# BOND v. DUNLAP

> District Court, D. Maine · July 24, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10210680

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** July 24, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “state regulation of elections enhances the democratic process”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

TIFFANY BOND, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Docket No. 1:20-cv-00216-NT
)
MATTHEW DUNLAP, in his official )
capacity as Secretary of State for the )
State of Maine; JANET MILLS, in her )
official capacity as the Governor of the )
State of Maine; TROY JACKSON, in )
his official capacity as the President of )
the Maine Senate; and SARA )
GIDEON, in her official capacity as )
the Speaker of the House, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

On June 19, 2020, Plaintiff Tiffany Bond1 filed a Complaint against four state
officials—Matthew Dunlap, Maine Secretary of State; Janet Mills, Governor of
Maine; Troy Jackson, President of the Maine Senate; and Sara Gideon, Speaker of
the Maine House of Representatives (“the Defendants” or “the State”)—seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief preventing enforcement of 21-A M.R.S.A.

1 Ms. Bond filed this action pro se, but I note that she is an attorney admitted to practice in
Maine. Generally, courts treat the submissions of pro se plaintiffs to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (A pro se plaintiff's
pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). Because
Ms. Bond prepared and filed her Complaint and emergency motion for injunctive relief, they will not
be held to less rigorous standards. See Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[N]o such
latitude is warranted where, as here, the unrepresented party is himself a lawyer.”).
§§ 353–354. Compl. (ECF No. 1). That statute requires candidates for the United
States Senate who are not enrolled in a political party to submit a nomination petition
to the Secretary containing the signatures of a minimum of 4,000 registered voters in

Maine, certified by local registrars, in order to appear on the Maine general election
ballot. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(5)(C). On June 29, 2020, Ms. Bond filed an Emergency
Motion for Injunctive Relief and Request for Expedited Hearing2 (“Pl.’s Mot.”) (ECF
No. 11). In her motion, Ms. Bond asks me to reduce the number of signatures required
to qualify her to appear on Maine’s general election ballot from 4,000 to 2,000. The
Defendants oppose the motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Bond obtained a non-party nomination petition form from Maine’s
Secretary of State (“Secretary”) on December 30, 2019, and began collecting
signatures on January 1, 2020. Affidavit of Tiffany Bond (“Bond Aff.”) ¶¶ 7, 9 (ECF

No. 11-3); Declaration of Melissa Packard (“Packard Decl.”) ¶ 16 (ECF No. 16). By
March 12, Ms. Bond had gathered approximately 2,500 signatures, but some of the
volunteer circulators had not yet taken their oath before a notary, or other qualified
person, and none of the signatures had been certified. Bond Aff. ¶¶ 12,16. Due to the

2 Recently, Ms. Bond contacted the Clerk’s Office and indicated that she would leave the decision
of whether to have a hearing up to me. The State has not requested a hearing or responded to Ms.
Bond’s request for a hearing. I have reviewed all the affidavits and documentary evidence that Ms.
Bond attached to her motion. I have credited all the relevant information submitted by her and there
is nothing that needs clarification. Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to have a hearing, and I deny
that motion.
public health threat posed by COVID-19, Ms. Bond suspended her own and her
campaign workers’ signature-gathering efforts on March 12, 2020. Bond Aff. ¶ 14.
I. Maine’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

The State has taken several steps to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Beginning in March, the Governor issued a series of Executive Orders aimed at
limiting the size of gatherings. On March 12, the Governor recommended that non-
essential large, indoor gatherings of 250 attendees or more be postponed. Declaration
of Derek P. Langhauser (“Langhauser Decl.”) ¶ 12(A)(1) (ECF No. 15). On March
15, the Governor recommended postponing all events with 50 or more people until
further notice and all gatherings of more than 10 that included individuals who are

at higher risk for severe illness, such as seniors. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(A)(1). On
March 18, the Governor issued Executive Order 14 FY 19/20, which limited
gatherings that are “primarily social, personal, and discretionary events other than
employment” to “not more than 10 people.” Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(A)(1). Finally, on
May 29, the Governor issued Executive Order 55 FY 19/20, which raised the
gathering limit from 10 persons to 50 persons. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(A)(1).

The Governor also issued Executive Orders directing Maine residents to stay
at home. On March 31, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 28 FY 19/20
directing people living in Maine to stay at home unless for essential work, as allowed
by Executive Order 19 FY 19/20 and its related interpretive guidance, or for an
essential personal activity as allowed by Executive Order 28 and its related
interpretive guidance. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(B). On April 29, the Governor issued
“An Order to Stay Safer at Home,” which continued to have Maine people stay at
home with the same established exceptions for permitted activities, such as grocery
shopping and exercising, but which also allowed Maine people to visit businesses or
participate in activities deemed safe to open under Stage 1 of the reopening plan.

Executive Order 49 FY 19/20. These activities included barber shops and hair salons,
auto dealerships, and drive-in stay-in-your-vehicle religious services that follow
COVID-19 Prevention Checklists. See Restarting Maine’s Economy,
https://www.maine.gov/covid19/restartingmaine (last visited July 24, 2020).
Executive Order 49 also added the use of cloth face coverings to the list of safety
measures. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(B)(3). This Order was in effect through May 31,

2020. On May 29, the Governor eased the stay-at-home directives “to the extent that
people may access increased business and personal activities that are being
reopened.” Executive Order 55 FY 19/20.
On April 27, an attorney involved in a people’s veto petition asked the Maine
Department of Economic and Community Development (“DECD”)—the lead state
agency guiding the State’s response to the economic and social impacts of the
pandemic—whether signature gathering was considered “essential” and, if so,

whether the safety measures and social distancing protocols recommended by the
Maine CDC and United States CDC would be adequate to permit signature
gathering.3 Langhauser Decl. ¶¶ 6, 12(B)(2). On May 5, 2020, DECD confirmed to the

3 The precautionary measures proposed by the people’s veto petition attorney included:
protective masks and gloves for circulators; single use pens for signatures; hand sanitizer and
sanitation products; folding tables to put pens and petitions on with a circulator present to witness the
signature; and maintenance of six feet of personal distance between signer and circulator. Circulators
would be instructed to deter individuals from congregating at signing locations and actively instruct
any signers to maintain proper social distancing protocols per the stricter of Maine CDC and United
attorney that signature gathering for the people’s veto referendum petition was a
permitted activity under Executive Order 28, and that the proposed safety measures
were appropriate. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(B)(4); Portland Press Herald, “Amid

pandemic, GOP gathers signatures to kill ranked-choice voting,”
https://www.pressherald.com/2020/05/18/amid-pandemic-gop-gathers-signatures-to-
kill-ranked-choice-voting/ (last visited July 20, 2020).
On April 8, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 37 FY 19/20, permitting
remote notarization by video for certain transactions, in response to requests by the
Maine State Bar Association and numerous attorneys and judges across the State.

Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(C)(1). However, this Order excepted the administration of
oaths to circulators of candidate, initiative, and referendum petitions based on
recommendations of the Secretary of State and Attorney General’s Offices that the
remote notarization process outlined in the Order would not adequately safeguard
the integrity of the election process. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(C)(2); Packard Decl. ¶ 28.
On April 10, 2020, the Governor issued Executive Order 39 FY 19/20, which
postponed the June 14 primary election to July 14, 2020, and expressly extended the

deadlines for candidate petition filings from May 25th to June 26th, for submission
of petitions to local registrars for certification of individual voter signatures, and from
June 1st to July 1st, for filing certified petitions with the Secretary. Packard Decl.
¶ 15; Langhauser Decl. ¶ 13.

States CDC social distancing protocols. Declaration of Derek P. Langhauser (“Langhauser Decl.”)
¶ 12(B)(2) (ECF No. 15).
II. Ms. Bond’s Efforts to Change Signature Procedures
Ms. Bond attempted to contact the Secretary of State’s office on multiple
occasions to secure an alternative to the state requirements for ballot access and/or
to discuss the notarization process.4 Bond Aff. ¶ 27. On March 18, 2020, Ms. Bond

contacted the Secretary of State’s Office to inquire whether any solutions were being
floated to the signature requirements; to discuss possible extension of deadlines or
acceptance of electronic signatures; and to ask whether notarization was still going
to be required. Response Affidavit of Tiffany Bond (“Bond Resp. Aff.”) ¶ 5 (ECF No.
21-1); Attachment B: Call Transcripts (“Call Transcripts”) 2–5 (ECF No. 21-3). On
April 7, 2020, Ms. Bond contacted the Secretary of State’s Office to ask whether any

solutions had been implemented and was told that a supervisor would get back to
her. Bond Resp. Aff. ¶ 5; Call Transcripts 6–7. On May 5, 2020, Ms. Bond contacted
the Secretary of State’s Office to inquire whether she was allowed to collect signatures
under the Governor’s stay-at-home order, and she was told: “[I]f you want to be put
on the ballot then you got to get your signatures.” Bond Resp. Aff. ¶ 5; Call
Transcripts 8. She also questioned how she could get petitions notarized and was told

4 Ms. Bond contends that she contacted the Secretary of State’s office five times—on March 2,
March 18, April 7, May 5, and May 6—“to seek a safe, effective, legal, and ethical way to meet the
state requirements for ballot access.” Affidavit of Tiffany Bond (“Bond Aff.”) ¶ 27 (ECF No. 11-3). The
Defendants contend that neither the Secretary of State nor the Governor’s office has any record of
communication from Ms. Bond other than the phone call to the Secretary of State’s Office on May 6,
2020, and a general constituent email to the Governor also sent on May 6. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(C)(3);
Declaration of Melissa Packard (“Packard Decl.”) ¶ 19 (ECF No. 16). Ms. Bond submits transcripts
of her calls as attachments to her Reply. Based on those transcripts, I find that Ms. Bond contacted
the Secretary of State on March 2, 2020, to ask whether a circulator could have a petition notarized in
New Hampshire. Response Affidavit of Tiffany Bond (“Bond Resp. Aff.”) ¶ 5 (ECF No. 21-1);
Attachment B: Call Transcripts (“Call Transcripts”) 1 (ECF No. 21-3). On the other dates, Ms. Bond
did speak with staff in the Secretary of State’s Office to discuss possible extensions or alternatives to
the in-person signature gathering and notarization requirements.
that a supervisor would get back to her. Call Transcripts 8–9. Finally, on May 6, 2020,
Melissa Packard from the Secretary of State’s Office contacted Ms. Bond, to discuss
the Governor’s stay-at-home order. Ms. Packard told Ms. Bond that “there’s nothing

to stop you” from collecting signatures “as long as . . . you are wearing the mask and
the person is willing to sign and . . . you stay six feet away . . . you might want to talk
to the Governor’s office directly . . . [to] see if that’s, they consider that essential. . . .”
Bond Resp. Aff. ¶ 5; Call Transcripts 10–11.
In an email message Ms. Bond sent to Ms. Packard later on May 6, 2020, Ms.
Bond stated that the in-person signature collection process did not feel “safe or ethical

for [her], volunteers, or voters,” and Ms. Bond attached an altered petition form that
she had developed. Packard Decl. ¶ 17. The proposed form contained no circulator’s
oath, only a single signature line for one voter to sign, and no space for a registrar’s
certification. Packard Decl. ¶ 17; Proposed Modified Petition (ECF No. 11-2). Ms.
Bond requested permission to email this form to individual voters so that they could
print out the form, sign it, and return it on their own. Packard Decl. ¶ 17. Ms. Bond
placed a second call to Melissa Packard on March 6, 2020, during which she

mentioned that she had sent an email with a proposed form. Bond Resp. Aff. ¶ 5; Call
Transcripts 14. Ms. Packard notified Ms. Bond that she would need to run the
proposal by her supervisor. Call Transcripts 14. Ms. Bond was later advised that the
Secretary had no authority to approve the modified form, or the use of such a
procedure, which would be contrary to statute. Packard Decl. ¶ 17.
Ms. Bond attempted to contact the Governor’s office by phone on May 6, 2020,
but she received a recorded message which stated:
We are receiving an extremely high volume of calls. We encourage you
to visit our website at Maine.gov/DECD before leaving a message. If you
visited the website and still have questions, you can email us at
businesss.answers@maine.gov.
Call Transcripts 13. Ms. Bond left a message indicating that she wanted to confirm
that she could continue to collect signatures under the Governor’s Order and
requesting a return call. Call Transcripts 13. Ms. Bond then sent an email to the
general constituent email system in the Governor’s office, with a message indicating
that she was “a Senate candidate attempting to finish gathering signatures for ballot
qualification and I do not feel safe or ethical doing so under the current Stay at Home
Order.” Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(C)(3). Ms. Bond’s email further stated that Executive
Order 37 FY 19/20, which related to remote notarization, “eliminated the possibility
of me finishing collecting by mail [so] I am requesting a one-page sheet that can be

emailed, printed, and returned by mail be used. It should not require notary because
the intent is for only the individual voter to sign their own name.” Langhauser Decl.
¶ 12(C)(3). She concluded the message by asking, “May I please have an email address
that I may email a proposed sample to?” Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(C)(3). The email was
forwarded to staff in the Governor’s office, who did not respond because they
determined that Ms. Bond had an email address to which she could send the form—

the same address she was already using to convey her email message. Langhauser
Decl. ¶ 12(C)(5). Ms. Bond did not send her form to the Governor’s Office. Langhauser
Decl. ¶ 12(C)(6).
According to the State, Ms. Bond’s May 6th proposal was unworkable in any
event—and remains so—because it does not provide the safeguards necessary to
protect the integrity of the petitioning process. Packard Decl. ¶ 28. The State also

asserts that a scanned pdf of a voter’s signature is not an adequate substitute for an
original, inked signature and would leave local registrars unable to verify that the
signature is that of a registered voter and is not a duplicate or a signature forged by
another person. Packard Decl. ¶ 25. Also, according to the State, eliminating the role
of the circulator and the notary would remove important safeguards to prevent fraud
and forgery in the petition process. Packard Decl. ¶ 24.

