# Davis, III v. Parsons

> District Court, D. Maryland · August 31, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10207393

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** August 31, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10207393

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing affidavit requirement of former Rule 56(f)
- stating that a district court “clearly has an obligation to notify parties regarding any court-instituted changes” in the posture of a motion, including conversion under Rule 12(d)
- holding correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s substantial risk of serious harm where correctional officers failed to take reasonable action after prisoner repeatedly informed them that he feared for his safety before he was beaten

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

BENJAMIN DAVIS III,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: ELH-21-2268

BALTIMORE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The self-represented plaintiff, Benjamin Davis III, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Baltimore County Department of Correction (“BCDC”), Director Gail Watts, and
Officer Chadley Parsons.1 ECF 1. He alleges that defendants were deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of physical harm to him by housing him with a dangerous inmate. ECF 1 at 4, 6.
Further, he complains about the conditions of his confinement. Id. at 6. And, he complains that
he was subjected to excessive force by defendant Parsons. Id. at 4, 6. Plaintiff also asserts medical
malpractice. Id.
Defendants have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (ECF 8),
supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 8-1) (collectively, the “Motion”) and numerous exhibits.
Davis opposes the Motion. ECF 10. He has also submitted exhibits (ECF 10-1) and an Affidavit.
ECF 10-2. Defendants replied. ECF 13.2

1 The Clerk shall be directed to amend the docket to reflect defendant Parsons’s full name.
2 On January 12, 2022, defendants moved for leave to amend their memorandum in
response to plaintiff’s opposition to their Motion. ECF 12. The motion shall be granted, and the
amended memorandum (ECF 13) shall be considered as defendants’ reply, along with the
attachments (ECF 11-1; 11-2).
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For
the reasons that follow, defendants’ Motion, construed as a motion for summary judgment, is
granted in part and denied in part.
I. Factual Background
A. Davis’s allegations
Davis alleges that on August 7, 2021, he was improperly housed in the Diagnostic Unit at

BCDC with inmate Richard Deblois. ECF 1 at 6. Davis attests that Deblois attacked and stabbed
him multiple times, causing permanent damage to Davis’s right eye. Id.; ECF 10-2 at 1 (Davis
Affidavit). Davis attempted to restrain Deblois until officers responded. ECF 10-2 at 1. Deblois
allegedly responded by grabbing Davis’s genitals. Id. Correctional staff allegedly refused to take
photographs of Davis following the incident to document his injuries. Id. Davis avers that he
received ten poorly placed sutures, causing scarring to his retina. ECF 10-2, id. at 1.
Davis asserts that defendant Watts deliberately housed him with Deblois. ECF 1 at 6.
Furthermore, he claims that classification intake was aware that Deblois, who Davis asserts is a
convicted murderer, was being housed with Davis, a nonviolent offender. ECF 10-2 at 1.
Following the assault, Davis was held in restrictive housing for twelve days, and he claims that

during that time he was denied access to showers, recreation time, cleaning supplies, and medical
care. ECF 1 at 6; ECF 10-2 at 2. Ultimately, Davis was cleared of all institutional infractions
related to the incident. ECF 10-2 at 2.
According to Davis, he was assaulted again on August 15, 2021, this time by Officer
Parsons. ECF 1 at 6; ECF 10-2 at 2. Parsons allegedly threatened Davis during breakfast, calling
him a snitch for filing a complaint against him. ECF 10-2 at 2. Davis attests that Parsons gave
him a “questionable tray” and when he refused it, Parsons punched Davis through the open slot
and called him a snitch again. ECF 10-2 at 2. Davis had filed numerous complaints regarding his
treatment, and he alleges that Parsons acted in retaliation by punching Davis in the mouth, causing
“contusions and loosened teeth.” ECF 1 at 6.
Davis seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7.
B. Defendants’ Motion
On August 6, 2021, the District Court for Baltimore County ordered Davis held without
bond, pending trial. Bail Review Summary, ECF 8-5 at 2. Pursuant to Baltimore County

Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy, Davis, as a new detainee, was initially assigned to
diagnostic housing before his “separation and security classification can take place.” ECF 8-6
(Aff. of Felicia Patilla), ¶¶ 4, 5. Classification determines the appropriate custody level of each
detainee, considering their “criminal, institutional, psychological, medical, and social” history.
ECF 8-7 (DOC Directive 3.5.01(III) at 2. Classification assessments are usually completed within
48 hours of arrival at BCDC. Id. However, since March 13, 2020, the quarantine period for new
inmates has been lengthened. ECF 8-8 (Memo of March 13, 2020, from Daniel Swain to DL-
Corrections) at 2.
Captain Felicia Patilla, who investigated the incident involving Davis and Deblois, avers
that video of the altercation shows Davis initiating the fight with Deblois. ECF 8-6, ¶ 8. According

to Patilla, on August 7, 2021, the two were talking while Deblois was sitting on his bunk with his
back to Davis. Id., ¶ 9-10. Deblois later turned around to face Davis and they continued talking,
but eventually Davis “stood up and walked directly toward Mr. Deblois, who then stood up and
struck Mr. Davis in the face.” Id., ¶ 12. The two began to fight, and Deblois used a “spork” to
strike Davis. Id., ¶ 15. Eventually, the two fought on the floor and moved out of the camera’s
view. Id., ¶ 14.
Housing Unit Officer Ayodele was observing medication distribution in Unit 4Q when he
saw Deblois and Davis in dorm #6, striking each other. ECF 8-13 (Ayodele Incident Report) at 2.
Ayodele called a code for additional staff to respond and both men were handcuffed and escorted
from the unit. Id. Deblois reported to Ayodele that a conversation between himself and Davis had
turned into a fight and he had to use a spork to defend himself. Id.
On August 8, 2021, Davis reported to mental health staff that Deblois sexually assaulted
him. ECF 8-14 (McElligott Incident Report) at 2. Davis stated that Deblois stabbed him in the
eye and squeezed his genitals, which Sgt. McElligott reported to the Baltimore County Police

Department’s Special Victims Unit. Id.; ECF 8-6, (Aff. of Felicia Patilla) ¶ 16. He also requested
that an officer interview Davis regarding the incident. Id.
Baltimore County Police interviewed Davis and Deblois and reviewed video of the
incident. They determined that there was no sexual activity during the fight, but that Deblois
touched Davis’s genitals while trying to defend himself. ECF 8-6, ¶ 17; ECF 8-15 (DOC
Correspondence) at 2. However, the police investigation was considered a sex offense and would
remain pending while the State’s Attorney decided whether to file charges. ECF 8-15 at 2.
Following the altercation, Davis received medical treatment on August 7, 2021. ECF 8-6,
¶ 18. Davis had a 4-centimeter laceration on his right eyelid from the fight, for which he received
five stitches. ECF 8-16 (Clinical Notes) at 2; ECF 8-6, ¶ 19. Davis was provided with an inmate

complaint form on August 11, 2021. Id., ¶ 21.
On August 15, 2021, while 4S Housing Unit Officer Chadley Parsons was distributing
meals, he approached Davis’s cell. Davis was housed alone. Parsons Incident Report, ECF 8-17
at 2. Parsons pushed a tray through the food port, but Davis allegedly pushed the tray back and
attempted to grab Parsons. Id. Parsons struck Davis once through the food port to stop Davis from
grabbing his arm and ordered Davis to remove his arm from the port, but Davis refused. Id. Davis
told Supervisor Sergeant Okome he threw the tray “because he wanted a hard tray.” Id. Parsons
punched Davis in the mouth. Id. Davis was seen by medical and cleared to stay in his housing
unit. Id.
Davis filed inmate complaint forms on August 11, 14, and 15, 2021. See ECF 8-18 at 2, 4,
7. Davis’s complaints were referred to Captain Patilla for investigation on August 16, 2021. Id.
at 3, 5-7. On August 17, 2021, Davis was released on his own recognizance with pretrial
supervision. Bail Review Order, ECF 8-19 at 5. This suit followed on September 3, 2021.

