# Corbitt v. Baltimore Police Department

> District Court, D. Maryland · March 22, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10206741

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** March 22, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

*
TERRELL CORBITT,
*
Plaintiffs,
*
v. Civil Action No. RDB-20-3431
*
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al., *

Defendants. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On December 15, 2017, Plaintiff Terrell Corbitt (“Plaintiff” or “Corbitt”) was struck
by a stray bullet as Baltimore City Police officers pursued a vehicle through the streets of
Baltimore City and exchanged gunfire with a suspect. On August 25, 2021, Corbitt filed the
operative seven-count Amended Complaint against the Baltimore City Police Department
(“BPD”), former BPD Commissioner Kevin Davis (“Davis”), and former Baltimore City
Police Chief T.J. Smith (“Smith”), as well as fourteen other BPD officers (collectively
“Officer-Defendants”) and other individuals allegedly involved in the incident. (ECF No. 27.)
In Counts IV, VI, and VII, Plaintiff brings claims against BPD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
deprivations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights on three theories of Monell
municipal liability.1 (Id.) In Count V, Plaintiff brings a claim against Davis and Smith under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability. (Id.)

1 Pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), local governmental bodies may
be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of individual defendants “where those
defendants were executing an official policy or custom of the local government resulting in a violation of the
plaintiff’s rights.” 436 U.S. at 690–91.
Now pending is a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendants
BPD, Davis, and Smith in response to the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 30.)2 The parties’
submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.

2021). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED
as to Counts IV and VI, as Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support his § 1983 claims
against the Baltimore City Police Department under the express policy and failure to train
theories of Monell liability. However, the pending Motion is DENIED as to Counts V and VII.
Plaintiff plausibly states a § 1983 claim against the Baltimore City Police Department under

the condonation theory of Monell liability with respect to an alleged pattern of excessive force
during vehicular pursuits. Corbitt plausibly pleads a § 1983 claim against Defendants Davis
and Smith for supervisory liability for the same alleged pattern. Additionally, this Court cannot
make a definitive ruling on Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity at this stage of the
litigation. Accordingly, Defendant’s pending Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in
a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found.
v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.)
Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff Terrell Corbitt is a resident of the State of

2 The remaining BPD officers and individuals named as defendants have not yet filed a response to the
Amended Complaint and are unaffected by this opinion.
Maryland. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 27.) The Baltimore City Police Department is an
agency of the state of Maryland, and is responsible for conducting criminal investigation and
apprehension in a reasonable manner to protect the life and well-being of Maryland residents.

(Id. ¶ 12.) At all times relevant to the Complaint, Defendant Davis was the Commissioner of
BPD, (id. ¶ 28), and Defendant Smith was a Police Chief for Baltimore City, (id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff
alleges that BPD, through policymakers such as Defendants Davis and Smith, creates and
implements policies, practices, and procedures regarding the apprehension of suspected
criminals. (Id.) He contends that such responsibilities extend to the training and supervision
of officers with respect to high-speed car chases. (Id.)

On or about December 15, 2017, Officer-Defendant Philip Lippe detained Mausean
Carter (“Carter”) at a traffic stop on Reisterstown Road. (Id. ¶ 67.) According to the complaint,
Officer Lippe stopped Carter because the window tinting on his vehicle exceeded legal limits.
(Id.) Officer Lippe informed another BPD officer and BPD dispatch that he believed Carter’s
vehicle resembled one that BPD was searching for in connection with recent homicides. (Id.)
Officer Lippe’s supervising Lieutenant authorized him to conduct a search of the vehicle. (Id.)

When Officer Lippe instructed Carter to exit the vehicle, Carter ignored the instruction and
fled the scene at a high rate of speed. (Id. ¶ 68.) Officer Lippe and his backup officer
immediately returned to their vehicles and pursued Carter northbound on Reisterstown Road.
(Id.) Carter began firing shots at the pursuing officers and continued firing at police vehicles
as they passed multiple schools. (Id. ¶¶ 69–70.)
Officer Lippe relayed information regarding their chase location and the shots fired to

