# Rodwell v. Wicomico County, Maryland

> District Court, D. Maryland · March 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10209902

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** March 19, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10209902

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that corrections officer performed discretionary act when he “commence[d] direct lifesaving measures” in response to incarcerated person’s suicide attempt
- stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule 8(a)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

:
TRACEY MICHAEL RODWELL
:

v. : Civil Action No. DKC 22-3014

:
WICOMICO COUNTY, MARYLAND
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights action is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Wicomico
County, Maryland, et al. (ECF No. 36). The issues have been
briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the
motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background1
On or about October 13, 2022, Plaintiff suffered a seizure
while he was a pretrial detainee at Wicomico County Detention
Center (“the Detention Center”). (ECF No. 33 ¶ 17). Two other
detainees in the unit heard a noise coming from Plaintiff’s cell
and walked to his door to check on him. (Id. ¶ 20). They observed
him lying on the ground and believed he was having a medical
emergency. (Id.). Almost immediately, both men ran to the unit

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the Second Amended Complaint and construed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff.
door and banged on it to get the attention of the correctional
officers in the hallway. (Id. ¶ 21). Officers Elmer Barrall,
Joseph Daly, Deniece Davis, Richard Elliott III, Zachary Emmert,

Preston Foreman, Sylvester Kellman, Jacob Skarson, James Sterling,
and Jonathan Watson (collectively, “Defendant Officers”) responded
to the unit.2 (Id. ¶ 22). About a minute later, several medical
staff members entered the unit. (Id. ¶ 23). They remained there
for approximately 30 minutes. (Id.). Two of the Defendant
Officers entered Plaintiff’s cell to attend to him. (Id. ¶ 24).
Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Lt. Davis
ordered at least two of the officers to remove Plaintiff from his
cell. (Id. ¶ 25). One officer grabbed Plaintiff’s ankles, another
grabbed his leg, and at least one more officer picked Plaintiff up
around his upper body area. (Id. ¶ 26). They laid him onto the
concrete floor in the hallway. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff, still

suffering a seizure, involuntarily attempted to sit up several
times after being laid on his back. (Id. ¶ 28). In response, the
officers surrounding Plaintiff piled on top of him to force his
body back down to the floor. (Id. ¶ 29). For nearly 30 minutes,
the officers repeatedly forced Plaintiff to lie back down on the
ground while medical staff stood by and watched. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 34).

2 On February 14, 2023, Defendants filed a letter they sent
to Plaintiff disclosing these names as the “individuals who may
have been involved in your alleged complaint.” (ECF No. 12-1, at
1).
Lt. Davis ordered that Plaintiff be restrained. (Id. ¶ 32). The
handcuffs were placed on Plaintiff so tightly that they caused
damage to his wrists and hands. (Id.). The handcuffs were

connected to a secondary chain that was wrapped around Plaintiff’s
waist. (Id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff was then hoisted onto a stretcher
by his wrists and pant legs. (Id. ¶ 34).
Plaintiff regained consciousness while being transported to
Tidal Health Peninsula Regional Hospital in Salisbury, Maryland.
(Id. ¶ 35). Plaintiff asked the transport officer, Officer
Burrell,3 what happened to him and why his arm hurt. (Id. ¶ 36).
Officer Burrell informed Plaintiff that he had a seizure, but did
not have any additional information for him. (Id.). Plaintiff
was examined by doctors upon arrival at the hospital but was not
informed of his injuries or any care or treatment that needed to
be administered upon his return to the Detention Center. (Id.

¶ 37). When he arrived back to the Detention Center, he was taken
to the medical tier where he complained of pain in his left arm,
left shoulder, left side of his neck, left elbow, and right hand.
(Id. ¶ 38). He received only Motrin to address his injuries. (Id.
¶ 39).
Plaintiff was released from the Detention Center
approximately 11 days later. (Id. ¶ 41). Upon release, he sought

3 It is possible Plaintiff meant to refer to Officer Elmer
Barrall, one of Defendant Officers involved at the scene.
medical treatment from an orthopedic specialist at Peninsula
Orthopedic Associates. (Id. ¶ 42). His MRI showed a torn rotator
cuff and a buildup of scar tissue that caused him additional pain.
(Id. ¶ 42, 57, 111). A secondary MRI also showed multiple sprains
to his left hand. (Id. ¶ 43). Currently, Plaintiff wears a brace
for pain management. (Id. ¶ 44). Although he was self-sufficient

before this incident, his injuries made it difficult to return to
work and he is now dependent on others for assistance with most
daily tasks. (Id. ¶ 45).
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing the Second Amended Complaint in light of a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “the court should
accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan
Lab’ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule

8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating
that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading
standard” of Rule 8(a)).
The Supreme Court of the United States explained that “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Nonetheless, the

complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive
a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, “once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563.
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader
is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)).
III. Analysis
A. Group Pleading
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims should be
dismissed because Plaintiff engaged in impermissible group
pleading. (ECF No. 36-1, at 6-7) (citing Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550
F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (dismissing superintendent of jails
because plaintiff “failed to allege any personal connection
between [the superintendent] and any denial of [plaintiff’s]
constitutional rights”); Thomas v. Maryland, No. 17-cv-1739-GJH,

2017 WL 6547733, at *6 (D.Md. Dec. 20, 2017) (dismissing officers
because plaintiffs “are unable to identify even a limited group of
officers actually responsible for the alleged harms”); Calhoun v.
Prince George’s Cnty., Md., No. 12-cv-2014-DKC, 2013 WL 3873224,
at *3 (D.Md. July 24, 2013) (dismissing three officers and
providing plaintiff an opportunity to file a second amended
complaint with more factual detail where plaintiff “does not
differentiate among the . . . three, but merely alleges
that . . . he was apprehended [and beaten] by all of them”); Krell
v. Queen Anne’s Cnty., No. 18-cv-637-JKB, 2018 WL 6523883, at *20
(D.Md. Dec. 12, 2018) (dismissing an officer where plaintiff

“refer[s] to unidentified officers and make[s] conclusory
statements” including that they “refused to timely render
appropriate medical assistance” and “participated in and enabled
the pattern or practice and conduct which interfered with
[Plaintiff’s] medical treatment”)).
As Plaintiff argues, each case Defendants cite is
distinguishable. (ECF No. 41, at 9-11). In Vinnedge, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the
superintendent of jails but remanded to the district court to
determine whether dismissal was proper as to the individual
detectives, who “clearly were in custody of the plaintiff during
some period of time[.]” Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 929.