II. Standards of Review
Defendants’ motion is styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See ECF 8. A motion styled in
this manner implicates the court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-
37 (D. Md. 2011).
Ordinarily, a court “is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual
disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss.” Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 510 F.3d 442, 450
(4th Cir. 2007). Under Rule 12(b)(6), however, a court, in its discretion, may consider matters
outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does so, “the motion must be treated

as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” but “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see
Adams Housing, LLC v. The City of Salisbury, Maryland, 672 F. App’x 220, 222 (4th Cir. Nov.
29, 2016) (per curiam).
A court may not convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment sua sponte,
unless it gives notice to the parties that it will do so. See Laughlin v. Metro Washington Airports
Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that a district court “clearly has an obligation to
notify parties regarding any court-instituted changes” in the posture of a motion, including
conversion under Rule 12(d)); Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk So. Corp., 109
F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by extraneous
materials cannot be regarded as one for summary judgment until the district court acts to convert
the motion by indicating that it will not exclude from its consideration of the motion the supporting
extraneous materials.”); see also Adams Housing, LLC, 672 F. App’x at 622 (“The court must give
notice to ensure that the party is aware that it must ‘come forward with all of [its] evidence.’”)

(citation omitted). However, when the movant expressly captions its motion “in the alternative”
as one for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s
consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur;
the court “does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261.
A district judge has “complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the
submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.” 5 C
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.).
But, this discretion “should be exercised with great caution and attention to the parties’ procedural
rights.” Id. at 149. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material

“is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action,” and “whether discovery prior to the utilization
of the summary judgment procedure” is necessary. Id. at 165-67.
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate “where the parties have not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc.,
637 F.3d 435, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2012); see Putney v. Likin, 656 F. App’x 632, 638-39 (4th Cir.
2016) (per curiam); McCray v. Maryland Dep’t of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2015).
However, “the party opposing summary judgment ‘cannot complain that summary judgment was
granted without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the
grounds that more time was needed for discovery.’” Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names,
302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954,
961 (4th Cir. 1996)). To raise adequately the issue that discovery is needed, the nonmovant
typically must file an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)),
explaining why, “for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,”
without needed discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); see Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244-45 (discussing

affidavit requirement of former Rule 56(f)).
“[T]o justify a denial of summary judgment on the grounds that additional discovery is
necessary, the facts identified in a Rule 56 affidavit must be ‘essential to [the] opposition.’” Scott
v. Nuvell Fin. Servs., LLC, 789 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (D. Md. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Gardner v. Ally Fin., Inc., 514 Fed. App’x 378 (4th Cir.
2013) (per curiam). A nonmoving party’s Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery is properly
denied “where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Strag v. Bd. of Trs., Craven
Cmty. Coll., 55 F.3d 943, 954 (4th Cir. 1995); see McClure v. Ports, 914 F.3d 866, 874-75 (4th
Cir. 2019); Gordon v. CIGNA Corp., 890 F.3d 463, 479 (4th Cir. 2018); Amirmokri v. Abraham,

437 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420 (D. Md. 2006), aff’d, 266 F. App’x. 274 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S.
885 (2008).
If a nonmoving party believes that further discovery is necessary before consideration of
summary judgment, the party fails to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit at his peril, because “‘the failure
to file an affidavit . . . is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery
was inadequate.’” Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted). But, the nonmoving party’s
failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit cannot obligate a court to issue a summary judgment ruling
that is obviously premature. And, a court “should hesitate before denying a Rule 56(d) motion
when the nonmovant seeks necessary information possessed only by the movant.” Pisano v.
Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2014).
Although the Fourth Circuit has placed “‘great weight’” on the Rule 56(d) affidavit, and
has said that a mere “‘reference to Rule 56(f) [now Rule 56(d)] and the need for additional
discovery in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not an
adequate substitute for [an] affidavit,’” the appellate court has “not always insisted” on a Rule

