# Anchorage SNF, LLC v. Padilla

> District Court, D. Maryland · January 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10207992

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** January 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10207992

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, governing evaluation of state Title IV-D programs, did not give rise to individual rights
- finding that plaintiff had a property interest in the Medicare payments for services rendered
- concluding that a nursing home has a property interest in alleged overpayments
- holding that “[s]overeign immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party is entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
ANCHORAGE SNF, LLC d/b/a
ANCHORAGE HEALTH CARE *
CENTER, et al.,
*
Plaintiffs,
*
Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00166-JRR
v. *

LOURDES R. PADILLA, in her capacity *
as the MARYLAND SECRETARY OF
HUMAN SERVICES, et al., *

Defendants. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Complaint (ECF No. 9; the “Motion”). The parties’ submissions have been reviewed and no
hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons that follow, by
accompanying order, the Motion will be denied as to Count I and granted as to Counts II and III.
BACKGROUND1
On January 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief
alleging Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs’ provider claims for Medicaid eligible skilled nursing
facility residents. (ECF No. 1, p. 2.) Plaintiffs are seventeen Ohio limited liability companies
operating 24-hour skilled nursing home facilities in Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 5-21. Defendant Padilla is
the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Human Services (“DHS”); Defendant Schrader is the
Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health (“MDH”). Id. ¶¶ 22-23.

1 For purposes of this memorandum, the court accepts as true the well-pled facts set forth in the Complaint.
As Secretary, Ms. Padilla is responsible for operation of DHS. See MD. CODE ANN.,
HUMAN SVS. §§ 2-203; 2-210-13. As Secretary, Mr. Schrader is responsible for operation of MDH,
as well as implementation and enforcement of the Heath-General Article, including the Medicaid
Program. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§2-101; 2-102(a), (b)(2); 2-104(m); and 15-

103(a)(1). Pursuant to an agreement between DHS and MDH, DHS is responsible for making
Medicaid Long-term Care (“MA-LTC”) eligibility determinations.
The Maryland State Medicaid Program operates under the statutory authority of Title XIX
of the Social Security Act Medical Assistance Program. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 56.) Defendants receive
federal funds and are required to administer the Medicaid Program in compliance with the Federal
Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (a)(8). Id. ¶ 57. Under federal law, Defendants are required to
make an eligibility determination within forty-five days of receiving an application for benefits.
Every Medicaid applicant must be given notice and the right to appeal any adverse eligibility
determination. Id. ¶¶ 62-63.
Plaintiffs allege that the State of Maryland Medicaid Program issued Notices of Eligibility

to residents who were at one time admitted to one of the named Plaintiffs’ nursing facilities. (ECF
No. 1, ¶¶ 25-26.) A Notice of Eligibility indicates to the Medicaid applicant that he or she has
been approved for benefits and provides that claims shall be paid to the provider. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28.
Maryland created the Problems Resolution Unit (“PRU”), which has the ability to reconsider and
redetermine an applicant’s eligibility for MA-LTC benefits following issuance of a Notice of
Eligibility. Id. There is no appeal process should the PRU terminate eligibility for benefits,
despite the previous issuance of a Notice of Eligibility. See generally (ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the PRU’s redetermination of residents’ eligibility for
MA-LTC, Plaintiffs have not been paid for numerous outstanding claims for over one-hundred
Medicaid applicants or recipients. Id. ¶ 26. Instead of paying the claims submitted by Plaintiffs,
the PRU denies the claim without notice or opportunity to appeal the redetermination decision. Id.
¶ 29.
The Complaint contains three counts: Violation of Due Process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count I); Violation of the Federal Medicaid Act’s Reasonable Promptness Requirement (Count
II); and Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (Count III). Plaintiffs request the court: issue declaratory
judgment that (1) Defendants are required to adhere to the mandates of the Medicaid Act; and (2)
Defendants’ failure to afford due process and prompt payment of claims submitted for approved
applicants who received proper Notices of Eligibility and who then were re-classified as ineligible
via the PRU is unlawful. Additionally, Plaintiffs request the court issue permanent injunctive relief
requiring Defendants to: (1) resolve issues presented to the PRU and issue a notice within 90 days;
(2) bring their MA-LTC application processing procedures into compliance with 42 U.S.C. §
1396(a)(8)’s reasonable promptness requirement; (3) afford an appeal process for PRU
redetermination of eligibility denials; (4) prospectively process and remit payment on billed claims

within sixty (60) days; (5) provide to MA-LTC applicants and beneficiaries notice of adverse PRU
determinations; and (6) provide to MA-LTC applicants and beneficiaries an appeal process for
redeterminations denying previously approved MA-LTC.2 (ECF No. 1, pp. 20-21.)
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiffs lack standing and fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 9, p. 2.)

