# Truant v. Persuhn

> District Court, D. Maryland · December 12, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10209437

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** December 12, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10209437

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “an ‘office’ or ‘department’ bears no unique legal identity, and thus, it cannot be sued under Maryland law”
- holding that removal to a stet docket did not meet the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim
- recognizing immunity where police officers act without malice
- holding a plaintiff cannot bring a malicious prosecution claim where his criminal case terminated in placement on the stet docket

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

WILLIAM FRANCIS TRUANT, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil No. RDB-23-00579

H.R. PERSUHN, et al., *

Defendants. *

* * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff William Francis Truant (“Plaintiff” or “Truant”) initially filed this action in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and it was removed by the Defendants to this Court on
the basis of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 1.) Truant
now brings this suit in an eight-count Amended Complaint against Defendants H.R. Persuhn
(“Persuhn”), Jeremy Boothe (“Boothe”), Alborz Doorandish (“Doorandish”), Gregory A.
Page (“Page”), Wesley Allinson (“Allinson”), Kenneth A. Lucas (“Lucas”), Cheyne E. Hicks
(“Hicks”) (collectively, “Officer Defendants”), and Baltimore County Police Department
(“BCPD”)1 for claims stemming from Plaintiff’s alleged unlawful arrest on

1 As an initial matter, Defendants note in their Combined Motion to Dismiss that Baltimore County Police
Department is not sui juris. (ECF No. 8-1 at 1–3.) While Plaintiff concedes that Baltimore County is the proper
entity to this lawsuit—not BCPD—Truant argues that the proper remedy is not dismissal. (ECF No. 11 at 15–
17.) Instead, Plaintiff asks this Court to substitute Baltimore County for BCPD as a defendant pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), which provides that a court must freely give leave when justice so
requires. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts Count VII and VIII against BCPD. (ECF No. 4 at 23–24.)
While Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision (Count VII) fails for substantive reasons,
this is the sole defect in Plaintiff’s indemnification claim (Count VIII). Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court will
simply substitute the proper defendant, Baltimore County, for the Baltimore County Police Department.
Herein, where this Court refers to Baltimore County Police Department or BCPD, it is referring to the
substituted Defendant Baltimore County.
December 29, 2019. (ECF No. 4.)2 Specifically, Truant alleges assault against Defendant
Persuhn (Count I); battery against all Officer Defendants (Count II); malicious prosecution
against all Officer Defendants (Count III); false imprisonment against all Officer Defendants

(Count IV); a federal claim of violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Officer Defendants
(Count V); violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against all Officer
Defendants (Count VI); negligent hiring, retention, or supervision against BCPD (Count VII);
and indemnification against BCPD3 (Count VIII). (Id.)
Pending4 before this Court is Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8).
and Officer Defendants’ Motion to Modify Letter Order, or in the Alternative for Leave to

File a Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 13). The parties’ submissions have
been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023).
For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
8), construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Defendants’
Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED as to Truant’s claims for assault

(Count I), malicious prosecution (Count III), and negligent hiring, retention, or supervision
(Count VII). Accordingly, Count I, Count III, and Count VII are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is DENIED as to the
remaining counts—Counts II, IV, V, VI, and VII. Accordingly, the following claims remain

2 This Court cites to the ECF generated page number, rather than the page number at the bottom of the parties’
various submissions, unless otherwise indicated.
3 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts Count VIII against Baltimore County. (ECF No. 4 at 24.)
4 Also pending before this Court is the Officer Defendants’ Motion to Modify Letter Order, or in the
Alternative for Leave to File a Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 13), which, as further explained
below, is DENIED.
pending: battery (Count II); false imprisonment (Count IV); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Count V); violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count VI); and
indemnification (Count VIII), which Defendants Persuhn, Boothe, Doorandish, Page,

Allinson, Lucas, Hicks, and Baltimore County (collectively, “Defendants”) shall answer within
fourteen (14) days of the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
BACKGROUND
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in
a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found.
v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.)

Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Except where otherwise indicated, the following facts
are derived from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) and accepted as true for the
purpose of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8).
Plaintiff William Francis Truant’s claims stem from his alleged illegal arrest on
December 29, 2019. (ECF No. 4 ¶ 1.) Truant, a resident of Baltimore County, alleges that
prior to his arrest he had researched BCPD’s finances and became aware that officers engaged

in what he perceived to be persistent and unnecessary overtime work. (Id. ¶ 4.) After learning
of these overtime practices, Truant requested to meet with BCPD Police Chief Melissa Hyatt
to discuss his findings and possible solutions. (Id. ¶ 5.) In late November 2019, Truant and
BCPD Captain John Young discussed Plaintiff’s concerns over the telephone. (Id.) During this
call, Truant shared specific examples of overtime waste that he had witnessed. (Id. ¶ 6.) Truant
alleges that BCPD did not address his concerns and instead placed his name on a “roll-call”
notification that provided officers at BCPD’s Cockeysville Precinct with information relevant
to their duties. (Id. ¶ 7, ¶ 7 n.1.)
Sometime after 3:00 PM on December 29, 2019, Truant alleges that he was driving