In Thomas, the plaintiffs attributed all claims to 28
individual police officers, and “seemingly list[ed] every possible
officer they [could] find, potentially including officers that
were not present on the scene or omitting others that were.”
Thomas, 2017 WL 6547733, at *6. Here, on the other hand, Plaintiff
named only the ten officers that Defendants provided to Plaintiff
as individual officers involved in the alleged use of force against
Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 12-1; 33 ¶¶ 7-16).
In Calhoun, the plaintiff’s sole allegation was that he “was
apprehended by the aforesaid police officers, and was beaten, about
the head, body, and limbs, assaulted, battered, falsely
imprisoned, and falsely arrested, by the defendants OFC

SCHWEINSBURG # 3331, OFC LACOMBE # 3110, OFC BURROUGHS # 2879, OFC
AVERY # 2401.” Calhoun, 2013 WL 3873224, at *3. This court found
the plaintiff’s allegations “far too conclusory to state an
excessive force claim adequately[]” and provided the plaintiff “an
opportunity to supply enough factual detail to state a claim” in
a second amended complaint. Id. Here, although Plaintiff
similarly does not distinguish among the ten individual officers,
his allegations are more specific than simply alleging excessive
force.
Finally, in Krell, Judge Bredar dismissed one individual
officer who had been grouped in with the other “Defendant
Corrections Officers” in the complaint. Krell, 2018 WL 6523883,

at *20 (citation omitted). The plaintiff alleged that the
individual officer was “responsible for a pattern and practice of
misconduct[]” but provided “no additional facts . . . as to her
actions, omissions, or, even, presence.” Id. Unlike the
“conclusory allegations made against a group of individuals” that
were “not specific enough to state a § 1983 claim” in Krell, here
the complaint includes specific allegations about the ten
officers’ actions, omissions, and presence. Id.
A case that neither party identified, J.A. v.
Miranda, No. 16-cv-3953-PX, 2017 WL 3840026 (D.Md. Sept. 1, 2017),
is more akin to this case. There, the plaintiff “could not
specifically identify by name each particular Officer” involved in

an alleged use of excessive force because “he was being beaten.”
Id. at *1. Instead, he alleged against all officers involved in
the beating that “one or more of the officers hit and kicked [him]
in the face and/or mouth” and “placed a bag over [his] head and
zip-tied the bag around his neck.” J.A., 2017 WL 3840026, at *1.
Acknowledging that “[g]roup pleading is not ideal,” Judge Xinis
ruled that “at the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not expected to
possess complete knowledge of the defendant’s alleged wrongful
conduct, but need only submit facts sufficient to plead a plausible
claim for relief.” Id. at *3. Judge Xinis provided the following
reasoning in denying the officers’ motion to dismiss:
That the complaint does not specify by name
those officers who specifically kicked [the
plaintiff] in the face or put a bag over his
head is hardly fatal. [The plaintiff], as the
person experiencing the beating, would not
plausibly be able to identify the officers
with particularity. But at the same time,
those officers at the scene are identified,
thus placing them on sufficient notice of the
claims and the nature of the alleged jointly
undertaken group misconduct.

Id.
The same is true here. Plaintiff limits his allegations to
the ten officers Defendants confirmed “may have been involved” at
the scene. (ECF Nos. 12-1, at 1; 33 ¶¶ 7-16). Because he was
unconscious, it is not fatal that he cannot distinguish by name
which officers allegedly “grabbed [his] ankles,” “grabbed his
leg,” “picked [him] up around his upper body area[,]” “laid [him]
onto the concrete floor[,]” “piled on top of him in order to force
his body back down to the floor[,]” “repeatedly forced [him] to
lay back down on the ground[,]” placed handcuffs on him “so tightly
that they caused damage to his wrists and hands[,]” or “connected
[the handcuffs] to a secondary chain that was wrapped around [his]
waist.” (ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33); see also
J.A., 2017 WL 3840026, at *3 (holding that group pleading is
sufficient “where the injured party was the alleged victim of a
group beat down which, no doubt, severely disadvantaged him and
any onlookers in identifying precisely which officers committed
which bad acts”); Bailey v. Campbell, No. 522-cv00052-KDB, 2024 WL
482211, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2024) (finding that plaintiff

who alleged that six deputies waited for him outside the holding
cell and three grabbed him and shoved him into the unmonitored
room alleged enough specific factual allegations to survive a
motion to dismiss). Although Plaintiff cannot—at this point—
identify which officer committed which alleged acts, his
allegations are targeted at only the officers present at the cell
extraction and specific enough to survive a motion to dismiss on
the ground of group pleading.
B. Common Law Tort Claims
Plaintiff brings claims for negligence (Count I) and gross
negligence (Count II) against all Defendants, and battery (Count
V) against Defendant Officers.
1. Governmental Immunity

Defendants contend that Defendant County4 should be dismissed
from Count I (negligence) and Count II (gross negligence)5 because,
as a municipality, it is immune from suit based on the tortious

