# Summerville v. Neckson

> District Court, D. Maryland · June 14, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10210210

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** June 14, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10210210

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “the inmate cannot be required to exhaust [administrative remedies] … when prison officials prevent inmates from using the administrative process”
- recognizing that the exhaustion requirement is “strict” but “does not operate as an absolute bar . . . .”
- recognizing that exhaustion provides prison officials with the opportunity to respond to a complaint through proper use of administrative remedies

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ZYQUON QUONTAZ SUMMERVILLE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: ELH-23-1290

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER NEEKSON,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Zyquon Quontaz Summerville, who is self-represented, is a Maryland prisoner who
was confined at the Baltimore County Detention Center (“BCDC”) when he filed his Complaint
against Correctional Officer Neekson. ECF 1. Neekson has moved to dismiss. ECF 7. It is
supported by a memorandum (ECF 7-1) (collectively, the “Motion”).
Summerville was informed by the Court, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1975), that his failure to file a response in opposition to the Motion could result in
dismissal of the Complaint. ECF 8. To date, Summerville has not filed a response.
Upon review of the Motion and applicable law, the Court deems a hearing unnecessary.
See Local Rule 105.6. (D. Md. 2023). For reasons that follow, I shall deny Neekson’s Motion.
I. Complaint Allegations
Summerville alleges that on May 1, 2023, at approximately 6:35 p.m., he asked to talk to
a sergeant during meal distribution at BCDC. ECF 1 at 3. According to Summerville, Officer
Neekson was argumentative and aggressive, waiving his hand in Summerville’s face. Id.
Summerville states that when he moved Neekson’s hand away from his (plaintiff’s) face, Neekson
assaulted him, punching him in the face until he was on the ground. Id. Summerville asserts that
Neekson, with the assistance of his partner, Koegla, also assaulted plaintiff while he was on the
ground and could not defend himself. Id. Summerville seeks monetary damages. Id. at 4.
II. Standard of Review
Neekson moves for dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). He also asserts qualified immunity.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 85 F. App’x 960 (4th Cir.
2004). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
evidence, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Demetres v. E. W. Const., Inc., 776 F.3d
271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166
F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) may proceed “in one of two ways”: either a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations
pleaded in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual
challenge, asserting “‘that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.’” Kerns v.

United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see also
Buchanan v. Consol. Stores Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (D. Md. 2001).
In a facial challenge, “the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the motion
must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.”
Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192; accord Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,
22 F. Supp. 3d 519, 524 (D. Md. 2014). In a factual challenge, on the other hand, “the district
court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns,
585 F.3d at 192. In that circumstance, the Court “may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on
the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to
one for summary judgment.” Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004);
see also Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th
Cir. 1991).
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 304–05 (4th Cir. 2022);

Fessler v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 959 F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 2020); In re Birmingham, 846
F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir.
2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., McBurney v.
Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a
plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” See Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan
Lab'ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472,
473 (4th Cir. 1997).

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d
321, 325–26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002).
That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide
the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . .”); see also Fauconier v. Clarke, 966
F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2020); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918
F.3d 312, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure,
a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a
complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v.
City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 10 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere “‘naked assertions’ of
wrongdoing” are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d
186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court ‘must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint,’ and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts]
in favor of the plaintiff.’” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration
in Retfalvi) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th

Cir. 2011)); see Semenova v. Maryland Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck
v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). However, “a court is not required
to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi, 930 F.3d at 605 (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Glassman v. Arlington Cnty., VA, 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th
Cir. 2010). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal
conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and
then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is
entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th.
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
In connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts ordinarily do not “‘resolve contests
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.’” King v. Rubenstein,
825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605,
616 (4th Cir. 2020). But, “in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an
affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss

filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc);
accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009).
Because Rule 12(b)(6) “is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint,” Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), “[t]his principle only
applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of the
complaint.’” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (emphasis in Goodman) (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250).
“Generally, when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), courts
are limited to considering the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the complaint and the
‘documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.’” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd.,