BPD dispatch, pursuant to Policy 1503. (Id.) A BPD helicopter was deployed to track Carter’s
trajectory during the pursuit (Id. ¶ 70.) The helicopter informed all Officer-Defendants to
exercise care and be aware of intersections as they pursued at a high rate of speed. (Id.) The
helicopter also advised the Officer-Defendants to keep their distance, as the helicopter could

continue to follow Carter. (Id. ¶ 72.) However, police continued to pursue the suspect, who
“sped past multiple pedestrians on the street, passed numerous cars and through heavy traffic,
passed through upwards of thirty intersections, travelled down roads in the incorrect direction,
maintained speeds of over 90 miles per hour, and engaged in the pursuit for over six minutes.”
(Id. ¶ 73) One police vehicle lost control and ended up on a residential sidewalk to avoid
colliding head on with a third-party vehicle. (Id. ¶ 72) Carter was finally apprehended after his

automobile was disabled at the 1800 block of Gwynns Falls Parkway. (Id. ¶ 75.)
During the chase, at least one Officer-Defendant fired three rounds at Carter from his
moving vehicle and missed the suspect. (Id. ¶ 74.) At some point during this exchange of fire,
Corbitt was struck in the head by a stray bullet as he was riding as a passenger in a car on the
way to Home Depot. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 42.) Corbitt survived but suffered a severe brain injury and
remains partially paralyzed. (Id. ¶ 49.)

On November 24, 2020, Plaintiff Corbitt filed a six-count Complaint alleging various
tort and constitutional claims against Defendants BPD, Davis, and Smith, as well as eighteen
Officer-Defendants, BPD employees, and other individuals allegedly involved in the incident.
(ECF No. 1.) Defendants Davis, Smith, and BPD filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim. (ECF No. 20.) On August 10, 2021, this Court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
Corbitt v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, No. RDB-20-3231, 2021 WL 3510579 (D. Md. Aug. 10, 2021).

With respect to BPD, and Defendants Davis and Smith in their official capacities, Counts I, III,
and VI were dismissed with prejudice. Id. at *1.3 Counts I, III, V, and VI, alleged against BPD
and Defendants Davis and Smith in their individual capacities, were dismissed without
prejudice. Id. at *9.

On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative seven-count Amended Complaint
alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants BPD, Davis, and Smith, as well as
fourteen Officer-Defendants and various individuals allegedly involved in the incident. (ECF
No. 27.) In Counts IV, VI, and VII Corbitt asserts claims against BPD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for deprivation of his rights Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 113, 126.) In Count V Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 supervisory liability claim against

Davis and Smith. (Id. ¶¶ 116–33.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages,
attorneys’ fees, and costs against each Defendant. (Id. ¶ 151.)
On September 22, 2021, Defendants BPD, Davis, and Smith filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 30.) BPD argues that Corbitt failed to plead a plausible §
1983 Monell claim. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 4–14, ECF No. 30-1.) Davis and Smith
argue that Plaintiff failed to state a § 1983 supervisory liability claim. (Id. at 15–19.) Davis and

Smith also invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Id. at 19–21.)
This motion is now pending.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

3 Counts I and III asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, and negligent supervision. (Id.)
Count VI alleged violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. (Id.)
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint
if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “to
test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits

of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483
(4th Cir. 2006).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
684 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under the plausibility
standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille,
LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint need not include “detailed factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must,
however, set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of
action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very
remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). “Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice” to plead a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see A Soc’y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d
342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011). Additionally, while a court must accept as true all factual allegations
contained in the complaint, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are not afforded such
deference. Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff brings an assortment of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of
his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Under Section 1983, a plaintiff may bring suit
against any person who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of
the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that: (1) a right conferred by the Constitution or the laws of the United States was violated;
and (2) the putative violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Through his Amended Complaint, Corbitt brings four claims against the Defendants.
(ECF No. 27.) Counts IV, VI, and VII bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Baltimore
Police Department pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Id.
¶¶ 106–15, 134–50.) Count V asserts a supervisory liability claim against Defendants Davis
and Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 116–33.) The Defendants respond by challenging
the sufficiency of the complaint and invoking qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Mem.)

