# MAINE FOREST PRODUCTS COUNCIL v. CORMIER

> District Court, D. Maine · February 18, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211402

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** February 18, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

MAINE FOREST PRODUCTS )
COUNCIL, PEPIN LUMBER, INC., )
and STÉPHANE AUDET, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) 1:21-cv-00286-JAW
)
PATTY CORMIER, in her official )
Capacity as DIRECTOR OF THE )
MAINE BUREAU OF FORESTRY, )
and AARON FREY, in his official )
capacity as ATTORNEY GENERAL )
FOR THE STATE OF MAINE, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
An employer, employee, and non-profit industry association seek a preliminary
injunction against state of Maine officials to preclude the enforcement of a logging
industry regulation, arguing that it is preempted and violates the equal protection
clauses of the United States and Maine constitutions. The Court concludes that the
law is preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act and accordingly enjoins
enforcement of the law.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 7, 2021, Maine Forest Products Council, Pepin Lumber, Inc., and
Stéphane Audet (the Plaintiffs) filed a three-count complaint against Patty Cormier,
in her official capacity as the Director of the Maine Bureau of Forestry, and Aaron
Frey, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the state of Maine (the
Defendants), alleging that Public Law Chapter 280 (An Act Regarding the
Transportation of Forest Products in the Forest Products Industry) (The Act or Public
Law 280) violates (1) the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, (2) the

Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and (3) the Equal
Protection Clause of the Maine Constitution. Compl. (ECF No. 1). The same day, the
Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO).
Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. and TRO (ECF No. 3) (Pls.’ Mot.). Also on October 7, 2021,
during a conference with counsel, the Court issued an oral order dismissing without
prejudice the Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO on the parties’ agreement that the

Defendants would not enforce the provisions of the Act pending further order of the
Court. Oral Orders (ECF Nos. 13 & 19). The parties thereafter agreed to proceed
solely on the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Min. Entry (ECF No. 18).
On November 1, 2021, the Defendants responded in opposition to the Plaintiffs’
motion for preliminary injunction. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. (ECF
No. 23) (Defs.’ Opp’n). On November 10, 2021, the Plaintiffs replied to the
Defendants’ opposition. Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (ECF No.

25) (Pls.’ Reply).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court recites the factual background from the Complaint and the
Plaintiffs’ and the Defendants’ statements of fact, as well as their declarations.1

1 For purposes of this motion, the parties do not dispute the facts presented.
A. The Parties
Maine Forest Products Council (MFPC) is a non-profit industry association,
incorporated in the state of Maine, organized to represent the interests of the forest

products industry in Maine. Compl. at ¶ 1; Decl. of Patrick Strauch ¶ 3 (ECF No. 6)
(Strauch Decl.) Its membership includes landowners, papermills, loggers, truckers,
and other entities operating in the Maine forest products economy. Compl. ¶ 1;
Strauch Decl. ¶ 3. Among MFPC’s membership are landowners owning more than
50,000 acres in Maine who frequently contract with independent logging companies
to cut and haul logs point-to-point within the state of Maine. Compl. ¶ 2. MFPC
provides a variety of services to its members including advocacy before the executive

and legislative branches of state and federal government. Strauch Decl. ¶ 4.
Pepin Lumber, Inc. (Pepin Lumber) is a logging company incorporated in the
state of Maine. Compl. ¶ 3. Its principal owner and president, Maurice Pepin, is a
citizen of Canada and maintains his permanent residence in Québec. Id. Pepin
Lumber provides logging services to landowners in Maine, including MFPC members.
Id. Approximately 85% of Pepin Lumber’s revenue comes from its hauling and

transportation services, whereby the company supplies tractor trailers and drivers to
haul logs cut on property within the state of Maine. Id.; Decl. of Cédric Pepin ¶ 6
(ECF No. 4) (Pepin Decl.). The other 15% of Pepin Lumber’s business comes from
road building services. Pepin Decl. ¶ 6. Pepin Lumber operates in Coburn Gore,
Maine, a remote, unorganized township in the northwest part of the state on the
border with Canada. Id. ¶ 5; Compl. ¶ 4. Because of Pepin Lumber’s remote location,
it has had difficulty both in the past and present finding United States workers and
frequently sponsors visa applications for temporary foreign workers under the United
States H-2A visa program created by the federal Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). Compl. ¶ 4; Pepin Decl. ¶ 6.

Consistent with past years, a significant proportion of Pepin Lumber’s current
tractor trailer drivers includes temporary foreign workers lawfully admitted into the
United States on H-2A visas for the purpose of operating tractor trailers in the
logging industry. Compl. ¶ 4. On May 25, 2021, the United States Department of
Labor (DOL) issued an “Approval of H-2A Temporary Labor Certification” allowing
Pepin Lumber to hire up to thirteen temporary foreign workers to serve as log truck

drivers from June 14, 2021, until April 13, 2022. Pepin Decl. ¶ 12. On June 1, 2021,
Pepin Lumber petitioned the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) to issue H-2A visas for the thirteen foreign workers Pepin Lumber intended
to employ in its “Log Truck Driver Tractor Trailer” position. Id. ¶ 13. On July 9,
2021, USCIS issued a “Notice of Action” approving Pepin Lumber’s petition for up to
thirteen H-2A visas for this position. Id. ¶ 14. Pepin Lumber currently employs six
Canadian citizens who are authorized to work on H-2A visas until April 13, 2022. Id.

¶¶ 15, 20.
Stéphane Audet is a Canadian citizen employed by Pepin Lumber as a tractor
trailer driver. Compl. ¶ 5; Decl. of Stéphane Audet ¶ 3 (ECF No. 5) (Audet Decl.). The
federal government granted Mr. Audet an H-2A visa and he entered the United
States on July 12, 2021. Audet Decl. ¶ 8. Mr. Audet is lawfully authorized to reside
and work in the United States as a tractor trailer operator for Pepin Lumber until
April 2022. Id.; Compl. ¶ 5. More than 85% of Mr. Audet’s job involves hauling logs
point-to-point within the state of Maine. Audet Decl. ¶ 4. Mr. Audet has worked for
Pepin Lumber as a truck driver on an H-2A visa for several years. Id. ¶ 10.

Patty Cormier serves as the Director of the Maine Bureau of Forestry within
the Maine Department of Agriculture, Conservation, and Forestry, and is charged by
Maine law with the authority to enforce the Act. Compl. ¶ 6. Aaron Frey is the
Attorney General of the state of Maine and is also charged by Maine law with the
authority to enforce the Act. Id. ¶ 7.
B. Public Law 280
Without the Governor’s signature,2 on June 19, 2021, the state of Maine

enacted Public Law 280 (introduced as L.D. 188), An Act Regarding the
Transportation of Products in the Forest Products Industry. Compl., Attach. 1 at 2-
3, An Act Regarding the Transportation of Products in the Forest Products Industry
(P.L. 2021, ch. 208). The Act substantively changes Titles 10 and 12 of the Maine
Revised Statutes, amending 10 M.R.S. § 2364-B and enacting 12 M.R.S. § 8006. See
P.L. 2021, ch. 280, §§ 1-6. As both parties note, the amendments to Title 12 contain

the substantive provisions of the Act, while the amendments to Title 10 aid in its
enforcement. See Pls.’ Mot. at 7; Defs.’ Mot. at 1 n.1.

2 If, within ten days of receiving a bill from the Maine Legislature, the Governor does not sign
the bill into law or veto the bill and the Legislature is still in session, the bill automatically becomes
law. See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 2; Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Ct. Given under
the Provisions of Art. VI, Section 3 of the Me. Const., 2015 ME 107, ¶ 29, 123 A.3d 494 (“During the
session, the Government has three options when a bill is presented to [her]: (1) [she] can sign the bill
into law; (2) [she] can withhold [her] signature, which, after ten days, as ‘the same force and effect as
if the Government had signed it’; or (3) [she] can object to the bill and send the bill and [her] objections
back to the Legislature within ten days”).
Section 8006, which is to be codified under Title 12 and contains the disputed
portions of the law, governs intrastate transportation of forest products by
nonresidents and creates two prohibitions in the transportation of forest products.

P.L. 2021, ch. 280, § 6. First, the law prohibits landowners from hiring certain non-
residents for transporting forest products. The Act states in relevant part:
A landowner3 may not hire, or contract with a person to hire, a motor
carrier4 to transport forest products5 that are harvested from the
landowner’s land from a location in the State to another location in the
State unless the motor carrier is operated by a resident of the United
States.

Id. Similarly, the law prohibits non-resident motor carriers from transporting forest
products:
A motor carrier may not transport forest products that are harvested
from a landowner’s land from a location in the State to another location
in the State unless the motor carrier is operated by a resident of the
United States.

Id. Relevant here, the Act expressly excludes from its definition of “resident of the
United States” a person with an H-2A visa. Id. (“‘Resident of the United States’ does
not include a person eligible to be in the United States under the United States H-2A
visa program”). The Act imposes on both landowners and motor carriers who violate
the Act a $1,000 fine for the first violation, $2,500 for the second, and $10,000 for the
third and any subsequent violations. Id.

3 A “landowner” is any “person that owns 50,000 acres or more of forest land in [the state of
Maine].” P.L. 2021, ch. 280, § 6.
4 “‘Motor carrier’ means a contract carrier, a common carrier or a private carrier of property by
motor vehicle.” P.L. 2021, ch. 280, § 6.
5 “‘Forest Products’ means logs, pulpwood, veneer, bold wood, wood chips, stud wood, poles,
pilings, biomass fuel wood, fuel wood or other products commonly known as forest products, but does
not include Christmas trees, maple syrup, nursery products used for ornamental purposes, wreaths,
bough material, cones or other seed crops.” 12 M.R.S. § 8881(3).
The Act further amends Title 10, Chapter 501, which governs “Weights and
Measures.” See 10 M.R.S. § 2301 et. seq. As currently enacted, a person transporting
wood is required to carry a “trip ticket” that provides information about the wood’s

landowner, place of origin, haul date, name of hauler, etc. 10 M.R.S. § 2364-B. The
Act amends the trip ticket requirement to also mandate “the owner of the land from
which the wood [is] harvested [to affirm] that the load of wood is being transported
in a legal manner consistent with state law.” P.L. 2021, ch. 280, § 3. The Act further
requires that the owner or manager of a log yard or mill site, in addition to the truck
driver, be able to produce a copy of the trip ticket. Id. § 4.

On February 23, 2021, Maine Senate President, Troy Jackson, submitted
testimony in favor of the Act to members of the Joint Standing Committee on
Taxation.6 Compl., Attach. 3, Test. in Supp. of LD 188 (Jackson Test.). In his
testimony Senate President Jackson stated “that Maine loggers and truckers face an
uphill battle competing against their counterparts in Canada, who benefit from a
favorable exchange rate and government-sponsored insurance. This dynamic has
depressed wages for Maine people working in the woods and handed large landowners

extraordinary power in the industry.” Id. at 2. The Act, as Senate President Jackson
described it, is an “attempt to correct yet another injustice to Maine workers.” Id.
Senate President Jackson then stated that “[t]hroughout [his] time in the industry,”
Canadian drivers are permitted to “deliver international shipments into the U.S. and

6 Senator Jackson initially sponsored L.D. 188. State of Me. Legislature, Summary of LD 188,
https://legislature.maine.gov/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?paper=SP0076&SessionID=14 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2022)
then pick up a load to be delivered back to Canada” but may not engage in point-to-
point deliveries within the United States, known as “cabotage.”7 Id. As a result,
“there is real confusion as to why the federal government would allow this practice

under the H-2A visa program.” Id. Thus, Senate President Jackson “strongly
believe[s] that H-2A visas were not intended for this purpose, and to allow this
practice is completely at odds with Homeland Security rules on cabotage . . . [and]
[t]here is absolutely no way that Maine workers can compete with this interpretation
of federal law.” Id. at 3. As such, “[a]llowing drivers in this industry to misuse the
H-2A program also flies in the face of one of the overarching principles of allowing H-

2A visas – to protect the wages and conditions of U.S. workers.” Id.
III. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
A. The Plaintiffs’ Position
The Plaintiffs argue that they meet the first prong of the preliminary
injunction standard—likelihood of success on the merits—because the INA preempts
the Act and the Act violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States
and Maine Constitutions. Pls.’ Mot. at 10-11.