III. Other Successful Signature Petition Drives
Other non-party candidates running for United States Senate gathered more
than the requisite number of signatures during this time period. Max Linn collected
4,636 valid signatures during the period from January 1 until early March. Packard
Decl. ¶ 20. Mr. Linn also gathered signatures on 270 more petition forms during the
week of June 8–16, 2020, which he had certified by local registrars and filed with the
Secretary before the deadline. Packard Decl. ¶ 20. Lisa Savage collected 5,221 valid

signatures on March 3rd, the day of the presidential primary election. Packard Decl.
¶ 21; Affidavit of Lisa Savage (“Savage Aff.”) ¶ 8 (ECF No. 11-9) (candidate and her
volunteers gathered 9,000 signatures that day). Ms. Savage filed her petitions with
the Secretary on April 9, 2020, which means that she, too, had to get registrars to
certify the signatures during the pandemic. Savage Aff. ¶ 10.
In addition, the proponents of a people’s veto petition collected over 60,000
signatures of registered voters between February 3 and June 10, 2020. Packard Decl.
¶ 22. Some of those signatures were collected throughout May and early June after
the DECD notified the attorney involved in a people’s veto petition that signature-
gathering was not prohibited under the Governor’s Executive Orders. The voters who

signed those petitions had to do so in the physical presence of a circulator, and that
circulator also had to take an oath in person before a notary. Packard Decl. ¶ 22. The
petitions had to be submitted to municipal registrars for certification no later than
June 10, 2020—two weeks before the Plaintiff’s deadline. Packard Decl. ¶ 22.
IV. Timing of this Lawsuit
Ms. Bond waited until June 19, 2020, to bring this action, and she filed her
emergency motion seeking injunctive relief on June 29, 2020. Her deadline to submit

her petitions to municipalities for review was June 26, 2020. After waiting until after
that statutory deadline to file this motion, she has asked this Court for “emergency
treatment” and an “expedited hearing.” Pl.’s Mot. 1–2.
Ms. Bond named Governor Mills and Secretary Dunlap as defendants because
they are “empowered to enforce and administer” Maine election laws. Compl. ¶¶ 11–
12, 15. Ms. Bond also included Senate President Jackson and House Speaker Gideon

as defendants because they allegedly “had the authority to adjust statutes in response
to the pandemic and the State’s Legislature was still in session at the beginning of
the impact of COVID-19 in Maine,” but failed to do so.5 Compl. ¶¶ 18, 21.

5 Ms. Bond does not appear to seek any relief directed against Senate President Jackson or
Speaker Gideon.
MAINE’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
As previously mentioned, to appear on the Maine general election ballot, a
candidate for the United States Senate who is not enrolled in a political party must

submit a nomination petition to the Secretary containing the signatures of a
minimum of 4,000 registered voters in Maine, certified by local registrars. 21-A
M.R.S.A. § 354(5)(C), (7).6 Any registered voter may sign a non-party candidate’s
nominating petitions, without regard to the voter’s party enrollment status. 21-A
M.R.S.A. § 354(2)–(3). The statutory deadline for filing non-party nomination
petitions with the Secretary is 5:00 pm on June 1st. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(8-A). That
deadline was extended until July 1, 2020, pursuant to Executive Order 39 FY 19/20,

issued on April 10, 2020.
The Secretary designs the form of the petition and provides forms to candidates
upon request, beginning in the December prior to the election year. 21-A M.R.S.A.
§ 353; Packard Decl. ¶ 8. Both party and non-party candidates are permitted to begin
collecting voter signatures on petitions on January 1st of the election year. 21-A
M.R.S.A. § 354(6).

The circulator of each nominating petition must verify by oath or affirmation
that “the circulator personally witnessed all of the signatures to the petition and that

6 A candidate seeking the nomination of a political party for the same office must submit
petitions containing 2,000 signatures from voters enrolled in that party by March 15th of the election
year and then must win the primary. All other requirements for non-party nomination petitions also
apply to party candidate petitions. Compare 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 335–336, with 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 354–
355. The number of signatures required on candidate petitions has remained constant for over 35
years. See Stoddard v. Quinn, 593 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D. Me. 1984). The number of signatures required
for a non-party candidate to run for United States Senate now represents only 0.38% of the total
number of registered voters in Maine. Packard Decl. ¶ 7.
to the best of the circulator’s knowledge and belief each signature is the signature of
the person whose name it purports to be.” 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(7)(A). This oath is
printed on the petition form, with a signature block for the circulator to sign and date,

and for the notary (or other authorized person who administered the oath) to sign and
date. Voters must personally sign their names to the petition form “in such a manner
as to satisfy the registrar of [his or her] municipality that [he or she] is a registered
voter.” 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(3). The voter’s name and address must also be printed on
the form by either the voter or the circulator. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(3)–(4).
Before they are filed with the Secretary, the signed petitions must be

submitted to local registrars for review. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(7). The statutory
deadline for this is May 25th of an election year, but this year, because of the COVID-
19 pandemic, it was extended by a month to June 26, 2020. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(7)(B);
Executive Order 39 FY19/20; Packard Decl. ¶ 15. The local registrar must examine
each signature on the petition to determine whether it is of a voter who is registered
to vote in that municipality. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354(7)(C); Packard Decl. ¶ 12. This
process typically involves manually checking the Central Voter Registration system

and comparing the voter’s signature to the voter registration card on file. Packard
Decl. ¶ 12. The petition form includes a block next to each signature along the left
margin, where the registrar can place a checkmark or code (e.g., “NR” for not
registered) to reflect the results of their review. Packard Decl. ¶ 12. At the bottom of
the petition form is a space for the municipal registrar to sign and date and indicate
the total number of registered voters who signed that petition form. Packard Decl.
¶ 12.
Once the certified petitions are filed with the Secretary, if the petition

“contains the required number of certified names and is properly completed,” the
Secretary “shall accept and file it.” 21-A M.R.S.A. § 356(1). Any registered voter in
the electoral district who wishes to contest the validity of a nomination petition must
file a challenge by 5:00 pm on the fifth business day after the petition filing deadline,
thereby initiating an administrative hearing and judicial review process. 21-A
M.R.S.A. § 356(2).