4 Defendants mistakenly refer to Wicomico County as the Town.
(ECF No. 36-1, at 7).

5 Defendants also mistakenly assert that Plaintiff seeks to
hold Defendant County liable for Count V—battery. (ECF No. 36-1,
at 7). In fact, Plaintiff only alleges Count V against Defendant
Officers.
acts of its employees. (ECF No. 36-1, at 7-11). Plaintiff argues
that Defendant County is not immune from liability “where the
officer acted within the scope of his or her duties and without

malice” because the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”)
“provides an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for
tortious conduct[.]” (ECF No. 41, at 12, 13) (citing DiPino v.
Davis, 354 Md. 18, 49 (1999)). Plaintiff asserts that “[a]s the
application of the LGTCA turns on questions of intent and
motivation, a highly nuanced and fact-specific determination, this
issue is best reserved for the trier of fact and is inappropriate
for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” (ECF No. 41, at
14) (citing Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 420, 424 (1968)). In the
alternative, Plaintiff contends that even if sovereign immunity
applies, Defendant County “is still a necessary party to this case
as a potential indemnitor.” (ECF No. 41, at 16). Defendants
respond that Plaintiff misreads DiPino and Defendant County cannot

be sued directly solely because of its defense and indemnification
responsibilities. (ECF No. 44, at 4-6).
Plaintiff conflates Defendant County’s duties to defend and
indemnify its employee in a tort suit with a waiver of sovereign
immunity. “[M]unicipalities are generally immune from common law
tort suits when engaged in governmental, as opposed to proprietary,
acts.” Devi v. Prince George’s Cnty., No. 16-cv-3790-DKC, 2017 WL
3592452, at *2 (D.Md. Aug. 21, 2017) (citing Nam v. Montgomery
Cnty., 127 Md.App. 172, 182 (1999); DiPino, 354 Md.App. at 47).
“[T]he operation of prisons and jails is a government function.”
Jones v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 1910 Sept. term 2014, 2016 WL
1321396, at *4 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. Apr. 5, 2016) (citing Jones Hollow
Ware Co. of Baltimore City v. Crane, 134 Md. 103, 115 (1919)).

Thus, Defendant County is immune as to common law tort claims
asserted against it based on torts committed by employees of its
prisons and jails.
Plaintiff is correct that § 5-303(b) of the LGTCA requires
Defendant County to indemnify a judgment against its employee for
damages resulting from a tortious act committed by the employee
without malice or gross negligence in the scope of employment.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-303(b)(1); see also Hansen v.
City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670, 689 (2011) (quoting Ashton v.
Brown, 339 Md. 70, 104 (1995)) (noting that the LGTCA “shifts

financial liability for wrongs committed by local government
officials, acting in the scope of their employment and without
malice, from the public officials to the local government entity
itself”). The LGTCA, however, “does not permit a plaintiff to
name Defendant County directly in a common law tort suit.” Devi,
2017 WL 3592452, at *2 (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 5-303(b); Martino v. Bell, 40 F.Supp.2d 719, 722 (D.Md. 1999)).
Plaintiff relies on Baltimore City Police Department v.
Esteppe, 247 Md.App. 476 (2020), aff’d, 476 Md. 3 (2021), for the
proposition that a “local government’s liability for any judgment
can be appropriately addressed within the underlying tort action
against the employee.” (ECF No. 41, at 18). Plaintiff argues

that it would be more “efficient” for Defendant County to remain
in this suit rather than requiring Plaintiff to bring another suit
to enforce Defendant County’s obligation to pay an underlying
judgment. (ECF No. 41, at 18) (quoting Estepp, 247 Md.App., at
511). In Esteppe, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against a
former police officer. Id. at 486. In the same action as the
underlying tort suit, the plaintiff filed a motion for declaratory
relief to recover the judgment from the police department and the
city, who had previously been dismissed from the suit. Id. at
494.
The state courts ruled that, if indemnification is disputed
after a favorable verdict in the underlying tort action, a tort

plaintiff may proceed to establish a local government’s liability
under the LGTCA either in the underlying tort action or in a
separate action at a later date. Whichever mechanism is chosen,
however, two requirements must be met: (1) the local government
must be a party to the proceeding, and (2) plaintiff must make a
claim to enforce the obligation. Id. at 500-06.
Here, Defendant County is a party to the suit. Plaintiff’s
current complaint does not seek a declaration that Defendant County
would be liable to pay a judgment entered against one of its
employees. Rather, the Second Amended Complaint seeks to hold
Defendant County directly liable for damages resulting from torts
committed by its employees. Because “the LGTCA does not permit a

plaintiff to sue the local government directly” in a common law
tort suit, Doe v. Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore Cnty., 595 F.Supp.3d
392, 411 (D.Md. 2022), the claims against Defendant County will be
dismissed without prejudice from Counts I and II, but Defendant
County will not be dismissed from the action. Plaintiff will have
the opportunity to file a third amended complaint seeking a
declaration that, if Defendant Officers are found liable for any
of the tort claims, Defendant County must pay the judgment.
2. Public Official Immunity
Defendants argue that Defendant Officers have common law and
statutory public official immunity against all state common law
claims not based on malice or gross negligence, and that Plaintiff

has not pled facts that would support a plausible claim for either
malice or gross negligence. (ECF No. 36-1, at 11-12). Plaintiff
counters that “public official immunity does not apply to the vast
majority of Plaintiff’s claims” because “immunity does not apply
where: (1) the plaintiff asserts a constitutional tort, (2) the
plaintiff asserts an intentional tort, (3) a jury determines that
the official acted with gross negligence, or (4) a jury determines
that the official acted with malice.” (ECF No. 41, at 20).
Plaintiff maintains he pled sufficient facts to demonstrate gross
negligence because
[a] reasonable juror could conclude either
that the Defendant Officers (1) did not know
what medical emergency Plaintiff was suffering
and did not know the proper treatment, but
nevertheless rendered significantly deficient
medical aid despite trained medical
professionals standing nearby or (2) knew that
Plaintiff was suffering a seizure, knew that
restraining a seizing person could, and likely
would, result in stress injuries caused by the
involuntary movements, and nevertheless
proceeded to forcibly restrain Plaintiff while
he was still undergoing the seizure.

