolon,
of the State of Maine’s Prosecutorial District VII. The Toffolon Bar Complaint and
attached documents assert, among other things, that (1) Fenstermaker was charged
by criminal complaint with committing multiple misdemeanor offenses stemming
from his alleged altercation with the owner of a towing business which had possession
of a car owned by one of Fenstermaker’s clients; (2) in court filings, including in his

own criminal case, and communications with government attorneys, Fenstermaker
repeatedly alleged, without factual support, that Maine prosecutorial officers and a
Maine state court judge are engaged in criminal conduct and are part of a conspiracy;
(3) Fenstermaker made improper filings in his former clients’ criminal cases after he
had withdrawn from his representation of the clients; (4) in his former clients’ cases,
Fenstermaker sought relief that would be favorable to himself in the criminal
prosecution against him; (5) Fenstermaker continued to visit the Washington County

Jail to meet with inmates despite the fact that he was no longer representing any
clients in the Jail; (6) Fenstermaker alleged that the appointment of co-counsel in
some of his cases was done to “muzzle” his own advocacy; and (7) at an arraignment
session in Machias, Fenstermaker told the assembled members of the public that they

1 On March 17, 2023, Justice Thomas R. McKeon, sitting as a single Justice of the SJC by designation,
issued an order impounding the Bar Counsel Affidavit and attached exhibits. The Board sought a
protective order that would protect the exhibits to the Bar Counsel Affidavit from public disclosure, a
request that Fenstermaker opposed. On April 13, 2023, Justice McKeon granted in part and denied
in part the Board’s request. Specifically, Justice McKeon ordered that some information in the exhibits
should not trust the District Attorney’s Office, which was engaged in a conspiracy,
and he offered free consultation even though he was not the assigned “lawyer of the
day.”

The second Bar Complaint was made by Assistant District Attorney Mark A.
Rucci, who alleges that Fenstermaker angrily confronted him at the Penobscot
Judicial Center. The confrontation was in response to Rucci having informed the
Dexter Police Department of an allegation made by Fenstermaker that the Police
Department had stolen firearms that were owned by one of Fenstermaker’s clients.
According to Rucci, Fenstermaker screamed and cursed while following Rucci in the

courthouse, causing Rucci to “[w]onder whether Attorney Fenstermaker would hit
[him].” Rucci’s account was supported by written statements from two Judicial
Marshals who had been present during the incident and reported that it seemed as if
Fenstermaker would assault Rucci.
Based upon the Assistant Bar Counsel’s affidavit and attached exhibits,
Justice Thomas R. McKeon, sitting as a single Justice of the SJC by designation,
concluded that Fenstermaker’s conduct violated, at the least, Maine Rules of

Professional Conduct 8.4(a), (b), and (d), and that Fenstermaker’s “misconduct serves
as an imminent threat to clients, the public and to the administration of justice.”
Justice McKeon thus ordered Attorney Fenstermaker “suspended from the practice
of law in Maine, until further Order of th[e] Court.” He also appointed Attorney Barry
Mills to serve as the receiver of Fenstermaker’s law practice.
The Board subsequently filed a Motion to Enforce in response to

Fenstermaker’s alleged failure to provide all of the necessary information and
property to the receiver. Justice McKeon held a hearing and then issued an Order
that granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Enforce. The Order provided
in relevant part that Fenstermaker “has no current intent to file a motion to dissolve

the interim order of suspension.”
B. Proceedings in this Court
In response to the discipline imposed by Justice McKeon, on March 21, 2023, I
issued an Order to Show Cause pursuant to Local Rule 83.3(c)(2), which suspended
Fenstermaker from the practice of law in this Court effective immediately and
required Fenstermaker to show cause as to why such discipline should not be imposed

(No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 1). Fenstermaker filed a response that, among
other things, described a pair of federal cases that he was litigating and argued that
identical discipline should not be imposed based on the factors provided in Local Rule
83.3(c)(6) (No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 2). On April 19, 2023, I issued an Order
appointing Audrey Braccio, Assistant Bar Counsel, as special counsel in this matter,
but otherwise took no action on Fenstermaker’s first response (No. 2:23-mc-00106-
JDL, ECF No. 3).2