home towards his home in Hunt Valley, Maryland, when he pulled over in a church parking
lot at 116 Ashland Road in Cockeysville, Maryland to call his wife. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Plaintiff
alleges that he then noticed an officer—later identified as Defendant Persuhn—conducting a
traffic stop of another citizen. (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to call his wife but
dropped his phone between the seats of his vehicle before completing the call. (Id. ¶ 25.)
Truant alleges that as he reached for his phone, Defendant Persuhn glared in his direction

before moving his cruiser at an unusual speed and stopping behind Plaintiff’s vehicle, all
without activating the cruiser’s emergency lights or his body camera.5 (Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) Truant
alleges that, fearing a collision, he moved his vehicle a short distance forward. (Id. ¶ 28.) Truant
alleges that Defendant Persuhn then exited his cruiser, aimed his service weapon at Plaintiff
without justification, and informed Plaintiff that he was the subject of an investigation. (Id. ¶
29–30.)

Truant alleges that he feared for his life and complied with Defendant Persuhn’s orders
to place his hands on the outside of the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 31.) He further alleges that after he
announced that he was calling 911, Defendant Persuhn confiscated Truant’s phone before
Plaintiff could speak to the operator. (Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) Plaintiff alleges that the 911 call continued
recording while Defendant Persuhn used his police radio to falsely notify dispatch that a

5 In his Amended Complaint, Truant alleges that although Defendant Persuhn stated in a police report that
Plaintiff’s car was moving and Plaintiff failed to rest in a designated parking space, the parking lot had no
designated spaces. (ECF No. 4 ¶ 28 n.3.)
suspicious suspect was following him. (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants
Boothe, Doorandish, Page, Allinson, Lucas, and Hicks responded to the scene and aided or
acquiesced in forcibly removing Plaintiff from his vehicle. (Id. ¶ 35.)

Truant alleges that after removing him from his vehicle, the Officer Defendants
slammed his neck on to the top of his open car door, struck him several times in the head,
and ordered him to place his hands behind his back. (Id. ¶ 36.) According to Truant, the Officer
Defendants’ actions caused him to become disoriented, and Truant told the Officer
Defendants that the position of his body did not allow him to comply with their orders. (Id.)
Truant alleges that the Officer Defendants then violently placed him in handcuffs and pushed

him to the ground, causing him to strike his head on the bottom corner of his open car door.
(Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff claims that the Officer Defendants ordered him to sit on the wet ground
for several minutes before they placed him into a police cruiser. (Id. ¶ 38.) According to Truant,
Defendant Booth, the highest-ranking officer present at the scene, asked Defendant Persuhn
about the justification for Truant’s arrest. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff alleges that thereafter, Defendants
Persuhn and Booth disengaged the audio function of their body cameras in violation of BCPD

policy.6 (Id. ¶ 40.) While Defendant Persuhn has stated that his interaction with Truant began
after Plaintiff did “donuts” in the parking lot, Plaintiff asserts that his vehicle is unable to
perform such maneuvers. (Id. ¶ 75 n.5.)
Truant alleges that he was taken to the BCPD Precinct 7 in Cockeysville, Maryland and
detained without knowledge of the charges against him. (Id. ¶ 41.), Plaintiff alleges that while

6 Plaintiff alleges that repeated requests for body camera footage from Defendant Persuhn’s prior traffic stop
have been denied, and a custodian of BCPD has certified that no such footage exists. (ECF No. 4 ¶ 27 n.2.)
awaiting processing he began to suffer blurry vision and lightheadedness from the blunt force
trauma during his arrest. (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff alleges that his initial requests for medical
assistance were ignored, but after significant time had passed a BCPD officer called an

ambulance to take Truant to the hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 44–47.) According to Plaintiff, he lost
consciousness for several minutes during the ride to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff alleges
that he was diagnosed with a concussion before being returned to police custody and released
on his own recognizance at 12:39 AM. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 52.)
Plaintiff alleges that the BCPD facilitated the assault against him and acquiesced in
Defendant Persuhn’s unethical policing by failing to properly reprimand, discipline, or retrain

Persuhn after his previously documented misconduct.7 (Id. ¶¶ 64–65.) Plaintiff asserts that
BCPD had knowledge of widespread misconduct by its officers before December 2019 and
therefore his illegal arrest was foreseeable to BCPD.8 (Id. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff alleges that his
improper arrest and assault would not have occurred if BCPD had properly trained its officers
in de-escalation tactics. (Id. ¶¶ 74–75.)
According to Plaintiff, he was fictitiously charged with second degree assault on a law

enforcement officer; resisting arrest; obstructing and hindering; failure to display license on
demand; failure to display registration card on demand; driving a motor-vehicle in a manner
intended to cause skidding; and spinning wheels. (Id. ¶ 53.) On September 15, 2021, the State’s
Attorney Office for Baltimore County moved to place Plaintiff’s matter on the stet docket,
which Truant accepted upon advice of his defense counsel. (Id. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff alleges that