(ECF No. 41, at 24). Plaintiff also asserts that a special
relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants defeats public
official immunity because Plaintiff was in Defendants’ custody.
(ECF No. 41, at 21) (quoting Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 306
Md. 617, 631 (1986)). Defendants respond that “without any
differentiation or specification of wrongdoing, there is not a
plausible basis to claim the individual officers acted with gross
negligence or malice[.]” (ECF No. 8).
“[A] governmental actor enjoys a certain public official
immunity for his or her non-malicious acts if it is determined
that: (1) he is a ‘public official,’ and (2) his tortious conduct
occurred while he was performing discretionary acts in furtherance
of his duties.” Dunbar v. Biedlingmaier, No. 20-cv-0738-DKC, 2022
WL 814293, at *8 (D.Md. Mar. 17, 2022) (quoting Ashburn, 306 Md.
at 622). Here, Defendant Officers are public officials. Cooper
v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 713 n.13 (2015) (“Prison guards or
correctional officers are public officials.”). Plaintiff does not
dispute that Defendant Officers’ alleged negligence occurred while

they were performing discretionary acts in furtherance of their
duties. Indeed, Defendant Officers exercised their personal
judgment in determining how to respond to Plaintiff’s seizure.
See Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md. 1, 17 (2004) (holding that
corrections officer performed discretionary act when he
“commence[d] direct lifesaving measures” in response to
incarcerated person’s suicide attempt).
To defeat public official immunity, a plaintiff must allege
that the defendant acted with malice or gross negligence or
committed an intentional tort or state constitutional tort.
Johnson v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 452 F.Supp.3d 283, 297-98
(D.Md. 2020). “Actual malice is established by proof that the

defendant-officer intentionally performed an act without legal
justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive
influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully
injure the plaintiff.” Id. at 298 (quoting Bord v. Baltimore
Cnty., 220 Md.App. 529, 557 (2014)) (internal citation marks
omitted). “A plaintiff cannot ‘rely on bare allegations that a
particular act raises an inference of malice.’” Koon as next
friend of Glay v. Prince George’s Cnty., MD, No. 17-cv-2799-DKC,
2019 WL 1317401, at *7 (D.Md. Mar. 22, 2019) (quoting Hines v.
French, 157 Md.App. 536, 563 (2004)). “Instead, a plaintiff
asserting malice ‘must point to specific evidence that raises an
inference that the defendant’s actions were improperly motivated
in order to defeat the motion.’” Id. (quoting Hines, 157 Md.App.

at 563).
Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to raise an inference
of malice. He pled that while he “convuls[ed] uncontrollably”
during his seizure, Defendant Officers “piled on top of him in
order to force his body back down to the floor[,]” “repeatedly
shoved [him] to the ground for nearly 30 minutes . . . while
medical staff stood mere inches away[,]” and applied handcuffs “so
tightly that they caused damage to his wrists and hands.” (ECF
No. 33 ¶¶ 19, 29, 32, 34). He alleged that Defendant Officers’
actions caused a torn rotator cuff, buildup of scar tissue that
causes pain, and multiple hand sprains. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 42, 43,

57). Plaintiff has not “‘[m]erely assert[ed] that an act was done
maliciously’ but rather . . . ‘allege[d] with some clarity and
precision those facts which make the act malicious.’” Cooper v.
Doyle, No. 22-cv-0052-DKC, 2022 WL 16923857, at *3 (D.Md. Nov. 14,
2022) (quoting Elliott v. Kupferman, 58 Md.App. 510, 528 (1984)).
Even if Plaintiff convulsed uncontrollably during his seizure,
there is no indication that he was combative or violent toward the
correctional officers, or that he was attempting to evade
restraint. See Layden v. Stanley, No. 4:22-cv-61-FL, 2023 WL
3733903, at *4 (E.D.N.C. May 30, 2023) (finding that plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged malice where they pled that the plaintiff
“had not been combative, or otherwise violent toward the officers”

and had been “handcuffed, possessed no weapon, and did not try to
flee”). Rather, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Defendant
Officers’ decision to pile on top of him and repeatedly shove him
to the ground constituted an “[u]njustified application of
malignant force,” which courts in this district have held “may
give rise to a reasonable inference that [an officer] was motivated
by ill will toward or an affirmative intent to injure Plaintiff.”
Est. of LeRoux v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, No. 8:22-cv-00856-
AAQ, 2023 WL 2571518, at *20 (D.Md. Mar. 20, 2023) (quoting Solis
v. Prince George’s cnty., 153 F.Supp.2d 793, 805 (D.Md. 2001)).
Plaintiff has also alleged facts sufficient to support an
inference of gross negligence. Gross negligence is

An intentional failure to perform a manifest
duty in reckless disregard of the consequences
as affecting the life or property of another,
and also implies a thoughtless disregard of
the consequences without the exertion of any
effort to avoid them. Stated conversely, a
wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or
acts wantonly and willfully only when he [or
she] inflicts injury intentionally or is so
utterly indifferent to the rights of others
that he [or she] acts as if such rights did
not exist.

Cooper, 443 Md. at 708. Defendant Officers’ alleged decision to
shove Plaintiff to the floor repeatedly for nearly 30 minutes
instead of instructing the medical staff, who stood watching, to
provide medical attention “‘implies a thoughtless disregard of the
consequences’ (i.e., [Plaintiff’s] injuries) ‘without the exertion
of any effort to avoid them.’” Shields v. Prince George’s Cnty.,
Maryland, No. 15-cv-1736-GJH, 2019 WL 3536800, at *13 (D.Md.
Aug. 2, 2019) (quoting Cooper, 443 Md. at 708). The claims against

