# Lindsey v. Njoku

> District Court, D. Maryland · June 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10208533

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** June 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10208533

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983
- stating that claims of self-represented litigants are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DEREK LINDSEY, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. GLR-22-284

CHUKWUMA NJOKU, et al., *

Defendants. *

***
MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Lt. Chukwuma Njoku and
Warden B. Harris’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 18). The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary.
See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2021). For the reasons outlined below, the Motion will be
granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Lindsey’s Allegations
Plaintiff Derek Lindsey is a state prisoner currently housed at the Maryland
Correctional Training Center (“MCTC”) in Hagerstown, Maryland. (Compl. at 1, ECF No.
1). Lindsey raises claims pertaining to his prior incarceration at Jessup Correctional
Institution (“JCI”).
On November 22, 2020, Lindsey pleaded guilty to a disciplinary charge and
received a disposition of 30 days “lock up time” and 60 days loss of good conduct credits.
(Compl. at 2; Admin. Procedure Docs. at 4−5, ECF No. 1-1). Although JCI officials
purportedly should have released Lindsey from “lock up” on December 19, 2020, he
remained confined. (Compl. at 2). Over seven months later, on July 29, 2021, Lindsey was

provided with a written notice stating that he was placed on administrative segregation
status. (Id.). The notice is dated July 28, 2021, and it says that Lindsey was assigned to
administrative segregation on December 19, 2020 by Defendant Njoku Chukwuma.
(Admin. Procedure Docs. at 2). The notice is incomplete, however, as it does not state the
reason he is being held in administrative segregation. (Id.). The notice advises Lindsey that
within five days of his placement, he will be seen by the case management team and given

an opportunity to be heard on whether his administrative segregation should continue. (Id.).
On August 9, 2021, after Lindsey received written notification of his placement, he
filed a grievance complaining that he was confined in administrative segregation since
December 19, 2020 without proper written notice. (Id. at 4−5). In his grievance, Lindsey
states that prison officials should have served the administrative segregation notice within

24 hours of placement in administrative segregation. (Id. at 5). On October 26, 2021,
Defendant Warden Harris issued a grievance response stating that his grievance was
investigated and found to be meritorious. (Id. at 1). Harris noted that “[s]upervision has
been advised to make sure to give all inmates the proper paperwork in a timely manner
when being placed on Administrative Segregation. As such no further action will be taken.”

(Id.).
B. Defendant Njoku and Harris’s Response
Njoku and Harris allege that Lindsey was issued a Notice of Inmate Rule Violation
dated November 20, 2020 for a November 19, 2020 incident. (Investigative Report at 3,
ECF No. 18-3). The notice states that Lindsey questioned why an officer locked his tier
down, yelled profanities, and indicated he was unhappy. (Id.). Lindsey then refused to leave

the area, continued to be hostile, and threatened to beat up correctional officers. (Id.). On
November 20, 2020, Lindsey was assigned to administrative segregation pending a formal
disciplinary hearing. (Id.). Lindsey then waived his appearance before a hearing officer and
pleaded guilty. (Id. at 1).
Njoku and Harris submitted an “Administrative Segregation Investigative Report”
attached to their Motion. (Id.). The report states that on December 19, 2020, Lindsey was

placed on administrative segregation because of the November 19, 2020 incident in which
Lindsey threatened an officer. (Id.). The report was signed on July 29, 2021 by Njoku who
is noted to be the “Investigator.” (Id.). Njoku recommends that Lindsey be transferred to
another facility. (Id.).
Njoku and Harris also provide a copy of the Notice of Assignment to Administrative

Segregation that is similar to the notice Lindsey submitted. (Id. at 2). This copy is
complete—it says that on December 19, 2020, Lindsey was placed in administrative
segregation pending an investigation. (Id.). The Notice is dated July 28, 2021, and Lindsey
signed the Notice acknowledging receipt on July 29, 2021. (Id.).
On October 7, 2021, Lindsey was transferred to Roxbury Correctional Institution

(“RCI”). (Id. at 4).
C. Procedural History
On February 18, 2022, the Court received Lindsey’s Complaint naming Njoku and
Harris as Defendants. (ECF No. 1). Lindsey challenges his placement in administrative
segregation without any procedural process for the period from December 19, 2020,
through July 28, 2021, and seeks damages for wrongful confinement. (Compl. at 2).

On November 16, 2022, Njoku and Harris filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 18). The Court received Lindsey’s Answer
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on December 7, 2022. (ECF No. 25).1
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standards of Review

1. Rule 12(b)(6)
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to “test[] the sufficiency of a complaint,”
not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City
of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). A complaint fails to state a claim if it
does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), or does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Though

1 Lindsey’s Response does not substantively respond to Njoku and Harris’ Motion
to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, but rather addresses Njoku and
Harris’ delays in responding to service of the Complaint, and failure to file an Answer in
this case. (See Resp. Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. at 1−2, ECF No. 22).
the plaintiff is not required to forecast evidence to prove the elements of the claim, the
complaint must allege sufficient facts to establish each element. Goss v. Bank of Am.,

N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d 445, 449 (D.Md. 2013) (quoting Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435,
439 (4th Cir. 2012)), aff’d, 546 F.App’x 165 (4th Cir. 2013).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must examine the complaint as a
whole, accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.