7 Truant alleges that Defendant Persuhn has a history of police misconduct and references a 2018 viral video
of Persuhn conducting an arrest in a combative and aggressive manner. (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 60–63.)
8 Truant states that Defendant Page—who was present at Plaintiff’s arrest—fatally shot Eric Sopp, an unarmed
man suffering a mental health crisis, during an unjustified stop on November 26, 2019. (Id. ¶ 69.)
since the events of his arrest, he has been unable to return to work, placed on Social Security
Disability benefits, and diagnosed with anxiety disorders and physical health conditions related
to the injuries he sustained during his December 29, 2019, arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 81–88.)

On December 21, 2022, Truant initiated the instant action in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint lodges eight counts against
the Defendants: assault against Defendant Persuhn (Count I); battery against all Officer
Defendants (Count II); malicious prosecution against all Officer Defendants (Count III); false
imprisonment against all Officer Defendants (Count IV); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
all Officer Defendants (Count V); violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights

against all Officer Defendants (Count VI); negligent hiring, retention, or supervision against
BCPD (Count VII); and indemnification against BCPD (Count VIII). (ECF No. 4.)
On March 4, 2023, Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal
question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). On April 6, 2023, twenty days after the deadline for a
responsive pleading, 9 Defendants untimely filed a Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8)
as to Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII. (ECF No. 8; ECF No. 11 at 12.) Plaintiff

responded in opposition. (ECF No. 11.) Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
8) is ripe for review.
On December 1, 2023, this Court issued a Letter Order instructing Defendants in the
above-captioned matter to file an Answer or other responsive pleading to Count V—the sole
basis for this Court’s federal question jurisdiction—by 5:00 PM on December 5, 2023. (ECF

9 All Defendants received service by February 24, 2023, and Defendants removed this action on March 3, 2023,
meaning Defendants were required to answer or present other defenses or objections by March 17, 2023 at the
latest. (ECF No. 11 at 11); FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(2).
No. 12.) At 11:52 PM on December 5, 2023, Officer Defendants filed a Motion to Modify
Letter Order, or in the Alternative for Leave to File a Motion for a More Definite Statement
(ECF No. 13). Therein, they ask this Court to modify the Letter Order to stay their obligation

to file a responsive pleading to Count V until after the Court rules on the pending partial
dismissal motion, (id. at 1–2), or, in the alternative, they request leave to file a Rule 12(e)
Motion for a More Definite Statement as to Count V. (Id. at 2–5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not
to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). In ruling on a motion
to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s]
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia, 857 F.3d at 208 (citing SD3, 801

F.3d at 422).
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under the plausibility standard,
a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown,

716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must, however, set forth
“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even
if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and

unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to
plead a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346
(4th Cir. 2011).
ANALYSIS
Before turning to the Defendants’ Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8), this

Court briefly addresses the Officer Defendants’ Motion to Modify Letter Order, or in the
Alternative for Leave to File a Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 13). Therein,
the Officer Defendants ask the Court to modify its December 1, 2023 Letter Order to stay
their obligation to file a responsive pleading to Count V until after the Court rules on the
pending partial dismissal motion, (id. at 1–2), or, in the alternative, they request leave to file a
Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement as to Count V. (Id. at 2–5.) First considering

their request to modify the Letter Order, the Officer Defendants correctly note that this Court
has held that “the majority view [is] that a partial motion to dismiss stays the time to file a
responsive pleading.” Robinson v. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:22-cv-01102-ELH, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
183342, at *1 n.3 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2023) (citing Singhal & Co., Inc. v. VersaTech, Inc., No. JKB-
19-01209, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147754, at *18 n.2 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2019); Saman v. LBDP,
Inc., No. DKC-12-1083, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159658, at *10 n.1 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2012).

Because this Court is now ruling on the partial motion to dismiss, the Officer Defendants’
request to stay their obligation to file a responsive pleading to Count V is DENIED AS
MOOT.
Considering the Officer Defendants’ suggestion that a more definitive statement is

required for Count V, this Court first notes that Rule 12(e) motions are typically filed
contemporaneous to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Rule 12(e) motions
“allow a defendant to move for a more definite statement if the complaint ‘is so vague or
ambiguous that [he] cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.’” Hodgson
v. Va. Baptist Hosp., Inc. 482 F.2d 821, 822–23 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e)).
Thus, “[w]here a party has enough information to frame an adequate answer, a court should

deny the Rule 12(e) motion and avoid delay in maturing the case.” Doe v. Bayer Corp., 367 F.
Supp. 2d 904, 917 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (citing Hodgson, 482 F.2d at 822).
Quite simply, allowing the Officer Defendants to file a Rule 12(e) motion at this stage
would be imprudent and more importantly lacks merit. This Court would be hard-pressed to
conclude that Count V is so vague and ambiguous that the Officer Defendants could not
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. Defendants have moved to dismiss