Defendant Officers in Counts I (negligence) and II (gross
negligence) will therefore proceed to discovery.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Officers committed the
intentional tort of battery. “Under Maryland law, ‘[a] battery
occurs when one intends a harmful or offensive contact with another
without that person’s consent.’” Young v. Prince George’s Cnty.,
Maryland, 355 F.3d 751, 759 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Nelson v.
Carroll, 355 Md. 593, 600 (1999)). Plaintiff has alleged facts
that, if proven, would establish that Defendant Officers battered

him by piling on top of him and repeatedly shoving him to the
ground. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 29, 31). Public official immunity does
not apply to his battery claim. It is well settled that “public
official immunity does not apply in the case of intentional torts,
such as battery.” Touko v. United States, No. 20-cv-1113-GJH,
2021 WL 2685328, at *3 (D.Md. June 29, 2021) (citing Cooper, 443
Md. at 713 n.14) (“A public official is not entitled to common law
public official immunity where the official committed an
intentional tort[.]”); Ashton, 339 Md. at 117 (“Public official
immunity is not a defense to these intentional torts.”); Cox v.
Prince George’s Cnty., 296 Md. 162, 169 (1983) (“[A] police officer
does not enjoy this immunity if he commits an intentional
tort[.]”); Johnson v. Prince George’s Cnty., Maryland, No. 10-cv-

0582-DKC, 2011 WL 806448, at *7 (D.Md. Mar. 1, 2011) (“Public
official immunity would not apply to [the plaintiff’s] intentional
tort claims.”)). Therefore, the claim against Defendant Officers
in Count V (battery) will proceed to discovery.
C. Excessive Force Claims
Plaintiff brings claims for excessive force against Defendant
Officers in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III) and Articles
16, 24, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count
IV).
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s excessive force claims should be
dismissed because “there is no basis to draw an inference that any

actions present a plausible claim that punishment occurred, only
attempts to care for someone experiencing a medical issue.” (ECF
No. 36-1, at 14). Plaintiff responds that Defendant Officers’ use
of force was objectively unreasonable because: (1) “[t]here was
no need for the use of any force”; (2) Plaintiff did not pose a
threat to anyone because he “was suffering a medical emergency in
his cell”; (3) Defendant Officers made no effort . . . to temper
or limit the amount of force that they were using”; (4) “no
security issue [was] present and none of the Defendant Officers
could have reasonably perceived any threat” because “Plaintiff was
actively seizing the entire time”; and (5) “Plaintiff, who was
undergoing a medical emergency, was certainly not resisting in any

manner.” (ECF No. 41, at 26). Defendants reply that “[t]he
failure to specify allegations against any of the Defendants is
fatal to this claim[.]” (ECF No. 44, at 9).
In his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant
Officers’ use of force violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. (ECF No. 33, at 15, 16). The Fourth Amendment
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual
punishments[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Finally, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)).

It is well-settled that the Fourth Amendment does not govern
claims brought by pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Wallace v. Moyer,
No. 17-cv-3718-CCB, 2020 WL 1506343, at *8 (D.Md. Mar. 30, 2020)
(citing Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty., Maryland, 302 F.3d 262,
268 (4th Cir. 2002)) (dismissing Fourth Amendment claim for
excessive force because “the Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected
the idea that the Fourth Amendment governs claims brought by
pretrial detainees”); Brown v. Warden, No. 17-cv-3231-GJH, 2019 WL
1409694, at *5 (D.Md. Mar. 28, 2019) (quoting Riley v. Dorton, 115
F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010)) (“[T]he protection of the

Fourth Amendment ‘does not extend to the alleged mistreatment of
arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody.’”); Ragins v. Co
Lieutenant Derrick Burman, No. 15-cv-2471-GJH, 2017 WL 5466675, at
*3 (D.Md. Nov. 13, 2017) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not apply
to claims of excessive force against pretrial detainees.”). Thus,
Count III will be dismissed as to the Fourth Amendment claim.
Courts have consistently held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects pretrial detainees, while the Eighth Amendment protects
convicted prisoners. See, e.g., Wallace, 2020 WL 1506343, at *9
(citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 400-01) (“The Supreme Court has
explained that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment applies only to convicted prisoners, and that

a pretrial detainee’s claims of mistreatment while detained are
instead governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause.”); Brown, 2019 WL 1409694, at *4 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S.
at 395 n.10) (noting that “the Due Process Clause protects a
pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to
punishment[]” and that “[a]fter conviction, the Eighth Amendment
serves as the primary source of substantive protection . . . in
cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is challenged as
excessive and unjustified[]”); Thompson v. Opoku, No. 18-cv-1022-
ELH, 2020 WL 978681, at *15 (D.Md. Feb. 28, 2020) (quoting Brown
v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001)) (“[T]he State does
not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is

concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt
in accordance with due process of law.”). Because Plaintiff was
not a convicted prisoner at the time of the incident giving rise
to his complaint, Count III will be dismissed as to his Eighth
Amendment claim.
To state an excessive force claim under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, “a pretrial detainee must show only
that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was
objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. A
pretrial detainee need not show subjective intent. Id. at 396-
97. The determination is made “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew
at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 397.

In evaluating the reasonableness of the force used, courts may
consider:
the relationship between the need for the use
of force and the amount of force used; the
extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort
made by the officer to temper or to limit the
amount of force; the severity of the security
problem at issue; the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.

Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Officers repeatedly
shoved Plaintiff to the ground while he was seizing indicate that
their use of force was “deliberately (not accidentally or
negligently) used.” Id. at 396. “[F]rom the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene,” Plaintiff has also alleged facts
showing that Defendant Officers’ use of force was excessive. Id.
at 397. He alleged that he was unconscious, suggesting Defendant
Officers’ use of force was entirely disproportionate to the minimal
security threat a reasonable officer would have perceived. Even
if Plaintiff was convulsing and could not follow Defendant
Officers’ commands, his allegations do not support any inference
that he was intentionally resisting, violent, combative, or
attempting to flee. Plaintiff’s allegations indicate Defendant
Officers did not attempt to temper their use of force; rather, he
alleges they repeatedly shoved him to the ground for nearly 30

minutes and handcuffed him tightly while he was seizing. Finally,
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officers caused severe injuries
including a torn rotator cuff and multiple hand sprains, which
have caused significant pain, prevented him from completing most
daily tasks independently, and made it nearly impossible for him
to work. Thus, it was objectively unreasonable to shove Plaintiff
repeatedly to the ground and apply handcuffs so tightly they caused
damage to his wrists and hands while Plaintiff was seizing. A
reasonable officer in the same situation would likely have
stabilized Plaintiff in a position that would minimize injuries
resulting from his convulsions and directed the medical staff to
provide medical care or transport him to a hospital immediately.