7 “Foreign-based trucks, busses, and taxicabs admitted under this section shall not engage in
local traffic in the United States unless the vehicle comes within one of the following exceptions . . ..”
19 C.F.R. § 123.14(c). There are two exceptions. One is that the “vehicle may carry merchandise or
passengers between points in the United States if such carriage is incidental to the immediately prior
or subsequent engagement of that vehicle in international traffic.” Id. § 123.14(c)(1). The other is that
a “foreign-based truck trailer may carry merchandise between points in the United States on its
departure for a foreign country under the same conditions as are prescribed for ‘other foreign railroad
equipment’ in § 123.12(a)(2).” Section 123.12(a) allows the admission of foreign locomotives and other
foreign railroad equipment into the United States without formal entry when used on a continuous
route to proceed to the end of the run and depart for the foreign country. Id. § 123.12(a). Subsection
(a)(2) addresses foreign locomotives and equipment making outward trips. Id. § 123.12(a)(2). Neither
party contends that either exception affects this Court’s decision.
Applying the theory of conflict preemption, the Plaintiffs contend that
“Congress has exercised its authority to regulate immigration and aliens through the
INA, which ‘represents a comprehensive and complete code covering all aspects of

admission of aliens to this country, whether for business or pleasure, or as
immigrants seeking to become permanent residents.” Id. at 11 (quoting Toll v.
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 13 (1982)). They argue that the Act “not only serves as an
‘obstacle’” to the H-2A visa program, but also “directly and purposefully contravenes
federal law” because “[t]he H-2A visa program serves one clear policy objective: to
assist United States employers in filling their labor needs where the current supply

of United States labor does not provide a sufficient number of workers.” Id. at 12.
The Plaintiffs say “[t]he conflict [between the Act and the H-2A program] could not
be more direct” because the Act “make[s] it illegal for certain H-2A visa recipients to
perform the very duties which federal immigration law specifically authorizes them
to come to the United States to perform.” Id. The Plaintiffs cite Dandamudi v. Tisch,
686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012), arguing that in that case, the Second Circuit found that
the INA preempted a statute barring “all lawfully present, nonimmigrant aliens from

obtaining licensure as pharmacists,” and a similar result should occur here. Pls.’ Mot.
at 13.
The Plaintiffs submit “[t]hat the drafter of the Act expressly intended to
contravene and undermine federal law” and that the Act arose from the “drafter’s
erroneous ‘belie[f] that the H-2A visas were not intended’ to allow foreign workers to
operate log trucks point-to-point in Maine, as the H-2A program specifically
authorizes.” Id. at 14 (citing Jackson Test. at 2). Thus, the Plaintiffs contend that
the Act undermines federal law and “does not reflect a scenario where Maine sought
to regulate in a traditional area of state police power and inadvertently encroached

on federal authority.” Id.
In their equal protection challenge the Plaintiffs first argue that the Court
should apply strict scrutiny because the Act discriminates on the basis of alienage
and therefore must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
Id. at 15 (citing Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 72 (1st Cir. 2006); Bruns v.
Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2014)). The Plaintiffs contend that the state of

Maine has no compelling interest because “the federal government has authorized H-
2A recipients to do [forest products transportation] work in Maine for years, and the
legislative history of the Act reflects no findings of fact suggesting that the H-2A
program has had any deleterious effect on any aspect of Maine life.” Id. at 16.
Instead, the Plaintiffs assert that the “Act arises merely from disagreement with
federal law ultimately borne of labor market protectionism.” Id.
The Plaintiffs further submit that the act is not “narrowly tailored” because

elimination of H-2A workers “does not serve to improve the position of United States
workers” because “employers can hire H-2A workers only after the federal
government has certified no United States workers are available to fill the relevant
job.” Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). The Plaintiffs again cite Dandamudi to support
their position, noting that the Second Circuit in that case concluded that non-
immigrant aliens are, like aliens generally, a suspect class, and, applying strict
scrutiny, found that the nonimmigrant pharmacists posed no health threat and the
law was not narrowly tailored because there were other ways to limit any potential
harm caused by employment of these professionals. Id. at 16-17.

As to the second factor in the preliminary injunction analysis, the Plaintiffs
contend that they will suffer irreparable harm as a matter of law because the
enforcement of the Act will violate their constitutional rights, and “compliance with
a preempted law itself serves as a form of irreparable harm.” Id. at 17. The Plaintiffs
further argue that the MFPC will be irreparably harmed because the Act will result
in an “immediate[] and permanent[] reduc[tion] [to the] labor force available to haul

forest products in Maine, in turn reducing the capacity to transport those products
and ultimately the supply of those products that can reach consumers.” Id. at 18.
The Act therefore “harms all downstream actors in the forest product industry, who
will face supply chain disruptions and higher prices.” Id.
As to Pepin Lumber, the Plaintiffs say “the Act means a substantial portion of
its current corps of log truck drivers no longer will be permitted to do the job for which
Pepin hire[d] them, hauling logs point-to-point in Maine.” Id. The Plaintiffs argue

that Pepin Lumber has historically had challenges finding workers, and “simply
would not be in a position to replace” its H-2A visa holders were the Act effective. Id.
As such, the Plaintiffs say “[t]he elimination of H-2A workers from Pepin Lumber’s
labor force will mean a permanent reduction in its capacity to haul logs and a
permanent reduction in its revenue.” Id. at 19. Finally, as to Mr. Audet, the Plaintiffs
assert that “the Act prohibits [him] from doing the work for which he has received an
H-2A visa—hauling logs point-to-point within Maine—which constitutes
approximately 85% of Audet’s income.” Id. Moreover, the Plaintiffs maintain that
“stripping [Mr.] Audet of his ability to perform the duties authorized by the H-2A visa

will likely cost him his H-2A visa status.” Id.
Under the third preliminary injunction factor, the Plaintiffs contend that no
substantial harm will result from injunctive relief because “the Act is likely
unconstitutional, and as such Maine has no legitimate interest in enforcing it during
the pendency of these proceedings.” Id. Moreover, the Plaintiffs submit that
injunctive relief will not harm Maine workers “as the federal H-2A visa program

already requires [] employers to show, and DOL to certify, that employers cannot
obtain United States workers to fill the jobs at issue.” Id.
Lastly, the Plaintiffs claim that the public interest favors injunctive relief
because the Act is likely preempted by federal law and “[i]t is hard to conceive of a
situation where the public interest would be served by enforcement of an
unconstitutional law or regulation.” Id. (quoting Condon v. Andino, Inc., 961 F. Supp.
323, 331 (D. Me. 1997)).

B. The Defendant’s Opposition
The Defendants argue that the “Court must begin with the presumption that
the state statute is valid” because the Legislature has acted in a field traditionally
occupied and regulated by the state. Defs.’ Opp’n at 10-11 (quoting Ouellette v. Mills,
91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D. Me. 2015)). The Act, the Defendants assert, is “[c]onsistent
with the State of Maine’s police power to regulate labor relations and its forestry
industry.” Id. at 12. The purpose of the Act, the Defendants claim, “is to limit the
historic abuse of the federal H-2A visa program in the State’s logging industry and to
ensure the cornerstone of the federal program—to avoid adverse impacts of
unauthorized alien workers on the domestic workforce—is safeguarded.” Id. Thus,

“[t]he Act regulates an area historically within the province of the states: enacting
legislation to ensure the vibrance of local economies and to protect all authorized
domestic workers, regardless of immigration status, from discrimination.” Id.
Next, the Defendants urge that the Plaintiffs cannot establish impossibility
preemption because “the INA does not mandate any action” by the Plaintiffs and “[n]o
employer is forced to file a petition for approval of H-2A visas and no employer is

forced to hire workers who are not already approved to work in the United States.”
Id. at 13. Thus, the Defendants say that because “the INA does not mandate the
behavior at issue, Plaintiffs can remain in compliance with both laws.” Id. As to Mr.
Audet, the Defendants state that “even if the Act is enforced against him, his H-2A
visa status is dependent on the availability of the temporary job he was hired to do.”
Id. Thus, “[i]f that job is no longer available to him, his authorization to work in the
United States expires under the Automatic Revocation Provision.” Id. at 13-14.

Therefore, the Defendants argue that “federal law is consistent with the Act because
the federal Automatic Revocation Provision is triggered when the position that Audet
was hired to do is no longer available as a matter of state law.” Id. at 14. The
Defendants therefore submit that “even if the Act immediately applied to Plaintiff
Audet, it would still be possible to comply with both federal and state law.” Id.
The Defendants further contend that the Plaintiffs cannot establish obstacle
preemption because the Act does not pose an obstacle to the H-2A visa program but
instead “advanc[es] the purpose of the H-2A program [which is] to grant unauthorized

aliens temporary, non-immigrant status only when their employment will not
adversely affect domestic workers or local industry.” Id. at 15. The Defendants assert
that the Act is harmonious with H-2A visa eligibility rules because it only limits
“driving a truck for a logging company transporting forest products that are
harvested from a Maine landowner’s land to another location in Maine—because (A)
there are ample eligible domestic workers to do that job and (B) employing aliens via

the H-2A visa program would adversely affect Maine’s logging industry in particular
and, as a result of fewer jobs and increased unemployment, its economy in general.”
Id. The Defendants dispute the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Dandamudi and argue that
the Second Circuit’s holding was based on equal protection grounds, not preemption,
and, here, unlike the law in Dandamudi, the Act advances, rather than inhibits, H-
2A visa program goals. Id. at 16-17.
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs will not succeed on their equal

protection claims, which the Defendants label an “as-applied,” not facial, challenge.
Defs.’ Mot. at 6. The Defendants assert that the Act is consistent with the federal
standards for treatment of aliens because the basis of the alleged disparate treatment
under the Act comes from federal law. Id. at 7. The Defendants say that “[t]he federal
H-2A visa program requires unauthorized aliens to go through a rigorous eligibility
process if they wish to work in the same jobs that are available to domestic workers.
The Act simply codifies the federal government’s disparate treatment between these
unauthorized alien workers and domestic workers.” Id.
The Defendants explain that “an employer seeking to hire unauthorized aliens

must satisfy various threshold eligibility requirements that are not applicable when
hiring a domestic worker.” Id. at 8. Thus, the Defendants submit that “[c]onsistent
with the distinction created by the federal government between unauthorized aliens
and domestic workers, the State of Maine has made a threshold determination that
there are sufficient eligible domestic truck drivers available to transport forest
products that are harvested from a Maine landowner’s land to another location in

Maine and that the use of H-2A visa workers for that activity would undermine the
health of the logging industry in Maine.” Id. at 8. The Defendants thus argue “[t]he
Act . . . applies the exact same threshold eligibility requirements to a single position
available at logging companies . . . to ensure that domestic log truck drivers who are
able, willing, and qualified are not unfairly denied such work.” Id.
Next, the Defendants contend that the Act is likely to survive strict scrutiny
“because it is narrowly tailored to serve the compelling State interest of regulating

employment, protecting workers from discrimination, and ensuring the vibrance of
its logging industry.” Id. at 8-9. The Defendants put forth that the “governmental
interest in minimizing discrimination against domestic workers in favor of
unauthorized aliens through the abuse of the H-2A visa program is certainly within
the State’s traditional police power.” Id. at 9 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012)). Additionally, the Defendants submit that the Act
is narrowly tailored “because it addresses just a single position within a single
industry” and is therefore “laser-focused on . . . local problems.” Id. at 9-10.
Finally, the Defendants again dispute the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Dandamudi,

first because the decision is not binding on this Court, but also because the state in
that case conceded having no compelling justification for its law, whereas here “Maine
has offered a compelling interest in protecting domestic workers from discrimination,
preventing unemployment, and protecting the vibrance of Maine’s logging industry.”
Id. at 10.
As to irreparable harm, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs’ potential