On May 2, 2023, Fenstermaker, pursuant to my April 19 Order, filed a second
memorandum of law arguing that the suspension previously imposed by this Court

2 I also ordered that the records that this Court received from the SJC be sealed (No. 2:23-mc-00106-
JDL, ECF No. 3). In light of Justice McKeon’s Order granting in part and denying in part the Board’s
request for a protective order, see supra n.1, it is ordered that the records, as ordered redacted by
Justice McKeon, are hereby unsealed. At this juncture, though, the Court’s records contain only the
original versions of Exhibits A and B to the Bar Counsel Affidavit—not versions that incorporate the
redactions ordered by Justice McKeon. Accordingly, the copies of Exhibits A and B to the Bar Counsel
Affidavit currently in this Court’s possession will remain sealed, and Assistant Bar Counsel Braccio is
directed to file on the docket a new version of the SJC records containing the redacted documents.
should be vacated (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3). The Board filed a response
in support of the suspension previously imposed (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 6).
Additionally, Fenstermaker filed a Motion for Recusal seeking my recusal from this

case (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4), which the Board opposes (No. 2:23-cv-
00174-JDL, ECF No. 5).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Fenstermaker’s Suspension
1. The Parties’ Arguments
Fenstermaker makes several arguments as to why identical discipline should

not be imposed in his case. First, Fenstermaker walks through each of the
attachments to the Toffolon Bar Complaint and explains why, in his view, they do not
support a conclusion that he committed misconduct warranting suspension; and with
respect to the Rucci Bar Complaint, Fenstermaker argues that he did not say
everything alleged by Rucci and that suspension is not the proper discipline for his
alleged conduct. Second, Fenstermaker argues that it would be a grave injustice if
he was suspended from the practice of law because his clients in two civil rights cases

filed in this Court, the Coates matter and the Keenan matter,3 would be deprived of
his representation and that other attorneys would be unlikely to take those cases.
Fenstermaker contends that, among other things, he was targeted and suspended in
state court for bringing these civil rights claims against officers of the State of Maine
and that the timing of his suspension supports this conclusion. Third, Fenstermaker

3 Specifically, these cases are Coates v. Maine Secretary of State, 1:23-cv-00062-JDL, and Keenan v.
argues that the state court proceedings that gave rise to his interim suspension,
which were conducted on an ex parte basis, deprived him of due process. Finally,
Fenstermaker also argues that a number of state criminal defendants are prejudiced

because they can no longer retain him to bring federal actions in which they would
assert that Maine state courts violated the criminal defendants’ right to counsel by
refusing “to acknowledge [Fenstermaker’s] engagement to represent those clients.”
No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3 at 17.
2. Local Rule 83.3(c)
Under Local Rule 83.3(c)(2), when this Court receives a certified copy of a

judgment demonstrating that an attorney admitted to the bar of this Court has been
disbarred or suspended by another United States jurisdiction, this Court may, in its
discretion, enter an order immediately suspending that attorney from practice. If the
Court issues such a suspension, it must issue “an order to show cause directing that
the attorney inform this Court . . . of any claim by the attorney predicated upon the
grounds set forth in Subsection (c)(6) hereof that the imposition of the identical
discipline . . . by the Court would be unwarranted and the reasons therefor.” D. Me.