780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 637 F.3d at 448).
Ordinarily, the court “may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not
expressly incorporated therein[.]” Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th
Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155 (2015);
see Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007).
But, under limited circumstances, when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may
consider documents beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss to one for
summary judgment. Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir.
2015). In particular, a court may consider documents that are “explicitly incorporated into the
complaint by reference and those attached to the complaint as exhibits.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166
(citation omitted); see also Six v. Generations Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Cir.
2018); Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014); U.S. ex rel. Oberg
v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014); Am.
Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543

U.S. 979 (2004); Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999).
However, “before treating the contents of an attached or incorporated document as true,
the district court should consider the nature of the document and why the plaintiff attached it.”
Goines, 822 F.3d at 167. “When the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document upon which his
claim is based, or when the complaint otherwise shows that the plaintiff has adopted the contents
of the document, crediting the document over conflicting allegations in the complaint is proper.”
Id. Conversely, “where the plaintiff attaches or incorporates a document for purposes other than
the truthfulness of the document, it is inappropriate to treat the contents of that document as true.”
Id.

A court may also “consider a document submitted by the movant that [is] not attached to
or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint
and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citations
omitted); see also Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 642 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
583 U.S. 1044 (2017); U.S. ex rel. Oberg, 745 F.3d at 136; Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc.
v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012). To be “integral,” a document must
be one “that by its ‘very existence, and not the mere information it contains, gives rise to the legal
rights asserted.’” Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d
602, 611 (D. Md. 2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)
(“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all
purposes.”).
Because Summerville is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice”); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)

(stating that claims of self-represented litigants are held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers”); accord. Bala v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Conservation
& Recreation, 532 F. App’x 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2013). But, the court must also abide by the
“‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses
from proceeding to trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526
(4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–
79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)).
III. Discussion
As noted, Neekson seeks dismissal of the Complaint on several grounds. He asserts that

Summerville has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction because “Plaintiff makes no
allegation of a violation of Federal law.” ECF 7-1 at 3. At best, argues defendant, plaintiff alleges
“an assault, which is a state claim.” Id. at 4. Therefore, Neekson maintains that plaintiff must
show that he has complied with Maryland’s Local Government Tort Claims Act, which he has not
done. Id.; see Md. Code, § 5-301(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
In addition, defendant claims that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id. And, he contends that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 5.
A. Subject matter Jurisdiction
Neekson claims that Summerville has failed to establish on the face of the Complaint that
there is a question of federal law at issue, so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court. ECF 7-1 at 3-
4. At most, Neekson contends that Summerville has alleged a state law assault claim. Id. at 4.
However, as stated above, this Court is obligated to liberally construe the pleadings of a

pro se litigant. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Construed liberally, the Complaint asserts a claim
for use of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.1 Therefore, this Court has federal question jurisdiction with regard to Summerville’s claim.
B. Exhaustion
Neekson asserts the affirmative defense that Summerville failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. ECF 7-1 at 4. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides,
in pertinent part: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained
in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or
diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase “prison conditions” encompasses “all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes,
and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

1 Notably, Neekson acknowledges that Summerville’s claim falls under the Fourteenth
Amendment in his argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity. See ECF 7-1 at 5.
532 (2002); see also Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 98 F. App’x
253 (4th Cir. 2004).
The doctrine governing exhaustion of administrative remedies has been well established
through administrative law jurisprudence. It provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial relief
until the prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

88–89 (2006). Therefore, a claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered by this Court.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007). In other words, exhaustion is mandatory, and a court
ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016); see
also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (“‘The mandatory ‘shall’… normally creates an
obligation impervious to judicial discretion’”) (alteration in original)) (citation omitted).
However, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement
and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner. Rather, the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by defendants.
See Bock, 549 U.S. at 215–216; Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682 (4th

Cir. 2005).
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement serves several purposes. These include “allowing a
prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit,
reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation
that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Bock, 549 U.S. at 219; see Griffin
v. Bryant, 56 F.4th 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that the exhaustion requirement is “strict”
but “does not operate as an absolute bar . . . .”); Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir.
2008) (recognizing that exhaustion provides prison officials with the opportunity to respond to a
complaint through proper use of administrative remedies). It is designed so that prisoners “pursue
administrative grievances until they receive a final denial of their claim[s], appealing through all
available stages in the administrative process” so that the agency reaches a decision on the merits.
Chase, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 530; see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001) (affirming
dismissal of prisoner’s claim for failure to exhaust where he “never sought intermediate or final
administrative review after prison authority denied relief”); Gibbs v. Bureau of Prison Off., 986 F.

