# LANE v. CITY OF ROCKLAND

> District Court, D. Maine · January 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211691

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** January 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211691

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a single incident during which three police officers discharged their firearms and no officers informed medical personnel that the suspect had been shot was sufficient to infer a custom from just that incident
- noting that the cases in which latitude has been given involve missing links that have been “alleged upon information and belief” or are plausible “simply by appeal to common sense” (cleaned up)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

GLENNIS K. LANE, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) No. 2:22-cv-00058-JAW
)
CITY OF ROCKLAND et al., )
)
Defendants )

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

In this civil rights action stemming from her arrest in May 2020,
Glennis K. Lane brings claims against a Rockland police officer, the City of Rockland,
and two Rockland officials.1 See First Amended Complaint (FAC) (ECF No. 45).
The Defendants move to dismiss several—but not all—of Lane’s claims for failing to
state a claim. See Motion to Dismiss (MTD) (ECF No. 13). I conclude that Lane has
failed to plead sufficient facts to support her civil rights claims based on municipal
and supervisory liability and waived any opposition to the other portions of the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court grant the
motion with one minor exception.
I. Background
Lane’s operative complaint contains the following allegations. On the evening
of May 21, 2020, Lane went to an apartment complex in Rockland to visit her sons.
See FAC ¶ 16. As she was pulling into the complex, she noticed her son’s truck parked

1 Lane also brings claims against four unnamed John and Jane Doe defendants, who are “police
officers, supervisors, policy makers, and/or officials employed by the City of Rockland.” FAC ¶¶ 12-13.
on a grassy area beside the road with a police car parked behind it. See id. ¶¶ 17-18.
Lane parked her car in front of her son’s truck and approached Rockland Police
Officer Michael Rolerson, who was sitting in the police car. See id. ¶ 18. After she

identified herself, Rolerson told her that her son had been arrested for operating
without a license and taken to the Knox County Jail; he also informed her that a
towing company had been summoned to remove her son’s truck and impound it.
See id. ¶ 19.
The Rockland Police Department (the “Department”) has a policy that when a
person is taken into custody he is to be given the option of locking his vehicle and

leaving it where it is, requesting that the vehicle be towed by a company of his choice,
or summoning a responsible person to come and get the vehicle.2 See id. ¶ 20.
Knowing this and hoping to avoid the expense of having the truck towed, Lane
informed Rolerson that she would move the truck to the apartment complex’s parking
area herself. See id. ¶ 21. Rolerson told Lane that she could not take the truck, but
she continued to insist that she was “fine to drive” and could move “the truck to a
parking spot.” Id. ¶¶ 23-24. In violation of the Department’s policy, Rolerson never

attempted to verify that Lane was the mother of the truck’s owner or that she “was
safe to drive the vehicle”; nor did he make any “attempt to call off the towing
company.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 32.
When Lane stepped onto the truck’s running board and attempted to enter the
vehicle, Rolerson came up behind her and grabbed her by the arms; he then

2 Lane alleges that these options were not presented to her son before he was taken to jail by another
unnamed officer. See FAC ¶ 20.
proceeded, in violation of the Department’s policies, to “batter” and “manhandle” her
causing “multiple visual injuries and bruises.” Id. ¶¶ 24-27. He put Lane in
“excessively tightened” handcuffs that caused her great pain, placed her in his police

car, and arrested her on charges of assault and refusing to submit to arrest.
Id. ¶¶ 28-30. When Lane pleaded with him to remove or loosen the handcuffs to
relieve her pain, Rolerson ignored her in violation of the Department’s policy.
See id. ¶¶ 34-35.
Rolerson took Lane to the Department, “where she was forced to remain in a
room for four hours” while “in severe pain.” Id. ¶ 38.3 Contrary to the Department’s

policy, no medical attention was ever provided to Lane and no photos were ever taken
of her obvious injuries, even though other unnamed officers “expressed some concern”
about her injuries. Id. ¶¶ 39-41. Lane sought medical care for her “bruising and
other injuries” the following day and had photos taken herself. See id. ¶¶ 42-43.
No use of force report was filed as required by Department policy. See id. ¶ 44.
Ultimately, the charges against Lane were dismissed for lack of evidence, but she and
her son both had to pay $100 in towing fees. See id. ¶¶ 37, 44.