The requirements for original inked signatures by voters and oaths by petition
circulators that are administered in person before a notary are designed to ensure
the security and integrity of the nomination process. Packard Decl. ¶¶ 23–25.
According to the State, detection of fraud and forgery in the nomination process
depends upon the ability to examine original, inked signatures. Packard Decl. ¶¶ 23–
25. State and local officials would be unable to identify forged signatures if ordered
to accept unverified “electronic signatures,” as the Plaintiff suggests. Packard Decl.

¶¶ 25–26.
Maintaining the integrity of states’ election infrastructure is critically
important. Local officials are an integral part of how state and federal elections are
administered in Maine, and many communities have very small populations and
limited resources. As far as the Secretary’s Office is aware, Maine municipalities do
not have any technologies in place that would permit voters to sign candidate
petitions electronically in a secure manner as a substitute for original inked
signatures, and the Secretary does not consider a scanned pdf of a voter’s signature
an adequate substitute. Packard Decl. ¶ 26. Moreover, law enforcement agencies,

such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of
Homeland Security and the U.S. Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
have cautioned state and local government officials to be wary of opening unsolicited
attachments even from known senders. Packard Decl. ¶ 26. Any system providing for
the secure electronic transmission of election-related documents would have to be
designed by a qualified vendor selected through a competitive bidding process that

typically takes several months. Packard Decl. ¶ 27. The system would then have to
be subjected to extensive testing to ensure that it operates accurately and reliably—
a process that also would take months. Packard Decl. ¶ 27.
LEGAL STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of
right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A trial court ruling
on a motion for a preliminary injunction must consider four factors: (1) “the movant’s
likelihood of success on the merits;” (2) “whether and to what extent the movant will
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief;” (3) “the balance of
[relative] hardships, that is, the hardship to the nonmovant if enjoined as opposed to
the hardship to the movant if no injunction issues;” and (4) “the effect, if any, that an

injunction [or the lack of one] may have on the public interest.” Russomano v. Novo
Nordisk Inc., 960 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). The harm
to the opposing party and weighing of the public interest “merge when the
Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). The
moving party “bears the burden of establishing that these four factors weigh in its

favor,” Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006), but
the likelihood of success on the merits is the most important. New Comm Wireless
Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002).
A mandatory injunction, which requires affirmative action by the non-moving
party in advance of trial and thus alters rather than preserves the status quo,
“normally should be granted only in those circumstances when the exigencies of the

situation demand such relief.” Braintree Labs., Inc. v Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 622
F.3d 36, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2010). But the focus remains “on prevention of injury by a
proper order, not merely on preservation of the status quo.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).

DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff asserts that Maine’s requirement that non-party candidates
obtain 4,000 signatures violates both her First Amendment and Equal Protection
rights.7 The Plaintiff does not argue that Maine’s ballot restrictions are facially
unconstitutional. Rather, the Plaintiff launches an as-applied attack against the

7 A plaintiff asserting these claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the Plaintiff does here, must
prove that the defendant, acting under the color of state law, caused a constitutional injury. Although
COVID-19 itself does not constitute state action, Maine’s decision to enforce its ballot restrictions is
state action, and the reasonableness of such restrictions must be considered against the altered
landscape during the pandemic, which includes actions taken by the State in its response. See Sinner
v. Jaeger, No. 3:20-cv-00076, 2020 WL 3244143, at *4 (D.N.D. June 15, 2020); Fair Maps Nev. v.
Cegavske, No. 3:20-cv-00271-MMD-WGC, 2020 WL 2798018, at *8 (D. Nev. May 29, 2020).
ballot restrictions, essentially arguing that the requirement that she obtain 4,000
signatures is unconstitutional in the current context of the COVID-19 pandemic. She
asks me to reduce the number of signatures required to 2,000.

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
When a plaintiff challenges a state’s imposition of ballot access restrictions, a
court must grapple with competing interests. On the one hand, candidate eligibility
requirements implicate First and Fourteenth Amendment rights: “the right of
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of
qualified voters . . . to cast their votes effectively.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 787 (1983) (internal quotations omitted) (calling these rights “among our most

precious freedoms”). On the other hand, states “retain the power to regulate their
own elections.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); see also U.S. Const. Art.
I, § 4, cl. 1 (delegating to state legislatures the power to prescribe the “[t]imes, [p]laces
and [m]anner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives”). Such
regulation ensures that elections are “fair and honest,” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, and
prevents “the democratic process from disintegrating into chaos.” Pérez-Guzmán v.

Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Dobson v. Dunlap, 576 F. Supp. 2d
181, 189 (D. Me. 2008) (explaining that “state regulation of elections enhances the
democratic process”). States have a “strong . . . interest in regulating all phases of the
electoral process, including ballot access.” Pérez-Guzmán, 346 F.3d at 238.
With these competing interests in mind, courts review ballot access restrictions
“under the sliding scale approach announced by the Supreme Court” in Anderson and
Burdick. Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Gardner (Gardner I), 638 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir.
2011). Under this Anderson-Burdick framework, the “rigorousness of [the court’s]
inquiry . . . depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. First, the court

assesses the “character and magnitude” of the burdens placed on a plaintiff’s
constitutionally protected rights. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). Second, the
court evaluates the “precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the
burdens.” Gardner I, 638 F.3d at 14. Regulations that impose “severe” burdens are
subject to strict scrutiny—they must be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling
state interest. Id.; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. At the other end of the spectrum,

regulations that impose only “relatively minor” burdens are subject to rational basis
review. Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 485–86 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Libertarian
Party of N.H. v. Gardner (Gardner II), 843 F.3d 20, 31 (1st Cir. 2016). As for the rest,
if the regulation “imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” the
state’s “important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the
restrictions.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotations omitted); see also Block v.
Mollis, 618 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D.R.I. 2009) (“[T]he lighter the burden, the more

forgiving the scrutiny; the heavier the burden, the more exacting the review.”).
A. Burden on Plaintiff
The first step of the Anderson-Burdick test is to evaluate the burden placed on
the Plaintiff. “The hallmark of a severe burden is exclusion or virtual exclusion from
the ballot.” Libertarian Party of Ky. v. Grimes, 835 F. 3d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2016); see
also Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974) (“[W]hat is demanded may
not be so excessive or impractical as to be in reality a mere device to always, or almost
always, exclude parties with significant support from the ballot. The Constitution
requires that access to the electorate be real, not merely theoretical.”) (internal
quotations omitted). “In the end, ‘there is no hard-and-fast rule as to when a

restriction on ballot eligibility becomes an unconstitutional burden.’ ” Garbett v.
Herbert, No. 2:20-CV-245-RJS, 2020 WL 2064101, at *12 (D. Utah Apr. 29, 2020)
(quoting Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 892 F.3d 1066, 1086 (10th Cir. 2018)).
The Plaintiff contends that, “[i]n light of the COVID19 pandemic, Maine’s ‘in
person’ signature gathering requirements severely burdened” her rights. Pl.’s Mem.
of Law in Support of Her Emergency Mot. for Injunctive Relief (“Pl.’s Mem.”) 6 (ECF

No. 11-1). She contends that requiring in-person signature collection means that
“only candidates who collect all or most signatures before the pandemic and who are
greatly monied or have added benefit of a party structure have been successful in
gaining ballot access.” Pl.’s Mem. 7 (emphasis in original). The Plaintiff further
explains that she “has characteristics that demonstrate the extreme burden that in-
person signature collection produces,” including that she has two minor children,
lives in a zip code with higher COVID-19 rates, and is an essential worker. Pl.’s Mem.