56(d) affidavit. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (internal citations omitted).
According to the Fourth Circuit, failure to file an affidavit may be excused “if the
nonmoving party has adequately informed the district court that the motion is premature and that
more discovery is necessary” and the “nonmoving party’s objections before the district court
‘served as the functional equivalent of an affidavit.’” Id. at 244-45 (internal citations omitted); see
also Putney, 656 F. App’x at 638; Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 961 (4th Cir. 2008). Moreover,
“[t]his is especially true where, as here, the non-moving party is proceeding pro se.” Putney, 656
F. App’x at 638.
Davis has filed an Affidavit concerning the facts of the case. ECF 10-2. But, he has not
filed an Affidavit under Rule 56(d). And, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to address the Motion

as one for summary judgment, as this will facilitate resolution of the case.
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-24 (1986); see also Cybernet, LLC v. David, 954 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2020); Variety Stores,
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018); Iraq Middle Mkt. Dev. Found v.
Harmoosh, 848 F.3d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 2017). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact so as to preclude the award of
summary judgment as a matter of law. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585-86 (2009);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986); see also
Gordon v. CIGNA Corp., 890 F.3d 463, 470 (4th Cir. 2018).
The Supreme Court has clarified that not every factual dispute will defeat a summary
judgment motion. “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion

for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). A fact is
“material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248.
There is a genuine issue as to material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see CTB, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 954 F.3d 647,
658 (4th Cir. 2020); Variety Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d at 659; Sharif v. United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d
199, 2014 (4th Cir. 2016); Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013). On
the other hand, “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position
will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d

307, 310 (4th Cir. 2014).
The nonmovant “must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the
building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”
Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which
is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should
not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514,
522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042 (2004); see
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. Notably, “[u]nsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion.” Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.

1987); see also, e.g., Reddy v. Buttar, 38 F.4th 393, 403-04 (4th Cir. 2022); CTB, Inc., 954 F.3d at
659; Harris v. Home Sales Co., 499 Fed. App’x 285, 294 (4th Cir. 2012).
The court must view all of the facts, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from
them, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585-86; Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587; accord Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2019);
Variety Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d at 659; Gordon, 890 F.3d at 470; Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d
323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017); FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2013). But, “to avoid
summary judgment, the non-moving party’s evidence must be of sufficient quantity and quality as
to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fanciful inferences and bald speculations of
the sort no rational trier of fact would draw or engage in at trial need not be drawn or engaged in

at summary judgment.” Local Union 7107 v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 124 F.3d 639, 640 (4th Cir.
1997).
The district court’s “function” is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249;
accord Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016). Thus, in
considering a summary judgment motion, the court may not make credibility determinations.
Kellen v. Lott, No. 21-6928, 2022 WL 2093849, at *1 (4th Cir. June 10, 2022) (per curiam); Betton
v. Belue, 942 F.3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 2019); Wilson v. Prince George’s Cty., 893 F.3d 213, 218-
19 (4th Cir. 2018); Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir.
2015); Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French, 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007). In the face of
conflicting evidence, such as competing affidavits, summary judgment ordinarily is not
appropriate, because it is the function of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including matters
of witness credibility. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir.
2006); Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002).

That said, “a party’s ‘self-serving opinion . . . cannot, absent objective corroboration, defeat
summary judgment.’” CTB, Inc., 954 F.3d at 658-59 (quoting Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370
F.3d 423, 433 (4th Cir. 2004)). But, if testimony is based on personal knowledge or firsthand
experience, it can constitute evidence of disputed material facts, even if it is uncorroborated and
self-serving. Lovett v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 700 Fed. App’x 209, 212 (4th Cir.
2017). Indeed, “‘a great deal of perfectly admissible testimony fits’” the “‘description’” of “‘self-
serving.’” Cowgill v. First Data Technologies, Inc., ___ F. 4th ___, 2022 WL 2901043, at *9 (4th
Cir. July 22, 2022) (citing United States v. Skelena, 692 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Davis is self-represented. Therefore, his submissions are liberally construed. See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as

to do substantial justice”); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that claims
of self-represented litigants are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers”); accord Bala v. Cmm’w of Va. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 532 F. App’x 332,
334 (4th Cir. 2013). But, the court must also abide by the “‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge
to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.’” Bouchat v. Balt.
Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 323-24).
III. Section 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that a plaintiff may file suit
against any person who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42
U.S.C. § 1983; see, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012); see also Owens v. Balt. City