In March 2022, Lane filed a complaint against Rolerson, the City of Rockland,
City Manager Thomas Luttrell, Chief of Police Christopher Young, and unnamed

3 Lane’s operative complaint is somewhat inconsistent about where she was taken after her arrest. At
one point she says she was taken to the Department, but at another point she says that she was
detained at the Knox County Jail. Compare FAC ¶ 38 (“Plaintiff was escorted to the Rockland Police
Department where she was forced to remain in a room for four hours . . . .”), with id. ¶ 41 (alleging
that she never received medical care while “detained at the Knox County jail”). The Defendants point
out that the correctional staff at the Knox County Jail are not City employees or officials. See MTD
Reply (ECF No. 28) at 7 n.3. I take the Defendants’ point, but I will give Lane the benefit the doubt
and assume, for purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss, that all of the unnamed actors she
describes in her complaint were City personnel.
John and Jane Doe Rockland employees or officials. See Complaint (ECF No. 1)
¶¶ 5-14. In addition to the allegations outlined above, Lane alleged that the City,
Luttrell, and Young deprived her of her civil rights by neglecting “their

responsibilities as policymakers due to their negligence in training, directing,
disciplining, and ensuring compliance with [D]epartment policy on the part of . . .
Rolerson in a timely manner to protect [her] from bodily injuries and emotional
distress.” Id. ¶ 51.
In April 2022, the Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. See MTD
at 1. Lane filed her response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, along with an

amended complaint, in July 2022. See MTD Opposition (ECF No. 24); Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 23). That amended complaint was eventually stricken for being
filed without leave, see Order (ECF No. 40), and Lane filed a motion seeking leave to
amend her complaint, see Motion to Amend (MTA) (ECF No. 34).
The Defendants opposed Lane’s proposed amendments, arguing that they were
futile and did not remedy the shortcomings identified in their motion to
dismiss. MTA Opposition (ECF No. 35).4 Nevertheless, I granted Lane’s motion to

amend after concluding that it would be more efficient to address the Defendants’
futility arguments in the context of the motion to dismiss. See Order (ECF No. 41).
In doing so, I indicated that I would substitute Lane’s “first amended complaint when
making a recommended decision on the motion to dismiss” and also “consider the

4 The Defendants did not oppose Lane’s elimination of the abuse of process count contained in her
original complaint. See MTA Opposition at 1. Accordingly, their argument that that count should be
dismissed, see MTD at 8-9, is moot.
arguments the parties raised in their briefing on the motion to amend in combination
with the arguments they raised in their briefing on the motion to dismiss.” Id. I gave
the parties the opportunity to notify me if they wished to submit supplemental

briefing in light of my ruling, see id. at 2, but neither side did so.
As things stand now, Lane is asserting six counts: violation of civil rights
(Count I), municipal liability (Count II), due process (Count III), false imprisonment
(Count IV), damages (Count V), and punitive damages (Count VI). See FAC ¶¶ 46-63.
And the Defendants are seeking the dismissal of (1) all claims against Luttrell and
Young (Counts I-VI), (2) the civil rights claims (Counts I-III) against the City, and

(3) the separate claims for damages and punitive damages (Counts V-VI). See MTD
at 3-10.5 They also separately seek the dismissal of Lane’s “request for punitive
damages” against the City, Luttrell, and Young. See id. at 10.
II. Legal Standard
When assessing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, courts must “accept as true all well-pleaded facts set out in the complaint
and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader.” SEC v. Tambone,

597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir. 2010). Generally, a complaint must contain only “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and need not set out “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl.

5 The Defendants do not seek the dismissal of Lane’s false imprisonment claim against the City, which
is brought under Maine law rather than federal law. Accordingly, the City will remain a party to this
litigation even if the Court agrees with my recommendation to grant the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. Similarly, the Defendants do not seek the dismissal of Lane’s substantive claims against
Rolerson.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “But gauzy generalities will not suffice;
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72

(1st Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Accordingly, a “motion to dismiss may be granted if the
factual allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove
the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture.” Seifer v. Gov’t Emps. Ins.
Co., No. 21-1371, 2022 WL 1538276, at *2 (1st Cir. May 13, 2022) (cleaned up).
III. Discussion
A. Supervisory Liability

I begin with Lane’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (Counts I-III) against Luttrell and
Young.6 In opposing the motion to dismiss, Lane makes clear that she is asserting
supervisory liability claims against Luttrell and Young on the basis that they
(1) engaged in a custom of ignoring police misconduct, and (2) failed to adequately
train and supervise the officers involved in the incident underlying her complaint.7
See MTD Opposition at 2-3, 5; MTA Reply (ECF No. 39) at 2. The Defendants argue
that Lane has failed to allege sufficient factual matter to support her supervisory

liability claims. See MTD at 5-7; MTD Reply at 3-7; MTA Opposition at 2-7.
Although “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior,”