I. Claims Against Baltimore Police Department

In Counts IV, VI, and VII of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to impose Monell
liability on the Baltimore Police Department. (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff’s asserts that BPD’s
liability under § 1983 arises through three different theories set forth in Monell. (Id.)
Municipalities are subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). As Judge Hollander of this Court has aptly summarized,
“[t]he Supreme Court determined in Monell that local governmental bodies may be liable under
§ 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of individual defendants, ‘but only where those
defendants were executing an official policy or custom of the local government resulting in a
violation of the plaintiff’s rights.’” Grim v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. ELH-18-3864, 2019 WL

5865561, at *17 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2019) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91).4 This liability is
direct, not vicarious; “a municipality is liable only for its own [unconstitutional] acts.” Owens v.
Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 60 (2011); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because
it employs a tortfeasor.” (emphasis in original)). The United States Supreme Court has
explained that:

[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by
its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
To state a claim for Monell liability, a plaintiff must allege that (1) “the municipality had
an unconstitutional policy or custom; and (2) the unconstitutional policy or custom caused a
violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 500 F. Supp. 3d
454, 459 (D. Md. 2020) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997);
Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1187 (2006);
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003)). A policy or custom for which a municipality
may be held liable can arise in four ways:

4 “Unlike public officials, municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity.” Owens v. Balt. City State’s
Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980)).
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulations; (2)
through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through
an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that ‘manifest[s]
deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens’; (4) through a practice that is so
‘persistent and widespread’ as to constitute a ‘custom or usage with the force of
law.’

Lytle, 326 F.3d at 471 (quoting Cater v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1999)). “Although
prevailing on the merits of a Monell claim is difficult, simply alleging such a claim is, by
definition, easier.” Owens, 767 F.3d at 403. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only
allege facts which, taken as true, “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Plaintiff alleges the first, third, and fourth theories of Monell liability. In Count IV,
Corbitt brings a claim under the “express policy” theory, alleging that BPD’s Policy 1503
permits the unconstitutional use of force during vehicular pursuits. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106–15.)
In Count VI, Corbitt brings a “failure to train” claim, alleging that BPD failed to train its
officers in vehicular pursuits, resulting in Corbitt’s injury and the death of innocent bystanders.
(Id. ¶¶ 134–42.) In Count VII, Corbitt raises a “condonation” claim, alleging that BPD is liable
for condoning an informal pattern or practice of excessive force. (Id. ¶¶ 143–50.) Only the
condonation theory is viable.
A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Baltimore Police Department Under the Express Policy
Theory of Monell Liability

In Count IV of the Amended Complaint Plaintiff Corbitt alleges that BPD is liable
under the express policy theory of Monell liability. (ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 106–15.) A municipality
may violate § 1983 through an express policy that, when enforced, violates a plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. See Lytle, 326 F.3d at 471. Corbitt challenges the Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services Policy 1503, Emergency Vehicle Operation and Pursuit
Policy (“Policy 1503”),5 as implemented September 13, 2017. Policy 1503 was an amendment
to a previous policy on vehicular chases originally known as General Order 11-90. (Id. ¶ 38.)

According to the Amended Complaint, this amendment was adopted in response to the
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s 2016 report entitled “Investigation of the
Baltimore City Police Department” (the “DOJ Report”), which provided guidance to BPD on
how to remedy its potentially unconstitutional conduct during the pursuit of fleeing suspect
vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 41.) Additionally, Policy 1503 was further amended in November 2019,
and this Court has deemed that iteration of the policy constitutional. See Simmons v. Balt. City

Police Dep’t, No. RDB-21-0969, 2021 WL 3418840 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2021). However, at the
time of Plaintiff’s alleged injury, the 2017 version of Policy 1503 was in effect. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 107.)
Accordingly, only the 2017 policy is relevant to this case.
Policy 1503 constrains officers’ discretion to engage in vehicular pursuits. The policy
authorizes officers to initiate a pursuit when “[t]he pursuit does not unreasonably endanger
the safety of others when weighed against the risk the fleeing felon poses if not immediately

apprehended but apprehended at a later time,” Policy 1503 at 3, and requires officers to
terminate a pursuit “when the pursuing member believes that the danger to the member(s) or
the public outweighs the necessity for immediate apprehension of the fleeing felon,” id. at 4.
Although the foregoing constraints are mandatory, Policy 1503 instructs officers to consider