State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Balt. City Police
Dep’t v. Owens, 575 U.S. 983 (2015). However, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive
rights,’ but provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). In
other words, § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of
state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
707 (1999).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was
committed by a “person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); see Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S.
823 (2011); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009); Jenkins
v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). The phrase “under color of state law” is an
element that “is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement—and the analysis
for each is identical.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982)).
Of relevance here, § 1983 also requires a showing of personal fault based upon a
defendant’s own conduct. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that
for an individual defendant to be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must
affirmatively show that the official acted personally to deprive the plaintiff of his rights). Thus,
there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)
(“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.”); see also Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); Love-Lane v. Martin,

355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001).
IV. Discussion
A. Baltimore County Department of Correction
Defendants argue that Baltimore County DOC, as a county agency, is non sui juris,
meaning that it is not an entity subject to suit; it cannot be sued independently from Baltimore
County. ECF 8-1 at 1, 7. As DOC is simply an agency of Baltimore County and Davis does not
allege any wrongdoing by Baltimore County, the suit shall be dismissed as to DOC. See Borkowski
v. Balt. Cty., 414 F.Supp. 3d 788, 804 (D. Md. 2019) (finding the Baltimore County Police
Department is non sui juris because it is an agency of Baltimore County) (quoting James v.
Frederick Cty. Pub. Schs., 441 F.Supp.2d 755, 758 (D. Md. 2006) (internal citations omitted)).

B. Exhaustion
Defendants contend that the remainder of Davis’s Complaint is subject to dismissal,
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997e, because his claims
have not been properly exhausted through the administrative remedy procedure.
The PLRA provides, in pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a):
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.
For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained
in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or
diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase “prison conditions” encompasses “all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes,
and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,

532 (2002); see Chase v. Peay, 286 F.Supp.2d 523, 528 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 98 Fed. App’x. 253
(4th Cir. 2004).
Notably, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement and
does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner plaintiff. The failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by defendants. See
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007); Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.2d
674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, a claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered
by this Court. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 220. In other words, exhaustion is mandatory, and a court
usually may not excuse an inmate’s failure to exhaust. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639
(2016).

Davis asserts that he was not permitted to pursue “proper remedies as requested.” ECF 10-
1 at 4. But, he has submitted copies of an Inmate Complaint Form that he filed on August 15,
2021. ECF 10-1 at 7-8.
In any event, Davis was not a prisoner as defined by the PLRA at the time he filed the
instant complaint. See Cofield v. Bowser, 247 Fed. App’x 413, 414 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(A plaintiff’s status at the time a lawsuit is initiated is determinative as to whether PLRA
exhaustion requirements apply). By defendants’ own admission, Davis was released from
Baltimore County Detention Center on August 17, 2021, and therefore not “incarcerated or
detained in any facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h); see ECF 8-19. As Davis was not a prisoner when
he filed suit on September 3, 2021, the PLRA exhaustion requirement does not apply to his claims
against Director Watts and Officer Parsons. Cofield, 247 Fed. App’x at 414 (“A former inmate
who has been released is no longer ‘incarcerated or detained’ for the purposes of § 1997e(h) and
therefore does not qualify as a ‘prisoner’ subject to the PLRA.”).
C. Director Gail Watts and Correctional Officer Parsons

At the time of the events in question, Davis was a pretrial detainee at BCDC. The Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution forbids punishment that involves “the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment of pretrial detainees based on essentially the same
principles as those applied to post-conviction detainees under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 177 (4th Cir. 2018). Indeed,
“[d]ue process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections
available to a convicted prisoner.” Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992).
“However, not all Eighth Amendment violations are the same: some constitute ‘deliberate
indifference,’ while others constitute ‘excessive force.’” Thompson v. Commonwealth, 878 F.3d