“loss of employment does not constitute an ‘irreparable harm’ since such a loss is
typically rectified with non-equitable relief” and subject employers can simply hire
“U.S. resident worker[s].” Id. at 17. Second, the Defendants argue that there is no
irreparable harm if the Act does not apply to H-2A visas that were issued prior to the
Act’s effective date and that any harm in the future is purely speculative. Id.
Finally, in weighing the public interest, the Defendants contend that “[t]he Act
seeks to protect domestic workers and the Maine logging industry” and that the

“creation and preservation of jobs are especially important during high times of
unemployment, such as now.” Id. at 18. Additionally, the Defendants submit that
there is no harm to Pepin Lumber or MFPC because they can employ domestic
workers to drive their trucks, and there is no harm to Mr. Audet because, while he
may lose his current job, there is no guarantee that he would even be eligible for
another H-2A visa in the future or that the specific job he was approved for will still
be available. Id. at 18.
C. The Plaintiffs’ Reply

In reply, the Plaintiffs point to four “threshold defects” in the Defendants’
opposition. Pls.’ Reply at 2. First, the Plaintiffs dispute the Defendants’ use of the
terms “unauthorized alien” and “domestic worker” which the Plaintiffs say are not
based on existing federal immigration law. Id. The Plaintiffs contend that this
“taxonomy” “leave[s] no room . . . for nonimmigrant aliens, like holders of H-2A visas,
who may work in the United States but who maintain their permanent residence in
their country of origin.” Id.

Second, the Plaintiffs assert that the attachments to the Defendants’
opposition—a press release and PowerPoint presentation—are inadmissible hearsay
and the Court should note the absence of any supporting testimony from state
officials about the Act. Id. at 2-3.
Third, the Plaintiffs dispute the Defendants’ reliance on Senate President
Jackson’s testimony because they “cite[] no authority for the proposition that the

testimony of a single legislator at a public hearing may serve as a ‘legislative finding’
or as a factual material on which the Court can rely for any purpose other than
divining legislative intent.” Id. at 3. The Plaintiffs contend that “courts may give
weight to enacted statements of fact and declarations of policy, [but] the Act contains
neither.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus while the testimony “reveals the legislative
intent behind the Act—indeed, the testimony confirms the Act’s impermissible
purposes otherwise apparent from its plain language—that testimony does not
consist of factual evidence on which this Court may rely for any other purpose.” Id.
Fourth, the Plaintiffs note that “the State appears to suggest Plaintiffs lack

standing because the Act applies only to those who may seek or receive H-2A visas
after the Act’s effective date.” Id. at 4. The Plaintiffs argue that the Act, by its “plain
language,” applies “regardless of when [a] person sought or received the visa,” which
gives Mr. Audet standing to sue. Id. Additionally, Pepin Lumber and MFPC
members have historically relied on H-2A visas, which gives them standing to
challenge the Act. Id.

As to the Defendants’ equal protection arguments, the Plaintiffs assert that
“the Act’s prohibition on H-2A visa recipients hauling forest products in Maine serves
as a prohibition on lawful, not unlawful aliens,” id. at 5 (emphasis in original), and
therefore the Act “does not ‘follow the federal direction’ of the treatment of aliens.”
Id. (quoting Defs.’ Opp’n at 7). The Plaintiffs contend that “it is not within the State’s
authority to determine the need for H-2A workers in Maine, a power clearly claimed
by the federal government.” Id. (citing Toll, 485 U.S. at 10). The Plaintiffs also

dispute the State’s alleged “interest in preventing unauthorized aliens from depriving
citizens and permanent resident aliens of jobs” because the Act does not regulate
“unauthorized aliens” but instead “prohibits lawfully present H-2A recipients” from
working as federally authorized logging truck drivers. Id. at 6 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Plaintiffs further argue that even if the State does have an
interest in protecting Maine workers from discrimination in times of high
unemployment, the Act is not narrowly tailored “because it forever bans the use of
any H-2A workers as log truck drivers regardless of employment conditions in
Maine.” Id. The Plaintiffs point out that this “blanket ban” is unlike the DOL’s

design for the H-2A visa program, which is to make a case-by-case determination of
whether there are domestic workers available for a particular job. Id. at 7.
The Plaintiffs dispute the applicability of the presumption against preemption
here because “the Act is not a neutral labor or forestry law that applies generally
across all workers in Maine’s forestry industry, such as a minimum wage requirement
or a safety standard . . . [but] instead . . . is ‘laser-focused’ on the use of immigrant

labor in Maine,” id. at 8 (quoting Defs.’ Opp’n at 10), which is not a “traditional
sphere[] of [state] authority.” Id. The Plaintiffs further contest the Defendants’
argument that “the H-2A program contemplates the possibility of states eliminating
the use of H-2A workers within their jurisdiction” because of the “Automatic
Revocation Provision” because “[t]he State cites no authority for the proposition that
Congress intended for this provision to serve as an invitation to states to cause job
loss through nullification of the H-2A program.” Id. at 8-9 (emphasis in original).

The Plaintiffs oppose the Defendant’s assertion that the Act creates a new program
using the same eligibility criteria found in the INA, reasoning that “it lays a flat ban
on the use of H-2A workers as log truck drivers, with no role for administrative
decision-making or any kind of case-by-case assessment of individualized
circumstances, such as takes place under the H-2A program.” Id. at 9.
Lastly, the Plaintiffs question the Defendants’ claim that Mr. Audet can be
“compensated through non-equitable relief” because they are not aware of any way
that Mr. Audet “can obtain retrospective monetary damages for economic losses

caused by the Act.” Id.
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never
awarded as of right.” Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 8-
9 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc.,
645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011)). A judge should use the authority to grant such
injunctive relief “sparingly.” Mass. Coal. of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def.

Agency & Office of Emergency Preparedness, 649 F.2d 71, 76 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981).
To determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction a court must analyze
four factors:
(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the potential for
irreparable harm [to the movant] if the injunction is denied; (3) the
balance of relevant impositions, i.e., the hardship to the nonmovant if
enjoined as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if no injunction
issues; and (4) the effect (if any) of the court’s ruling on the public
interest.

Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration
in original) (quoting Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004)).
“The party seeking the preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing
that these four factors weigh in its favor.” Id. at 18. Ultimately, “trial courts have
wide discretion in making judgments regarding the appropriateness of such relief.”
Francisco Sánchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2009).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
“The sine qua non of this four-part inquiry is likelihood of success on the
merits: if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed in his

quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.” New Comm Wireless
Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Sindicato
Puertorriqueño de Trabajadores v. Fortuño, 699 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2012) (confirming
that this factor is “the most important part of the preliminary injunction assessment”)
(quoting Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2007)). The Court
analyzes the merits of the Plaintiffs’ challenges to Public Law 280 and concludes the
law is preempted by Federal law and violates the Equal Protection Clause.

1. Federal Preemption
“Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both
the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound
to respect,” which can result in laws in “conflict or at cross-purposes.” Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398-99 (2012). “The Supremacy Clause provides a clear
rule that federal law ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to

the Contrary notwithstanding.’” Id. at 399 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). “State
law must . . . give way to federal law in [three] . . . circumstances”: (1) when Congress
“enact[s] a statute containing an express pre-emption provision;” (2) when “Congress,
acting within its proper authority” determined that conduct in a particular field
“must be regulated by its exclusive governance” (field preemption); and (3) when state
laws conflict with federal law such that “compliance with federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility” (impossibility preemption) or where “the
challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of

the full purpose and objectives of Congress” (obstacle preemption), which is
collectively termed “conflict preemption.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“According to the Supreme Court, ‘[w]hat is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of
judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying
its purpose and intended effects.” Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95,
102 (D. Me. 2008) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373

(2000)). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish preemption. Capron v. Off. of Att’y
Gen. of Mass., 944 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 150 (2020).
“In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has
‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ [the court]
start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,

518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S.
1, 13 (2013); Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400 (both quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The presumption against preemption applies to both
express and implied preemption analyses. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of S.
Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 322, 431 (D. Me. 2017) (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
However, “the presumption against preemption does not apply where Congress’s
intent is apparent from the statutory text, context, and purpose.” Spectrum
Northeast LLC v. Frey, 496 F. Supp. 3d 507, 512 (D. Me. 2020) (citing Coventry Health
Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1197-98 & n.3 (2017)); see also Nat’l

Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 74 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court
has repeatedly cited Hines [v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)] for the proposition that
an ‘Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws in the same
subject” (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981))).
Here, the Plaintiffs argue conflict preemption. Pls.’ Mot. at 11. Thus, the Court

first addresses whether the Act stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the INA.
a. The Purpose and Scope of Federal Immigration
Authority, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
the Federal H-2A Visa Program.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[t]he Government of the United
States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of
aliens,” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394, including the “regulation of aliens within our
borders.” Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). Federal immigration authority “rests,
in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power ‘to establish a[] uniform
Rule of Naturalization,’ and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct
relations with foreign nations.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394-95 (internal citations
omitted); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Toll at 458 U.S. at 10. The Supreme
Court has articulated the underlying justification for this power, namely that “[i]t is
fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security
of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on
this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.” Arizona, 567
U.S. at 395 (citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-280 (1876); THE

FEDERALIST NO. 3, 39 (C. Rossiter ed. 2003) (J. Jay))). To this end, the Supreme Court
“has reaffirmed that ‘[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international
relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country’s own
nationals when those nationals are in another country.” Id. (alterations in Arizona)
(quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 64).
The federal government’s immigration authority permits it to “determine[e]

what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain,
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of
their naturalization.” Toll, 458 U.S. at 11. This power inherently limits that of the
states:
Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can
neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by
Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the
United States or the several states. State laws which impose
discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully
within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived
federal power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held
invalid.

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410,
419 (1948)); see also id. at 13 (“[S]tate regulation not congressionally sanctioned that
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it
imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress”). Against this broad
guiding principle, the Supreme Court also wrote: “[t]o be sure, when Congress has
done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the country temporarily, the
proper application of the principle is likely to be a matter of some dispute.” Id. at 13.
Finally, the “the mere fact that a state law implicates the interests of persons

who are the subject of federal regulation, even with respect to immigration, does not
alone provide a basis for inferring that the federal regulatory scheme was intended
to preempt a field that encompasses such a state law, at least when it concerns a
matter of such quintessentially local concern as employment.” Capron, 944 F.3d at
24 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976), superseded by statute on other
grounds as recognized in Arizona, 567 U.S. at 404).8

In 1952 Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which
is a “comprehensive and complete code covering all aspects of admission of aliens9 to
this country, whether for business or pleasure, or as immigrants seeking to become
permanent residents.” Toll, 458 U.S. at 13-14 (quoting Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S.
647, 664 (1978)); see Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2020) (“The . . . INA . . .
sets out the ‘terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent
treatment of aliens lawfully in the country’” (quoting Chamber of Comm. of U.S. of

Am. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011))). The INA “recognizes two basic classes of
aliens, immigrant and nonimmigrant.” Toll, 458 U.S. at 13.

8 Decided in 1976 prior to the 1986 enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA), De Canas held that “States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the
employment relationship to protect workers within the State,” 424 U.S. at 356. The IRCA now governs
employment of illegal aliens. See Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797-98 (2020); Whiting, 563 at 588-
89 (discussing the IRCA). Although De Canas’ central holding is no longer good law because of the
enactment of the IRCA, courts continue to cite it for its principles on immigration law and preemption
more generally. See e.g., Whiting, 563 U.S. at 587-88; Capron, 944 F.3d at 22-23.
9 An “alien” is “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
To begin, the INA defines “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). The INA defines “immigrant” as “every alien”
except aliens who fall within statutorily defined classes of “nonimmigrant aliens.” Id.