5 On a motion to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. See Brennan v.
Deluxe Corp., 361 F. Supp. 3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Phillips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 2009)). General Order 11-90 and both the 2017 and 2019 versions of Policy 1503, discussed infra, are
public records of which this Court will take judicial notice.
several non-exclusive discretionary factors when making these judgments. As relevant, these
factors include public safety:
2. Factors that shall be considered, both individually and collectively, when
deciding to initiate or continue a pursuit, include, but are not limited to:

2.1 The safety of the public, including: the type of area, such as a school
zone; time of day and lighting; weather, road conditions, and density of
vehicular and pedestrian traffic; and the speed of the pursuit relative to
these factors.
. . .
3. Factors that shall be considered, both individually and collectively, when
deciding to terminate a pursuit, include, but are not limited to:

3.6 When the identity of the fleeing felon is known and it does not
reasonably appear that the safety needs for immediate capture outweigh
the risks associated with continuing the pursuit.

Policy 1503 at 3–5.

Plaintiff challenges two aspects of this policy. First, he contends that Policy 1503 “does
not expressly prohibit the use of excessive force . . . despite its unconstitutional threat to safety
of the public and its contravention of the U.S. Constitution’s 14th Amendment.” (Am. Compl.
¶ 109.) Second, Plaintiff contends that Policy 1503 provides BPD officers with over broad
discretion to consider several factors when deciding not to pursue an eluding vehicle, and thus
permits officers to neglect to consider any of the factors at all. (Id. ¶¶ 109, 111–112.) Both
contentions are unavailing.
As an initial matter, Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s facial challenge to the September
13, 2017 version of BPD Policy 1503 is moot because the policy has been amended and is no
longer in effect. (Defs.’ Mem. 6–7.) This argument fails. Article III of the Constitution limits
the judicial authority of the federal courts to actual “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “A case becomes moot ‘when the issues presented are no longer “live” or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Deal v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
911 F.3d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Simmons v. United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d

754, 763 (4th Cir. 2011)). This Court may dismiss a case as moot “only when it is impossible
for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568
U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Employees, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)). Claims for
monetary damages, “if at all plausible, ensure a live controversy.” Mission Product Holdings, Inc.
v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660 (2019) (citing Memphis, Light, Gas, & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1978)). Corbitt seeks damages, not an injunction. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)

Accordingly, Corbitt’s controversy is live, as he maintains a cognizable interest in the outcome
even though Policy 1053 has been subsequently modified. The issue of mootness is of no
moment in this case.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the express policy theory. As noted
above, Plaintiff alleges that Policy 1503 is unconstitutional because it does not expressly
prohibit the use of excessive force during vehicular chases, and thus allows officers to engage

in vehicular pursuits without regard for the constitutional rights of civilians. (Am. Compl. ¶
113.) Additionally, he alleges that Policy 1503 provides officers far too broad discretion over
when to pursue a fleeing suspect. (Id. ¶¶ 111–12.) Specifically, he alleges that Policy 1503 does
not require BPD officers to apply the factors enumerated in the Policy to determine whether
to engage in a vehicular pursuit, and only instructs them to “consider” those factors in their
discretion. (Id. ¶ 113.)
This Court rejected an identical argument in Simmons v. Baltimore City Police Department,
No. RDB-21-0969, 2021 WL 3418840 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2021). In Simmons, this Court addressed
a challenge to the 2019 version of Policy 1503. 2021 WL 3418840, at *9. Plaintiffs challenged

Policy 1503, alleging that it “authorizes officers to use force that far exceeds what is reasonable,
necessary, and proportional to respond to threats,” and that it “provides officers with far too
broad discretion” because “although it states that there are factors to be ‘considered,’ there
are no defined rules.” Id. This Court dismissed Simmons’ claim, ruling that “[t]he fact that
officers are provided discretion with respect to how to weigh the provided factors, does not
render the Policy unconstitutional.” Id. Moreover, this Court highlighted that the November

2019 iteration of Policy 1503 was created through a mandatory collaborative process involving
this Court, the DOJ, an Independent Monitor, BPD, and public input. 2021 WL 3418840, at
*10. This Court concluded:
To suggest that Policy 1503, developed as required through the Consent Decree,
is unconstitutional places the BPD in an impossible situation. The BPD was
mandated to revise its policies in conjunction with the DOJ and the Monitoring
Team to ensure that there is ‘effective and constitutional policing’ in the City of
Baltimore.