89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017). “The deliberate indifference standard generally applies to cases alleging
failures to safeguard the inmate’s health and safety, including failing to protect inmates from
attack, maintaining inhumane conditions of confinement, or failing to render medical assistance.”
Id. at 98.
1. Failure to Protect
“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments imposes certain
basic duties on prison officials.” Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Those duties “include maintaining humane conditions of confinement,
including the provision of adequate medical care and . . . ‘reasonable measures to guarantee the
safety of the inmates.’” Raynor 817 at 127. But, “not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the
hands of another translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the
victim’s safety.” Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015).
In order to prevail on a claim of failure to protect from violence, Davis must establish that
defendants exhibited deliberate or callous indifference to a specific known risk of harm. See

Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987). “Prison conditions may be ‘restrictive and
even harsh,’ but gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no
legitimate penological objective, any more than it squares with evolving standards of decency.
Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994) (citations
omitted).
However, a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment “unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837; see also Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 339-

40 (4th Cir. 1997). A two-part inquiry that includes both an objective and a subjective
component must be satisfied to establish liability. See Raynor, 817 F.3d at 127.
Objectively, a plaintiff “must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the form of a
serious or significant physical or emotional injury” or substantial risk of either injury. Danser v.
Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2014). The objective inquiry requires the court to
“assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it
violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
Subjectively, a plaintiff must establish that the prison official had “a sufficiently culpable
state of mind” amounting to “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834. Evidence establishing a culpable state of mind requires actual knowledge of an excessive
risk to the prisoner’s safety or proof that the prison official was aware of facts from which an
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that the inference was
drawn. Id. at 837. A plaintiff may “prove an official’s actual knowledge of a substantial risk ‘in

the usual ways including inference from circumstantial evidence” so that “‘a factfinder may
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was
obvious.’” Raynor, 817 F.3d at 128.
Actual knowledge of a substantial risk does not alone establish liability. Where prison
officials responded reasonably to a risk, they may be found free of liability. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
844. “In failure to protect cases, prison guards have no constitutional duty to intervene in the
armed assault of one inmate upon another when intervention would place the guards in danger of
physical harm.” Raynor, 817 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prosser v.
Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 1995)); Thompson, 878 F.3d at 108 (“[P]rison officials are not
liable if taking action would endanger their own lives or if the harm occurred despite their

reasonable efforts to prevent it.”). Failure to take any reasonable action in an ongoing assault,
however, can amount to deliberate indifference. See Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 236 (4th Cir.
2016) (holding correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s substantial risk of
serious harm where correctional officers failed to take reasonable action after prisoner repeatedly
informed them that he feared for his safety before he was beaten); Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525,
532 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (finding no deliberate indifference where unarmed prison officials
did not intervene in an armed attack immediately but called for backup).
Here, the parties dispute who initiated the altercation between Davis and Deblois as well
as the extent of Davis’s injuries and the number of stiches Davis received for the laceration to his
eyelid. Regardless, even assuming Davis established that the injury to his eye was objectively
serious, he cannot show that Watts had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Nothing in the record
demonstrates that Watts knew Deblois posed a serious risk of physical harm to Davis.
The charges pending against a pretrial detainee may be considered during the classification

process. But, that does not support a finding that Watts knew or should have inferred that Deblois’s
pending criminal charges meant that he specifically posed a risk to Davis’s safety.3 Moreover,
there is no evidence that demonstrates that Watts personally decided that Davis and Deblois should
be placed together in diagnostic housing.
Liability does not attach merely because of Watts’s position or title. Yet, that is clearly the
basis of the claim. Therefore, Watts is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
2. Conditions of Confinement
Davis asserts his conditions of confinement were unconstitutional while he was in
restrictive housing because he was denied access to showers, recreation, cleaning supplies, and
medical care for the injuries he sustained during the altercation with Deblois. ECF 1 at 6; ECF 10.