§ 1101(a)(15). The classes of nonimmigrant aliens include ambassadors, aliens
entering the United States for study or training, and, as relevant here, individuals
who live in a foreign country and come to the United States to perform “agricultural
labor”. Id. § 1105(a)(15)(H)(ii). By contrast, an “immigrant,” as opposed to
“nonimmigrant,” alien is any non-citizen who does not fall into any of the
“nonimmigrant” categories in § 1101(a)(15) and, for example, includes persons who

enter the United States as refugees or asylees. See, e.g., id. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157
(admission of refugees), 1158 (asylum).
Within the broad category of “nonimmigrant aliens” are several classes, each
distinguishable based on the type of visa granted and the alien’s purpose for entering
the United States.10 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (defining different classes
of nonimmigrant alien visas). One such nonimmigrant alien subcategory is for
individuals who have been lawfully granted H-2A visas by the United States,

permitting them to enter the country for a set period of time to engage in agricultural
labor or services. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a).
Specifically, the INA defines a H-2A visa holder as an “alien having a residence
in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming

10 For example, F-1 visas are granted to aliens who enter the United States to study; B-1 visas
for business; and B-2 visas for tourism. U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs,
Directory of Visa Categories, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-
resources/all-visa-categories.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).
temporarily to the United States to . . . perform agricultural labor or services.” Id.
The Department of Homeland Security has stated that the “purpose of the [H-2A
program] is to provide agricultural employers with an orderly and timely flow of legal

workers, thereby decreasing their reliance on unauthorized workers, while protecting
the rights of laborers.” 73 Fed. Reg. 76891, 76891 (Dec. 18, 2008) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
pts. 214, 215, 274) (summary of the purpose of the final rule)11.
Obtaining an H-2A visa is a complex two-step process. The application process
is initiated not by the potential holder of the H-2A visa, but by the employer seeking
to hire the potential H-2A visa holders for agricultural work. See 8 U.S.C. §

1188(a)(1)(A)-(B); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(i)(A), (D); 20 C.F.R. § 655.130. First, the
employer must apply for a “temporary agricultural labor certification” (labor
certification) from the Department of Labor (DOL)12 certifying that:

11 “Although the preamble has been in disuse for many years there is a modern tendency to use
it or a policy section to explain the basis for legislative action on the theory that it will assist to
establish the constitutionality of the act. The preamble is useful in constitutional litigation where it
is alleged that the act . . . conflicts with specific constitutional prohibitions.” 1A SUTHERLAND
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20:4 (7th ed. 2020).
12 The labor certification itself is a four-part process. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, H-2A Temporary
Certification for Agriculture Workers, https://flag.dol.gov/programs/H-2A (last visited Feb. 16, 2022)
(FLAG DOL). First, the employer must submit a “job order” with the State Workforce Agency (SWA)
serving the area of intended employment. 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(1). The job order contains the
“material terms and conditions of employment,” and must be submitted to the state agency “no more
than 75 calendar days and no fewer than 60 calendar days before the date of need.” Id. § 655.103.
The job order must also be processed as a “clearance order” through the Agricultural
Recruitment System (ARS). Id. §§ 651.10, 655.121(a)(3). Before issuing a clearance order, the SWA
must find that the employer has “attempted and [has] not been able to obtain sufficient workers within
the local labor market” or there is an “anticipate[d] . . . shortage of local workers.” Id. § 653.501(a)(1)-
(2).
Second, the employer must file an H-2A application with the Chicago National Processing
Center no less than 45 calendar days prior to the work start date. FLAG DOL.
Third, if the SWA determines that the job order is compliant, the SWA and employer must
advertise the job order in the intended area of employment for the recruitment period. 20 C.F.R. §
655.121(c)-(d); FLAG DOL.
(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and
who will be available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor
or services involved in the petition,13 and

(B) the employment of the alien in such labor or services will not adversely
affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States
similarly employed.14

8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A)-(B); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.130 (certification application
filing requirements). During the certification process the DOL will also “test[]
whether [the] employment qualifies as temporary or seasonal.” 8 C.F.R. §
214.2(h)(5)(iv)(B); see also 20 C.F.R. § 655.122.
Upon receipt of a labor certification from the DOL, the employer must next file
a petition with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
showing “that the proposed employment qualifies as a basis for H-2A status.” 8
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(i)(A), (D). In this petition the employer must demonstrate that
“each beneficiary will be employed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
certification”15; that the employment is of a “temporary or seasonal nature,” which

13 An employer may not give preferential treatment to aliens and “must offer to U.S. workers no
less than the same benefits, wages, and working conditions that the employer is offering, intends to
offer, or will provide to H-2A workers. Job offers may not impose on U.S. workers any restrictions or
obligations that will not be imposed on the employer’s H-2A workers.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(a).
14 Federal regulations break this two-step process down further into five components: (1)
“whether employment is as an agricultural worker”; (2) “whether [the employment] is open to U.S.
workers”; (3) whether “qualified U.S. workers are available”; (4) any “adverse impact of employment
of a qualified alien”; and (5) “whether employment conditions, including housing, meet applicable
requirements.” 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(5)(ii).
15 Employers must meet certain wage requirements, provide housing and transportation, and
guarantee employment for at least 75% of the work period specified in the employment contract, known
as the “three-fourths guarantee.” 20 C.F.R. § 655.122 (contents of job offers); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, H-
2A: Temporary Agricultural Employment of Foreign Workers,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/agriculture/h2a (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact
Sheet #26: Section H-2A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs26.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2022). An
employer may be subject to civil monetary penalties if they violate terms of the work contract, 29
C.F.R. § 502.19(c), which include wages, hours, and working conditions and other conditions in Subpart
B of 29 C.F.R. § 655. Id. § 502.10. t
is usually satisfied by a DOL seasonality finding during the initial certification
process; that the beneficiary of the H-2A visa meets the minimum qualifications of
the job and is able to fully perform the duties of that position; and that the employer

consents to certain notification requirements. Id. § 214.2(h)(5)(iii), (iv)-(vi).
Once granted, the H-2A visa is tied to specific employment, meaning that “[a]n
alien with this status may be employed only by the [employer] through whom the
status was obtained.” Id. § 274a.12(b)(9). An alien’s H-2A visa may be revoked upon
finding that “[t]he beneficiary is no longer employed by the petitioner in the capacity
specified in the petition, or if the beneficiary is no longer receiving training as

specified in the petition.” Id. § 214.2(h)(11)(iii)(A)(1).
b. Whether Public Law 280 is Preempted by the
Immigration and Nationality Act
In light of the federal government’s comprehensive role in immigration and
naturalization, the Court must determine whether Public Law 280 stands as an
obstacle to the implementation and enforcement of the H-2A visa program as created
by the INA.
To begin, the parties disagree on whether the Act should be defined as an
immigration and naturalization regulation, an area governed by the federal
government, or an industry or employment regulation, an area traditionally governed
by the states. As this District has noted, “[i]n order to decide whether Congress

intended to occupy the field, it is important, first, to define the field.” Ouellette v.
Mills, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D. Me. 2015); see also id. at 8 n.7 (citing In re Pharm. Indus.
Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156 (1st Cir. 2009)). The Plaintiffs frame
the Act as regulating immigration, Pls.’ Reply at 8 (“[T]he Act is not a neutral labor
or forestry law that applies generally across all workers in Maine’s forestry
industry”), while the Defendants argue the Act regulates the logging industry, which

is traditionally a state function. Defs.’ Opp’n at 11-12 (“The Act regulates an area
historically within the province of the states: enacting legislation to ensure the
vibrance of local economies and to protect all authorized domestic workers, regardless
of immigration status, from discrimination”).
Although the Defendants are correct that regulation of the logging industry
and employment in Maine is a traditional state function, see e.g., 12 M.R.S. § 8869

(forest harvest regulations), the Court disagrees that the Act falls within the scope of
a traditional employment or industry regulation.16 Given that the Act effectively
grants the state of Maine the superseding authority to revoke H-2A visas for certain
individuals and supplant the DOL’s labor certification, as discussed below, the Act at
its core regulates immigration, an inherently federal area, rather than industry or
employment. The Court does not treat Public Law 280 as a traditional state law in
its conflict preemption analysis.

16 The Defendants point to three laws as examples of Maine’s authority to regulate the logging
industry: 26 M.R.S. § 871, which prohibits the hiring of illegal aliens in the logging industry, § 872,
which requires proof of equipment ownership for logging companies hiring foreign workers, and § 873,
which sets forth procedures for recruiting qualified workers in the logging industry. However, these
laws do not change the Court’s calculus. The IRCA’s legislative history states that “the Committee
does not intend to preempt licensing or ‘fitness to do business laws,’ such as state farm labor contractor
laws or forestry laws, which specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring,
recruiting or referring undocumented aliens.” H.R. Rep. 99-682, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662. All
three laws the Defendants cite fall within this articulated “exception” that the federal government left
to the states. First, section 871 addresses work in the logging industry by illegal immigrants, which
Congress did not intend the IRCA to preempt. Second, sections 872 and 873 both fall squarely within
the type of “fitness to do business” laws that states have traditionally adopted and do not impact
admittance of aliens to the United States.
Under the theory of conflict preemption courts have held that a state law may
be preempted if the goals of that state law are in direct conflict with Congressional
objectives, as articulated by a federal statute. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 75-76; Rogers

v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 626 (3d Cir. 1977). Here, the Court finds Public Law 280
preempted by the INA because it strikes a different balance between the dual goals
of protecting employers and protecting the local workforce in a way that inherently
conflicts with congressional intent.
The First Circuit’s most recent analysis of this difficult area is found in its 2019
decision Capron v. Office of the Attorney General of Massachusetts, which provides

helpful guidance. In Capron, the First Circuit addressed whether the INA and the
federal Au Pair Program preempted Commonwealth of Massachusetts statutes
controlling wage and hour laws for nonimmigrant aliens holding J-1 visas. 944 F.3d
at 20. The challenge to the Massachusetts laws was based only on implied
preemption and therefore the First Circuit addressed only field and conflict
preemption. Id. at 21.
The Capron Court reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision in De Canas v. Bica,

noting that the Supreme Court applied a presumption against preemption and, once
applied, the De Canas Court concluded that “‘[t]he comprehensiveness’ of the INA
‘without more[,]’ was not sufficient to establish the ‘clear and manifest’ congressional
intent to oust state law that is required to overcome the presumption against
preemption.” Id. at 23 (alterations in Capron) (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357,
359). The Capron Court noted that in De Canas the “state laws at issue were not
deciding ‘who should or should not be admitted into the country and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain,’ as they merely concerned the power to
employ undocumented aliens already in the country.” Id. at 22 (quoting De Canas,

424 U.S. at 355). The First Circuit also pointed out that the Supreme Court had
explained that the “state law measures -- which regulated employment -- concerned
a quintessentially local area of regulation.” Id. (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356-57).
The First Circuit did not resolve whether the presumption against preemption
should apply. Instead, the Capron Court observed that even if it were to conclude
that the presumption against field preemption applied, the plaintiffs would still bear

the burden of proving that the Au Pair Program preempts the relevant field. Id. at
24. The First Circuit pointed out that the INA and Au Pair Program applied to
sponsoring organizations and the Massachusetts statutes applied to the host families
of the au pairs. Id. Next, the First Circuit discounted the impact of the
Massachusetts law on the “federal government’s power over foreign affairs, both with
respect to immigration and foreign relations.” Id. at 24-25. Significantly, the Capron
Court noted that “these state law measures do not purport -- as the ones at issue in