6 Lane’s complaint does not make entirely clear which counts are against which defendants, so I will
assume, as the Defendants did, see MTD at 10, that she is pressing all three of her federal civil rights
claims (Counts I-III) against Luttrell and Young.
7 Lane concedes that Luttrell and Young did not participate directly in any violation of her rights, and
she “accepts” that there is not an official “policy that authorizes or encourages [Rockland] police
officers” to violate the rights of citizens. MTD Opposition at 1.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), supervisory officials may be liable for their
“own acts or omissions,” Aponte Matos v. Toledo Dávila, 135 F.3d 182, 192
(1st Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). Short of direct involvement—which is not alleged here—

supervisors may held liable if they formulate a policy or engage in a custom that leads
to the challenged occurrence, see Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez,
23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994), or if they fail to adequately train or supervise
subordinates, see Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999). Under
any scenario, the supervisor’s action or inaction must display “deliberate indifference
toward the rights of third parties,” id., meaning that the supervisor “must have actual

or constructive knowledge of a grave risk of harm posed by the subordinate and fail
to take easily available measures to address the risk,” Saldivar v. Racine,
818 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Beyond deliberate indifference, there
must also be an affirmative link that connects the supervisor to the subordinate’s
violative act or omission. See Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 582.
To determine whether Lane’s complaint states plausible claims of supervisory
liability against Luttrell and Young, I must “begin by identifying pleadings that,

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In her now operative complaint, Lane alleges that
Luttrell and Young are both policymakers responsible for promulgating “policies,
procedures[,] and guidelines for employees of the Rockland Police Department” and
for enforcing those rules and ensuring that Department personnel “obey the laws of
the United States and the State of Maine.” FAC ¶¶ 9-10. She further alleges,
Defendants Luttrell and Young jointly, severally, and in their
supervisory capacity, due to their failure, upon information and belief,
to train and supervise officers in the Rockland Police Department,
created a deliberate indifference to discipline, training, etc. and color of
law or policy which deprived [Lane] of her Fourth Amendment rights,
and those rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution as incorporated and applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Had the above referred-to
training, discipline and direction been present, these injuries and
indignities on [Lane] would not have been perpetrated by a well-trained
and reasonable police officer.

Id. ¶ 47.

I agree with the Defendants that these allegations do little more than assert a
legal conclusion about Luttrell and Young’s involvement in the underlying
constitutional violations. See MTA Opposition at 4-5. By simply parroting the
standard for supervisory liability, Lane has made “precisely the type of
‘the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ allegation[s] that the Supreme Court has
determined should not be given credence when standing alone.” Sanchez v.
Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Perhaps recognizing the barebones nature of her allegations regarding Luttrell
and Young, Lane argues that the other allegations in her complaint give rise to
commonsense inferences that make her supervisory liability claims plausible.
See generally MTD Opposition; MTA Reply. She points out that her complaint
implicates more than just one officer and contends that Rolerson and the other
unnamed officers would not have acted the way they did unless “a custom had been
established . . . empowering officers to ignore” with impunity Department policies
“designed to preserve the civil rights of citizens.” MTD Opposition at 3. She further
asserts that her allegations make it “clear” that Rolerson and the other officers were
not adequately trained or supervised. Id. at 5. Based on these suggested inferences,
she argues that Luttrell and Young “must be charged with constructive knowledge

that either the custom or the failure to train presented a serious risk of harm to
citizens.” Id.
As the Defendants correctly point out, see MTA Opposition at 4-5, “isolated
instances of unconstitutional activity ordinarily are insufficient to establish a
supervisor’s policy or custom, or otherwise to show deliberate indifference,”
Maldonado-Denis, 23 F.3d at 582. This is because the custom “must be so well settled

and widespread that the” supervisory officials “can be said to have either actual or
constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice.” Bordanaro v.
McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989).
Likewise, a preexisting “pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference
for purposes of failure to train . . . . Without notice that a course of training is deficient
in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen

a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62, 64 (2011) (cleaned up).8

8 The Supreme Court has not foreclosed a “rare” exception where “the unconstitutional consequences
of failing to train could be so patently obvious” that liability could attach “without proof of a
pre-existing pattern of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 64. Lane does not argue that her allegations
fall within this rare exception, see generally MTD Opposition; MTA Reply, and, in any event, her
complaint fails to offer sufficient non-conclusory facts upon which to conclude that her injuries were
the “patently obvious,” “highly predictable” result of Luttrell’s and Young’s failure to train Rolerson
and the other officers. Connick, 563 U.S. at 64 (cleaned up); see Senna v. Ciccone, No. 14-12849-DJC,
2015 WL 751166, at *9 (D. Mass. Feb. 23, 2015) (reaching a similar conclusion even when presented
with more specific allegations about a city’s inadequate training).
With that said, courts have sometimes inferred supervisory/municipal liability
from a single instance of police misconduct involving multiple officers working in
concert. See McElroy v. City of Lowell, 741 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 & nn. 3-5 (D. Mass.