In considering a “conditions of confinement claim,” a court must again employ Farmer’s two-
pronged “deliberate indifference” test, considering first whether there was a deprivation of a basic
human need that was objectively sufficiently serious. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th
Cir. 1995); see also Roberts v. Taniguchi, JKB-12-cv-1187, WL 5252288, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 23,

3 Notably, defendants also submit with their reply the results of a Maryland Judiciary Public
Case Search. The results show that Davis himself has been convicted of attempted second degree
murder and second-degree assault. ECF 11-1 at 4-5; 11-2 at 3. As such, Davis would be
considered a violent or dangerous detainee by his own argument.
2012) (stating that a plaintiff must show “conditions which ‘deprive inmates of the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities.’”) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
Davis must also show “evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury
resulting from the challenged conditions.” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir.
1993). But “[j]ail employees may not ignore a dangerous condition of confinement on the ground
that the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms.” Webb v. Deboo, 423 F. App’x

299, 300 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)). Thus, constitutional
harm also includes whether a pretrial detainee was exposed to “a substantial risk of harm.” Id.
The Fourth Circuit has “emphasiz[ed] that the correct standard to apply when considering
the objective prong…is whether there is an ‘extreme deprivation’ and ‘a serious or significant
physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions’ or…‘a substantial risk of
such serious harm’ resulting from…exposure to the challenged conditions.” Scinto v. Stansberry,
841 F.3d 219, 229 n.3 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.
2003)). “Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in
combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing
effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or

exercise…” Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).
Moreover, the length of confinement “cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement
meets constitutional standards.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978).
Moreover, to demonstrate the subjective component, a plaintiff must show deliberate
indifference, meaning “the official kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety.” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225).
“Deliberate indifference is ‘more than mere negligence,’ but ‘less than acts or omissions [done]
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.’” Scinto, 841 F.3d
at 225 (alternation in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A plaintiff may satisfy this
standard by “prov[ing] by circumstantial evidence that a risk was so obvious that it had to have
been known.” Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 136. “[O]nce prison officials become aware of a problem
with prison conditions, they cannot simply ignore the problem, but should take corrective action
when warranted.” Williams, 952 F.2d at 826.
Absent exceptional circumstances, “complete deprivation of exercise for an extended

period of time violates Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.”
Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 1992). It is well understood that “some form of
regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical well being
of…inmates.” Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2018). In considering the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the denial of exercise, the court looks at the “overall duration of
incarceration, the length of time for which prisoners are locked in their cells each day, and the
practical opportunities for the institution to provide prisoners with increased exercise
opportunities.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, a restriction to two showers or exercise periods per week might not violate
“the Eighth Amendment if confined to a relatively short period of maximum confinement,” but if

extended over a period of years and perhaps indefinitely, “the rule may be quite different.” See
Sweet v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 529 F.2d 854, 866 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Mitchell, 954 F.2d
at 191 (explaining that a “complete deprivation of exercise for an extended period of time violates
Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment”). For example, three days
without showers might not violate the Eighth Amendment, see Shakka, 71 F.3d at 167-68, whereas
two months without showers and recreation can be sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment
claim. See Brown v. Lamanna, 304 F. App’x 206, 208 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
Defendants assert that Davis was not subjected to the alleged conditions for an extended
period of time, but do little else to respond to his allegations. Specifically, they do not deny Davis’s
contention that he was denied access to the showers to recreation for the entirety of his time in
restrictive housing, nor do they respond to his claim that he was not permitted to receive medical
attention during this time. The Motion responds only to the allegation that he was denied cleaning
supplies, and on that point defendants fail adequately to respond.

In support of their argument, defendants submit various emails from 2020, which include
directives concerning the distribution and use of cleaning supplies. Defendants insist that
extensive procedures were instituted in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and that it is “unlikely”
that Davis was without “some access” to cleaning supplies. ECF 8-1 at 10. However, this court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Davis as the nonmoving party, and on this
limited record, I cannot determine the totality of circumstances experienced by Davis and whether
the conditions under which he was held amount to a constitutional violation.
Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate at this juncture. Davis’s conditions of
confinement claim shall proceed.
3. Excessive Force and Retaliation