De Canas did . . . -- to preclude the foreign nationals affected by them from being
employed. They merely establish the wage and hour rights that the foreign nationals
affected by the federal regulatory scheme enjoy if they are employed.” Id. at 25. The
First Circuit concluded that field preemption did not apply. Id. at 26.
The Capron Court next turned to conflict preemption, observing that the
plaintiffs were pressing only obstacle preemption. Id. Here, the First Circuit wrote
that “[t]he notion that underlies obstacle preemption is that the federal government
would want a federal measure to be preemptive of any state law that ‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of

that federal measure.” Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). The First Circuit said
that the plaintiffs in Capron must show that “there is a conflict between the state law
measures and the Au Pair Program by showing that the former would frustrate the
purposes and objectives of the latter.” Id. at 28. To do so, the plaintiffs in Capron
had to “identify affirmative evidence that Congress or the D[epartment o[f] S[tate]
had a ceiling-setting -- and thus obstacle-preemption-creating -- intent.” Id. (citing

Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400, 414). In Capron, the First Circuit examined evidence of
congressional intent and found it lacking. Id. at 29-33. Nor did the First Circuit find
convincing the plaintiffs’ recitation of statutory and regulatory history. Id. at 33-39.
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ preemption argument, the First Circuit concluded that the
federal laws and regulations did not create a “ceiling-setting character” and the
appellate court found “neither the text, nor the regulatory history, nor even past
practice demonstrates that they have [].” Id. at 44.17

The First Circuit has not spoken on the preemptive effect of the INA on state
laws impacting non-immigrant H-2A visas but has analyzed the preemptive effect of
the federal government’s foreign relations power on a state law banning trade with

17 On February 10, 2022, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued Consumer Data Indus.
Ass’n v. Frey, No. 20-2064, __F.4th__, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 (1st Cir. Feb. 10, 2022), addressing
preemption. The Consumer Data Court explained the contours of express preemption in that case. Id.
at *7 (“In this setting, our inquiry reduces to whether the Amendments are swept into the maw of
FCRA preemption, and in particular, that of express preemption”). Here, the Court has resolved this
issue before it on obstacle, not express, preemption and therefore Consumer Data is relevant only as
it reinforces how nuanced preemption analyses must be.
then-named Burma. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 44. In Natsios, the First Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that the state law, which restricted
Massachusetts and its agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies

doing business with Burma, was preempted because the state law “veer[ed] from the
carefully balanced path that Congress ha[d] constructed” in its attempts to “steer a
middle path.” Id. at 45, 76. The First Circuit went on to explain that Congress’ goal
to improve human rights was a foreign relations policy and in creating the policy,
Congress had “considered various mechanisms to accomplish and balance this
country’s various interests and goals and chose a set of carefully calibrated tools.” Id.

The First Circuit compared the “careful calibration reflect[ing] the judgment of the
Congress and the President” as to the “most effective means to improve human rights
conditions in Burma while safeguarding other national interests” with the state’s
choice of “a blunt instrument to further only a single goal, making judgments
different from and contrary to the judgments made by Congress and the President.”
Id.
The Third Circuit applied a similar “goal balancing analysis” in Rogers v.

Larson, 563 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1977), a case factually similar to the one before this
Court. There, the Third Circuit held that a Virgin Islands law requiring the
termination of nonimmigrant H-2A visa workers for replacement with qualified
resident workers was preempted by the INA18 because it stood “as an obstacle to the

18 The version of the INA in effect when the Third Circuit decided Rogers combined the H-2A and
H-2B programs, see La. Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Solis, 814 F. Supp. 2d 655, 663 (W.D. La. 2011), however
the H-2A visa requirements at the time were the same. See Rogers, 563 F.2d at 622-24. The enactment
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of the INA and [was],
therefore, invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 619 n.1, 626. The Third
Circuit concluded that the INA and the Virgin Islands law “share[d] some common

purposes” but were nonetheless “in direct conflict.” Id. at 626. The Third Circuit
recognized that both laws sought to “assure an adequate labor force on the one hand
and to protect the jobs of citizens on the other” before concluding that “[a]ny statutory
scheme with these two purposes must inevitably strike a balance between the two
goals” of protecting citizen-workers by restricting employment by nonimmigrant
aliens and protecting an ample workforce by eliminating all restrictions on

nonimmigrant alien entry. Id.; see also Hernandez Flecha v. Quiros, 567 F.2d 1154,
1156 (1st Cir. 1977) (agreeing with the Third Circuit’s articulation of the dual goals
of the INA’s H-2A program); Digilab, Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 495 F.2d 323, 326 (1st Cir.
1974) (describing the dual “praiseworthy Congressional legislative objectives”).
It was in the different striking of the balance of these two goals that the Third
Circuit found a conflict between the INA and the Virgin Islands’ law. Rogers, 563
F.2d at 626. The Third Circuit described the following considerations undergirding

the INA: continuity of the workforce; an employer’s expectation that a nonimmigrant
worker will not be terminated until the date specified on the DOL’s certification;
prevention of disruptive turnovers in employment; incentives for aliens to come to the
United States for employment; and certainty to those with H-2A visas that they will

of the IRCA in 1986 subdivided the INA into the current H-2A and H-2B programs. Cong. Research
Serv., H-2A and H-2B Temporary Worker Visas: Policy and Related Issues at 2-3 (2020),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R44849.pdf.
have employment for a period of at least one year. Id. In contrast, the Third Circuit
described the Virgin Islands’ law as “balanc[ing] . . . in the direction of protection of
citizen-workers” by allowing “[t]he Government of the Virgin Islands [to] . . . shorten

the period of stay granted to an alien worker by the United States by causing him to
fail to comply with a condition of his stay under federal law: continued employment.”
Id.
The same tension between federal goals and state goals in Capron, Natsios,
and Rogers is present in this case. The purpose of the H-2A visa program, as
articulated by the Department of Homeland Security and recognized by the Third

Circuit, is to “provide agricultural employers with an orderly and timely flow of legal
workers, thereby decreasing their reliance on unauthorized workers, while protecting
the rights of laborers.” 73 Fed. Reg. 76891, 76891; see also Rogers, 563 F.2d at 626.
The DOL’s labor certification analysis further reflects this delicate balance between
employers and domestic workers by requiring the Secretary to consider both an
employer’s need to fill a particular position and the impact of foreign workers on the
citizen workforce. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A)-(B). Conversely, Public Law 280 is

intended to reduce competition with Canadian truckers and improve access to jobs
for Maine workers. See Jackson Test. at 1-2; Decl. of Nolan L. Reichl, Attach. 1, Ex.
A, at 4-5 (BDN Article). As in Rogers and Natsios, and unlike in Capron, the Act
ignores Congress’ balancing to favor state employment interests. Namely, the Act
promotes local workers’ interests without considering individual employers’ needs
and is similarly a “blunt instrument” to further a single goal. See Natsios, 181 F.3d
at 76.
While the H-2A visa program and Public Law 280 share the goal of protecting

local workers, “the fact that state and federal legislation share common goals, either
in whole or in part, is not sufficient to preclude a finding of preemption.” Id. at 77
(citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992)). “The crucial
inquiry is whether a state law impedes the federal effort.” Id. Because the goals of
Public Law 280 conflict with the goals and design of the H-2A visa program, the state
law impedes the federal government’s ability to issue H-2A visas to employers hiring

logging truck drivers who meet DOL and USCIS H-2A petition requirements. See
LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 424-25 (5th Cir. 2005) (implying that a law barring F-
1 or J-1 nonimmigrant visa holders from sitting for the Louisiana bar exam was not
preempted in part because the law did not undercut the underlying goal of the F-1
and J-1 student visas, which is to allow for the matriculation of nonimmigrant
students). As stated by the First Circuit in Natsios, “[w]here . . . the federal
government has acted in an area of unique federal concern and has crafted a

balanced, tailored approach to an issue, and the state law threatens to upset that
balance, the state law is preempted.” Natsios, 151 F.3d at 77.
The Act further stands as an obstacle to the INA because the Act (1) directly
prohibits what the INA allows, thereby rendering the federal government’s grant of
the H-2A visa “advisory” by letting the state of Maine make a final determination as
to the permissibility of certain H-2A visas and; (2) supplants the DOL’s labor
certification with the Maine Legislature’s own determination regarding employers’
need for foreign workers.
Two out-of-circuit cases are instructive in the Court’s analysis. In Dandamudi

v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit struck down a New York law
prohibiting nonimmigrant workers with H-1B visas19 or TN statuses20 from working
as licensed pharmacists.21 Id. at 69-70. The Second Circuit determined that federal
law preempted the New York law because the New York law effectively made the
federal laws creating H-B1 and TN visa status “advisory.” Id. at 80. The Second
Circuit concluded the New York law would frustrate the federal scheme because the

federal government could give eligible nonimmigrants permission to enter the United
States for certain purposes while the New York law would simultaneously allow the
state to bar an entire class of nonimmigrants from engaging in certain occupations.
Id. The Second Circuit further explained that it was within Congress’ authority to
grant entry to professionally qualified nonimmigrants and the New York law created
an obstacle to this authority by “making immigration status a professional
qualification.” Id.

19 Individuals holding H-1B visas are considered “nonimmigrant aliens” and may come
“temporarily to the United States to perform services . . . in a specialty occupation.” 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).
20 ““TN’ status is a temporary worker status created by federal law pursuant to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). NAFTA permits ‘a citizen of Canada or Mexico who
seeks temporary entry as a business person to engage in business activities at a professional level’ to
enter the United States and work here pursuant to the requirements of the TN status.” Dandamudi,
686 F.3d at 70 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 214.6(a))
21 The Second Circuit reversed on equal protection grounds, but also conducted a preemption
analysis this Court finds instructive.
Conversely, in LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit held that a state law
prohibiting nonimmigrant aliens holding J-1 student visas, or H-1 temporary worker
visas, from taking the Louisiana state bar exam was not preempted by the INA. 419

F.3d at 410-11. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the Louisiana law did not bar “what
Congress expressly permits by federal statute” in part because the state law did not
inhibit the purpose of J-1 student visas or hinder compliance with visa requirements.
Id. at 424-25. The Fifth Circuit similarly concluded that the state law did not
interfere with the INA because an H-B1 visa holder could still comply with their visa
even if they did not take the bar exam because professional licensure was only one of

four ways a person can prove eligibility for a temporary work visa, and the statute
contemplated compliant employment on a H-B1 visa without professional licensure.
Id. at 425 & n.56; cf. Capron, 944 F.3d at 25 (holding than a state law governing
wages and hours of au pairs was not preempted because the “state law measures [did]
not purport . . . to preclude the foreign nationals affected by them from being
employed”).
Here, Public Law 280 is further preempted because it makes federal law

advisory. As in Dandamudi and unlike in LeClerc, Public Law 280 would make it
impossible for certain H-2A visa holders to comply with their federal visa
requirements.
First, in doing so, as in Dandamudi, Public Law 280 renders certain federally
granted H-2A visas advisory by permitting the state of Maine to make the final
determination as to visa eligibility for logging truck drivers. As discussed above, each
H-2A visa is tied to a specific job with a specific employer. The application process
for the H-2A visa is conducted by the employer, rather than the employee, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1188(a)(1)(A)-(B), and the required DOL certification is specific to that employer’s

particular job opening, as demonstrated by the requirement that the employer
provide detailed evidence that it first advertised the job to U.S. citizens and
permanent residents for a specific duration, pursuant to certain geographic
requirements. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(H)(5)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 655.130. Not only may “[a]n
alien in this status [only] be employed . . . by the [employer] through whom the status
was obtained,” 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(9), but if the federal government finds “[t]he

beneficiary is no longer employed by the petitioner in the capacity specified in the
petition,” the federal government may revoke the H-2A visa. Id. §
214.2(h)(11)(iii)(A)(1).
The interdependent relationship between visa status and employment status
is critical for defining the scope of the Act and why it presents an obstacle to the INA.
Through the H-2A visa petition process, the DOL may certify the request for a foreign
worker as a truck driver in the logging industry and USCIS may then grant a H-2A

visa for an employee in that specific job. However, the state of Maine, under the
authority of Public Law 280, can then prohibit these particular H-2A visa holders
from working in the position specifically authorized by their visa. Thus, under 8
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(11)(iii)(A)(1) the federal government would then give notice to the
employer that it intended to revoke the workers’ H-2A visas for failing to work in the
position for which they were granted the visa.22 Id. (“Grounds for revocation. The
director shall send to the petitioner a notice of intent to revoke the petition in relevant
part if he or she finds that: (1) the beneficiary is no longer employed by the petitioner

in the capacity specified in the petition, or if the beneficiary is no longer receiving
training as specified in the petition”) (emphasis supplied).
As delineated in § 214.2(h)(11)(iii)(A)(1), this would be true even if the
employer were to then offer the H-2A visa holder a different job in the logging
industry. Because H-2A visas are position-specific, the visa is non-transferrable—
even between different jobs and even by the same employer. See 8 C.F.R. §

214.2(h)(11)(iii)(A)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(9). Prohibiting employment of logging
truck drivers holding H-2A visas effectively forces those individuals to “fail to comply
with a condition of his stay under federal law: continued employment.” Rogers, 563
F.2d at 626; see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that “the Executive branch [exercised its discretion when it]
determined that deferred action recipients—including DACA recipients—are
ordinarily authorized to work in the United States” and that the state law at issue is

preempted because it “obstructs many DACA recipients’ ability to work in Arizona”).