Count VI of the Amended Complaint, which alleges violation of Article 26 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. Article 26 is in pari materia with the prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Bass v.
State, 35 A.2d 155, 157 (Md. 1943). Accordingly, the same facts that support Truant’s Article
26 claim apply with equal force to his § 1983 claim brought under the Fourth Amendment.
Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 140–41(Md. 2000). The same analysis discussed infra with

respect to Count VI applies to Count V as well.
When a Rule 12(e) motion—or something akin to it—is untimely or inappropriate
under the circumstances, courts have often reminded the parties that elucidation of the
pleading’s allegations is normally accomplished through discovery. See Poole v. White, 2 F.R.D.

40, 41 (N.D.W. Va. 1941) (“The great weight of authority is to the effect that bills of particulars
should be limited to information necessary to enable the preparation of responsive pleadings,
and that other information should be secured by interrogatories or discovery.”); 5C CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1378 (3d ed. 2020) (“[E]ven
if a motion under Rule 12(e) proves to be untimely or inappropriate, the movant should be
able to obtain the desired information through the deposition and discovery process.”).

Indeed, as many courts have noted, Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored precisely because of the
liberal pleading and discovery available under the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Frederick v. Koziol, 727
F. Supp. 1019, 1020–21 (E.D. Va. 1990). Accordingly, Defendants’ request for leave to request
a more definitive statement as to Count V is DENIED.
Turning to the dismissal motion, Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, VI,
VII, and VIII. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff concedes that his assault claim (Count I) is time-barred

because the one-year statute of limitations expired on December 29, 2020. (ECF No. 11 at
22.) Accordingly, that Count will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This Court will
address Counts II, III, IV, VI,10 VII, and VIII in turn, and some counts are consolidated where
appropriate.

10 As previously noted, this Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Article 26 claim in Count VI also applies to Truant’s
§ 1983 claim in Count V.
I. Plaintiff’s Procedural Arguments
Truant contends that Defendants waived their opportunity to file a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by filing their Combined Motion

to Dismiss three weeks late. (ECF No. 11 at 6, 13.) Truant argues that this Court should enter
a directed verdict and order discovery upon the limited issue of damages, remand the matter
to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, or dismiss the Motion in its entirety as untimely.
(Id. at 6–7.) This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based
on federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.11 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Packett
v. Univ. of Md. Med. Ctr., Civ. No. RDB-17-1630, 2017 WL 5903759, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 30,

2017) (noting federal question jurisdiction attaches when plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint
includes a federal cause of action); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 (1986);
Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 442 (4th Cir. 2005). As currently pled, this Court has
jurisdiction over this matter. Therefore, remand is improper at this stage.
Rule 12(b) requires that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or lack of subject
matter jurisdiction “be made before pleading if responsive pleading is allowed.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b). In actions that defendants have removed to federal court, Rule 81(c)(2) requires a
defendant who did not answer before removal to answer or present other defenses or
objections:
within the longest of these periods: (A) 21 days after receiving—through service
or otherwise—notice of the initial pleading stating the claim for relief; (B) 21
days after being served with the summons for an initial pleading on file at the
time of service; or (C) 7 days after the notice of removal is filed.

11 As discussed throughout this Memorandum Opinion, Defendants have not filed a responsive pleading to
Count V, which is the basis for this Court’s federal question jurisdiction over this matter.
FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(2). Exceptions to 12(b) motions fall under Rule 12(h)(2), which allows a
defendant to bring a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction “by a motion under Rule 12(c).” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2)(B). Rule 12(c) states that

a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought after pleadings are closed but early
enough so as not to delay trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that a defendant’s untimely motion to dismiss
pursuant to 12(b)(6) may be considered as a Rule 12(c) motion. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178
F.3d 213, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(c) motion receives the same standard of review as a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 375

(4th Cir. 2012); Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2002);
Attkisson v. Bridges, No. RDB-20-0068, 2021 WL 6123267, at * 3 (D. Md. Dec. 27, 2021). Here,
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is untimely, but Plaintiff’s counsel concedes that Defendants’
counsel requested additional time to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint.12 (ECF No. 11 at 12.)
Plaintiff does not proffer that Defendants’ Motion was made so late as to delay the start of
trial. Accordingly, this Court will construe Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) as a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).
II. LGTCA Notice Requirements
As Plaintiff and Defendants recognize, Maryland’s Local Government Tort Claims Act
(“LGTCA”) requires plaintiffs bringing tort claims against municipalities to either give notice
or substantially comply with the LGTCA’s notice requirements. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.