2 It is not clear to the court how requests 3 and 6 differ (reflected in the Complaint at p. 20 as requests E and H of the
ad damnum), but the distinction, if there is one, is immaterial for purposes of resolution of the Motion.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
“Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Barnett v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 3d 515, 518 (D. Md. 2016).
“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Trump, 416 F. Supp. 3d 452, 479 (D. Md.
2019). Subject matter jurisdiction challenges may proceed in two ways: a facial challenge or a
factual challenge. Id. A facial challenge asserts “that the allegations pleaded in the complaint are
insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. A factual challenge asserts “that the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.” Id. (quoting Kerns v. United States, 585
F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)). “In a facial challenge, ‘the facts alleged in the complaint are taken
as true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject
matter jurisdiction.’” Trump, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 479 (quoting Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192 (instructing
that in a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction the plaintiff enjoys “the same procedural
protection as . . . under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.”)). “[I]n a factual challenge, ‘the district

court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id.
The court finds that Defendants raise facial challenges to subject matter jurisdiction; accordingly,
the 12(b)(1) Motion will be evaluated in accordance with the procedural protections afforded under
Rule 12(b)(6), which is to say that the facts alleged in the Complaint will be “taken as true” per
Trump and Kerns.
Defendants assert a facial subject matter jurisdiction challenge on two bases. First,
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish standing. See generally (ECF No. 9-
1, Section IV. A.) Alternatively, Defendants argue by way of a footnote that, if the Complaint
alleges colorable claims, Defendants enjoy Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to the extent
the Complaint seeks retrospective relief. (ECF No. 9-1, p. 17, n.6.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A motion asserted under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” It does

not “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”
Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, a “Rule 12(b)(6) motion should only
be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain
that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.”
Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244 (citing Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)).
The court, however, is “…not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a
plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. (citing District 26, United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v. Wellmore Coal
Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1979)).

ANALYSIS
I. Consideration of Exhibits
As an initial matter, Defendants attach one exhibit to their Motion: Exhibit A –
Memorandum of Agreement Between Maryland Department of Health and Maryland Department
of Human Services (ECF No. 9-2; the “MOA”.) Plaintiffs attach two exhibits to their Opposition:
Exhibit A – Saint Anthony Hospital v. Theresa A. Eagleson, Case No. 1:21-cv-2325 (7th Cir. Jul.
5, 2022.) (ECF No. 12-2; the “Saint Anthony Case”); and Exhibit B – MA Problem Resolution
Division – FAQs (ECF No. 12-3; the “FAQs”).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),3 a court usually does not
consider evidence outside of the complaint. A court may consider documents attached to a motion
to dismiss if the document is “integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and [if] the
plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity.” Am. Chiropractic Ass’n, Inc. v. Trigon Healthcare

Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Phillips v. LCI Int’l Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th
Cir. 1999)). “An integral document is a document that by its ‘very existence, and not the mere
information it contains, gives rise to the legal rights asserted.’” Chesapeake, 794 F. Supp. 2d. at
611 (quoting Walker v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 517 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (E.D. Va. 2007)). “In addition
to integral and authentic exhibits, on a 12(b)(6) motion the court ‘may properly take judicial notice
of matters of public record.’” Id. (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 2009)).
The MOA sets forth the purpose of the agreement, duties, and obligations of MDH and
DHS with respect to eligibility determinations. Plaintiffs’ alleged property rights at issue in this
litigation are premised on the eligibility determinations made by Defendants as set forth in the

MOA. The rights at issue, however, do not arise out of the MOA; instead, Plaintiffs’ alleged rights
arise out of the Constitution and various federal statutory and regulatory conditions. The MOA
was executed to effectuate the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security Act and applicable
federal regulations. Plaintiffs’ rights as Medicaid providers, whatever those rights may be, do not
exist because of the MOA. Accordingly, the court finds that the MOA is not integral to the
Complaint and will not consider it for purposes of resolution of the Motion.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ exhibits, the court finds that the Saint Anthony Case is a matter
of public record, and the court may take judicial notice of that exhibit. The FAQs do not give rise

3 As set forth earlier, the court will treat the 12(b)(1) motion as a 12(b)(6) motion for procedural purposes because it
raises a facial challenge.
to Plaintiffs’ rights, but rather answer questions related to the submission and payment of claims.
The information in the FAQs pertains to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims; the FAQs do not give rise
to the claims or alleged rights on which they rest. Accordingly, the court will not consider Exhibit
B attached to Plaintiffs’ Opposition at this stage.

II. 12(b)(1) MOTION – COUNTS I AND II
A. Sovereign Immunity
Defendants argue that even if the court finds that the Complaint survives a 12(b)(6) contest,
Defendants enjoy sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, except to the extent that
the claims seek prospective relief. (ECF No. 9-1, p. 17, n. 6.) Although Defendants raise the
sovereign immunity argument in the alternative (and only by way of a footnote), a finding that
Defendants enjoy sovereign immunity on all claims, presents a jurisdictional bar to the court’s
adjudicative power on those claims. Cunningham v. General Dynamics Info. Tech., 888 F.3d 640,
649 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that “[s]overeign immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to
hear claims, and a court finding that a party is entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the
action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (quoting Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d