2010) (collecting cases). But they have only done so where “the conduct of the
offending officers was so outrageous and the participation of many was so pervasive,
that no other conclusion could be drawn” except that the behavior was the result of a
custom or inadequate training. Id. at 355 (citing Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156);
see, e.g., Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 802-05 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding
that a single incident during which three police officers discharged their firearms and

no officers informed medical personnel that the suspect had been shot was sufficient
to infer a custom from just that incident); Cohen v. City of Portland,
No. 2:21-cv-00267-NT, 2022 WL 1406204, at *6 (D. Me. May 4, 2022) (holding that a
plaintiff’s allegation that nine police officers and fire rescue personnel watched his
son—who had been chased by police into frigid ocean water during a mental health
crisis—drown without intervening was sufficient to infer inadequate training from
just that single incident).

Here, Lane has fallen well short of alleging sufficient facts to infer from just
her isolated experience that Luttrell and Young were on notice of a widespread and
well-settled improper custom or inadequate training and supervision. Although Lane
alleges that multiple officers violated Department policies and her constitutional
rights, her allegations do not support the inference that officers did so as part of a
concerted action. Moreover, although Lane’s allegations against Rolerson and the
other officers are serious, they do not suggest a pattern of misconduct so shocking or
egregious “as to allow an inference of supervisory encouragement, condonation, or
even acquiescence.” Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 820 (1st Cir. 1985); cf. Kibbe,

777 F.2d at 802-05; Cohen, 2022 WL 1406204, at *6.
Lane complains that she is being held to an unfair standard because “without
discovery” she cannot know what Luttrell and Young knew about customs and
training or “what they did, did not do, or should have done.” MTD Opposition at 6.
But the “absence of discovery is no excuse for” failing to allege sufficient facts to raise
her right to relief above the speculative level. Stewart v. Fleming, 838 F. Supp. 2d 1,

3 (D. Me. 2012). Indeed, as Twombly and Iqbal make clear, alleging sufficient facts
is what unlocks the doors to discovery and enables a plaintiff’s claims to survive a
motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57 (“Asking for plausible grounds
to infer [illegal conduct] does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading
stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct]. . . . The need at the pleading stage for
allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) [illegal conduct] reflects

the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the plain statement possess enough
heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” (cleaned up)); Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678-79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. . . . [O]nly a complaint that states
a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”).
The First Circuit has indicated that “some latitude may be appropriate in
applying the plausibility standard” in cases where “a material part of the information
needed is likely to be within the defendant’s control” and it would be “reasonable to

expect that modest discovery may provide the missing link.” Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 23
(cleaned up). Lane identifies broad discovery that she believes will help her prove
her claims against Luttrell and Young, see MTD Opposition at 2, 6; MTA Reply at 2,
but she does not acknowledge the First Circuit’s applicable standard, let alone
identify any missing links in her complaint that could be filled in with narrow
discovery. And given the wide gap between Lane’s conclusory allegations against

Luttrell and Young and what would be sufficient to show plausible supervisory
liability claims, there is little reason to believe that limited discovery would fill in all
the missing pieces. See Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 23 (noting that the cases in which
latitude has been given involve missing links that have been “alleged upon
information and belief” or are plausible “simply by appeal to common sense”
(cleaned up)); Stewart, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 3-4 (dismissing a plaintiff’s supervisory
liability claims against a police chief where she made only conclusory allegations and

rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that she could not state a plausible claim without
discovery); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting that the plausibility requirement “calls
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of” the alleged illegal conduct).
At bottom, Lane’s supervisory claims against Luttrell and Young are “too
speculative to survive a motion to dismiss.” Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 22. She has simply
failed to allege sufficient facts to show that Luttrell and Young were deliberately
indifferent or that their acts or omissions were affirmatively linked to the
constitutional violations of their subordinates. In such circumstances, she has not