Loc. R. 83.3(c)(2)(C). The Rule provides that identical discipline shall be imposed
unless “the respondent-attorney demonstrates, or this Court finds, that the record in
the other jurisdiction clearly shows” one of four circumstances. D. Me. Loc. R.
83.3(c)(6). These four circumstances are (1) “that the procedure was so lacking in
notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;” (2)
“that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct . . . as to give

rise to the clear conviction that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept
as final the conclusion on that subject;” (3) “that the imposition of the same discipline
or the making of the same finding by this Court would result in grave injustice;” and
(4) “that the conduct at issue is deemed by this Court to warrant substantially

different action.” D. Me. Loc. R. 83.3(c)(6)(A)-(D). If any of these circumstances are
present, the Court “shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate.” D. Me. Loc.
R. 83.3(c)(6).
The respondent-attorney “bears the burden to demonstrate ‘by clear and
convincing evidence . . . that the imposition of substantially similar discipline is
unwarranted.’” In re Burbank, 790 F. App’x 226, 228 (1st Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(alteration in original) (quoting In re Barach, 540 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2008) (per
curiam)).4 And given the limited nature of the Court’s inquiry, “the norm will be for
this court to impose discipline which is substantially similar to that imposed by the
state court.” Id. (quoting In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116, 119 (1st Cir. 2005) (per
curiam)). Therefore, “the state court’s substantive findings ordinarily are entitled to
a high degree of respect when this court is asked to impose reciprocal discipline,” In
re Williams, 398 F.3d at 118, and an attorney faces an “uphill climb” in showing that

reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, see In re Barach, 540 F.3d at 85.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that Fenstermaker has not shown that
any of the conditions in Local Rule 83.3(c)(6) are met. I address each in turn.

4 Although Burbank, Barach, and most of the other cases discussed in this section arise under the
First Circuit’s analog to Local Rule 83.3(c)(6) rather than the Local Rule itself, the cases are
nonetheless instructive about the principles to be applied in reciprocal discipline cases governed by
(a) Due Process
To the extent that Fenstermaker’s due process argument is properly before
me,5 he has not shown “that the procedure [in the state court] was so lacking in notice

or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process.” D. Me. Loc.
R. 83.3(c)(6)(A). Due process is inherently a flexible concept, see In re Barach, 540
F.3d at 85-86, and in the context of attorney discipline cases, “due process concerns
are limited to ‘want of notice or opportunity to be heard.’” In re Williams, 398 F.3d
at 120 (quoting Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917)); see also In re Barach, 540
F.3d at 85 (noting that due process is satisfied “if a state adopts procedures that

collectively ensure the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary proceedings”).
Here, although Fenstermaker was suspended on an interim basis after an ex
parte petition from the Board, the Maine Bar Rules specifically provide an
opportunity for attorneys to be heard in such circumstances by filing a motion for
dissolution of the interim suspension. See Me. Bar R. 24(d). Fenstermaker, though,
chose not to file such a motion or challenge his interim suspension by the SJC. His
decision not to pursue the process available to him under state law precludes him

from showing that the process in the state court was “lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard.” D. Me. Loc. R. 83.3(c)(6)(A). Moreover, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the process by which the SJC imposes interim suspensions, which is
governed by Maine Bar Rule 24, violates due process. Thus, Fenstermaker’s due
process argument fails. See In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 120 (“The respondent has

5 Fenstermaker developed this issue only in his Reply Brief (ECF No. 11). See Small v. Colvin, No.
2:14-cv-00042-NT, 2015 WL 860856, at *6 n.6 (D. Me. Feb. 27, 2015) (observing that an issue raised
proffered no credible evidence that the notice actually given was inappropriate or that
the state court did not afford him a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to be heard.
Thus, his due process claim fails.”); In re Burbank, 790 F. App’x at 230 (“Indeed, the

SJC provided sufficient notice to Burbank of the allegations against him, time to
respond, and, ultimately, a testimonial hearing before imposing a suspension from
practice.”).
(b) Infirmity of Proof
Fenstermaker argues that although the state court record is replete with
allegations that he committed misconduct, there is no actual proof of such

misconduct, so there is an “infirmity of proof” under Local Rule 83.3(c)(6)(B). Under
this element, the Court will consider whether, based on the state court record, it is
left with a “clear conviction” that it could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final
the state court’s conclusion on the subject of misconduct. See D. Me. Loc. R.
83.3(c)(6)(B); In re Suárez-Jiménez, 666 F. App’x 2, 5 (1st Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
Here, the information in the SJC record supporting the finding of
Fenstermaker’s professional misconduct is substantial. The Bar Counsel Affidavit,