196, 207 (5th Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, the court will address Defendants’ sovereign immunity
arguments at the outset. In support, Defendants argue that the wording of Paragraphs C, F, and I,
in the Requests for Relief section of the Complaint suggests that Plaintiffs seek retrospective relief,
which is not permitted under the Ex parte Young exception, discussed below. Id.
Because it is akin to an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating
that they are protected by sovereign immunity. Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir.
2014). “[F]or purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, a state official acting in his official capacity
is protected from a damages action by the same immunity.” Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842,
844-45 (4th Cir.2003) (citations omitted).
In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court established a narrow exception
to a state official’s Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court. Under the Ex parte
Young doctrine, “the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude private individuals from bringing
suit against State officials for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief designed to remedy

ongoing violations of federal law.” Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 292 (4th Cir. 2000).
The Ex parte Young doctrine provides that “a federal court has jurisdiction over a suit against a
state officer to enjoin official actions that violate federal law, even if the State itself is immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.” Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 288
(1997). “The Young doctrine recognizes that if a state official violates federal law, he is stripped
of his official or representative character and may be personally liable for his conduct; the State
cannot cloak the officer in its sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 159-160). “[A]
court decree enjoining a State officer from committing future violations of federal law generally
will not upset the careful federal balance established by the Constitution and confirmed by
the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 269.

“To preserve this balance, however, this court must ensure that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity remains meaningful, while also giving recognition to the need to prevent violations of
federal law.” Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 269 (internal quotations omitted). “Just because
a private citizen’s federal suit seeks declaratory injunctive relief against State officials does not
mean that it must automatically be allowed to proceed under an exception to the Eleventh
Amendment protection.” Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir.
2001). “Such empty formalism would improperly sacrifice the real interests served by
the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. Rather, just as the Court did in Coeur D’Alene Tribe, this court
must evaluate the degree to which the State’s sovereign interest would be adversely affected by a
federal suit seeking injunctive relief against State officials, as well as the extent to which federal,
rather than State, law must be enforced to vindicate the federal interest. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 293.
The Ex parte Young fiction is an exercise in line drawing. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.
at 280. “The nature of a suit as one against the state is to be determined by the essential nature

and effect of the proceeding.” Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459,
464 (1945). “When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state
is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit
even though individual officials are nominal defendants.” Id. That notwithstanding, “[t]he
Supreme Court has [] repeatedly recognized that, ‘relief that serves directly to bring an end to a
present violation of federal law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though
accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.’” Virginia Hosp. Ass’n v.
Baliles, 868 F.2d 653, 662 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)).
Defendants argue that paragraphs C, F, and I of the ad damnum suggest, in whole or in
part, that Plaintiffs seek retrospective relief:

C. Issue permanent injunctive relief requiring the Defendants within
ninety (90) days to resolve issues presented to the PRU and issue a
notice;
F. Issue permanent injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to
prospectively process and remit payment on all billed claims within
sixty (60) days;
I. Declare unlawful the Defendants’ failure to afford Due Process
and Prompt payment of claims submitted for approved applicants
who received proper Notices of Eligibility;
(ECF No. 1, p. 20-21; ECF No. 9-1, p. 18, n.6.)
The Complaint further alleges:
Approved Notices of Eligibility are not being paid, and to effectuate
this end, Maryland created another entity, the Problems Resolution
Unit, or PRU, where Notices of Eligibility are redetermined without
issuing redetermination notices; that is, they are determined a
second time, without issuing redetermination notices. A Notice of
Eligibility indicates that claims shall be paid to the provider. If
Maryland/PRU wanted to change the Notice of Eligibility,
Maryland/PRU would have to issue a redetermination notice while
paying any claims in the interim. This is not occurring.
There is no authority that the CMS approved Maryland the use of
PRU to invalidate Notices of Eligibility and subject approved
applicants to an unappealable “redetermination denial.”
The Defendants have failed to provide a system which ensures that
medical assistance will be available, including at least the care and
services listed in paragraphs (1) through (5) of 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a),
to all individuals meeting specified financial eligibility standards, as
required under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10).
(ECF No 1, ¶¶ 28, 44-45.)
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the procedures utilized by the PRU violate their due
process rights and do not comply with federal law. (See generally ECF No. 1.) In so alleging,
Plaintiffs complain of ongoing violations of the United States Constitution, federal statutes and
regulations. Plaintiffs’ requested relief seeks to have Defendants update the redetermination
procedure to comply with federal law. The fact that Defendants may have to spend state funds to
effect compliance with federal law does not remove them from the Ex Parte Young exception.
Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 868 F.2d at 662. Plaintiffs’ requested relief does not rise to the level of
making the State the real party in interest.
In support of their sovereign immunity argument, Defendants cite to
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Edelman Court found that the relief granted by the
federal district court required state officials to release and remit retroactive federal benefits. The
Court held:
But that portion of the District Court’s decree which petitioner
challenges on Eleventh Amendment grounds goes much further than
any of the cases cited. It requires payment of state funds, not as a
necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a
substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of
compensation to those whose applications were processed on the
slower time schedule at a time when petitioner was under no court-
imposed obligation to conform to a different standard. While the
Court of Appeals described this retroactive award of monetary relief
as a form of “equitable restitution,” it is in practical effect
indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages against
the State. It will to a virtual certainty be paid from state funds, and
not from the pockets of the individual state officials who were the
defendants in the action. It is measured in terms of a monetary loss
resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the
defendant state officials.

Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
Here, unlike Edelman, Plaintiffs do not demand that Defendants pay monies to Plaintiffs
to make them whole for past wrongs; rather, Plaintiffs seek to bring the redetermination process
administered by the PRU in compliance with federal law. If the court grants Plaintiffs’ requested
relief, Defendants may be required to pay claims which were not properly processed, but it may
still deny claims on proper grounds. The requested relief seeks to ensure that if Defendants make
redeterminations regarding eligibility, thereby affecting the payment of claims, Defendants do so
in accordance with federal law. Should Plaintiffs prevail on the merits, updating and modifying
policies to ensure compliance with federal law is necessary to vindicate Plaintiffs’ federal rights
going forward. Accordingly, this action falls within the Ex parte Young exception and will not be
dismissed should Plaintiffs prevail.
B. Standing
In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their due process rights under § 1983.
Count II alleges violations of the Federal Medicaid Act’s reasonable promptness requirement.
Defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant relief under Counts I and
II because the rights protected under the Constitution and the individual rights protected under the
federal Medicaid Act belong to the residents living at the nursing homes operated by Plaintiffs and
not Plaintiffs themselves. Accordingly, Defendants argue, Plaintiffs are without standing to pursue
the claims in Counts I and II of the Complaint. (ECF No. 9-1, p. 11.)
“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc., v. Wal-Mart Assocs,. 566 F. Supp.

3d 383, 390 (D. Md. 2021) (quoting U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2.)) “[S]tanding is an essential and
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III” that gives meaning to these
constitutional limits by “’identify[ing] those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the
judicial process.’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). Article III standing requires an individual plaintiff to “have
(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330 (2016). To demonstrate an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must allege “an invasion of a legally-
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent.” Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted); Griffin v. Dep't of Lab. Fed. Credit Union, 912 F.3d 649, 653

(4th Cir. 2019).
1. Count I – Due Process
Defendants argue that the facts supporting Plaintiffs’ due process claim under § 1983 is
based on the alleged denial of MA-LTC eligibility to Plaintiffs’ residents after they had been found
eligible, without an opportunity to appeal the denials. Based on these allegations, Defendants
assert that the only persons who could assert their constitutional due process rights were violated
by PRU redeterminations are Plaintiffs’ residents. (ECF No. 9-1, p. 12.) Plaintiffs respond that
they have standing to assert a claim for violation of procedural and substantive due process under
§ 1983 because they have a protected property interest in receiving payments for services rendered,
and they have suffered both threatened and actual injury by being denied Medicaid payments for
services rendered to MA-LTC eligible residents. (ECF No. 12-1, p. 4.)
The first step in the court’s due process analysis is to determine whether Plaintiffs have a
constitutionally protected property interest. In order for Plaintiffs to have a property interest in a