Id. (quoting United States v. Balt. Police Dep’t, JKB-17-0099, 249 F. Supp. 3d 816, 819 (D. Md.
2017)).
Plaintiff fails to meaningfully distinguish Simmons. Although the 2017 iteration of Policy
1503 was amended in 2019, the language relevant to Plaintiff’s claim remained unchanged.
The detailed factors officers are required to consider when determining when to initiate or
terminate a pursuit in the 2019 Policy are identical to those in the 2017 enactment of Policy
1503. Accordingly, the considerations that were decisive in Simmons are equally applicable here:
Policy 1503, the product of a mandatory Consent Decree, is not unconstitutional for providing
officers discretion with respect to how to weigh the factors before engaging in a pursuit of a
fleeing suspect. Moreover, the language of the policy permitting officers to use their firearms

during high-speed chases was not altered during the revision process and reads the same in
both the 2017 and 2019 versions of Policy 1503: Both policies prohibit officers from firing
weapons from a moving vehicle except “[t]o counter an imminent threat of death or serious
physical injury,” or “[t]o counter a situation where the officer or another person is unavoidably
in the path of the vehicle and cannot move to safety.” Policy 1503 at 6–7. As that language
remains unchanged, it is no less constitutional in this case than in Simmons. Accordingly,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under the express policy theory of Monell liability under
§ 1983. With respect to Count IV, BPD’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED,
and Count IV is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Baltimore Police Department Under the Failure to
Train Theory of Monell Liability

In Count VI of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Fourteenth Amendment
violations under the failure to train theory of Monell liability. “[T]he inadequacy of police
training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of person with whom the police come into contact.” City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). “That a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily
trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may
have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program.” Id. at 390–91. To state a claim
under Section 1983 based on a failure to train, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the nature of the
training”; (2) that the training was a ‘deliberate or conscious’ choice by the municipality; and
(3) that the officer’s conduct resulted from said training.” Grim, 2019 WL 5865561, at *17
(quoting Lewis v. Simms, AW-11-CV-2171, 2012 WL 254024, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2012)).
Plaintiff Corbitt alleges that “the training afforded to BPD officers concerning high

speed vehicular pursuits is inadequate compared to the circumstances they are likely to face in
a densely populated city such as Baltimore.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 139.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims
that BPD’s failure to train its officers “was the moving force” behind his injury because “[t]heir
actions and/or omissions made it all but certain that Plaintiff or a similarly situated individual
would be injured by the actions of BPD Officers.” (Id. ¶ 142.) To support this claim, Plaintiff
references testimony by former BPD officer Timothy E. Beall, who killed a motorcyclist

during a high-speed vehicular chase. (Id. ¶ 140.) Officer Beall later testified that “there was no
substantive training specific to how officers should conduct these pursuits themselves.” (Id.)
He explained that his training simply consisted of driving on a closed course facility, and that
“the practice of General Order 11-90 was ‘somewhat different from the written version [as]
supervisors often instructed officers to pursue vehicles and continue pursuits even in violation
of the policy.” (Id.) However, as this Court noted in Simmons, Officer Beall’s testimony related

only to General Order 11-90—the policy that was in effect prior to the enactment of Policy
1503 pursuant to the Consent Decree. Simmons, 2021 WL 3418840, at *11. Accordingly,
Officer Beall’s testimony remains irrelevant in this case, as he was not trained under the policy
at issue.
Unable to rely on Officer Beale’s testimony, Plaintiff’s failure to train theory falls short.
Plaintiff offers no additional allegations concerning the “nature of training” or the manner in

which “that the officer’s conduct resulted from said training.” Lewis, 2012 WL 254024, at *1;
see Hall v. Fabrizio, JKB-12-754, 2012 WL 2905293, at *2 (D. Md. July 13, 2012) (dismissing
failure to train claim against BPD because “the complaint [did] not allege any facts regarding
the sort of training that Baltimore police officers actually receive or how that training reflects

the decision of any municipal policymaker.”). Plaintiff merely states in broad, conclusory terms
that the training was inadequate, and alleges summarily that the “failure to train was the moving
force behind [his] injury.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 139, 142.) Absent any reference to a particular BPD
training practice or a more specific shortcoming in BPD training program, Plaintiff fails to
plausibly claim that BPD’s putative training deficiencies caused his injury. Accordingly,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under the failure to train theory of Monell liability under