Toffolon Bar Complaint, Rucci Bar Complaint, and the accompanying exhibits show,
among other things, that (1) Fenstermaker was charged with multiple misdemeanor
offenses arising out of an alleged altercation involving his effort to take possession of
a client’s car; (2) Fenstermaker made, in the words of the Bar Counsel Affidavit,
“meritless allegations that courts, prosecutors, and [the Maine Commission on
Indigent Legal Services] were part of a conspiracy to deprive criminal defendants of

their constitutional right to counsel” and that Maine officials were involved in
criminal activity; (3) Fenstermaker sought to represent former clients after he had
withdrawn from representation and, in some instances, to make his own alleged
criminal conduct an issue in his former clients’ cases in a manner that would

primarily benefit his own interests; and (4) Fenstermaker angrily confronted another
attorney over a disagreement and put both the attorney and surrounding marshals
in fear that he would assault the attorney. Taken as a whole, the information
contained in the record provides solid support for Justice McKeon’s finding that
Fenstermaker violated, at the least, Maine Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(a), (b),
and (d).

Although Fenstermaker takes issue with some of the assertions made in the
Bar Complaints and exhibits, Local Rule 83.3(c)(6) does not permit a respondent to
relitigate issues that could have been raised in the underlying disciplinary
proceeding. See Burbank, 790 F. App’x at 229; In re Suárez-Jiménez, 666 F. App’x at
5. Contrary to Fenstermaker’s argument, the record does not evince an infirmity of
proof. And as previously noted, Fenstermaker had the right to be heard on the
interim suspension imposed by the SJC and chose not to avail himself of that

opportunity.
(c) Grave Injustice
Fenstermaker argues that the imposition of the same discipline that the SJC
imposed would result in a “grave injustice” to his former clients, who are actively
litigating the Coates and Keenan civil rights cases in this Court. See D. Me. Loc. R.
83.3(c)(6)(C). According to Fenstermaker, the Coates and Keenan cases “will almost

certainly both be dismissed” because “[n]o attorney is going to touch those matters
after [Fenstermaker’s] treatment,” which he contends was retaliatory. No. 2:23-cv-
00174-JDL, ECF No. 3 at 15. Fenstermaker further argues that permitting
retaliation by “powerful Maine-based political interests in a coordinated effort to

silence [his] advocacy” would be a grave injustice. No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No.
3 at 15. Fenstermaker also notes that it would prejudice a number of potential clients
who want to retain him to file federal habeas petitions on their behalf.
Although Fenstermaker’s suspension may inconvenience his former clients
and cause some degree of hardship to them in the Coates and Keenan cases,
Fenstermaker’s assertion that “[n]o attorney is going to touch those matters after

[Fenstermaker’s] treatment,” No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3 at 15, is no more
than mere speculation.6 Moreover, the potential prejudice to existing clients from
having an attorney suspended is present in most, if not every, case in which an
attorney is suspended from practice. In the same vein, although criminal defendants
who wish to retain Fenstermaker to challenge the alleged denial of their right to
counsel by the Maine state courts are now compelled to seek alternative
representation, that circumstance does not render the imposition of an identical

suspension on Fenstermaker a grave injustice.
Finally, contrary to Fenstermaker’s argument that this case is unique because
he was intentionally suspended to prevent him from litigating the Keenan and Coates
cases, Fenstermaker has failed to show that the SJC suspension was imposed for that
reason. Fenstermaker asserts that the timing of the Board’s petition requesting his
suspension, which was submitted after the Keenan and Coates cases had been filed
in federal court, gives rise to an inference of retaliation. However, the timeline of
events fully supports the conclusion that the interim suspension was imposed for
reasons unrelated to the Keenan and Coates cases.