22 The Court is further unpersuaded by the Defendants’ argument as to the “Automatic
Revocation Provision.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 13-14. Defendants assert that the Act is consistent with federal
law because “[t]he H-2A visa program . . . specifically contemplates an early expiration of the visa if
the job an alien was hired to do is no longer available to them. Thus, federal law is consistent with
the Act because the federal Automatic Revocation Provision is triggered when the position that [Mr.
Audet] was hired to do is no longer available as a matter of state law.” That an H-2A visa holder is
able to comply with both federal law and the Act in termination of the H-2A visa upon application of
the Act ignores that the Act displaces federal authority to determine immigration status in the first
place. Moreover, the First Circuit has rejected the argument that a law is not preempted when it is
possible to comply with both state and federal law because “[a]ny concurrent state power that may
exist is restricted to the narrowest limits.” Natsios, 181 F.3d at 77.
By excluding H-2A visa holders from the definition of employees eligible to
serve as point-to-point logging truck drivers, the Act effectively gives Maine the final
say as to the immigration status of a certain subset of employees—nonimmigrant

truck drivers in the logging industry holding H-2A visas—who are permitted under
federal law to remain in the United States solely for that purpose. Cf. Capron, 944
F.3d at 25 (“[T]hese state law measures do not purport -- as the ones at issue in De
Canas did . . . -- to preclude the foreign nationals affected by them from being
employed”); Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95, 101 (D. Me. 2008) (“The
Maine Workers’ Compensation Act in no way determines admission into the United

States or the conditions for remaining in this country; therefore, it is not a ‘regulation
of immigration’”).
The authority granted by Public Law 280 allows Maine to supersede the
decisions of the federal government and make its own determination as to whether a
specific individual may enter the United States to be employed within the country
runs contrary to the federal government’s vested authority to “determine[e] what
aliens shall be admitted to the United States [and] the period they may remain.” Toll,

458 U.S. at 11; cf Capron 944 F.3d at 25 (concluding that state laws “merely
establish[ing] the wage and hour rights that the foreign nationals affected by the
federal regulatory scheme enjoy if employed” was not preempted because the state
laws did not affect visa or employment status). As noted in Dandamundi, a state law
that effectively revokes a lawfully granted visa renders federal law “advisory”
because it permits “the states to decide whether nonimmigrants (as a class, not as
individuals) should be permitted to [hold certain occupations].” 686 F.3d at 80
(quoting Adusumelli v. Steiner, 740 F. Supp. 2d 582, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1155 (granting the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to revoke

visa status petitions); Hartford Enters, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
Moreover, as Public Law 280 effectively reverses the federal government’s
grant of H-2A visas, the Act “proscrib[es] . . . what Congress expressly permits by
federal statute,” which the LeClerc Court considered a vital distinction. LeClerc, 419
F.3d at 424-25 (“Section 3(B) does not succumb to the Toll infirmity of proscribing by
state law what Congress expressly permits by federal statute . . . [because] Section

3(b) does not prevent the legal matriculation of nonimmigrant alien students
admitted to the United States on F-1 or J-1 visas . . . [and is] in fact, consistent with
provisions that prohibit student visa holders from obtaining gainful employment . . .
.”).
Second, Public Law 280 is distinguishable from the law in LeClerc because it
leaves open no alternative ways for an H-2A visa holder employed as a logging truck
driver to comply with their visa. Because H-2A visas are tied not just to an employer,

but to a specific job, termination of the underlying job (in this case driving a logging
truck point-to-point in Maine) necessarily means termination of the H-2A visa itself.
Unlike the H-1B visa holders in LeClerc who could continue to work and live in the
United States under the same visa with alternative employment, nonimmigrants
granted entrance to the United States under a H-2A visa for the purpose of truck
driving for a Maine logging operation may not stay in the United States if their
employment is terminated, other than to seek a new, separate H-2A visa. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(h)(5)(viii)(B) (stating that H-2A workers may remain in the United States for
30 days beyond the expiration of the approved H-2A petition to prepare for departure

or to seek an extension or change of nonimmigrant status). Thus, the Act stands as
an obstacle to the implementation of the H-2A visa program because it allows the
state of Maine to effectively reverse certain federal government visa determinations
and expressly prohibit the visa that the INA expressly authorized.
The Defendants submit that the Act does not pose an obstacle to the INA
because the Act imposes on employers the same “rigorous [two-part] analysis”

conducted by the DOL in the H-2A program. Defs.’ Opp’n at 16. To this end,
Defendants say Maine has determined that “(A) there are ample eligible domestic
workers to [work as logging truck drivers point-to-point within the state of Maine]
and (B) employing aliens via the H-2A visa program would adversely affect Maine’s
logging industry in particular, and as a result of fewer jobs and increased
unemployment, its economy in general.” Id. at 15.
Although Public Law 280 may implicitly adopt the same criteria used by the

DOL, the INA expressly reserves labor certification decision-making for the DOL, on
a yearly, case-by-case basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1)(A)-(B) (stating that the
Secretary of Labor is responsible for the H-2A certification analysis). The INA and
accompanying regulations therefore leave no room for states to enact their own state-
based INAs and make their own determinations of an employer’s eligibility for a
certificate of labor. Moreover, the state’s determination of eligibility via Public Law
280 is at odds with the INA’s design, because Public Law 280 makes a one-time,
blanket determination that there are sufficient eligible domestic workers and that
the H-2A program harms Maine’s logging industry which is substantially broader

and more restrictive than the federal government’s yearly, case-by-case
determinations as part of the H-2A visa program.
Finally, the exception articulated in Toll, that a state law may not preempt the
INA when Congress “has done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the
country temporarily,” does not apply here. 458 U.S. at 13. While H-2A visa holders
may enter the United States for a defined period, their visas go beyond mere entry.

Congress went a step further when it authorized the DOL to determine an alien’s
employment eligibility, finding that an employer’s hiring of foreign workers is
necessary when an employer is unable to hire domestic workers, and conditioning an
alien’s entrance to the United States on continued employment in a specific position
in a specific geographic area. See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 81 (holding that the H-B1
visa program goes beyond merely allowing a nonimmigrant to enter the United States
temporarily because the visa also grants nonimmigrant aliens permission to work in

certain occupations); see also Toll, 458 U.S. at 14 (holding that a state’s refusal to
grant G-4 nonimmigrant alien visa holders in-state tuition solely on account of their
status was an additional burden not contemplated by Congress in admitting the visa
holders into the United States because Congress explicitly did not prohibit G-4
holders from acquiring domicile).
Moreover, Public Law 280 “imposes additional burdens not contemplated by
Congress,” Toll, 458 U.S. at 13, as it singles out a specific job within a specific
industry as no longer eligible for H-2A visas which goes beyond what Congress

initially contemplated in the INA. See id. at 14 (“In light of Congress’ explicit decision
not to bar G-4 aliens from acquiring domicile, the State’s decision to deny ‘in-state’
status to G-4 aliens, solely on account of the G-4 alien’s federal immigration status,
surely amounts to an ancillary ‘burden not contemplated by Congress’ in admitting
these aliens to the United States”) (emphasis in Toll); cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 378-79 (1971) (concluding that a state’s withholding of welfare benefits from

lawfully admitted resident aliens who later become indigent “impose[s] auxiliary
burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens” not contemplated by Congress).
c. Summary
The Court concludes that federal law preempts Public Law 280 because the
goals of the Act conflict with the INA, the Act allows the state of Maine to make final
H-2A visa decisions, and the Act permits Maine to make its own determination of
employers’ need for foreign workers in contradiction to the requirements of the

federal H-2A program.
2. Equal Protection23
‘The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides, “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its

23 Before addressing equal protection, the Court considered the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance, which advises federal courts “not to reach constitutional issues where alternative grounds
for resolution are available.” Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Pagan, 748 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2014)
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 24 Bruns v. Mayhew, 931 F. Supp. 2d
260, 266 (D. Me. 2013), aff’d and remanded, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). “Because ‘person’ denotes lawfully admitted resident aliens

and citizens of the United States, both noncitizens and citizens are entitled to ‘equal
protection of the laws of the State in which they reside.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 403
U.S. at 371). “In order to establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must
show state-imposed disparate treatment compared with others similarly situated ‘in
all relevant respects.’” Bruns, 750 F.3d at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Barrington Cove Ltd. P’ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 8

(1st Cir. 2001)). “In determining whether two groups are similarly situated” the
“somewhat imprecise test [is] ‘whether a prudent person, looking objectively . . . would
think them roughly equivalent.’” Id. (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll.,
889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989)). Thus, “the proponent of the equal protection violation
must show that the parties with whom he seeks to be compared have engaged in the
same activity vis-à-vis the government entity without such distinguishing or

(quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir.
2013)). “The cannon of constitutional avoidance binds both [the First Circuit] and the district court.”
Id. (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936); Sony BMF Music Entm’t v.
Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 508 (1st Cir. 2011)). Even though the Court’s preemption ruling could
resolve the case, the issue of irreparable harm is clearer if there is a constitutional infringement.
Accordingly, although cognizant of constitutional avoidance, the Court determined that the
constitutional issue could not be avoided without running the risk that the First Circuit would resolve
the irreparable harm issue in favor of the Defendants and be required to remand the matter for
resolution of the equal protection issue.
24 The Maine Constitution states, “No person . . . [shall] be denied the equal protection of the
laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person’s civil rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof.” ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A. “This provision is coextensive with the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Bennett, 2015 ME 46, ¶ 17, 114 A.3d 994,
1000. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ state and federal equal protection claims are
identical.
mitigating circumstances as would render the comparison inutile.” Id. at 66 (quoting
Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 251 (1st Cir. 2007)).
a. Applicable Standard of Scrutiny and the Plyler
“Uniform Rule” Doctrine.
To properly evaluate the constitutionality of Public Law 280, the Court must
first determine the applicable standard of constitutional scrutiny. “Alienage, like
race and nationality, constitutes a suspect classification under the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Id. “Because ‘[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a discrete and
insular minority,’ a state’s alienage-based classifications inherently raise concerns of
invidious discrimination and are therefore generally subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.” Id. (alteration in Bruns) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)). Although “states traditionally enjoy broad power to
regulate economics and social welfare, even the otherwise ‘valid interest in preserving
the fiscal integrity of [state] programs’ is generally insufficient grounds for a state-

imposed burden on alienage to survive an equal protection challenge.” Id. (quoting
Graham, 403 U.S. at 374-75).
“The calculus is markedly different for congressional acts distinguishing on the
basis of alienage, evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
Id. (emphasis in Bruns). “Because Congress acts with plenary authority when it
legislates the rights and benefits to be afforded aliens present in this country . . .