governmental benefit, such as Medicaid reimbursement payments, Plaintiffs, “clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. [They] must have more than a unilateral expectation
of it. [They] must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Reagents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1996). Interest in a governmental benefit becomes a property interest for due
process purposes “if there are rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of
entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 601 (1972).
The Complaint alleges:
Plaintiffs are owed for numerous outstanding claims for Medicaid
Long-term Care (“MA-LTC”) applicants whose benefits have been
approved with Notices of Eligibility, but the approved benefits have
not been paid to the respective facilities.
Plaintiffs have not been paid for numerous outstanding claims for
over one hundred (100) Medicaid applicants or recipients who are
now or had at one time been admitted to one of the named Plaintiffs’
nursing facilities. Said outstanding claims have not been paid by the
Maryland Medicaid program.
Plaintiffs have suffered both threatened and actual injury by being
denied Medicaid payments for services rendered to residents in their
facilities.
Approved Notices of Eligibility are not being paid, and to effectuate
this end, Maryland created another entity, the Problems Resolution
Unit, or PRU, where Notices of Eligibility are redetermined without
issuing redetermination notices; that is, they are determined a
second time, without issuing redetermination notices. A Notice of
Eligibility indicates that claims shall be paid to the provider. If
Maryland/PRU wanted to change the Notice of Eligibility,
Maryland/PRU would have to issue a redetermination notice while
paying any claims in the interim. This is not occurring.
By definition, redetermination and recoupment notices are required
to have appeal rights. In addition, if Maryland/PRU wanted to
recover any funds paid out in claims, Maryland/PRU would have to
initiate a recoupment, which would also have appeal rights. If
Maryland/PRU followed proper procedures rather than bypassing
the redetermination and recoupment steps, providers would clearly
have a property interest in any redetermination or recoupment and,
therefore, appeal rights. Matter of White Plains Nursing Home v.
Whalen 53 A.D.2d 926, 927 (1976) (concluding that a nursing home
has a property interest in alleged overpayments). Instead, PRU
simply denies, with no due process, properly submitted claims to
avoid paying.
Notices of Eligibility were already issued by Maryland, and then the
PRU unit terminated eligibility and began a redetermination
process.
Without appeal rights, which Defendants’ policy controls, there is
no due process and no administrative recourse – which is the harm,
and money is owed – which is the damage.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that Medicaid
reimbursement rates are the type of entitlement that triggers due
process, and the providers, akin to the Plaintiffs in this matter,
established a property interest such that any alteration must be
conducted with due process. Rock River Health Care, LLC v.
Eagleson, 14 F.4th 768 (7th Cir. Oct. 4, 2021).
A healthcare provider “certainly has a property interest in the
ongoing Medicare payments for services rendered to patients.”
Accident, Injury and Rehabilitation, PC v. Azar, 2018 WL 4625791
at *7 (D. S.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (vacated on other grounds by
Accident, Injury and Rehabilitation, PC v. Azar, 943 F.3d 195 (4th
Cir. 2019)); Med-Cert Home Care, LLC v. Azar, 2020 WL 117060
at *3 (N.D. Texas March 11, 2020) (“Med-Cert has a valid property
interest in receiving Medicare payments for services rendered.”);
Infinity Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Azar, 349 F. Supp. 3d 587 (S.D.
Texas Nov. 19, 2018) (finding that plaintiff had a property interest
in the Medicare payments for services rendered), Angels of Care
Home Health, Inc. v. Azar, 2019 WL 1101286 at *2 (N.D. Texas
Feb. 13, 2019) (concluding plaintiff had a property interest in
payment for services rendered), Adams EMS, Inc. v. Azar, 2018 WL
5264244 at *10 (S.D. Texas Oct. 23, 2018) (finding plaintiff had “a
property interest in receiving and retaining the Medicare payments
it has earned”).
The Medicaid Statutes require Maryland to provide benefits to
eligible individuals; however, until the state agency remits payment
for long-term care services provided to eligible beneficiaries, the
Plaintiff nursing homes are the entities who have provided services
to their patients.
In light of the Defendants’ failure to comply with federal and state
Medicaid laws, the Plaintiffs have been unable to recover significant
amounts of “approved” benefits revenue as payment for the skilled
nursing care provided to residents who were issued proper Notices
of Eligibility, but then later denied through PRU’s redetermination
process. Because PRU does not afford appeal rights, these benefits,
and the payments that they represent, have been unjustly taken
without due process of law.
(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 25-31, 35, and 46.)
Here, Plaintiffs allege a property interest in the form of a governmental benefit: Medicaid
funds for approved services rendered by Plaintiffs. Further, the Complaint ably alleges mutually
set expectations between Plaintiffs and Defendants: The Notice of Eligibility provides that claims
shall be paid to the provider; both Plaintiffs and Defendants understand that once a Notice of
Eligibility has been issued to a resident of a skilled nursing facility operated by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs
are entitled to payment of claims for the services they render. If Defendants determined that
Plaintiffs were overpaid for a submitted claim, any redetermination or recoupment procedures
would require notice and appeal rights.
Further, the court is persuaded by the logic and analysis of Accident, Injury and
Rehabilitation, PC, Med-Cert Home Care, LLC, Infinity Healthcare Services, Inc., Angels of Care
Home Health, Inc., and Adams EMS, Inc., supra. The courts in those cases determined the medical
providers had a property interest in payments for services previously rendered. For the purposes
of the Motion, the court is satisfied that once an applicant/resident receives a Notice of Eligibility,
Plaintiffs’ property interest in payment for services rendered is born. The Notice of Eligibility
signals to the applicant and Plaintiffs that the applicant is eligible for the services offered by
Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs will be paid for those services once rendered. Accordingly, the court
finds, that Plaintiffs have a property interest in payments for services rendered to eligible residents.
Because Plaintiffs have a property interest in the payments, they have alleged an actual

injury sufficient to establish standing as to Count I. Accordingly, the Motion will be denied as to
the Rule 12(b)(1) subject matter jurisdiction challenge to Count I.
2. Federal Rights - Counts II and III
Count II of the Complaint asserts violations of the Federal Medicaid Act’s reasonable
promptness requirement under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8) and seeks relief under § 1983. (ECF No.
1, ¶¶ 89, 93.) Count III of the Complaint asserts a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C.
1396a(a)(30)A, but does not seek relief under § 1983. Id. ¶ 100.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “whether a statutory violation may be enforced
through § 1983 ‘is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private right of
action can be implied from a particular statute.’” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)

(quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508, n.9 (1990)). Both inquiries begin with
determining whether Congress intended to create a federal right. Id. “[T]he question whether
Congress . . . intended to create a private right of action [is] definitively answered in the negative”
where “a statute by its terms grants no private rights to any identifiable class.” Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979). “For a statute to create such private rights, its text must
be ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited.’” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (quoting Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692, n.13, (1979)). “But even where a statute is phrased in
such explicit rights-creating terms, a plaintiff suing under an implied right of action still must show
that the statute manifests an intent ‘to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.’” Id.
(quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)).
i. Count II
Defendants argue that Count II affords Plaintiffs no basis for relief under § 1983 because

the provisions of the Medicaid Act relied upon by Plaintiffs do not create a federal right
enforceable by Medicaid Providers. (ECF No. 9-1, p. 13.)
“[Section] 1983 merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights ‘secured’
elsewhere, i.e., rights independently ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.”
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285. “One cannot go into court and claim a violation of § 1983 – for § 1983
by itself does not protect anyone against anything.” Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). “Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of
showing an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the
vindication of rights secured by federal statutes. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute
confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” 536 U.S. at 284.

The Complaint alleges:

The Medicaid Act defines “medical assistance” as “payment of part
or all of the cost of … care and services” included in an enumerated
list of twenty-seven (27) medical assistance categories. 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a).

The Medicaid Act provides that the state plan for medical assistance
must provide all who wish to apply for medical assistance with the
opportunity to apply and that assistance shall be furnished with
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(8).

In violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) of the Federal Medicaid Act,
the Defendants, while acting under the color of law, failed to provide
payment to the Plaintiffs for approved services rendered with
“reasonable promptness.”
The state plan also must provide for making medical assistance
available, including at minimum, the care and services listed in
paragraphs (1) through (5), (17), (21), (28), and (29) of 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a). 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10).

Defendants’ failure to remit payment for long-term care Medicaid
for those applicants who received proper Notices of Eligibility
within one year is an unreasonable delay where applicants have been
approved for Long-term Care benefits, Plaintiffs have been
providing round-the-clock skilled nursing care, and the PRU unit
has failed to promptly or timely pay approved benefits.

The Defendants’ violations, which have been repeated and knowing,
entitle the Plaintiffs to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 85-88, 91, and 93.)

Section 1396a(a)(8) provides that any individual may apply for medical assistance, and if
an applicant is determined to be eligible, he or she is entitled to reasonably prompt medical
assistance. Based on the plain language of § 1396a(a)(8), Congress intended for Medicaid
beneficiaries to receive reasonably prompt medical assistance. Section 1396a(a)(8) does not
evidence Congressional intent to create a federal right to reasonably prompt payment for Medicaid
providers like Plaintiffs. See Bio-Med. Applications of N.C. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 412 F. Supp.
2d 549, 553-54 (E.D.N.C. 2006) (“Section 1396a(a)(8) does reference individual recipients. The
section requires state Medicaid plans to ‘provide that all individuals wishing to make application
for medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall
be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.’ However, to the extent that
this section does reference individual rights, it still does not indicate that such rights are to be
enforceable by a private cause of action by the Medicaid providers, such as plaintiffs here.”)
Because Plaintiffs have not identified a federal statutory provision that grants them a federal right,
they may not proceed on their § 1983 claim for violation of the reasonable promptness requirement,
because the right of reasonable promptness belongs to the Medicaid beneficiary. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing. The Rule 12 (b)(1) Motion
will be granted as to Count II.
ii Count III
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claim under Count III because

the Medicaid Act provisions that Plaintiffs rely upon do not create private federal rights
enforceable under § 1983 or through any other means. (ECF No. 9-1, p. 14.)
Count III of the Complaint asserts a cause of action for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
Although Count III is not brought under § 1983, the first part of the analysis is the same – whether
the statute shows Congress intended to create a federal right. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273, supra.
The Complaint alleges:
Before approving a state Medicaid plan or amendments, CMS must
conduct a review to determine whether it complies with federal
requirements. CMS will only approve proposed state plans and
amendments if they comply with federal statutory and regulatory
requirements. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U.S. 498, at
502.

An amendment to a State’s Medicaid plan must “provide such
methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the
payment for, care and services available under the plan … as may
be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such
care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with
efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist
enough providers so that care and services are available under the
plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available
to the general population in the geographic area.” 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(30)(A) (emphasis added).

The implementation of unapproved procedures that restrict payment
for nursing facility services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries
without a mechanism in place to appeal or review rejections not only
harms the beneficiaries who are saddled with unsurmountable
medical debt, but it prevents care providers from remaining in
business to serve the general populations.