The Toffolon Bar Complaint, which details Fenstermaker’s conduct in 2022,
was filed on December 22, 2022—before the Keenan and Coates complaints were filed
in federal court on January 31, 2023, and February 9, 2023, respectively. The Rucci
Bar Complaint was filed afterwards, on February 22, 2023. The petition seeking
Fenstermaker’s suspension and the accompanying Bar Counsel Affidavit—which rely
on both the Toffolon and Rucci Bar Complaints—were filed not long after, during the

week of March 15, 2023. This timeline, which includes Bar Complaints submitted
both prior and subsequent to the filing of the Keenan and Coates complaints,
undercuts Fenstermaker’s argument that the petition seeking his interim suspension
was filed in retaliation for his advocacy in those cases. Moreover, the substantial
factual support submitted in connection with the petition in support of
Fenstermaker’s suspension further belies Fenstermaker’s claim of improper
retaliation.

(d) Other Reasons Not to Impose Identical Discipline
Finally, I am not persuaded by Fenstermaker’s insistence that the particular
circumstances of this case support deviating from the discipline imposed by the SJC.
Despite the conclusory bombast employed by Fenstermaker in his written
submissions with this Court accusing state officials of wrongdoing, those submissions
fail to lay out a credible foundation from which wrongdoing might be found. Rather,

the SJC record shows substantial proof that Fenstermaker was suspended on an
interim basis for his own misconduct, and there is no compelling reason to deviate
from the suspension imposed by the SJC.
For the preceding reasons, Fenstermaker has failed to show that identical

discipline should not be imposed.7 Therefore, my initial suspension of Fenstermaker
will remain in effect.8
B. Motion for Recusal
I am also unpersuaded by Fenstermaker’s argument that I am required to
recuse from this case under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) and (b)(1) (West 2023).
Fenstermaker argues that because he challenges the State of Maine’s allegedly

unlawful practices in the Keenan and Coates cases, my prior service as a Judge in the
Maine state court system—which Fenstermaker characterizes as “fetid and corrupt”,
a “cesspool,” and “implicat[ed]” in the Keenan and Coates matters—creates the
appearance of partiality requiring my recusal.9 No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4-1

7 Fenstermaker also argues that the Court should expand the record to include a number of
documents that were not before the SJC. However, under the terms of Local Rule 83.3(c)(6), my review
is limited to “the record in the other jurisdiction.” See also In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 119 (noting that
in reciprocal discipline cases, the “court will undertake an ‘intrinsic consideration of the state record’”
(quoting Selling, 243 U.S. at 51)). Thus, I decline Fenstermaker’s request to expand the record and
instead limit my review to the materials that were before the SJC. Moreover, as noted above, the
materials currently in the record provide an adequate basis for concluding that Fenstermaker engaged
in misconduct, so there is no need to expand the record in any event.

8 I reject as unpersuasive all of Fenstermaker’s arguments about his suspension that are not
expressly addressed in this Order, and I conclude that those additional arguments do not merit further
discussion.

9 Specifically, Fenstermaker makes the following argument:

The district court judge in this matter rose to his present position because of his ability
to finesse and massage Maine’s fetid and corrupt state judicial system with political
aplomb. The district judge served as a Maine district court judge for approximately
six or seven years and then served on Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court for twelve years.
Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court serves as the ringleader of Maine’s fetid and corrupt
state court system and Chief Judge Levy’s lengthy service on this tribunal makes him
at 2. Fenstermaker also argues that due to my prior state judicial service, I am
“almost certainly personally acquainted with Governor [Janet] Mills and Attorney
General [Aaron] Frey,” whose conduct is also implicated in Fenstermaker’s civil

rights lawsuits. No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.
Section 455(a) of Title 28 provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The statute further provides that
judges shall disqualify themselves when, among other things, they have “a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary

facts concerning the proceeding.” Id. § 455(b)(1). “The statute ‘forbids not only the
reality of partiality but its objective appearance as well.’” United States v. Pulido,
566 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 45 (1st
Cir. 2000)); see also Snyder, 235 F.3d at 45 (“As the Supreme Court has pithily
characterized [section 455]: ‘Quite simply and quite universally, recusal [i]s required
whenever “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”’” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Liteky v United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994))).