Plaintiff can proceed on his claim for excessive force under
§ 1983. See, e.g., Thompson, 2020 WL 978681, at *17-18 (denying
correctional officers’ motion for summary judgment where plaintiff
argued he was not combative and dropped down to the floor when
officers extracted him from his cell).
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Officers’ use of
excessive force violates Articles 16, 24, 25, and 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. (ECF No. 33, at 18). Article 24
is construed in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment, Article
26 is construed in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment, and
Articles 16 and 25 are construed in pari materia with the Eighth
Amendment. Karn v. PTS of Am., LLC, No. 16-cv-3261-GJH, 2017 WL

4162251, at *9 (D.Md. Sept. 19, 2017) (noting that “the cases are
legion in which Maryland Courts have construed Article 26 in pari
materia with the Fourth Amendment” and “Article 24 is the state
analog to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause”); Wallace,
2020 WL 1506343, at *9 (“Maryland courts read Articles 16 and 25
as in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment.”).
Because Plaintiff has stated a claim for excessive force under
the Fourteenth Amendment, his Article 24 claim will also proceed
to discovery. His Article 16, 25, and 26 claims will be dismissed
because they, like the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, do not apply
to pretrial detainees. See Wallace, 2020 WL 1506343, at *8, *9
(dismissing Article 16, 25, and 26 claims because they do not apply

to pretrial detainees).
D. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care Claims
Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide adequate
medical care in violation of § 1983 (Count VI) and Articles 16,
24, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count VII).
Defendants assert that these claims should be dismissed
because Plaintiff’s allegations are “facially implausible in light
of facts that are alleged.” (ECF No. 36-1, at 17). Specifically,
Defendants contend that medical staff were present at the scene
immediately, nothing suggests Defendant Officers acted at odds
with the medical staff, Plaintiff does not allege that the medical
staff should have done anything differently, and Plaintiff was
transported to the hospital. (Id.). Plaintiff responds that he

in fact pled that “Defendant Officers arrived on scene first,
ignored the medical personnel, and determined their own course of
action—a dangerous and grotesquely insufficient response to a
seizure—preventing medical personnel from acting.” (ECF No. 41,
at 28). Plaintiff argues that Defendant Officers “(1) disregarded
the substantial risk of serious injury that would result from
immobilizing a person suffering from involuntary muscle spasms,
and (2) ignored Plaintiff’s serious need for medical care during
a seizure, which was readily available in the medical personnel
who stood nearby but were not permitted to render aid.” (Id. at
29). Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s allegations “are too

non-specific and undifferentiated to state a plausible claim.”
(ECF No. 44, at 10).
In his § 1983 claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
failure to provide adequate medical care violated the Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment portion
of Count VI and the Maryland Declaration Article 26 portion of
Count VII will be dismissed for the same reason that they were
dismissed in Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. See, e.g., Fisher
v. Fernandez-Casas, No. 3:20-cv-846-HEH, 2022 WL 1227998, at *2
(E.D.Va. Apr. 26, 2022) (quoting Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295,
300 (4th Cir. 2021)) (“Although [Plaintiff] contends that
Defendant[]’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment, because

[Plaintiff] was likely a ‘pretrial detainee and not a convicted
prisoner,’ the Fourteenth Amendment governs his claims of
inadequate medical care.”).
The Eight Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishment” requires prison officials to provide medical care to
convicted prisoners. Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th
Cir. 2016). “When a prison official demonstrates ‘deliberate
indifference” to an inmate’s serious medical needs, a
constitutional violation occurs under the Eighth Amendment.”
DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Scinto, 841 F.3d at 236). “[P]retrial detainees, like inmates
under active sentence, are entitled to medical attention, and

prison officials violate detainees’ rights to due process when
they are deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.”
Tarashuk v. Givens, 53 F.4th 154, 1635 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d 1087, 1094 (4th Cir. 1992)). Because a
pretrial detainee’s right to medical attention arises under the
Due Process Clause, the Fourth Circuit has ruled that “the
Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Eighth Amendment, governs” a
pretrial detainee’s claim for deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs. Mays, 992 F.3d at 300; see also Brown, 240 F.3d at
388 (quoting Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992))
(“[I]f [plaintiff] was a pretrial detainee rather than a convicted
prisoner, then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

rather than the Eighth Amendment, ‘mandates the provision of
medical care to detainees who require it.’”). Thus, the Eighth
Amendment portion of Count VI and the Maryland Declaration Articles
16 and 25 portion of Count VII will be dismissed.
The Fourth Circuit recently held that “Kingsley’s objective
test extends to all pretrial detainee claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to an excessive risk
of harm.” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 610 (4th Cir. 2023).
Accordingly, it articulated the standard for claims alleging
deliberate indifference to a medical need:
To state a claim for deliberate
indifference to a medical need, . . . a
pretrial detainee must plead that (1) they had
a medical condition or injury that posed a
substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the
defendant intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly acted or failed to act to
appropriately address the risk that the
condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or
should have known (a) that the detainee had
that condition and (b) that the defendant’s
action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high
risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee
was harmed.