congressional disparate treatment of aliens is presumed to rest on national
immigration policy rather than invidious discrimination.” Id. (citing Mathews v.
Díaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-85 (1976)).
Although “[n]o state may independently exercise [federal power to conduct
foreign policy, control access to the United States, and determine who may become a
citizen] . . . if the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes

to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of
course, follow the federal direction.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
Where the exception, which has been termed the “uniform rule” doctrine, see, e.g.,
Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants?, 73
WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 77, 127 (2016), applies, state action that distinguishes among
people on the basis of alienage may be subject to rational basis review rather than

strict scrutiny because the state is “following federal direction.” See, e.g., Sudomir v.
McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The defendants respond by asserting
that it is not necessary to make such a showing [under strict scrutiny] because
California has merely adopted a federal classification which is subject only to the
rational basis standard of review”); Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085,
1091 (N.Y. 2001) (“If the rule were uniform, each State would carry out the same
policy under the mandate of Congress—the only body with authority to set

immigration policy”); Condon, 73 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. at 127.
The Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes a “uniform rule” and
courts have explored this doctrine nearly exclusively in the context of state benefit
laws where Congress expressly delegated some implementation authority under the
benefit law to the states. See, e.g., Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581, 583-84 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that rational basis review applied because Congress “(clearly)
expressed its will regarding a matter related to aliens” when it passed the Welfare
Reform Act giving limited discretion to the states to determine alien qualification for
Medicaid benefits); Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)

(holding that a state program was due judicial deference because Congress had
expressed a uniform, national policy that the states could adopt as evidenced by the
fact that the Medicaid program was administered and partially funded by states). To
apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the Act, the Court must first determine
whether the INA creates a uniform doctrine that the state of Maine is simply
implementing through its enactment of Public Law 280.

The Defendants submit that the Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fails because
Public Law 280 is consistent with the federal standard of treatment for aliens as
proscribed in Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (1982). Defs.’ Opp’n at 6-7. The Defendants
argue that because the Act “simply codifies the federal government’s disparate
treatment between [] unauthorized alien workers and domestic workers,” the law is
consistent with federal standards and the Court should therefore apply rational basis
as it would to a federal statute distinguishing on the basis of alienage. Id. at 7. The

Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply strict scrutiny because the state law distinguishes
among people based on alienage, and thus “inherently raise[s] concerns of invidious
discrimination and [is] therefore generally subject to strict judicial scrutiny.” Pls.’
Mot. at 15 (quoting Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66).
The Court rejects the Defendants’ argument. First, as noted previously, courts
have nearly exclusively applied the uniform rule doctrine in the context of Medicaid,
which is “a Gordian knot of federal and state legislation” and thus a classic example
of cooperative federalism.25 See Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66. Here, the INA is notably
different. Unlike Medicaid and other social welfare programs, Congress has not

delegated to states authority under the INA to regulate admittance to the United
States. See, e.g., Korab 797 F.3d at 581; Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255. While State
Workforce Agencies do play a role in the initial labor certification determination for
H-2A visas, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.103, 655.121(a)(1), there is nothing in the INA or
related federal regulations to suggest Congress delegated to states the discretion to
craft their own visa eligibility requirements. On the contrary, the federal regulations

set forth unform criteria that all SWAs must apply in their respective regions. See
20 C.F.R. § 655.130.
The Defendants contend that Public Law 280 simply follows federal direction
and “codifies the federal government’s disparate treatment between [] unauthorized
alien workers and domestic workers” by applying “the exact same threshold eligibility
requirements to a single position” and making its own “threshold determination that
there are sufficient eligible domestic truck drivers available to transport forest

products.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 7-8.
The Defendants’ argument is flawed, however, as it casts the issue of
“uniformity” too broadly. Even if Public Law 280 is read to apply the same two-part

25 Under cooperative federalism, Congress delegates certain legislative powers, creating
“uniformity [that] does not require the elimination of any differences among the States.” Korab, 797
F.3d at 581 (quoting Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982)). Moreover, the
federal government has typically delegated such authority in the context of social welfare programs
over which “states traditionally enjoy broad power.” Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66.
labor certification analysis under federal law, it remains that Congress has not
delegated discretion to states to create their own criteria for visa applicants and
instead requires compliance with the requirements of the DOL and USCIS. There is

nothing in the INA to suggest that Congress intended the H-2A visa program to be
broadly uniform and yet vary from state to state. Indeed, such a conclusion would
run contrary to the federal government’s broad power over immigration as
undergirded by the principle that “the United States must be able to confer and
communicate on this subject [as] one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Public Law 208 does

not follow federal direction and thus does not invoke the uniform rule doctrine.
In the absence of the uniform rule doctrine, the Court must determine whether
rational basis or strict scrutiny applies to the Act. While courts agree that aliens are
a prime example of a “discrete and insular minority,” see Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. at 152-53 n.4, circuit courts are split on the breadth of the term “alien.” Some
courts have held that strict scrutiny applies only to laws discriminating against
lawful permanent resident (LPR) aliens and not against nonimmigrant aliens, see,

e.g., LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415-22, while other courts have held that strict scrutiny
applies to all laws discriminating against lawfully admitted aliens regardless of their
LPR or nonimmigrant alien status. See, e.g., Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 72-79. The
Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue but has articulated several parameters
for the Court’s analysis.
i. Supreme Court Precedent
In Graham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona law
requiring a fifteen-year residency term for welfare eligibility and a Pennsylvania law

requiring that welfare recipients be United States citizens, because both laws
“create[d] two classes of needy persons, indistinguishable except with respect to
whether they are or are not citizens of this country.” 403 U.S. at 367-68, 371. The
Graham plaintiffs had LPR status. Id. at 368-70. The Court applied strict scrutiny,
noting that “classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race,
are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny [because] [a]liens as a
class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority . . . for whom such

heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” Id. at 372 (citing Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. at 152-53, n.4).
The Graham Court admitted that it had, on occasion, upheld statutes
permitting states to distinguish between aliens and citizens but narrowed this
exception to circumstances where the “laws were necessary to protect special
interests of the State or its citizens.” Id. at 372 (“[T]he power of a state to apply its

laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits”)
(quoting Takahashi 334 U.S. at 420)). The Supreme Court concluded that neither
the Arizona nor Pennsylvania laws could withstand strict scrutiny because a state
has no “‘special public interest’ in favoring its own citizens over aliens in the
distribution of limited resources such as welfare benefits” because “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment and the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a general policy
that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide ‘in any state’ on an equality of
legal privileges with all citizens under nondiscriminatory laws.” Id. at 372-74 (citing
Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420).
In coming to this conclusion, the Court compared aliens and citizens, reasoning

“[a]liens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces. Unlike []
short-term residents26 . . . aliens may live within a state for many years, work in the
state and contribute to the economic growth of the state.” Id. at 376 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court found further footing for the application of
strict scrutiny in supremacy concepts. Relying again on Takahashi, the Court held
that conditioning welfare benefits solely on alienage “conflict[s] with . . . overriding

national policies . . . [and states] ‘can neither add to nor take from the conditions
lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization, and residence of aliens
in the United States.’” Id. at 337-38 (quoting Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419).
The Supreme Court similarly applied strict scrutiny in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 722 (1973), to strike down a state law that limited bar admission to citizens in a
lawsuit brought by an alien with LPR status. Id. at 718. Following Graham, the
Griffiths Court reasoned that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the

economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our
society,” and thus, “[i]t is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it
deprives them of employment opportunities.” Id. at 722. The Supreme Court
concluded that the law was not narrowly tailored and that exclusion of aliens from

26 The Supreme Court did not define what it meant by “short-term residents.”
bar membership was not necessary to ensure the professional standards of the state
bar. Id. at 722-23, 725.
In Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court explained that a

law differentiating persons based on alienage is subject to “close judicial scrutiny” if
the law “is directed at aliens and [] only aliens are harmed by it.” Id. at 9 (striking
down a state law prohibiting nonresident aliens who have not expressed intent to
become citizens from receiving financial assistance for higher education). The Court
rejected appellants’ argument that a law is only subject to strict scrutiny if it
“distinguishes between citizens and aliens vel non,” stating that “[t]he fact that the

statute is not an absolute bar [against all aliens] does not mean that it does not
discriminate against the class.” Id.
Finally, in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court applied heightened rational basis
review to a law excluding children who were not legally admitted into the country
from free public education. 457 U.S. at 205. The Court determined that
“[u]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence
in this country [is] in violation of federal law.” Id. at 223. However, the Plyler Court

ultimately applied heightened rational basis because the class of persons at issue,
“innocent” undocumented alien children, were “not accountable for their disabling
status.” Id. at 223-24.
Taken together, these cases stand for several principles: (1) lawfully admitted
aliens are protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution;
(2) unlawful aliens are subject to a different level of scrutiny than lawfully admitted
aliens; (3) the Court uses the terminology “aliens” and “resident aliens” but has not
expressly limited strict scrutiny to LPRs nor defined “resident alien”; (4) the Court
looks to key hallmarks of participation in society in determining the level of review;

and (5) a law need not discriminate against all lawfully admitted aliens to be a
violation of Equal Protection and thus discrimination against a single subgroup of
lawfully admitted aliens may be unconstitutional.
ii. The Circuit Court Split
The First Circuit has not spoken on whether state laws discriminating against
lawfully admitted nonimmigrant aliens, such as H-2A visa holders, are subject to
strict scrutiny or rational basis review. The other circuit courts that have addressed

this issue are split.
Circuits applying rational basis have looked primarily to the “transient” nature
of nonimmigrant alien visas, holding that the shorter duration of a nonimmigrant
alien’s stay, in comparison to that of an LPR alien, undercuts the justification for the
application of strict scrutiny. In LeClerc, the Fifth Circuit applied rational basis to
uphold a state law prohibiting nonimmigrant aliens from taking the Louisiana state

bar. 419 F.3d at 410. The LeClerc Court interpreted Supreme Court precedent as
only applying strict scrutiny to “permanent resident aliens” and differentiated aliens
with LPR status as more akin to citizens compared to other nonimmigrant aliens. Id.
at 415. In distinguishing between LPRs and nonimmigrant aliens, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that LPRs are vulnerable because they cannot participate in the political
process but nonimmigrant aliens do not need such protections because “they have no
intention of abandoning their native citizenship” and “enter with no enforceable claim
to establishing permanent residence or ties here.” Id. at 417. In essence, a
nonimmigrant alien’s “lack of legal capacity . . . is tied to their temporary connection
to this country” and they therefore “do not warrant Carolene Products status.” Id. at