7. The Plaintiff adds that, even if signature collection is “legally and/or physically
feasible, . . . it is unlikely that petition circulators would be able to gather signatures
because there are fewer people congregating in public places and fewer people likely
to open their doors to uninvited strangers seeking to collect signatures on election
petitions.” Compl. ¶ 75.
Based on these difficulties, the Plaintiff seeks a reduction in the number of
signatures required for ballot access. As noted above, the Plaintiff does not assert
that the 4,000-signature requirement is facially unconstitutional or always imposes

a severe burden. Rather, she contends that the requirement, coupled with the
restriction to in-person signature collection, is unconstitutional in light of the COVID-
19 pandemic and responsive state orders. The Plaintiff asserts that “Maine’s failure
to modify the ‘in person’ signature collection process . . . created a remarkable hurdle
to candidates,” but she does not appear to request a modification of that “in-person”
requirement in her motion. Pl.’s Mem. 6–7. Nor would such a request be effective

without a further extension of the deadline, which she also does not request.8
Although the target of the Plaintiff’s motion is the number of signatures and,
relatedly, the in-person signing requirement, I must consider those requirements
within the context of Maine’s overall scheme for ballot access. See Lerman v. Bd. of
Elections in City of New York, 232 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The burden imposed
by the challenged regulation is not evaluated in isolation, but within the context of
the state’s overall scheme of election regulations.”). In this election season, that

overall scheme includes an extension of the deadline to submit signatures. The
Plaintiff acknowledges that the Governor extended the deadline for submission of
signatures. Pl.’s Mem. 9. But she concludes that Maine has “failed to modify

8 For their part, the Defendants contend that Maine municipalities are ill-equipped to accept
electronic signatures and that the development of such a system would take months. Defs.’ Mem. of
Law in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 5–6 (ECF No. 17); see also Pl.’s
Response to Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Reply”) 7 (ECF No. 21) (“[C]onced[ing] that the State of
Maine appears thoroughly incapable of implementing any form of online signature collection at
present. . . .”).
meaningfully the ballot qualification process to address the impact of Covid19.” Pl.’s
Mem. 9. She does not develop any argument as to why the extension, which included
weeks in June as the State was easing restrictions, was not a meaningful modification

The extension certainly lessened the burden imposed by Maine’s ballot access
scheme. The Plaintiff was given several weeks, after the lifting of the stay-at-home
order and as the state was opening up, to collect more signatures.9 Requiring
candidates to collect all 4,000 signatures by the original May 25th deadline might
have created a severe burden, and it might also have been a severe burden if Maine’s
stay-at-home order extended right up until the deadline to collect signatures. See

SawariMedia LLC v. Whitmer, No. 20-cv-11246, 2020 WL 3097266 (E.D. Mich. June
11, 2020) (stay-at-home order extended up to submission deadline); Libertarian Party
of Ill. v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-2112, 2020 WL 1951687, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2020)
(problem exacerbated by fact that “the ‘window’ for gathering such signatures opened
at nearly the same time that [the Governor] first imposed [COVID-19] restrictions.”).
But neither of those scenarios is present here. See Gottlieb v. Lamont, No. 3:20-CV-
0623 (JCH), 2020 WL 3046205 (D. Conn. June 8, 2020) (“Had the Governor failed to

9 The Defendants maintain that the Governor’s stay-at-home order did not prohibit the
solicitation and collection of signatures for ballot petitions. Defs.’ Opp’n 7–8. Even if that fact was
unclear from the order’s text, subsequent guidance—issued nearly two months before the deadline—
appears to have confirmed that such activity was allowed. Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(B)(4). That guidance
was discussed in a newspaper article six weeks before the submission deadline. Portland Press Herald,
“Amid pandemic, GOP gathers signatures to kill ranked-choice voting,”
https://www.pressherald.com/2020/05/18/amid-pandemic-gop-gathers-signatures-to-kill-ranked-
choice-voting/ (last visited July 24, 2020). In states where the stay-at-home orders did not prohibit
signature collection, courts have been less inclined to find that plaintiffs were severely burdened. See
Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020).
modify the election laws during this public health emergency, plaintiffs’ claim of
severe burden would have had much greater force.”).
Given that the extension coincided with the reopening of the State, I cannot

conclude that a reasonably diligent10 candidate would have been virtually excluded
from the ballot due to the State’s enforcement of its modified access requirements.
See Cooper v. Raffensperger, 1:20-CV-01312-ELR, 2020 WL 3892454 (N.D. Ga. July
9, 2020) (concluding that plaintiffs were not virtually excluded from ballot where
plaintiffs had two months before the onset of COVID-19 to collect signatures,
plaintiffs benefitted from a month-long extension, and the state was beginning to

reopen); see also Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Preliminary Injunction
(“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 11 (ECF No. 17) (noting that proponents of people’s referendum
obtained over 60,000 voter signatures between February and June); Packard Decl. ¶
22 (stating that hundreds of signatures for referendum were collected in one week in
June). Thus, based on the record before me, although the Plaintiff faced a non-trivial
burden in her attempts to get on the ballot, the Plaintiff has failed to show that she
is likely to succeed in claiming that the burden imposed by Maine’s ballot

10 The Defendants suggest that the Plaintiff herself was not diligent in collecting signatures. See
Defs.’ Opp’n 2. As the First Circuit has made clear, the issue is not whether the Plaintiff herself lacked
diligence. Pérez-Guzmán v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 242–43 (1st Cir. 2003) (rejecting the argument that
“only those who demonstrate due diligence can mount a First Amendment challenge to a ballot access
requirement”). Rather, the question is whether the State’s ballot restrictions are severely burdensome
to a reasonably diligent candidate. In a case often referenced in this context, the Supreme Court
remanded for further factfinding as to whether, “in the context of California politics . . . a reasonably
diligent independent candidate [could] be expected to satisfy the signature requirements” imposed by
a state statute. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974). Thus, the remand “went to the
burdensomeness of the challenged regulation (i.e., its severity), not to causation.” Pérez-Guzmán, 346
F.3d 242–43. “While a particular plaintiff's ‘[p]ast experience’ can have evidentiary significance in an
assessment of severity, . . . a showing of personal due diligence is not an element of a ballot access
claim.” Id.
requirements was severe. See Gottlieb, 2020 WL 3046205, at *7; Whitfield v.
Thurston, No. 4:20-cv-00466-KGB2020, 2020 WL 3451692, at *21 (E.D. Ark. June 24,
2020).