Id. at 611.
Under this objective standard, a “plaintiff no longer has to
show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the detainee’s
serious medical condition and consciously disregarded the risk
that their action or failure to act would result in harm.” Id.
Rather, “it is sufficient that the plaintiff show that . . . the
defendant should have known of that condition and that risk, and
acted accordingly.” Id. The Fourth Circuit advised, however,
that “it is still not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the
defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the
detainee.” Id. at 611-12.
Plaintiff has stated a claim for failure to provide adequate
medical care under § 1983 and Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. First, he alleged that he experienced a
seizure during which he convulsed involuntarily—certainly a
medical condition that could pose a substantial risk of serious
harm. (ECF No. 33 ¶ 19); Wise v. C. Maruka, No. 1:20-cv-00056-
OJA, 2021 WL 1603819, at *21 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 5, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Wise v. Maruka, No. 1:20-cv-00056,

2021 WL 1146002 (S.D.W.Va. Mar. 25, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-6816,
2023 WL 1519515 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 2023) (presuming a seizure
condition subjected plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious
harm).
Second, by asserting that Defendant Officers “repeatedly
shoved [him] to the ground for nearly 30 minutes . . . while
medical staff stood mere inches away,” Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged both that Defendant Officers’ state of mind was at least
reckless and that Defendant Officers failed to address the risk
that Plaintiff’s seizure presented. (ECF No. 33 ¶ 34). Taken as

true, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Defendant Officers
recklessly risked further harm by repeatedly shoving him to the
ground and restraining him while he was actively seizing, and
failed to address the risk that Plaintiff’s seizure presented by
failing to provide, or failing to direct the medical staff present
to provide, medical care.
Third, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Officers knew or
should have known he was seizing because he pled that (1) two
detainees, believing Plaintiff was experiencing a medical
emergency, banged on the unit door to get the attention of the
correctional officers in the hallway; (2) Defendant Officers
observed him convulsing; (3) medical staff also responded to the

cell; and (4) while being transported to the hospital, Officer
Burrell informed Plaintiff he had a seizure. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 20,
21, 23, 28, 30, 31, 34, 36). Plaintiff also plausibly alleged
that Defendant Officers’ decision to force him to the ground
repeatedly and failure to provide or direct the provision of
medical care for nearly 30 minutes posed an unjustifiably high
risk of harm.
Fourth, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Officers’
conduct caused harm including a torn rotator cuff, buildup of scar
tissue that causes pain, and multiple hand sprains. (ECF No. 33
¶¶ 42, 43, 57).
Thus, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Defendant Officers were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Officers for failure to provide adequate medical
care under § 1983 and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights will proceed to discovery.6

6 Plaintiff also names Defendant County in Counts VI and VII.
Because Plaintiff does not include any allegations specific to
Defendant County in Counts VI or VII, however, Defendant County’s
liability for failure to provide adequate medical care is more
appropriately addressed in the Monell and Longtin analysis below.
E. Monell and Longtin Claims
Plaintiff brings Monell and Longtin claims in Counts VIII and
IX respectively. In his Monell claim, he alleges that Defendant

County engaged in a pattern and practice of continually delegating
its non-delegable duty to ensure the safety of inmates and
detainees. (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 122-125). He also alleges that by
failing to establish effective procedures, rules, orders,
guidelines, and practices to ensure that violations of the rights
of citizens do not occur, and by failing to ensure that allegations
of such violations will be thoroughly investigated and
appropriately punished, Defendant County instituted and maintained
formal and informal customs, policies, and practices that foster,
promote, and encourage employees to violate the rights of citizens.
(Id. ¶¶ 128, 129). Plaintiff’s Longtin claim is similar, although
in it, he also (1) specifies that the right Defendant County

violated was the right to receive adequate medical care; (2)
includes a failure-to-train claim; and (3) alleges that Defendant
County has been sued in the past for failing to provide adequate
mental health care and accommodations for detainees with
disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 139-141, 146, 147).
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Monell and Longtin claims should
be dismissed because Plaintiff (1) does not specify which duties
relating to the health and safety of inmates Defendant County
violated; (2) does not identify a particular policy, pattern, or
practice Defendant County maintained; and (3) does not identify a
single example of unconstitutional conduct other than the one
Plaintiff allegedly experienced. (ECF No. 36-1, at 19-21).

Plaintiff responds that he stated a Monell claim by
demonstrating a custom by condonation, which does not require him
to point to any express written policy or policymaker’s decision,
and instead requires him to point to the government’s actual or
constructive knowledge of the conduct and failure to correct it
due to deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 41, at 31). Plaintiff
argues he met this standard because Defendant County
unconstitutionally permitted lay individuals to provide medical
care, which demonstrates a gross disregard for the health and
safety of detainees. (Id. at 31-32). Plaintiff also contends
that the Fourth Circuit has found that plaintiffs have pled
sufficient Monell claims where they alleged that other cases
existed, without identifying any prior incident. (Id. at 30-31)
(citing Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379,

403 (4th Cir. 2014)). Finally, Plaintiff maintains that because
he has met the pleading standard for a Monell claim, he has also
satisfied the pleading standard for a Longtin claim, which is
broader in nature because the protections of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights extend beyond federal constitutional
protections. (Id. at 32).
Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s allegations of previous
cases “lack the similarity and pervasiveness” required by Owens
and “appear as isolated incidents at best, without any description

that those cases were even meritorious.” (ECF No. 44, at 11).
Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to bring a claim against a
municipality if the municipality maintained a policy or custom
that caused violation of a constitutional right. Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 699-91 (1978).
A plaintiff can show the existence of a policy or custom in four
ways:
(1) through an express policy, such as a
written ordinance or regulation; (2) through
the decisions of a person with final
policymaking authority; (3) through an
omission, such as a failure to properly train
officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens”; or
(4) through a practice that is so “persistent
and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or
usage with the force of law.”

Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter
v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). Here, Plaintiff
does not allege the existence of an express policy or decision of
a person with final policymaking authority. Plaintiff attempts to
allege the existence of a policy or custom by (1) arguing Defendant
County failed to train its correctional officers and (2)
identifying a custom by condonation of failing to provide adequate
medical care.7 (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 140-147).
1. Failure to Train

A municipality can only be held liable for a failure to train
under § 1983 where the failure reflects a “deliberate” or
“conscious” choice on the part of the municipality. City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). Thus, a
“complaint should contain facts revealing: (1) the nature of the
training, (2) that the training was a ‘deliberate or conscious’
choice by the municipality, and (3) that the officer’s conduct
resulted from said training.” Peters v. City of Mount Rainier,
No. 14-cv-00955-GJH, 2014 WL 4855032, at *5 (D.Md. Sept. 29, 2014)
(quoting Lewis v. Simms, No. 11–cv-2172-AW, 2012 WL 254024, at *3
(D.Md. Jan. 26, 2012)).
Plaintiff has not alleged such facts. He alleges solely that

Defendant County’s “training and supervision do not effectively
protect detainees which has resulted in the repeated injury of
detainees like Plaintiff[]” and “Defendants have failed to
properly train, supervise, and discipline their officers with
respect to the proper response to a detainee experiencing a medical

7 These allegations are included in Count IX, which Plaintiff
labels as his Longin claim, but not in Count VIII, which Plaintiff
labels as his Monell claim. Because Monell and Longin claims are
treated the same, Palma v. Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, 598
F.Supp.3d 288, 297 n.5 (D.Md. 2022), the court will consider
Plaintiff’s allegations in both counts in its analysis.
emergency.” (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 140, 141). Plaintiff does not allege
any detail about Defendant County’s training practices or how they
led to a pattern or practice of providing inadequate medical care.

Without more, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not plausibly
state a claim for municipal liability based on Defendant County’s
failure to train its correctional officers. See, e.g., Grim v.
Baltimore Police Dep’t, No. 18-cv-3864-ELH, 2019 WL 5865561, at
*18 (D.Md. Nov. 8, 2019) (dismissing claim where “plaintiff
allege[d] that the BPD failed properly to train officers, but she
does not identify any particular BPD training practices or any
specific defect or omission in the BPD training program”); Devi,
2017 WL 3592452, at *3 (dismissing claim where “Plaintiff merely
state[d] in conclusory terms that Defendant County failed to
adequately train, supervise, and discipline its officers against
the use of excessive force, thereby demonstrat[ing] a gross

disregard for the constitutional rights of the public and
[Plaintiff]”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Peters, 2014 WL
4855032, at *5 (dismissing failure-to-train allegation that “is
nothing more than a bare-bones generalization that a legal element
(i.e. the policy[-]or-custom element) is met”).
2. Custom by Condonation
Under the custom by condonation theory of liability, “a city
violates § 1983 if municipal policymakers fail ‘to put a stop to
or correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct.’”
Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380,
1389 (4th Cir. 1987)). In a custom by condonation claim, a
“plaintiff must point to a ‘persistent and widespread practice[ ]

of municipal officials,’ the ‘duration and frequency’ of which
indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive
knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their
‘deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386-
91). “Both knowledge and indifference can be inferred from the
‘extent’ of employees’ misconduct.” Id. at 402-03 (citing
Spell, 824 F.2d at 1391). “Sporadic or isolated violations of
rights will not give rise to Monell liability; only ‘widespread or
flagrant’ violations will.” Id. at 403 (citing Spell, 824 F.2d at
1387).
The Fourth Circuit has emphasized that the pleading standard
on a Monell claim is low. Id. Indeed, “[t]he recitation of facts

need not be particularly detailed, and the chance of success need
not be particularly high.” Id. “A plaintiff fails to state a
claim only when he offers ‘labels and conclusions” or formulaically
recites the elements of his § 1983 cause of action.” Id. (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Accordingly, the Owens court determined
that the plaintiff sufficiently pled a custom by condonation claim
where he alleged that other cases existed but did not name them.
Id. at 403 (“The assertions as to ‘reported and unreported cases’
and numerous ‘successful motions’ are factual allegations, the
veracity of which could plausibly support a Monell claim.”).
Here, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant County “has been sued

on at least two separate occasions for failing to provide adequate
mental health care, leading to the untimely deaths of at least two
detainees[]” and “has been sued on at least one prior occasion for
failing to provide accommodations for detainees with
disabilities.” (ECF No. 33 ¶¶ 146, 147). These allegations do
not satisfy even the low pleading standard for Monell claims
articulated in Owens. The instant suit alleges Defendants failed
to provide adequate medical care, not mental health care, and does
not allege that Defendants failed to provide disability
accommodations for Plaintiff. Because the lawsuits Plaintiff
relies upon do not allege the same kind of misconduct of which
Plaintiff complains here, the three examples do not indicate a

“persistent and widespread practice” of failing to provide
adequate medical care. Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (quoting Spell
v, 824 F.2d at 1389). Nor has he alleged that any of the cases
involved conduct—and adverse adjudication—prior to the conduct in
this case. Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Defendant
County engaged in a custom by condonation of tolerating
constitutional violations of detainees’ right to receive adequate
medical care.
Plaintiff’s Monell claim will be dismissed, as will his
Longtin claim. “Courts in this district have stated that ‘Longtin
claims are essentially Maryland’s version of Monell claims.’”
McCullough, 2020 WL 836235, at *6 (quoting Krell, 2018 WL 6523883,
at *16); see also Rosa v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cnty., Md.,

No. 8:11-cv-02873-AW, 2012 WL 3715331, at *9 (D.Md. Aug. 27, 2012).
“Thus, Monell and Longtin claims rise or fall together, and the
Court need not undertake an independent analysis of the sufficiency
of the latter.” Palma, 598 F.Supp.3d at 297 n.5 (citing Krell,
2018 WL 6523883, at *15).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will
be granted as to (1) Plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence
claims against Defendant County, with leave to amend to add a
request for a declaration that Defendant County is obligated to

indemnify Defendant Officers (Counts I and II); (2) the portion of
Plaintiff’s excessive force and failure to provide medical care
claims alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment, Eighth
Amendment, and Articles 16, 25, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights (Counts III, IV, VI, VII); and (3) Plaintiff’s Monell
and Longtin claims (Counts VII and IX). Defendants’ motion will
be denied as to all other claims. A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10209902. Public record. Not legal advice.