417-18.
The LeClerc Court distinguished Graham, Nyquist, and Griffiths, holding that
the state laws in those cases “warranted close judicial scrutiny because they took
positions seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the
alien to permanent residence.” Id. at 417 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978)); see also Folely, 435 U.S. at 295 (“These exclusions

struck at the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community”). The LeClerc Court
further distinguished Griffiths, which also involved a law restricting bar admissions,
on the ground that the aliens at issue were permanent resident aliens rather than
nonimmigrant aliens and the law at issue in Griffiths prohibited all aliens from
practicing law, rather than just a subset of aliens. Id. at 415.
In coming to its conclusion the LeClerc Court identified key differences
between resident aliens and nonimmigrant aliens: “[n]onimmigrant aliens’ status is

far more constricted than that of resident aliens,” as nonimmigrant aliens are
admitted for a short duration, do not seek permanent residence in the United States,
may not serve in the military, are subject to strict employment restrictions and
different tax treatment, and may be denied welfare benefits. 419 F.3d at 419.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the “federally prescribed” transient nature of
nonimmigrant aliens meant that the state had a legitimate interest in passing a law
to protect its citizens from nonimmigrant alien attorneys who may leave the country
at any time. Id. at 421-22.27
Conversely, circuit courts applying strict scrutiny have discounted “transience”

as a relevant factor in determining the level of scrutiny, instead emphasizing the
vulnerability of nonimmigrant aliens. In Dandamudi v. Tisch the Second Circuit
applied strict scrutiny, reasoning that, since Graham, the Supreme Court has
continuously reasserted its holding that aliens should not be singled out absent
narrow tailoring for a compelling state interest. 686 F.3d at 73 (collecting cases). The
Dandamudi Court explained that the Supreme Court has “never distinguished

between classes of legal resident aliens” and has “never held that lawfully admitted
aliens are outside of Graham’s protection.” Id. at 74 (emphasis in Dandamudi). The
Dandamudi Court further rejected the holdings in LeClerc and LULAC because those
courts “narrow[ed] Graham’s holding to reach only those aliens who are
indistinguishable from citizens” which the Dandamudi Court believed to
“misconstrue[] both law and fact.” Id. at 75.
The Dandamudi Court identified three reasons for not following the Fifth and

Sixth Circuits. First, the Second Circuit concluded that the language in Graham
relied on by the LeClerc and LULAC Courts—that, much like citizens, aliens pay
taxes and may be called into the armed forces—was not intended by the Supreme

27 The Sixth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Bredesen (LULAC), upholding a state law prohibiting nonimmigrant aliens from obtaining state-
issued driver’s licenses. 500 F.3d 523, 536-37 (2007). The decision relied almost exclusively on
LeClerc. See id. at 533. The LULAC court adopted the reasoning of the lower court and differentiated
Nyquist, concluding that unlike the law in Nyquist, the classification at issue was “in no way
inconsistent with federal law, but rather mirror[ed] it.” Id.
Court to serve as a “litmus test for determining whether a particular group of aliens
is a suspect class” because “[a] group of aliens need not be identical or even virtually
identical to citizens to be fully protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 76.

“Nothing in the Supreme Court’s precedent counsels us to ‘judicially craft[] a subset
of aliens, scaled by how [we] perceive the aliens’ proximity to citizenship.” Id.
(quoting LeClerc, 444 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 2006) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting
from the denial of reh’g en banc)).
Second, the Second Circuit stated that lawfully admitted aliens are a “discrete
and insular minority” because of their “‘impotence in the political process[,] . . . the

long history of invidious discrimination against them’ . . . [and] their limited role in
the political process.” Id. at 77 (quoting LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 428-29 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)). The Dandamudi Court characterized nonimmigrant aliens as “likely []
more powerless and vulnerable to state predations—more discrete and insular” than
LPR aliens, thus warranting additional protections. Id. (quoting Constitutional
Law—Equal Protection—Fifth Circuit Holds that Louisiana Can Prevent
Nonimmigrant Aliens from Sitting for the Bar, 119 HARV. L. REV. 669, 674 (2005)).

The Second Circuit further concluded that nonimmigrants do pay taxes just as
citizens and LPRs do, and dismissed as irrelevant the contention that limited work
permission under a nonimmigrant visa was grounds for distinguishing nonimmigrant
aliens from LPRs and citizens because “the state [sought] to prohibit aliens from
engaging in the very occupation for which the federal government granted the alien
permission to enter the United States.” Id.
Having discarded all other distinctions between LPRs and nonimmigrants, the
Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the level of scrutiny “boil[s] down
to one potentially important difference—nonimmigrants have not yet obtained

permission to reside in the United States permanently.” Id. at 78 (quoting
Adusumelli v. Steiner, 740 F. Supp. 2d 582, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). The Dandamudi
Court thus rejected the core of the LeClerc Court’s argument that the transient
nature of nonimmigrant status creates legitimate state concerns that justify rational
basis. Id. The Second Circuit noted that many of the nonimmigrant aliens at issue,
professionals who often remained in the United States for more than six years,

ultimately apply for permanent residence. Id. Thus, the non-permanent nature of
their entry into the United States was immaterial. Id.
In light of the Supreme Court’s well-established principle that alienage28 is a
suspect class and in absence of Supreme Court precedent that this rule is reserved
solely for LPRs and not lawfully-admitted nonimmigrant aliens, the Court follows the
Second Circuit, rather than the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. While the Supreme Court
has never expressly stated that a law discriminating against nonimmigrant aliens

requires strict scrutiny, existing precedent points to its application here. The Court
therefore applies strict scrutiny.
First, the Supreme Court has framed its rules on alienage broadly, consistently
referring to “aliens” as a general category without distinguishing among various

28 Public Law 280 expressly excludes H-2A visa holders from its definition of “resident of the
United States” and therefore distinguishes between H-2A visa holders and all other persons, citizens,
and other visa or LPR holders alike. It is therefore appropriate for the Court to view Public Law 280
as discriminating on the basis of alienage.
types of aliens. In Graham, the Supreme Court crafted its rule on alienage broadly
despite being faced with a law that discriminated specifically against LPRs. See e.g.,
Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (describing “aliens” broadly as a protected class). Although

the Supreme Court later used the term “resident alien” in Griffiths, see 413 U.S. at
722, “resident alien” is not an immigration category defined by the INA. The INA
defines “residence” as any “place of general abode; the place of general abode of a
person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(33); see also Adam Bryan Wall, Justice for All?: The Equal Protection
Clause and Its Not-So-Equal Application to Legal Aliens, 84 TUL. L. REV. 759, 775

(2010) (citing Gerald Rosberg, Discrimination Against the “Nonresident” Alien, 44 U.
PITT. L. REV. 399, 401 (1983)) (discussing the circuit courts’ interpretations of
“resident alien” and who the Supreme Court meant to include in the “alien suspect
class”). Moreover, an “alien,” as defined by the INA, is “any person not a citizen or
national of the United States,” encompassing both nonimmigrant aliens and LPRs. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). The Supreme Court’s broad usage of “alien,” and the INA’s
definitions of “resident” and “alien”, support the conclusion that strict scrutiny is not

cabined to LPR aliens. The Court therefore sees no reason to impose its own
distinctions within the broader category of “alien.”
Second, the Supreme Court has at various points erected a dichotomy, not
between LPR aliens and nonimmigrant aliens, both lawful, but between lawfully and
unlawfully admitted aliens. For example, the Graham Court reiterated its previous
conclusion in Takahashi that “aliens lawfully within this country have a right to enter
and abide in any State in the Union ‘on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens
under nondiscriminatory laws.’” Graham, 403 U.S. at 378 (quoting Takahashi, 334
U.S. at 420). The Graham Court did not distinguish among different types of legal

aliens, so long as the aliens were legally within the United States. The Supreme
Court further solidified this distinction in Plyler when it confirmed that laws
discriminating against aliens not legally admitted to the United States are subject
only to rational basis review. 457 U.S. at 223. The Graham/Plyler distinction
between lawfully and unlawfully admitted aliens supports the application of strict
scrutiny in this case, as H-2A visa holders are lawfully admitted aliens. Given the

Supreme Court’s distinction between lawful and unlawful aliens, it would be
incongruous to subject lawfully admitted nonimmigrant aliens to rational basis, just
as the Court would an unlawful alien.
Third, LeClerc and LULAC distinguished Graham, Nyquist, and Griffiths
because the state laws at issue in those cases were inconsistent with a congressional
determination. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417, 424 (“[T]here is no incongruity between
what Congress permits of student and temporary worker nonimmigrants and what

Section 3(B) prevents”); LULAC, 500 F.3d at 533. While the LeClerc and LULAC
Courts concluded that the state laws before them were consistent with a
congressional determination and therefore distinguishable from Supreme Court
precedent, the same is not true here. As previously discussed, Public Law 280 is
inconsistent with the congressional determination that certain persons meeting
specific criteria may lawfully enter the United States for employment, including
employment as a logging truck driver if the specified criteria are met. In this respect,
the law is inconsistent with a congressional determination, as it “str[ikes] at the heart
of [certain H-2A visa holders’] ability to exist in the community,” Foley, 435 U.S. at

295. This case, unlike LeClerc and LULAC, is therefore consistent with Graham,
Nyquist, and Griffiths because Public Law 280 expressly makes illegal what Congress
has permitted.
Fourth, the Court disagrees that nonimmigrant aliens do not need the same
protections as LPRs because they are in the United States temporarily and have no
intention of abandoning citizenship in their native countries. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d

at 417. In light of the Supreme Court’s reaffirmance “that ‘[o]ne of the most important
and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the
just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country,”
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 64), it is incongruous that some
nonimmigrant aliens be granted certain protections and others not, simply based on
their desire to retain citizenship in their country of origin and the duration of their
stay in the United States. The United States has an interest in protecting the rights

of all lawfully admitted aliens, regardless of the length of their stay and willingness
to return home. Nor do the Defendants point to any authority suggesting otherwise.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the Second Circuit that nonimmigrant aliens
may, in fact, be more vulnerable than LPR aliens. See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77.
H-2A visa holders and other nonimmigrant aliens cannot vote or participate in the
political process, are otherwise “subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder
of the community,” and may be unfamiliar with the language and culture. Hampton
v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1976). The H-2A visa’s short duration and its
agricultural nature may render H-2A visa holders particularly vulnerable as they

may be less likely to speak English and may not be as well educated, compared to
someone who enters, for example, on a B-1 visa who has specialized training.
Fifth, applying the same indicia from Graham and Griffiths, H-2A
nonimmigrant visa holders share many of the characteristics identified by the
Supreme Court in cases warranting strict scrutiny. Like other nonimmigrant visa
holders and LPRs, H-2A visa holders pay federal income taxes, although they are not

required to file Social Security or Medicare taxes. IRS, Foreign Agricultural Workers
on H-2A Visas, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/foreign-
agricultural-workers (last visited Feb. 17, 2022). H-2A visa holders also support the
economy, despite the limited duration of their stay, by filling jobs that domestic
workers are unwilling or unable to take. See Graham, 403 U.S. 635 at 376;
Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78. Because the H-2A program fills needed positions that
would otherwise remain open, the transient nature of individual workers does not

undermine the value of H-2A visa holders’ contributions to the economy. In designing
the program, Congress contemplated that the limited duration of the H-2A visa was
in the best interest of employers and United States workers.
b. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Ultimately, strict scrutiny applies; however, the Defendants do not meet their
burden of showing that the state has a compelling government interest that is
narrowly tailored. The Defendants argue that state government has a compelling
interest “in minimizing discrimination against domestic workers in favor of
unauthorized aliens through the abuse of the H-2A visa program,” which it submits
“is certainly within the State’s traditional police power.”29 Defs.’ Opp’n at 9.

The Court disagrees. While state labor and industry laws fall within the
traditional state police power, Public Law 280 does not fall within the four corners of
a traditional labor law because it fundamentally impacts immigration, as discussed
in the Court’s preemption analysis. As Public Law 280 effectively gives the state of
Maine the ability to revoke H-2A visas for certain individuals and supplant the DOL’s
labor certification, the Act raises the issue of immigration. The Court thus is not

convinced by the Defendants’ reliance on Hartford Enterprises, Inc. v. Cody, which
concerned a broadly applicable workers’ compensation statute that the court
concluded “in no way determine[d] admission to the United States or conditions for
remaining in this country.” As discussed previously, Public Law 280 ultimately
determines admission to the United States and the conditions for remaining in the

29 While the Defendants’ brief does not expressly address the issue of “cabotage,” it was discussed
at length in Senate President Ja

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10211402. Public record. Not legal advice.