12 Plaintiff did not agree to Defendants’ request, (ECF No. 11 at 12), and Defendants did not file a motion with
this Court to extend time.
PROC. § 5-304(b)(1). Under the LGTCA, a plaintiff must give notice of a claim against
Baltimore County to the county solicitor in person or via certified mail within one year after
the injury. Id. § 5-304(b)(1), (c)(1), (c)(3)(iii). Alternatively, the LGTCA considers its notice

requirement fulfilled if, within one year after the injury, “the defendant local government has
actual or constructive notice of (1) [t]he claimant’s injury; or (2) [t]he defect or circumstances
giving rise to the claimant’s injury.” Id. § 5-304(e). The LGTCA further notes that even absent
the required notice, a court may entertain an action upon plaintiff’s motion and showing of
good cause “unless the defendant can affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced
by lack of required notice.” Id. § 5-304(d).

Maryland courts have held that a plaintiff substantially complies with the LGTCA
notice requirements when the plaintiff: (1) makes some kind of effort to provide the requisite
notice; (2) in fact gives some kind of notice; (3) gives requisite and timely notice of facts and
circumstances giving rise to the claim; and (4) provides notice that fulfills the LGTCA notice
requirement’s purpose of apprising the “local government of its possible liability at a time
when [the local government] could conduct its own investigation.” Ellis v. Housing Auth. Of

Balt. City, 82 A.3d 161, 167 (Md. 2013) (quoting Faulk v. Ewing, 808 A.2d 1262, 1272 (Md.
2002)). “Thus, substantial compliance will occur when the local government receives actual
notice such that it is given the opportunity to properly investigate the potential tort claim.”
Huggins v. Prince George’s Cnty., 683 F.3d 525, 538 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hansen v. City of Laurel,
996 A.2d 882, 891 (Md. App. 2010)).
Here, Truant has substantially complied with LGTCA notice requirements because he

provided the county solicitor with actual notice of his intent to sue within one year of the
injury. Although Plaintiff did not meet the requirement to send notice either in person or via
certified mail, Plaintiff in fact mailed notice of his intent to file the instant action to the
Baltimore County solicitor via standard United States mail within one year of the injury. (ECF

No. 11 at 15; ECF No. 4 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff’s letter fulfilled the purpose of the LGTCA notice
requirements by apprising Baltimore County of its possible liability when it could still conduct
its own investigation. Similarly, because the letter informed the Baltimore County solicitor of
Plaintiff’s intent to sue, Defendants received actual notice of Plaintiff’s injury sufficient to
meet the requirements of the LGTCA § 5-304(e)(1). See, e.g., Faulk, 808 A.2d at 1274, 1278
(holding plaintiff substantially complied with LGTCA notice requirements by giving actual

notice to the insurance entity charged with investigating his claim against the government).
III. Battery (Count II) & False Imprisonment (Count IV)
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s battery claim (Count II) and false imprisonment claim
(Count IV) should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged actual malice sufficient to
overcome Officer Defendants public official immunity.13 (ECF No. 8 at 2.) Defendants argue
that actual malice requires clear and precise factual allegations that demonstrate malicious acts,

although malice may also be inferred from a public official’s unjustified use of malignant force.
(Id. at 7.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff merely raises conclusory allegations unsupported
by facts that show Officer Defendants knew of Plaintiff before his arrest. (Id.)
Maryland recognizes public official immunity under both common law and the
LGTCA. At common law, public official immunity shields public officials who engage in

13 Defendants also challenge Plaintiff’s battery and false imprisonment claims on the grounds that Plaintiff
failed to comply with LGTCA notice requirements. (ECF No. 8 at 1.) As discussed supra, this argument fails
because Plaintiff substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements.
negligent acts while performing discretionary duties. Houghton v. Forrest, 989 A.2d 223, 228
(Md. 2010). The Supreme Court of Maryland has long held that “the LGTCA does not waive
any preexisting immunity against suit held by the local government or its employees.” Rounds

v. Md.-Nat. Cap. Park and Planning Comm’n, 109 A.3d 639, 649 (Md. 2015); Williams v. Maynard,
754 A.2d 379, 388 (Md. 2000); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-507(a)(1) (2013)
(codifying common law immunity for public officials who act without malice and within the
scope of their employment). Instead, the LGTCA designates a local government as de-facto
“insurer,” obligated to indemnify its employees from tort liability unless they acted with malice
or gross negligence. Hansen v. City of Laurel, 25 A.3d 122, 128–29 n.5 (Md. 2011); accord Rios v.

