# BROWN v. RIEGER

> District Court, D. Maine · September 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211607

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** September 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

SUZANNE BROWN, )
)
Petitioner )
)
v. ) 2:22-cv-00259-JAW
)
KIMBERLY RIEGER, et al., )
)
Respondents )

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTIONS
FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Petitioner, who is serving a federal sentence, commenced this action seeking her
immediate release from custody. Petitioner is currently serving her sentence in home
confinement in the District of Maine.1 Petitioner maintains that she is entitled to release
based on the good time credits she has accumulated under the First Step Act.

1 The Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas petition due to her current confinement in this district.
“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United
States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.”
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004). The warden, or here the Bureau of Prisons, need not always
be present in the district where the petition is filed. In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,
410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973), the Supreme Court rejected an inflexible approach to ascertaining a district
court’s jurisdiction over habeas petitions. In the course of reviewing a jurisdictional concern dissimilar to
the one generated here, the Court discussed at length and preserved in part the holding of Ahrens v. Clark,
335 U.S. 188 (1948), to the effect that prisoners presently confined in one state based on federal authority
exercised in another state may “challenge[] their detention by bringing an action [in the state of
confinement] against the federal officials who confined them in that district”. Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95.
See also, cf. Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The district of sentencing does not have
jurisdiction to consider the merits of a § 2241 petition, unless the petitioner or his custodian is also located
there.”) (emphasis added). The Bureau of Prisons relocated Petitioner from incarceration at FDC
Philadelphia to home confinement in Maine. The District of Maine is thus the district of confinement under
the Bureau of Prisons’ Federal Location Monitoring Program.
Because she was seeking relief from custody and cited in part 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the
court docketed Petitioner’s filing as a request for habeas relief. (Petition, ECF No.1.) In
her filing, Petitioner requested emergency injunctive relief through a motion for temporary

restraining order and a motion for preliminary injunction. (Motions, ECF No. 4.) Petitioner
also subsequently reiterated her request for immediate release. (Motions, ECF No. 8, 11.)
Upon the filing of the petition, because Petitioner alleged that she had “repeatedly
asked” for her credits to be updated, but had not received an update, the Court directed the
Office of United States Probation and Pretrial Services for the District of Maine, which

evidently is responsible for monitoring Petitioner while assigned to home confinement in
Maine, to obtain the Bureau of Prisons’ credit calculation for Petitioner and Petitioner’s
projected release date.2 (Order, ECF No. 5.) The report, filed on August 31, 2022, revealed
that a current calculation of Petitioner’s credits was not available due to a conversion of
the Bureau’s information system, but that the Bureau expected to be able to provide an

update within a couple of weeks. (Status Report, ECF No. 6.) The Court directed the
Office of United States Probation and Pretrial Services to provide a further update by
September 15, 2022. According to the second status report, Petitioner’s anticipated release
date, with credits applied, is December 17, 2022. (Status Report, ECF No. 9.)

2 I also ordered this information from the Bureau because Petitioner’s filing did not “clearly show that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be
heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B).
DISCUSSION

After a court imposes a sentence, the Bureau of Prisons is responsible for the
calculation of the sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)-(b); Gonzalez v. United States, 959
F.2d 211, 212 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Courts have original jurisdiction over imposition of a
sentence. The Bureau of Prisons is, however, responsible for computing that sentence and
applying appropriate good time credit.”). Petitioner may challenge the calculation through
a § 2241 motion. Francis v. Maloney, 798 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2015).3

To obtain the emergency injunctive relief she seeks, Petitioner must show “(1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if
the injunction is withheld, (3) a favorable balance of hardships, and (4) a fit (or lack of
friction) between the injunction and the public interest.” Nieves–Marquez v. Puerto Rico,
353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003); Hoffman v. Sec’y of State of Me., 574 F. Supp. 2d 179,

186 (D. Me. 2008).
Petitioner’s request is supported mostly by her uncorroborated assertions as to the
amount of credit to which she is entitled. Petitioner’s assertions revealed a potential
disagreement between Petitioner and the Bureau of Prisons as to the calculation of good
time credits. The information the Bureau provided confirmed the disagreement. To this

point, Petitioner has not provided a sufficient record upon which the Court could conclude

3 When a petitioner challenges the calculation of good time credit, the petitioner typically must exhaust the
administrative remedies available through the Bureau of Prisons before the petitioner can initiate a habeas
action. McKinney v. United States, No. 1:18-cr-00084-JAW-3, 2022 WL 1997242, at * 3 (June 6, 2022)
(collecting cases). Petitioner asserts that there “are no viable administrative remedies ‘available.’”
(Memorandum of Law at 18, ECF No. 1-2.) Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense and thus is not
raised at this stage of the proceedings, I make no determination as to the availability of an administrative
remedy for the relief Petitioner seeks.
that her contention – that the Bureau of Prisons has not properly calculated her good time
credit – is more likely to prevail than the Bureau’s position. “The sine qua non of [the]
four-part inquiry is likelihood of success on the merits; if the moving party cannot

demonstrate that he is likely to succeed in his quest, the remaining factors become matters
of idle curiosity.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 2002). There is thus no need to address the other factors. Because she has not
established a likelihood of success on her claim, Petitioner is not entitled to emergency
injunctive relief.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, I recommend the Court deny Petitioner’s requests
for emergency injunctive relief. (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 4;
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 4; Motion for Immediate Release, ECF No. 8;
Motion for Emergency Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, ECF No. 8 Motion for
Immediate Release, ECF No. 11; Motion for Emergency Preliminary and Permanent
Injunction, ECF No. 11.) 4
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district

4 Because the Office of Probation and Pretrial Services is evidently only managing the equipment and
scheduling within the Bureau of Prisons’ Federal Location Monitoring Program (Status Report, ECF No.
6) and because the record does not reflect that the other named defendant, the Bureau of Prisons Northeast
Residential Reentry Management, is a separate legal entity, Petitioner arguably has not joined the necessary
party to obtain relief. The Court could conceivably deny emergency injunctive relief on that basis. Given
the time-related issues presented by Petitioner’s requests and the fact that the proper respondent can likely
be identified, I do not recommend denial on that basis. With counsel now appointed for Petitioner, I expect
the issue of the proper respondent will be addressed soon.
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum
shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.

/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated this 22nd day of September, 2022.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211607. Public record. Not legal advice.