2005). But the court need not accept unsupported or conclusory factual allegations devoid
of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th
Cir. 1979), or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
2. Conversion & Extrinsic Evidence

Njoku and Harris’ Motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56. A motion styled in this manner implicates the court’s discretion
under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept.
Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436–37 (D.Md. 2011), aff’d, 684 F.3d 462

(4th Cir. 2012). This Rule provides that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court “has ‘complete
discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the
pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby
converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.’” Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No.

ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright &
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2012 Supp.)).
Here, the Court declines to convert the Motion into one for summary judgment.
However, the Court will still consider the documents attached to the Complaint and the
Motion. Ordinarily, a court may not consider extrinsic evidence when resolving a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794

F.Supp.2d 602, 611 (D.Md. 2011). But this general rule is subject to several exceptions,
including documents attached to the complaint and the motion to dismiss, so long as they
are integral to the complaint and authentic, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); Blankenship v.
Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006). The documents that Lindsey, Njoku, and
Harris attached to their pleadings pertain to Lindsey’s placement in administrative

segregation and his subsequent grievance. (See ECF Nos. 1-1, 18-3). There is no dispute
that the documents are integral to the complaint and authentic, and thus the Court will
consider them in its analysis of the Motion.
B. Analysis
1. Due Process

Initially, the Court notes that because Lindsey is self-represented, the Court must
liberally construe his Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”); see also Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that claims of self-represented litigants are held
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”).

In his Complaint, Lindsey does not identify the constitutional provisions on which
his claims are based, but he identifies Njoku and Harris’ actions that he believes violated
the law. He states that he was “punished” by not being released from administrative
segregation after the expiration of his disciplinary time. (Compl. at 2). He further states
that although his disciplinary sanction expired on December 19, 2020, he continued to be
held in administrative segregation, and did not receive paperwork notifying him that he

was being held for investigation, until over seven months had passed. (Id.). Lindsey also
notes that when he filed a grievance pertaining to being held without notice, his grievance
was found to be meritorious. (Id. at 2; Admin. Procedure Docs. at 1).
Liberally construing the Complaint, Lindsey claims that Njoku and Harris violated
his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by holding him in

administrative segregation for over seven months without any process. The due process
claim requires a two-part analysis. First, Lindsey must establish that he had a protectable
liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation. Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517,
526 (4th Cir. 2015), amended (July 7, 2015). Second, if a liberty interest is identified,
Lindsey must then establish that Njoku and Harris did not provide him with minimally

adequate process to protect that liberty interest. Id.; see also Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th
926, 941 (4th Cir. 2022).
To establish a protectable liberty interest, plaintiffs must allege that confinement
conditions “impose ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life,’ provided they can first establish that interest ‘arise[s]
from state policies or regulations.’” Thorpe, 37 F.4th at 942 (quoting Incumaa, 791 F.3d at

526–27).
Njoku and Harris make only a passing reference to the due process claim.2 They
argue that to the extent that Lindsey alleges only that Njoku and Harris violated state
policies and procedures, he has not adequately alleged a procedural due process claim.
(Mot. at 7). Njoku and Harris are correct in this limited regard. See Riccio v. Cnty. of
Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990) (“If state law grants more procedural rights

than the Constitution would otherwise require, a state’s failure to abide by that law is not a
federal due process issue.”); Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 163 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[A] section
1983 claim can only be sustained by allegations and proof of a violation of the Constitution
or statutes of the United States and specifically may not rest solely on a violation of state
statutes or qualify as a common law tort.”). But Njoku and Harris fail to analyze the law

further. They do not address whether Lindsey has adequately alleged that the conditions in
administrative segregation are atypical and substantially harsh “in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life” such that constitutional due process protections are then triggered.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

2 Instead of analyzing the due process claim, Njoku and Harris argue: (1) they are
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims brought against them in official
capacity; (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Lindsey has failed to allege a claim
of unconstitutional conditions of confinement; (4) Lindsey has failed to plead supervisory
liability; and (5) Lindsey has plead insufficient and conclusory facts and has failed to state
a claim. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Alt. Summ. J. [“Mot.”] at 4−12, ECF No. 18-1).
Njoku and Harris have incorrectly framed Lindsey’s claims under the Eighth
Amendment standard for cruel and usual punishment and do not address the factors