Montgomery Cnty., 872 A.2d 1, 19 (Md. 2005).
Public official immunity applies “when the actor is (1) a public official, (2) the tortious
conduct occurred in the course of the actor's performance of discretionary, rather than
ministerial acts, and (3) those acts were within the scope of the actor’s official duties.” Id.
Crucially, public official immunity does not apply where a public official acts with malice or
commits an intentional or constitutional tort. Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 452 F. Supp. 3d 283,

297–98 (D. Md. 2020); see also Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s Cnty., 309 F.3d 224, 233 (4th Cir.
2002) (“Neither statutory nor common law immunity is available to a Maryland public official
who acts with malice.” (citing DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 370 (Md. 1999)); Houghton v. Forrest,
989 A.2d 223, 228 (Md. 2010) (“For more than twenty years, however, [the Supreme Court of
Maryland] has held that common law public official immunity does not apply to intentional
torts.”). Maryland courts define malice as “conduct characterized by evil or wrongful motive,
intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md.
157, 935 A.2d 699, 714 (Md. 2007) (citations omitted).
In Maryland, “law enforcement officers are public officials and, thus, fall within the

scope of qualified immunity as to their discretionary acts.” Williams v. Baltimore, 751 A.3d 41,
61 (Md. 2000); see also Robinson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Prince George’s Cnty., 278 A.2d 71, 74
(Md. 1971) (recognizing immunity where police officers act without malice). Police officers
act with discretion when they act “within the scope of their law enforcement function,”
including when they conduct an arrest. Cooper v. Doyle, No. DKC 22-0052, 2022 WL 16923857,
at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2022). Here, Plaintiff’s battery and false imprisonment claims against

Officer Defendants are intentional tort claims that can only advance “when there is no legal
authority or justification” to support the officers’ actions. Johnson v. Prince George’s Cnty., No.
DKC-10-0582, 2011 WL 806448, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2011).
Truant has sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that he was
forcefully arrested without legal justification. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Persuhn
aimed his service weapon at Plaintiff while he was seated in his stopped vehicle, ordered him

to exit his vehicle, and falsely informed other officers that a suspicious subject was following
him all suggest that Defendant Persuhn acted without legal justification to arrest Truant.
Similarly, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the use of force during his arrest was unjustified by
alleging that he informed Officer Defendants of his activity—including dialing emergency
services—and that he followed Officer Defendants’ orders to the best of his ability while
communicating when he was not physically able to comply. Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently
pled battery and false imprisonment as intentional torts to which public official immunity does
not apply.
Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs must allege malice to overcome public official

immunity is incorrect as to Plaintiff’s intentional tort claims. As Judge Chasinow of this Court
has noted, regardless of a showing of malice, public official immunity does not apply to
intentional torts such as battery and false imprisonment. Johnson, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 297–98.
Because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Officer Defendants acted without legal
justification, Plaintiff’s claims for battery (Count II) and false imprisonment (Count IV) shall
proceed to discovery.

IV. Malicious Prosecution (Count III)
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a criminal
proceeding instituted or continued by defendant against the plaintiff; (2) without probable
cause; (3) with malice, or with a motive other than to bring the offender to justice; and (4)
termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff.” Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md.
2000). As this Court has recognized, placement on a “stet” docket is not a favorable

termination of a criminal prosecution for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim in
Maryland. Osborne v. Georgiades, RDB-14-182, 2017 WL 3978485, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2017);
see also Williams v. Prince George’s Cnty., 157 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605–06 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that
removal to a stet docket did not meet the favorable termination element of a malicious
prosecution claim); State v. Meade, 647 A.2d 830, 840 (Md. 1994), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 780 A.2d 410, 435 (Md. App. 2001) (holding a plaintiff cannot bring a malicious
prosecution claim where his criminal case terminated in placement on the stet docket).
Here, Plaintiff concedes that his criminal case terminated in a placement on the stet
docket but argues that such a termination reflected the State’s unwillingness and inability to

prosecute the criminal charge. Plaintiff analogizes his case to Fitzwater v. Tasker, 269 A.2d 588
(Md. 1970), in which the Supreme Court of Maryland14 deemed placement on a stet docket a
favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim where the lower court
signed a letter that the placement “in effect mean[t] that the State was unwilling and unable to
prosecute.” Id. at 590, 592. In response, Defendants correctly assert that the termination of
Plaintiff’s case on the stet docket precludes any claim of malicious prosecution.

Plaintiff’s analogy to Fitzwater is inapt. The Fitzwater court determined that the
termination of the case in a stet docket there was improper and should have been a nolle
prosequi. Id. at 592. Moreover, the Fitzwater court emphasized that the facts of the case explicitly
demonstrated that the State did not wish to further prosecute the case and the trial court had
provided a letter stating such. Id. at 590. Here, there is no such explicit admission of an inability
or unwillingness to further prosecute the case. Accordingly, the termination of Plaintiff’s

criminal case in placement on the stet docket is not a favorable outcome for the purposes of
a malicious prosecution claim. See Meade, 642 A.2d at 40 (stet is not a favorable termination);
Hines v. French, 852 A.2d 1047, 1057 (Md. App. 2004); Cofield v. City of Baltimore, No. GLR-14-
3976, 2015 WL 4040605, at *5 (D. Md. June 30, 2015); Williams, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 605;
Osborne, 2017 WL 3978485, at *4.