B. State’s Interest
Next, I consider the importance of the State’s interests furthered by the ballot
access requirements. The Defendants identify several such interests. First, the
petitioning process ensures “that candidates have demonstrated a modicum of
support to qualify for the ballot, thereby reducing the possibility of vote splitting and
voter confusion, and ensuring that elections are fair and orderly.” Defs.’ Opp’n 5.
Second, the “wet” signature and in-person certification requirements “ensure the

security and integrity of the nomination process,” and the Defendants emphasize that
“[d]etection of fraud and forgery in the nomination process depends upon the ability
to examine original, inked signatures.” Defs.’ Opp’n 5 (adding that “State and local
officials would be unable to identify forged signatures if ordered to accept unverified
“electronic signatures,” as plaintiff suggests”); see also Packard Decl. ¶¶ 24–26. For
her part, the Plaintiff asserts that there was “no justifiable countervailing

government interest” furthered by the State’s ballot qualification process and that
there is “no valid state interest in requiring ‘in-person’ signature collection” during
the COVID-19 pandemic. Pl.’s Mem. 1, 8–9. In her Reply, the Plaintiff dismisses the
Defendants’ interest in preventing vote splitting as “mooted” in light of ranked choice
voting and asserts that any potential fraud is “extraordinarily rare.” Pl.’s Response
to Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Reply”) 1, 10 (ECF No. 21).
The Supreme Court has stated—and courts have repeatedly affirmed—that
there is “an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a
significant modicum of support” before printing a candidate’s name on a ballot.

Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). Courts have repeatedly held that this
showing of support and other state interests are compelling. See Munro v. Socialist
Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194 (1986) (reaffirming that a state’s “interest in
preserving the integrity of the electoral process and in regulating the number of
candidates on the ballot [is] compelling”); Gardner II, 843 F.3d at 32 (citing
Libertarian Party of Me. v. Diamond, 992 F.2d 365, 371 (1st Cir. 1993) (endorsing

state interest in “avoiding overloaded ballots and frivolous candidacies, which
diminish victory margins, contribute to the cost of conducting elections, confuse and
frustrate voters, increase the need for burdensome runoffs, and may ultimately
discourage voter participation in the electoral process”)); Constitutional Party of
Virginia v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:20-cv-349, 2020 WL 4001087, at *6
(E.D. Va. July 15, 2020) (holding that state’s restrictions—requiring a minimum
number of signatures, requiring the witnessing of signatures, and imposing a

deadline—served “compelling” interests of ensuring candidates had sufficient
support, protecting against voter fraud, and giving the state enough time to verify
signatures); Fair Maps Nevada v. Cegavske, No. 3:20-cv-00271-MMD-WGC, 2020 WL
2798018, at *17 (D. Nev. May 29, 2020) (declining to alter state’s in-person signature
requirement because it was “narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government
interest of preventing fraud”).
The State has identified compelling interests served by its ballot access
scheme. The numerical signature requirement addresses the well-recognized
government interest in ensuring that candidates have obtained sufficient support

before their names appear on the ballot. The specifications for signature collection
and submission are aimed at reducing fraud and protecting the integrity of the
election process, threats which are not merely hypothetical. The State identifies
several recent instances in which fraudulent signatures were detected, adding that
the in-person and “wet” signature requirements enable local registrars to “to verify
that the signature is that of a registered voter and is not a duplicate or a signature

forged by another person.” Packard Decl. ¶¶ 24–25 (explaining that in the last
election cycle, an independent candidate submitted petition with “multiple examples
of forgery, including signatures of dead people, signatures of people who testified that
they did not sign a petition, signatures that a handwriting expert determined were
forged, and signatures that did not match those individuals’ signatures on the voter
registration cards on file with local election officials”); see also John Doe No. 1 v. Reed,
561 U.S. 186, 197 (2010) (“The State’s interest is particularly strong with respect to

efforts to root out fraud, which not only may produce fraudulent outcomes, but has a
systemic effect as well: It drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and
breeds distrust of our government.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The State “undoubtedly ha[s] an interest in the statutory scheme [it] enact[s]”
under its constitutional authority. See Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Merrill, No. 3:20-
CV-0467 (JCH), 2020 WL 3526922, at *14 (D. Conn. June 27, 2020) (citing Hunter v.
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 243 (6th Cir. 2011) (“States . . . have a
strong interest in their ability to enforce state election law requirements.”)). The
Maine Legislature enacted these requirements to protect these interests, and courts

have upheld them in the past. Libertarian Party of Me. v. Dunlap, 659 F. Supp. 2d
215 (D. Me. 2009). COVID-19 has not altered the significance of the State’s interests.
C. Weighing the Plaintiff’s Burden against the State’s Interests
In the last stage of the Anderson-Burdick test, I must consider whether the
State’s ballot access restrictions are properly tailored to meet its asserted interests.
Because I determined that the Plaintiff failed to show that the burden is severe, the
State’s restrictions survive scrutiny if they are “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory”

means of achieving the State’s interests of ballot clarity and election security.11 I
conclude that they are.
In normal times, the State’s ballot requirements have been deemed
constitutional. See Libertarian Party of Me. v. Dunlap, 659 F. Supp. 2d 215 (D. Me.
2009) (upholding Maine’s ballot access scheme and rejecting challenge to requirement