Lindsey must allege for a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Njoku and Harris
discuss the Eighth Amendment standard as applied to incidents such as double bunking,
lack of exercise, inadequate ventilation, and lack of showers. (Mot. at 7−11). Lindsey does
not assert any facts of this nature. Thus, Njoku and Harris’ argument is unavailing and the
Court declines to create a defense on Njoku and Harris’ behalf.
Accordingly, Njoku and Harris’ Motion asserting that Lindsey has failed to allege

unconstitutional conditions of confinement and otherwise failed to state a claim is denied
without prejudice to renew, solely on Lindsey’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
2. Official Capacity Claims

Next, Njoku and Harris assert that they are immune from claims brought against
them in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. (Mot. at 4−5). Lindsey
does not specifically state whether he is bringing claims against Njoku and Harris in their
individual or official capacities, or both. “When a plaintiff does not allege capacity
specifically, the court must examine the nature of the plaintiff’s claims, the relief sought,
and the course of proceedings to determine whether a state official is being sued in a
personal capacity.” Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995).

Lindsey’s Complaint alleges that Njoku assigned him to administrative segregation
without any process and provides supporting written documentation. (Compl. at 2; Admin.
Procedure Docs. at 2). Lindsey also provides documentation that Harris determined that
the claims raised in his grievance had merit. (Compl. at 2; Admin Procedure Docs. at 1).
Lindsey does not allege that Njoku and Harris’ actions were the policy or practice of the
State or their agencies, which would indicate he is bringing suit against Njoku and Harris

in their official capacity, and he seeks solely damages which are unavailable in an official
capacity suit. See Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61.
Therefore, based on a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Lindsey intends
to bring claims against Njoku and Harris in their individual capacity only, and thus declines
to address the defense that Njoku and Harris are immune from suit in their official capacity.
3. Personal Participation and Supervisory Liability

Njoku and Harris contend that the Complaint should be dismissed as to both Njoku
and Harris because Lindsey fails to allege that either defendant personally participated in
violating his constitutional rights. (Mot. at 11−12). At bottom, the Court finds that Lindsey
successfully alleges personal participation by Njoku but not Harris.
Liability under § 1983 attaches only upon personal participation by a defendant in

the constitutional violation. It is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply in § 1983 claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir.
2004) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Liability of
supervisory officials “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather
is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of

subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict
on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)). Supervisory liability under
§ 1983 must be supported with evidence that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and
unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s

response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, as to Njoku, Lindsey seeks to hold him liable for assigning him to
administrative segregation without any process. He attaches to his Complaint the Notice of

Assignment to Administrative Segregation with the placement made by Njoku and
references the Notice in his Complaint. (Compl. at 2, Admin. Procedure Docs. at 2).
Further, Njoku and Harris provide the Administrative Segregation Investigative Report that
identifies Njoku as the Investigator assigned to the matter. (Investigative Report at 1). This
document states that Lindsey was placed in administrative segregation on December 19,

2020, and Njoku issued the report on July 29, 2021. (Id.). Contrary to Njoku and Harris’
assertion, Lindsey has adequately plead personal participation as to Defendant Njoku and
this claim may go forward.
As to Defendant Harris, Lindsey fails to allege personal participation. Lindsey filed
his grievance on August 8, 2021, after he had already received notice of placement in

administrative segregation on July 29, 2021. (Admin. Procedure Docs. at 4). Harris then
determined that Lindsey’s grievance had merit and counseled staff to timely issue notices
of placement in administrative segregation. (Id. at 6). Lindsey has alleged no other facts to
suggest that Harris was “personally” involved in the alleged constitutional violation. These
allegations are insufficient to allege that Harris either individually or in a supervisory
capacity participated in the failure to provide Lindsey with notice and process related to

his placement in administrative segregation, or that Harris is responsible for the placement
due to his supervisory status. See Whitehurst v. Dovey, No. GJH-20-0484, 2022 WL
952027, at *6 (D.Md. Mar. 30, 2022) (“Under § 1983, individual liability must be based
on personal conduct . . . The mere fact that [defendant] denied [a] grievance does not alone
impose liability.” (quoting Atkins v. Md. Div. of Corr., No. PWG-14-3312, 2015 WL
5124103, at *6 (D.Md. Aug. 28, 2015))). Here, Harris found the grievance to be meritorious

and took action to correct supervisory behavior going forward.
Accordingly, the Motion will be granted as to Lindsey’s claims against Harris and
denied as to his claims against Njoku.
4. Qualified Immunity
Njoku and Harris raise the defense of qualified immunity. (Mot. at 5−7). They

generally provide the legal standard for the Court to determine if they are entitled to
qualified immunity, but fail to apply the law to the facts of the case. In addition, as the
Court has noted above, Njoku and Harris have failed to properly identify and substantively
address Lindsey’s cause of action. At this juncture, the Court declines to analyze a defense
that Njoku and Harris have asserted based on an incorrect legal theory, and without

application to the record.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Njoku and Harris’ Motion will be granted in part and
denied in part. A separate Order follows.
Entered this 7th day of June, 2023.

/s/
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10208533. Public record. Not legal advice.