14 At the time of Fitzwater, the Supreme Court of Maryland was named the “Court of Appeals of Maryland.” At
the November 8, 2022 general election, voters in Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the
name of the “Court of Appeals of Maryland” to the “Supreme Court of Maryland.” The name change took
effect on December 14, 2022.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, and Count III is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
V. Violation of Article 2615 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count VI)

In his Article 24 claim—which, as further explained below, this Court construes as an
Article 26 claim—Plaintiff asserts that the Officer Defendants deprived him of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and unreasonable force. (ECF No. 4
¶ 122.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Persuhn’s use of his service weapon
constituted unreasonable force under the circumstances. (Id. at ¶ 124.) Plaintiff also seems to
allege that Plaintiff’s seizure was unreasonable because the Officer Defendants knowingly

fabricated probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 122–126.) Defendants do not
substantively address Plaintiff’s Article 24 claim but instead argue it should be dismissed for
procedural defects. Specifically, Defendants allege that Plaintiff failed to meet the notice
requirement of Maryland’s Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) and failed to
plead malice such that Officer Defendants are entitled to immunity.16 (ECF No. 8-1 at 3, 6.)
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ensures that “no man ought to

be . . . deprived of his life, liberty or property.” MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., art. XXIV
(“Article 24”). In its guarantees and application, Article 24 “is the state law equivalent of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States.” Rosa v. Bd. of Educ. Of Charles Cnty., Md., No.
8:11-CV-02873-AW, 2012 WL 3715331, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2012) (citing Pitensberger v.
Pitensberger, 410 A.2d 1052, 1056 (Md. 1980)). Accordingly, as a substantive matter, Article 24

15 As discussed supra, the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s Article 26 claim in Count VI also applies to Truant’s
§ 1983 claim in Count V.
16 As discussed supra, Plaintiff substantially complied with the notice requirements of LGTCA.
is interpreted coextensively with the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Taylor
v. Go-Getters, Inc., No. 20-cv-3624, 2021 WL 5840956, at *16 (D. Md. Dec. 9, 2021).
Although Plaintiff alleges an Article 24 claim, his claim raises rights protected by Article

26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
bestows due process in seizure of person or property. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS., art. XXIV.
Article 26 ensures the same protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment and is interpreted
and applied correspondingly. Dennis v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cnty., 21 F. Supp. 3d 497, 504 (D.
Md. 2014). “The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures includes the right
to be free of ‘seizures effectuated by excessive force.’” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). As this Court has recognized, “all claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and
its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a [Fourteenth Amendment] ‘substantive due
process’ approach.” Nicholson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. DKC-20-3146, 2023 WL 4549741, at *8
(D. Md. July 14, 2023) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); Barnes v. Montgomery

Cnty., 798 F. Supp. 2d 688, 700 (D. Md. 2011). Here, Plaintiff’s Article 24 claim appears to
allege excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 122–124.) As such, this Court will construe Plaintiff’s Article 24
claim as though it were an Article 26 claim.
Public official immunity does not justify dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. As the Maryland Supreme Court has recognized, “[a] state

public official alleged to have violated Article 24, or any article of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights, is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Okwa v. Harper, 757 A.2d 118, 140 (Md. 2000);
see also Lee v. Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 305 (Md. 2004) (collecting cases). Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights “precludes the application of public official immunity to constitutional

torts.” Lee, 863 A.2d at 309. Therefore, Officer Defendants are not entitled to public official
immunity against Plaintiff’s constitutional tort claim.
Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support his claim that Officer Defendants used
unreasonable force by aiming a service weapon at Plaintiff while he was still seated in his
vehicle and forcefully hitting Plaintiff’s head during the arrest. Similarly, Plaintiff sufficiently
alleges that Defendant officers conducted an unreasonable arrest without probable cause.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Persuhn fabricated probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest by
falsely informing Officer Defendants that Plaintiff was suspiciously following him.
Accordingly, Count VI will proceed to discovery.
VI. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision (Count VII)
Plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claim against BCPD alleges that
at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, BCPD should have known of Defendant Persuhn’s pattern of

harassment against Baltimore County citizens. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on
June 7, 2018, more than a year before Plaintiff’s encounter with Defendant Persuhn, a viral
video captured Defendant Persuhn stopping an African American man without justification
and invading the man’s personal space. (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 128–132.) Plaintiff alleges that because
the viral video garnered public scrutiny, BCPD knew or should have known of Defendant
Persuhn’s actions and should have provided appropriate discipline or training. (Id. ¶¶ 131–