11 Even if the burden on the Plaintiff were severe, the Plaintiff has failed to show that she is
likely to succeed. As noted, the State’s interests are compelling. And the State’s extension of the
deadline to submit signatures demonstrates that it adjusted its requirement to the particular COVID-
19 context, in a way that it concluded still served those compelling interests. Moreover, requiring the
Plaintiff to obtain the same number of signatures as a party candidate is not necessarily a less
restrictive means of achieving the State’s interests. Party candidates and non-party candidates face
different requirements, beyond just the number of signatures, and in some ways the requirements for
party candidates are even more burdensome. Party candidates must collect 2,000 signatures from a
smaller pool of eligible voters (namely those registered to that party), submit those signatures for
verification months earlier, and then win a primary election. 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 331, 335. Thus, I cannot
conclude that simply requiring that non-party candidates collect 2,000 signatures from all registered
voters, without any of the other hurdles imposed on party candidates, is a less restrictive means of
achieving the same state interests. In other words, the fact that party candidates need to collect fewer
signatures does not mean that the State’s requirements for non-party candidates are not narrowly
tailored.
that non-party candidates must certify nomination petitions with municipal
registrars at least one week before filing with Secretary of State). Recognizing the
unique difficulties in this election year, the State has modified its requirements by

extending the deadline, which suggests that it has tailored its requirement—and thus
the burden on candidates—to the COVID-19 context. This extension reasonably
accounts for the period of time when signature collection was less feasible and when
it may have been unclear if signature collection was permitted under the stay-at-
home order.
Importantly, although the Plaintiff was over a thousand signatures short by

the deadline, she does not request any further extension.12 Rather, she asks a federal
court to reduce the number of signatures required by state statute. But the Plaintiff
develops no argument as to how halving the number of required signatures would
still meet the important state interest of ensuring that candidates on the ballot have
shown a “significant modicum of support.” See Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442. She suggests
that she has obtained sufficient support because she collected more signatures than
is required for party candidates. Compl. ¶ 78.13 This argument falls short. To be

12 The Plaintiff does not appear to argue that any further extension of the signature submission
deadline would sufficiently lower the burden, as the only relief she seeks is a reduction of the signature
requirement. I decline to alter the State’s ballot qualification process in a way not requested by the
Plaintiff. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (staying
injunction in which district court granted “extraordinary” relief not requested by plaintiffs).
13 Ms. Bond also notes that she “has previously received 16,552 votes in a federal election,” and
she asserts, without support, that “[i]t can be reasonably inferred that at least a quarter of prior voters
would sign a nomination petition for Plaintiff.” Pl.’s Reply 10. But such a conclusion is too speculative,
as voter preferences and priorities “change over time.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2503
(2019) (“Voters elect individual candidates in individual districts, and their selections depend on the
issues that matter to them, the quality of the candidates, the tone of the candidates’ campaigns, the
performance of an incumbent, national events or local issues that drive voter turnout, and other
placed on the general election ballot, party candidates must collect 2,000 signatures
from voters registered with that party by March 15 and then must win their party’s
primary. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 335.

As Defendants point out, 4,000 signatures represent only 0.38 percent of the
registered voters in Maine. Defs.’ Opp’n 3 n.1; Packard Decl. ¶ 7. This number was
chosen by the Legislature 35 years ago as necessary to constitute a sufficient
modicum of support for a candidate to appear on the ballot, and it has not increased
since. See Common Sense Party v. Padilla, No. 2:20-cv-01091-MCE-EFB, 2020 WL
3491041, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2020) (explaining that it was “unquestionable” that

state had interest in regulating ballot access and that reducing the number of
signatures would “subvert these compelling state interests”). Moreover, this number
is lower than percentages required by other state ballot schemes, including those that
have survived challenges in the COVID-19 context. See Whitfield, 2020 WL 3451692,
at *19–22 (rejecting motion to modify state’s requirement that independent
candidates for statewide office obtain signatures from 0.58 percent of registered
voters); Libertarian Party of Conn., 2020 WL 3526922, at *2–3 (declining to reduce

number of required signatures for unaffiliated and minor party candidates where
state had lowered the threshold to 5,250 signatures or signatures from .70 percent of
actual voters from the previous election); see also Common Sense Party, 2020 WL
3491041, at *7 (declining to grant request to reduce number of required signatures,

considerations.”). The number of votes Ms. Bond received in a different year while running for a
different office says little about the support she has obtained for her desired place on this year’s ballot.
which currently represented 0.33 percent of total voters, and explaining that to do so
“would wholly subvert . . . compelling state interests”) (internal quotations omitted).
The Plaintiff points out that other states have altered ballot access

requirements in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Pl.’s Mem. 10 (citing changes
in Florida, New Jersey, Utah, Minnesota, Michigan, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Vermont). However, in most of the examples she provides, the changes were
made by state officials and legislatures, rather than through a federal court
injunction holding the prior restrictions unconstitutional. In cases where federal
courts have granted injunctive relief this election cycle, the facts surrounding the

states’ stay-at-home orders and ballot restrictions are distinguishable in three ways.
First, in some cases, the courts emphasized that the applicable stay-at-home
order prohibited signature collection. See Esshaki v. Whitmer (Esshaki I), 2:20-CV-
10831-TGB, 2020 WL 1910154, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 20, 2020) (noting that
signature collection was a misdemeanor offense under stay-at-home order).14 The

14 In Esshaki, the district court enjoined Michigan from enforcing its ballot access requirements,
concluding that the plaintiff was virtually excluded from the ballot and that the state’s restrictions
were not narrowly tailored. Esshaki v. Whitmer (Esshaki I), 2:20-CV-10831-TGB, 2020 WL 1910154,
at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 20, 2020), aff’d in part and rev’d in part Esshaki v. Whitmer (Esshaki II), ––
– F. App’x ––––, 2020 WL 2185553 (6th Cir. May 5, 2020). As noted, in that case, the stay-at-home
order extended past the signature submission deadline and did not exempt campaign activity, thus
making it a misdemeanor offense to collect signatures. Id. at *2–3. Moreover, the state only proposed
a deadline extension of eight days, and it was unclear whether the stay-at-home order would be lifted
before that new deadline.
Importantly, the Sixth Circuit stayed part of the injunction on appeal, concluding that the
district court lacked authority to dictate the specific modifications the state must implement. Esshaki
II, 2020 WL 2185553, at *2. The Sixth Circuit upheld the portion of the district court’s ruling that
enjoined the state from enforcing its ballot restrictions, but “instruct[ed] the State to select its own
adjustments so as to reduce the burden on ballot access, narrow the restrictions to align with its
interest, and thereby render the application of the ballot-access provisions constitutional under the
circumstances.” Id.; see also Thompson, 959 F.3d at 812 (“The broader point is that the federal
Constitution provides States—not federal judges—the ability to choose among many permissible
options when designing elections. And because that’s where the decision-making authority is, federal
Defendants maintain that Maine’s order did not prohibit such activity, a point that
DECD clarified on May 5 and that was discussed in a newspaper article on May 18.
Defs.’ Opp’n 7–9; Langhauser Decl. ¶ 12(B)(4); Portland Press Herald, “Amid

pandemic, GOP gathers signatures to kill ranked-choice voting,”
https://www.pressherald.com/2020/05/18/amid-pandemic-gop-gathers-signatures-to-
kill-ranked-choice-voting/ (last visited July 24, 2020); see also Thompson v. DeWine,
959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020) (Ohio stay-at-home order permitted signature collection);
Hawkins v. DeWine, No. 2:20-CV-2781, 2020 WL 3448228 (S.D. Ohio June 24, 2020)
(same).