But the recusal standard is an objective one, and it “does not mean that
required recusal can be based on an ‘unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous
speculation.’” In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting In re

brought to light. He was, in short, neck deep in Maine’s corrupt state court system
and apparently politically flourished in that fetid system, to the point that he was
elevated to the Federal bench. Because Respondent’s state court suspension was
orchestrated to protect Maine’s cesspool of a state court system, and the district court
judge was a successful operator in that very cesspool, the appearance of partiality is
great.
United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981)). Similarly, “section 455 does not
require recusal ‘on the basis of remote, contingent, indirect[,] or speculative
interests.’” United States v. Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United

States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2000)). Instead, recusal requires “that
there be no reasonable question, in any informed person’s mind, as to the impartiality
of the judge.” In re United States, 441 F.3d 44, 68 (1st Cir. 2006). Furthermore,
judges are not to lightly recuse themselves under section 455. Snyder, 235 F.3d at
45. This is because unwarranted recusals may be prejudicial and because “the
unnecessary transfer of a case from one judge to another is inherently inefficient and

delays the administration of justice.” Id. at 46. Thus, “[a] trial judge must hear cases
unless [there is] some reasonable factual basis to doubt the impartiality or fairness
of the tribunal.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d
1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1979)).
In this case, recusal is not warranted because no “reasonable question” about
my impartiality is suggested by Fenstermaker’s contentions and the invective he
employs to describe Maine’s state courts. In re United States, 441 F.3d at 68; Snyder,

235 F.3d at 45. Fenstermaker’s assertions about my earlier service as a Maine state
judge are precisely the kind of “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous
speculation” that does not give rise to a duty to recuse. In re Martinez-Catala, 129
F.3d at 220 (quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694). Leaving aside the fact that
Fenstermaker’s reasoning would apparently require anyone who had served as a
judge in the Maine state court system to recuse from this matter, Fenstermaker has

not alleged any facts that provide a reasonable basis to question my partiality.
Fenstermaker also asserts: “Because of Chief Judge Levy’s lengthy service in
the fetid and corrupt Maine court system, he is almost certainly personally
acquainted with Governor Mills and Attorney General Frey.” No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL,

ECF No. 4-1 at 2. A judge’s social acquaintances and affiliations, including any
affiliations with government leaders, is not, without more, grounds for recusal. See
In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d at 221 (concluding that a judge’s former political
affiliation was not a basis for mandatory recusal); In re United States, 666 F.2d at
696-97 (concluding that a judge was not required to recuse despite the fact that the
defendant in that case had, in his political career, treated an associate of the judge

favorably); United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 113-14 & nn.33-34 (D.
Mass. 2015) (concluding that a judge’s acquaintance with a witness was not a
sufficient basis for mandatory recusal); see also United States v. Angelus, 258 F. App’x
840, 842 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a professional acquaintance with
government officials was insufficient to warrant mandatory recusal).
Fenstermaker has raised no reason grounded in fact or law to warrant my
recusal in this case. Under these circumstances, his request is frivolous, as is his

request that he be permitted to conduct discovery regarding “any and all
communications between the district court judge and any other individual, including
other members of this Court, after Respondent filed the Keenan Matter on January
31, 2023 regarding Respondent in any manner.” No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4-
1 at 4. See Nickerson-Malpher v. Worley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77, 82 (D. Me. 2008)
(denying a frivolous motion for recusal and warning the moving party against further

frivolous filings); see also In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d at 220 (observing that
although a party seeking the recusal of a judge may seek discovery, “the allowance of
such discovery is within the sound discretion of the court”).
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Fenstermaker’s suspension
shall remain in effect as set forth in my Order dated March 21, 2023 (No. 2:23-mc-
00106-JDL, ECF No. 1), and his Motion to Recuse (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No.
4) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2023

/s/ JON D. LEVY
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211835. Public record. Not legal advice.