Supp. 941, 943–44 (D. Md. 1997) (dismissing a federal prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to exhaust
where he did not appeal his administrative claim through all four stages of the BOP’s grievance
process).
Exhaustion applies in § 1983 cases. Williams v. Carvajal, 63 F.4th 279, 285 (4th Cir.
2023). Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Moore, 517 F.3d at 725, 729; see Langford v. Couch, 50 F. Supp. 2d
544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“The … PLRA amendment made clear that exhaustion is now
mandatory.”). Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines ….” Woodford, 548 U.S. at

88. This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues
on the merits).’” Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)).
But, the Court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not
procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d
1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding
that “the inmate cannot be required to exhaust [administrative remedies] … when prison officials
prevent inmates from using the administrative process”).
Here, Neekson points to Summerville’s statement in his Complaint that he has “yet to
receive an immediate action from the facility” in response to the form complaint’s question
regarding the result of the grievance he filed through BCDC’s administrative remedy procedure.
ECF 7-1 at 4; see ECF 1 at 3. Summerville further explains that BCDC is “very lax in taking a
immedited [sic] action in situations like this.” ECF 1 at 3.

According to Neekson, this demonstrates Summerville’s failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. ECF 7-1 at 4. However, as stated, exhaustion is not a jurisdictional
requirement and therefore it is not Summerville’s burden at this stage to show that he has exhausted
the available administrative remedies before filing a suit. Rather, it is Neekson’s burden to plead
and prove this affirmative defense. As Neekson puts forth no facts to show that Summerville failed
to use the administrative remedy procedure at BCDC before filing the suit, he has failed to meet
the burden of this defense.
C. Qualified Immunity
Neekson generally asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity, on the ground that the

alleged conduct does not reflect deliberate indifference or otherwise “shock[] the conscience. . . .”
ECF 7-1 at 5. This is not the standard, however. Indeed, defendant makes only a general statement
of the qualified immunity principles without any substantive analysis of the issue.
“Qualified immunity bars § 1983 actions against government officials in their individual
capacities ‘unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’” Barrett v. Pae Gov't Servs.,
Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 428 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018))
(cleaned up); see also Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1 (2021) (per curiam); City of
Tahlequah, Okla. v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9 (2021) (per curiam); Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020);
Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 504 (4th Cir. 2024); Thurston v. Frye, 99 F.4th 665, 673 (4th
Cir. 2024); Lewis v. Caraballo, 98 F.4th 521, 530 (4th Cir. 2024); Halcomb v. Ravenell, 992 F.3d
316, 319 (4th Cir. 2021); Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555
(4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 1013 (2018); Osborne v. Georgiades, 679 F. App’x 234,
237 (4th Cir. 2017); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 235 (4th Cir. 2016); Hunter v. Town of

Mocksville, N. Carolina, 789 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2015).
In Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 395 (4th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied sub nom. Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Owens, 575 U.S. 983 (2015), the Fourth Circuit
reiterated: “Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for ‘civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)).
Defendants’ qualified immunity defense is unavailing at this stage of the litigation because
it is well established that a detainee has a constitutional right to be free from excessive force under

the Fourteenth Amendment. And, plaintiff has alleged facts violative of the constitutional right.
See Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2005). It would be premature to decide the
issue at this juncture.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I shall deny Neekson’s Motion. Neekson shall answer the
complaint within 30 days. An Order follows.

June 14, 2024 /s/
Date Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10210210. Public record. Not legal advice.