“nudged” her supervisory liability claims “across the line from conceivable to
plausible” and the claims “must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
B. Municipal Liability
Lane’s claims for municipal liability under Section 1983 (Counts I-III) are
premised on the same custom and failure to train/supervise allegations as her
supervisory liability claims against Luttrell and Young, see FAC ¶¶ 46-56, and,

therefore, they should be dismissed for the same reasons outlined above,
see, e.g., Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 20 (upholding the dismissal of Section 1983 claims
against a municipality where the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that a police chief
had been deliberately indifferent when acting as a final policymaker for the
municipality); Lopera v. Town of Coventry, 652 F. Supp. 2d 203, 220 (D.R.I. 2009)
(“Plaintiffs’ claim for municipal liability is based on a failure to train and fails for the
same reasons their claims for supervisory liability fail.”).

C. Other Claims Raised in the Motion to Dismiss
In their motion to dismiss, the Defendants also seek the dismissal of Lane’s
other claim against Luttrell and Young for false imprisonment (Counts IV) as well as
her separate claims for damages and punitive damages (Counts V-VI). See MTD
at 10. Lane has not addressed these counts in her opposition to the motion to dismiss
or in her briefing on the motion to amend. See generally MTD Opposition; MTA;
MTA Reply. Accordingly, Lane has waived any opposition to the dismissal of those
claims and they should be dismissed. See Perkins v. City of Attleboro,
969 F. Supp. 158, 177 (D. Mass. 2013).

Each substantive count in Lane’s complaint contains a general prayer for
damages, so the dismissal of her separate “claims” for damages and punitive damages
would nevertheless leave those prayers intact. See FAC ¶¶ 46-58; cf. Frank v.
L.L. Bean, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13-14 (D. Me. 2005) (dismissing a plaintiff’s
separate claim for punitive damages on the basis that such damages are a remedy
not an independent cause of action, but noting that the plaintiff could still “pursue a

punitive damages remedy against” the defendant if she made “the proper showing at
trial”); Connors v. Town of Brunswick, No. 99-331-P-C, 2000 WL 1175641,
at *11 & n.18 (D. Me. Aug. 16, 2000) (rec. dec.) (noting that the prayers for relief
contained in each of the plaintiff’s substantive counts remained intact even after
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s separate
claim for punitive damages), aff’d, ECF No. 62 (D. Me. Oct. 16, 2000); AcBel Polytech,
Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 13-13046-DJC, 2014 WL 4656608,

at *11 & n.4 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2014) (dismissing a plaintiff’s separate claim for
punitive damages because “damages are a remedy . . . not a cause of action” but noting
that the plaintiff could still argue for punitive damages later on if there was a finding
of liability).
The Defendants separately argue that Lane’s “request for punitive damages”
against the City should be dismissed on the basis that such damages are not
recoverable under the applicable law.9 See MTD at 10. Although Lane has not
addressed this argument either, I recommend that the Court exercise its discretion
and decline to resolve whether punitive damages are recoverable against the City at

this stage in the proceedings. See D’Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc., v. Sweetwater Sound,
Inc., No. 17-cv-747-LM, 2018 WL 6519070, at *6 (D.N.H. Dec. 11, 2018) (declining to
dismiss a plaintiff’s “request for punitive damages” because “whether punitive
damages are recoverable is not a proper subject for adjudication in a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion” (cleaned up)); Bernard v. Town of Lebanon, No. 2:16-cv-00042-JAW,
2017 WL 1232406, at *6 n.3 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 2017) (declining to resolve the availability

of punitive damages on a motion to dismiss because “the issue may not be amenable
to resolution by a motion to dismiss”).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court GRANT IN PART and
DENY IN PART the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, I recommend that
the Court DISMISS (1) all claims against Luttrell and Young (Counts I-VI), (2) the
civil rights claims against the City (Counts I-III), and (3) the separate claims for

damages and punitive damages as to all remaining defendants (Counts V-VI) but

9 The Defendants also seek the dismissal of Lane’s request for punitive damages against Luttrell and
Young. See MTD at 10; MTD Reply at 1-2. It is axiomatic that, if the Court accepts my
recommendation to dismiss all claims against Luttrell and Young, Lane would not be able to recover
any damages from them.
DECLINE to determine the availability of punitive damages against the City at this
stage in the proceedings.
NOTICE

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a Magistrate
Judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the District
Court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the District Court and to appeal the District Court’s
order.

Dated: January 31, 2023

/s/ Karen Frink Wolf
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211691. Public record. Not legal advice.