133.) Plaintiff alleges that because BCPD failed to act as would a reasonable employer,
Defendant Persuhn was not disciplined and was able to harm Plaintiff on December 29, 2019.
(Id. ¶¶ 132, 134–135.)
Defendants correctly argue that BCPD cannot be sued under Maryland law because it

is not a cognizable entity distinct from Baltimore County. (ECF No. 8 at 1); see also Boyer v.
State, 594 A.2d 121, 128 n.9 (Md. 1992) (holding that a county sheriff’s department is not a
legal entity subject to suit under Maryland law); Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’y’s Off., 767 F.3d
379, 393 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that “an ‘office’ or ‘department’ bears no unique legal identity,
and thus, it cannot be sued under Maryland law”). As noted above, this Court will construe
this claim as if it is against Baltimore County. Defendants further argue that to the extent

Count VII is construed against Baltimore County, governmental immunity from negligence
claims bars Plaintiff from raising it. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2.) According to Defendant, counties in
Maryland retain immunity from liability for non-constitutional torts based on governmental
activity. (Id.) Instead, Maryland counties must indemnify county employees who commit
non-malicious, tortious acts within the scope of their employment. (Id.) As such, Defendants
assert that any state tort law claims must proceed only against individual county employees,

rather than against the county itself. (Id. at 3.)
Under Maryland law, “the tort of negligent selection, training, or retention, like any
negligence action, requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of four elements: (1) the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff
suffered actual injury; and (4) the injury proximately resulted” from the alleged breach. Jones v.
State, 38 A.3d 333, 343 (Md. 2012); accord Buettner-Hartsoe v. Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. Assoc.,

No. RDB-20-3132, 2021 WL 2580385, at *11 (D. Md. Jun. 23, 2021). However, “Maryland
law is well settled that a county (or municipality) generally enjoys immunity against common
law tort liability arising out of acts that are governmental, as opposed to acts that are private
or proprietary.” Clark v. Prince George’s Cnty., 65 A.3d 785, 790 (Md. App. 2013) (citing DiPino,

729 A.2d at 370). Whether an entity is acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity turns
on whether the activity is intended to “promote the welfare of the whole public” and is devoid
of any “private interest.” Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53, 65 (1979).
Maryland courts have consistently held that “[t]he operation by a county of its police
department is quintessentially governmental.” Clark, 65 A.3d at 791; see also Mora v. City of
Gaithersburg, 462 F. Supp. 2d 675, 697 (D. Md. 2006); Williams v. Prince George’s Cnty., 157 F.

Supp. 2d 596, 604 (D. Md. 2001). Here, Plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim goes to Baltimore
County’s operation of its police department, a quintessentially governmental action to which
Baltimore County is entitled to immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim
(Count VII) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
VII. Indemnification (Count VIII)
The final count of Plaintiff’s Complaint raises an indemnification claim against BCPD

and asserts that BCPD should be ordered to indemnify Officer Defendants for any judgment
entered against them in this matter. Defendants respond that the indemnification claim should
be dismissed because indemnification is not an independent cause of action. (ECF No. 8-1 at
5.)
The LGTCA provides that a “local government shall be liable for any judgment against
its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee

within the scope of employment with the local government.” MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 5-303(b)(1). The LGTCA explicitly notes that BCPD is such a “local government.”
Id. § 5-301(d)(21). Furthermore, the LGTCA provides that a local government cannot assert
sovereign immunity as a defense against claims for indemnification.17 Id. § 5-303(b)(2). Given

that Plaintiff in this case has alleged claims against Officer Defendants that will survive
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, the Plaintiffs’ claim for indemnification under Count VIII
must also survive. See McPherson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 494 F. Supp. 3d 269, 287–88 (D. Md. 2020)
(noting that an indemnification claim before final judgment may encourage a case’s efficient
resolution). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s indemnification claim will proceed to discovery.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Officer Defendants’ Motion to Modify Letter Order, or
in the Alternative for Leave to File a Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 13) is
DENIED.
Defendants H.R. Persuhn, Jeremy Boothe, Alborz Doorandish, Gregory A. Page,
Wesley Allinson, Kenneth A. Lucas, Cheyne E. Hicks, and Baltimore County Police
Department’s Combined Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Motion (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED as to Counts I, III,
and VII, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants. The Motion (ECF
No. 8) is DENIED as to Counts II, IV, VI, and VIII. Defendants shall file an answer the

17 As Judge Gallagher of this Court has explained, the LGTCA provides that “any ‘local government,’ which
includes the BPD, ‘shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious
acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment.’” Johnson, 452 F. Supp. 3d at
319 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303(b)(1), (d)(1)(21)). In Johnson, Judge Gallagher held that
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim for indemnification was premature given that the plaintiffs had alleged claims
against individual Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) detectives and the LGTCA waived State sovereign
immunity in the context of indemnification. Id. at 319–20.
Plaintiff’s remaining claims for battery (Count II), false imprisonment (Count IV), violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V), violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
(Count VI), and indemnification (Count VIII) within fourteen (14) days of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order.
A separate Order follows.
Dated: December 12, 2023 /s/
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10209437. Public record. Not legal advice.