(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 99-100 and 102.)
Section 1396a(a)(30)(A) sets forth the requirements for an amendment to a state’s
Medicaid Plan and provides that an amendment must have sufficient procedures for payment of
care and services so that care and services will be available. While § 1396a(a)(30)(A) mentions
providers, it does not create rights for providers. Rather, § 1396a(a)(30)(A) requires sufficient

methods and procedures be in place to ensure that care and services are available to the general
population in a given geographic area. Congress intended that § 1396a(a)(30)(A) benefit the
general population, not Medicaid providers. The court finds the reasoning in Bio-Med and
Burlington United Methodist Family Services v. Atkins persuasive.
The Bio-Med court explains:
Rather than focusing on the individual, the language of these
Medicaid provisions is akin to the type of institutional policy and
practice language that the Supreme Court specifically found did not
support a finding of Congressional intent to create individual rights.
See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 343-44, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 137 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1997)
(concluding that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, governing
evaluation of state Title IV-D programs, did not give rise to
individual rights). The language of these sections set forth
procedural requirements for state plans, rather than create individual
rights for Medicaid providers or recipients. As such, the
undersigned concludes that these sections do not clearly evidence
Congressional intent to create individual rights enforceable through
a § 1983 private cause of action. These Medicaid statute sections,
therefore, are insufficient to support federal subject matter
jurisdiction over this case.

Bio-Med. Applications of N.C. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 412 F. Supp. 2d 549, 553 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
The Burlington court instructs:
The language is dense and complex, but breaks down into four
requirements concerning payments. The state plan must provide
methods and procedures to assure that payments to providers
produce four outcomes: (1) efficiency, (2) economy, (3) quality of
care, and (4) adequate access to providers for Medicaid
beneficiaries.
The first two required outcomes, efficiency and economy, relate to
the state program, not providers. An indirect effect of these
provisions on providers would be to limit the amount of payments,
consistent with efficiency. At any rate, no rights for, or duties
toward, providers are created by these directives.

As other courts have recognized, the remaining provisions for
quality of care and adequate access are “drafted … with an
unmistakable focus on” Medicaid beneficiaries, not providers.
Pennsylvania Pharmacists, 283 F.3d at 538 (quoting Cannon, 441
U.S. at 691). Enlisting enough providers so that adequate care and
services are available to the general population could benefit
providers indirectly, but this language creates no duty for states to
use certain rate-setting methods or to pay certain rates. If there is a
duty here, it would appear to be to beneficiaries, but that question is
not presented by this case.

Burlington United Methodist Family Services v. Atkins, 227 F.Supp.2d 593, 596 (S.D.W.Va.
2002).
In addressing whether §1396a(a)(30)(a) creates a private right for providers, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held:
Prior to Gonzaga, whether subsection (30)(A) authorized private
rights for providers was a close question; the circuits were split on
the issue, and well reasoned opinions had been written on both
sides….Whether Gonzaga is a tidal shift or merely a shift in
emphasis, we are obligated to respect it, and it controls this case.
Providers such as pharmacies do not have a private right of action
under subsection (30)(A); if they think that state reimbursement is
inadequate--and cannot persuade the Secretary to act--they must
vote with their feet.

Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance v. Ferguson., 362 F.3d 50, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2004).
Because the court finds that §1396a(a)(30)(A) does not create a federal right for Plaintiffs,
they do not have standing to bring a claim for violation of § 1396a(a)(30)(A) by way of § 1983 or
an implied cause of action. Accordingly, the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion will be granted as to Count III.
III. 12(b)(6) MOTION
A. Property or Liberty Interest
In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their due process rights under § 1983.
Count II alleges violations of the Federal Medicaid Act’s reasonable promptness requirement. As
argued in support of their 12(b)(1) Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 because they have no right to recover for the

violation of someone else’s rights. (ECF No. 9-1 p. 15.) Based on their arguments in support of
the 12(b)(1) Motion, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Count III because 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) does not create a federal right
privately enforceable under § 1983 or through any other means.
To the extent Defendants reiterate their 12(b)(1) arguments in their 12(b)(6) Motion, the
court’s analysis set forth in Section II. B. applies.
B. Due Process Claim
Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiffs intended to plead a cause of action for
violation of due process rights distinct from § 1983, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief

under the elements of either a substantive or procedural due process claim. Plaintiffs counter that
they have properly pled a procedural due process claim. Plaintiffs do not argue that they have
raised a substantive due process claim; therefore, the court will only address Plaintiffs’ procedural
due process claim under Count I.
“To properly plead a due process violation, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show
that he had a cognizable property or liberty interest, and that he was deprived of that interest
without due process.” Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ. & Henry Debose, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 198012 *8 (E.D.Va. Nov. 14, 2019) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71
(1972)); Shirvinski v. U.S. Coast Guard, 673 F.3d 308, 314 (4th Cir. 2012).
“The Constitution does not create protected property interests.” Sheppard, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 198012 at *8 (citing Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d
712, 721 (E.D. Va. 2015) (quoting Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep. of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 109 (4th
Cir. 2011)). “Instead, a property interest must be created by some other source, such as state law

or rules entitling citizens to certain benefits.” Id. (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.) “For a property
interest to be protected, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property
interest, not have merely a desire for it.” Id.
As discussed in Section II. B. 1., the court finds that Plaintiffs have pled adequately a
cognizable interest in payments for services rendered to MA-LTC eligible residents. Therefore,
the court will analyze whether Plaintiffs have pled facts that they were deprived of their property
interest without due process.
The Complaint alleges:
Approved Notices of Eligibility are not being paid, and to effectuate
this end, Maryland created another entity, the Problems Resolution
Unit, or PRU, where Notices of Eligibility are redetermined without
issuing redetermination notices; that is, they are determined a
second time, without issuing redetermination notices. A Notice of
Eligibility indicates that claims shall be paid to the provider. If
Maryland/PRU wanted to change the Notice of Eligibility,
Maryland/PRU would have to issue a redetermination notice while
paying any claims in the interim. This is not occurring.