Davis asserts that Parsons used excessive force, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To prevail, Davis must show that “the use of force is deliberate – i.e., purposeful or knowing.”
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015). Davis need not detail his alleged assailant’s
subjective state of mind. Rather, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396-97; see also Dilworth v.
Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016). Objective reasonableness “turns on the ‘facts and
circumstances of each particular case.’” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The court must “make this determination from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with 20/20 vision
of hindsight.” Id. at 397.
Whether force used by prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if “force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The court must look at the need
for application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the

extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates as reasonably
perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the response. Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
The absence of significant injury alone is not dispositive of a claim of excessive force,
however. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). The extent of injury incurred is one factor
indicative of whether the force used was necessary in a particular situation. But, if force is applied
maliciously and sadistically liability is not avoided simply because the prisoner had the good
fortune to escape serious harm. Id. at 38.
The parties agree that the incident in question occurred on August 15, 2021, during the
distribution of breakfast trays, and that Davis was confined to his cell at all times. However, this

is where the parties’ accounts diverge. The Incident Report completed by Parsons states that when
Parsons opened the food port to give Davis a breakfast tray, Davis pushed the tray back and
attempted to grab Parsons. ECF 8-17. In response, Parsons struck Davis’s face to prevent him
from grabbing him and ordered Davis to remove his arm from the port. Id. In contrast, Davis
attests that Parsons threatened him, calling him a snitch, before giving him a “questionable” food
tray. ECF 10-2 at 2. When Davis refused the tray, Parsons punched him in the face, calling him
a snitch once again. Id. Davis states that he at no time attacked Parsons. Id. As such, there is a
genuine dispute as to who incited the physical altercation between Davis and Parsons.
Davis submitted a grievance in which he detailed Parsons calling him a “Snitch Bitch” and
telling him to lie down before Davis “got beat up.” ECF 10-1 at 7. Davis appears to contend that
Parsons was acting in retaliation for grievances filed by Davis regarding Parson’s denial of
mandatory shower and recreation time.
“The First Amendment right to free speech includes not only the affirmative right to speak,
but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise of that right.”

Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2000). To state a claim of retaliation
for exercising First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in
protected First Amendment activity; (2) the defendant took some action that adversely affected the
First Amendment rights; and (3) there was a causal relationship between the protected activity and
the defendant’s conduct. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d
474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff can establish this element of retaliatory conduct if the
defendant took an action that would “deter ‘a person of ordinary firmness’ from the exercise of
First Amendment rights.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Constantine,
411 F.3d at 500).
“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the

Constitution.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); see Desper v. Clarke, 1 F.4th 236, 242
(4th Cir. 2021). Nevertheless, “the constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more limited in
scope than the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large,” although “incarceration
does not divest prisoners of all constitutional protections.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228-
29 (2001). “[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with
the status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Specifically, the Fourth Circuit has said that an
inmate’s “right to file a prison grievance free from retaliation” is protected by the First
Amendment. Booker v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 2017).
The plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between his First Amendment activity
and the alleged retaliatory action. See Constantine, 411 F.3d at 501. The showing can be based on
circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the defendant was aware of the First Amendment
activity and that the retaliation took place within some “temporal proximity” of that activity. Id.

Defendants do not dispute the assertion of a retaliation claim. Indeed, they do not respond
to Davis’s claim of retaliation in the legal analysis section of their memorandum. Based on this
record, I shall allow the claim to proceed.
V. Conclusion
Defendants’ qualified immunity defense is unavailing because there exists a material
dispute of fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly violative of Davis’s constitutional rights
actually occurred. See Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2005). Although it is
true that qualified immunity is ordinarily determined at the summary judgment stage of litigation,
see Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003), the defense of “[q]ualified immunity does
not, however, override the ordinary rules applicable to summary judgment proceedings.”

Willingham, 412 F.3d at 559 (citing Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992)).
For the reasons set forth earlier, defendants’ Motion, construed as a motion for summary
judgment, will be granted in part and denied in part. The Complaint shall be dismissed as to
BCDC. Summary judgment is entered in favor of defendant Watts as to Davis’s failure to protect
claim. Davis’s conditions of confinement, excessive force, and retaliation claims shall proceed.
It is anticipated that discovery will be necessary to complete the factual record. Therefore,
counsel shall be appointed to represent Davis.
A separate Order follows.

August 31, 2022 /s/
Date Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10207393. Public record. Not legal advice.