Second, courts have considered the timing of the signature submission
deadline to be important. Courts have modified ballot access requirements in cases
where the stay-at-home order extended up to and beyond the deadline, and at least
one court suggested that an extension of the deadline would be sufficient. Esshaki I,
2020 WL 1910154 at *2–3 (stay-at-home order extended past deadline);
SawariMedia, 2020 WL 3097266, at *15 n.22 (“If . . . Defendants believe that they
could not alter the requirement under the Michigan Constitution concerning the

minimum number of signatures in support of a ballot initiative, they could extend the
statutory deadline for the filing of the petitions containing those signatures.”).
Candidates in Maine had several weeks—after the lifting of the stay-at-home order
and as restrictions were relaxed—to collect signatures. See Thompson, 959 F.3d at

courts don’t lightly tamper with election regulations. These concerns are magnified here where the
new election procedures proffered by Plaintiffs threaten to take the state into unchartered waters.”).
810 (denying injunctive relief in part because state was beginning to open up before
deadline); Libertarian Party of Conn., 2020 WL 3526922, at *9 (rejecting argument
that in-person petitioning remained unfeasible, noting that “the state ha[d] begun

the process of reopening”).
Finally, courts have been less inclined to issue injunctions where the state
proactively altered its requirements—such as Maine has done by extending the
deadline. See Libertarian Party of Conn., 2020 WL 3526922, at *9, *15 (declining to
grant injunction where state had extended the deadline by two days, eliminated in-
person signatures, and reduced the number of signatures required to .70 percent of

the number of voters in the previous election or 5,250 signatures, whichever was less);
Murray v. Cuomo, No. 1:20-cv-03571-MKV, 2020 WL 2521449, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May
18, 2020) (declining to grant injunction where state proactively altered ballot access
measures by shortening the period to collect signatures but also cutting the number
of signatures required).
In fact, the Plaintiff identifies no case in which a federal court granted the
relief she seeks in a comparable context. In some cases where courts did alter ballot

requirements, the state defendants had consented to or not opposed the changes. See
Cooper, 2020 WL 3892454, at *9 n.9 (explaining that defendant did not oppose
reduction in number of signatures required); Libertarian Party of Ill., 2020 WL
1951687, at *4 (defendants “acknowledged that the ballot access restrictions must be
relaxed” and parties agreed to order that relaxed statutory signature requirements
and extended deadline); Acosta v. Restrepo, No. 1:20-CV-00262-MSM-LDA, 2020 WL
3495777, at *5 (D.R.I. June 25, 2020) (secretary of state proposed measure whereby
voters could execute petitions remotely). In another, the court held that a state’s
restrictions were not narrowly tailored because the state had conceded that it could

still protect its interests through narrower means. See Constitutional Party of
Virginia, 2020 WL 4001087, at *6 (noting that, “at trial, defendants recognized [that
plaintiffs were virtually excluded from the ballot] and proposed more narrow means
by which they [could] protect their interests”). Neither of those circumstances is
present here. The Plaintiff cites no case in which a federal court enjoined enforcement
of a state’s numerical signature requirement over the state’s opposition and after the

state had already modified its requirements.
Based on the record before me, I cannot say that the Plaintiff is likely to
succeed on her claim that Maine’s ballot access requirements, considered together,
are unconstitutional as applied in this context.
II. Remaining Factors
Although the likelihood of success on the merits is the most important of the
four factors used in evaluating a motion for a temporary restraining order, I will

briefly discuss the remaining factors.
First, I consider the irreparable harm to the Plaintiff if I decline to enter a
temporary restraining order reducing the number of signatures needed for her to
appear on the ballot. To date, on this record, Ms. Bond has collected approximately
2,700 signatures of registered voters on her petitions. Packard Decl. ¶ 29.
Accordingly, the irreparable harm to Ms. Bond if no injunction issues is that her name
will not appear on the general election ballot in November.
Next, I consider the balance of the hardships on the parties. The significant
hardship to Ms. Bond outlined above must be balanced against the hardship to the
State—and relatedly to the public—if the preliminary injunction were granted. See

Nken, 556 U.S. at 435 (harm to opposing party and public interest merge when
government is party). Weighed against Ms. Bond’s burden is Maine’s important
interest of ensuring that candidates appearing on the ballot have a “significant
modicum of support.” Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442; Am. Party of Tex., 415 U.S. at 782; see
also Munro, 479 U.S. at 194. In this case, the requirement of 4,000 voters’ signatures
for non-party candidates, which is only .38 percent of Maine registered voters, allows

the State to protect its interests in treating all minor party candidates fairly and in
the enforcement of its statutory scheme. 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354. The extraordinary
remedy that Ms. Bond seeks—ballot access without the showing of support—would
threaten the State’s ability to protect these important interests and would result in
the discriminatory treatment of other minor or non-party candidates. Maine’s
petition signature requirements, as modified by Executive Order 39, serve important
state interests and justify the reasonable, nondiscriminatory requirements to appear

as a candidate for United States Senate on the general election ballot.
In addition, the public has a strong interest in ensuring that non-party
candidates have clear methods for getting their names on the ballot. The signature
requirement Ms. Bond seeks to alter has been a part of Maine’s electoral landscape
for over thirty years. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 354; Stoddard, 593 F. Supp. at 302
(discussing requirement of 4,000 signatures for non-party candidates). This
requirement reflects a considered judgment about how best to ensure that candidates
on the general election ballot have a minimum but measurable level of support from
Mainers, while ensuring the integrity of the election process. The public and the State

have a strong interest in the continued adherence to the numeric signature
requirement, even during the challenging times presented by the COVID-19
pandemic. See Libertarian Party of Conn., 2020 WL 3526922, at *14; Hunter, 635 F.3d
at 243. Although I “acknowledge[ ] the realities and the added difficulties on the
ground due to the COVID-19 pandemic,” maintaining Maine’s signature requirement
for non-party candidates is in the public interest. Libertarian Party of Pa. v. Wolf, No.

20-cv-2299, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124200, at *43–44 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2020)
(explaining that “[e]nforcing a signature collection requirement also furthers the
state’s interest in an orderly and transparent election process”).
The Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts
should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Republican
Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020). While the
general election is a little over three months away, slashing the numerical signature

requirement—after the submission deadline has already passed—would be “altering
state election rules in a way that goes beyond the court’s role.” Libertarian Party of
Pa., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124200, at *44–45; see also Esshaki v. Whitmer (Esshaki
II), ––– F. App’x ––––, 2020 WL 2185553, at *2 (6th Cir. May 5, 2020) (“[F]ederal
courts have no authority to dictate to the States precisely how they should conduct
their elections.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I DENY the Plaintiff’s emergency motion for
injunctive relief and I DENY the Plaintiff’s request for a hearing.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy Torresen
United States District Judge
Dated this 24th day of July, 2020.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10210680. Public record. Not legal advice.