By definition, redetermination and recoupment notices are required
to have appeal rights. In addition, if Maryland/PRU wanted to
recover any funds paid out in claims, Maryland/PRU would have to
initiate a recoupment, which would also have appeal rights. If
Maryland/PRU followed proper procedures rather than bypassing
the redetermination and recoupment steps, providers would clearly
have a property interest in any redetermination or recoupment and,
therefore, appeal rights. Matter of White Plains Nursing Home v.
Whalen 53 A.D.2d 926, 927 (1976) (concluding that a nursing home
has a property interest in alleged overpayments). Instead, PRU
simply denies, with no due process, properly submitted claims to
avoid paying.
Without appeal rights, which Defendants’ policy controls, there is
no due process and no administrative recourse – which is the harm,
and money is owed – which is the damage.

Medicaid Beneficiaries have a Constitutionally-protected property
interest in Medicaid applicants’ benefits.

Long-term care skilled nursing providers have a protected property
interest to receive reimbursement for long-term skilled nursing care
services which have been/are being provided to approved Medicaid
long-term care applicants/recipients.

Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their property interest to which
Plaintiffs had a legitimate claim of entitlement by failing to provide
notice of denial of benefits and failing to provide an opportunity to
appeal denied benefits.

Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their property interests to which
Plaintiffs had a legitimate claim of entitlement by failing to provide
notice of redetermination of benefits and failing to provide an
opportunity to appeal the redetermined benefits.

(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 28-29, 31, and 67-70.)
The court finds that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts that they were deprived of their
property interest without due process. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs rendered services to
Medicaid eligible residents and submitted claims for payment of their services. Plaintiffs further
allege they were not paid because of the PRU redeterminations about which neither residents nor
Plaintiffs were made aware. Further, because Plaintiffs were not given an opportunity to appeal
non-payment for services it had already rendered to eligible residents, coupled with the lack of
notice, they have adequately pled violations of due process. Accordingly, the court finds that
Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts as to Count I to survive the Motion pursuant to 12(b)(6).
C. Dates of alleged wrongful conduct
Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to specify facts regarding the alleged damages
Plaintiffs have suffered, including when services at issue were made and when claims for payment
were presented. In support, Defendants offer that Plaintiffs’ failure to provide specific dates of
Defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct deprives them of the opportunity to assert a statute of
limitations defense. (ECF No. 9-1, pp. 17-19.)
The court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) as to Count I for the reasons stated in Section III. B. To the extent Defendants
argue that the lack of specific dates or resident patient identities prejudices their ability to mount
a defense, the court finds that argument to be without merit. Defendants are free to assert any
affirmative defense to the extent, in good faith, they anticipate or assert that discovery will support;
or to amend their answer in accordance with the Rules and orders of court as appropriate.
Accordingly, the Motion will be denied on this basis.
D. DHS involvement in payment of claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege specific facts demonstrating DHS has
or had any involvement in the payment for services rendered for eligible MA-LTC beneficiaries,
or the redetermination of eligibility by the PRU. Accordingly, Defendants assert, Plaintiffs cannot
plead facts that Defendant Padilla or DHS failed to properly make payments to Plaintiffs. (ECF

No. 9-1, pp. 19-20.)
Plaintiffs allege:
Defendants are directly responsible for policies and procedures
which have caused harm to Plaintiffs and the residents in their
facilities. Maryland’s policies and procedures have violated
Plaintiffs’ due process rights and certain provisions of the Medicaid
statute, 42 U.S.C. 1396a, et seq. Further, Maryland’s policies and
procedures have never been approved by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS), all in violation of applicable,
controlling, legal authority.

Defendant Padilla is the Secretary of the Maryland Department of
Human Services (“DHS”), the state agency charged with
administering and supervising Maryland’s Medicaid program. At all
times material to this Complaint, Defendant Padilla acted under
color of state law in administering the regulations, customs, policies,
and practices material herein. She is sued in her official capacity
only.

(ECF No. 1, p. 3 and ¶ 22.)
Plaintiffs allege more than just non-payment for services rendered; Plaintiffs assert that
Defendants are responsible for the policies and procedures that result in non-payment of claims
for services rendered to eligible residents. Even if Defendant Padilla and DHS are not directly
responsible for issuing payment, they are responsible for creating the policies and procedures to
effectuate the state’s Medicaid program. Accordingly, the Motion will be denied on this basis.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion (ECF No.) is DENIED with respect to Count
I and GRANTED with respect to Counts II and III. This case shall proceed as to Plaintiffs’ Due
Process claim (Count I).
A separate order follows.
________/s/_________
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge

January 30, 2023

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10207992. Public record. Not legal advice.