§ 1983. For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED as to
Count VI, and Count VI is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Plaintiff States a Claim Against Baltimore Police Department Under the Condonation Theory
of Monell Liability

In Count VII of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that BPD is liable
for Fourteenth Amendment violations under the condonation theory of Monell liability. (Id. ¶¶
143–50.) A municipality is liable under a condonation theory if its policymakers “fail ‘to put a
stop to or correct a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct.’” Owens, 767 F.3d at 402
(quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987)). To state a plausible claim for
relief under such a theory, a plaintiff must allege “a ‘persistent and widespread practice[] of
municipal officers,’ the ‘duration and frequency’ of which indicate that policy makers (1) had
actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their
‘deliberate indifference.’” Id. (quoting Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386–91). A plaintiff must also
sufficiently plead a causal connection between the custom and the constitutional injury they
suffered. Spell, 824 F.2d at 1391. Corbitt claims that BPD has engaged in widespread
misconduct during vehicular pursuits since 2012, that several prior incidents, lawsuits, and
investigations establish that BPD had knowledge of this misconduct and failed to correct it,

and that there is a causal connection between this misconduct and his injury. These allegations
are collectively sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.
First, Plaintiff has plausibly pled the existence of a persistent and widespread practice
of engaging in unconstitutional vehicular chases, and BPD’s knowledge of this practice.
Plaintiff asserts that there is “a culture of acceptance and condonation of unconstitutional
officer use of force during emergency chases.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 149.) In support, Plaintiff cites

six prior lawsuits and describes five specific instances in which BPD engaged in vehicular
chases that resulted in death or injury of innocent civilians. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 89.) Plaintiff also
references the DOJ Report’s investigation into BPD police practices as evidence of “a rampant
pattern of excessive force.” (Id. ¶ 144.) At this stage in the litigation, these allegations are
sufficient to plead a pattern of widespread unconstitutional conduct—and BPD’s knowledge
of the same.

Second, Corbitt plausibly pleads BPD’s deliberate indifference. To plead deliberate
indifference, plaintiff need only allege that the municipality was aware of the alleged pattern
or practice and “that the municipality’s failure to discipline its officers ‘allowed’ a custom,
policy or practice ‘of [constitutional] violations to develop.’” Jones v. Jordan, GLR-16-2662, 2017
WL 4122795, at **10 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2017) (quoting J.A. v. Miranda, No. PX-16-3953, 2017
WL 3840026, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 1, 2017)). In addition to the lawsuits filed over the past ten

years, Plaintiff alleges that the DOJ Report’s findings of the use of excessive force during
vehicular pursuits provided officers with notice of the issue. (Am. Compl. ¶ 144.) Additionally,
Plaintiff complains that BPD has a custom of “insufficient or non-existent officer discipline,”
despite the fact that BPD had knowledge of lawsuits against them as a result of “violations of

citizens’ civil rights during police vehicle pursuits.” (Id. ¶¶ 146–47, 149.) He further claims that
Defendant failed to “take any corrective action in the face of the continuing lawsuits against
[the] BPD for civilian injuries and deaths due to officer emergency car chases.” (Id. ¶ 150.)
Accepting these allegations as true, Corbitt has plausibly alleged that BPD has ignored its
officers’ practice of engaging in excessive force during vehicular pursuits that result in civilian
injuries and deaths, thereby approving the practice by condonation.

Defendant counters that Plaintiff’s reliance on “a meager history of isolated incidents”
is not sufficient to establish a persistent and widespread practice or to satisfy the “deliberate
indifference” standard. (Defs.’ Mem. 13.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has rejected this argument. In Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379
(4th Cir. 2014), the plaintiff alleged that the Baltimore City Police Department maintained “a
custom, policy, or practice of condoning its officers’ conduct in knowingly, consciously, and

repeatedly withholding and suppressing exculpatory evidence.” 767 F.3d at 402. Owens cited
to “[r]eported and unreported cases from the period of time before and during the events
complained of,” as well as “numerous ‘successful motions,’” to support his claim. Id. at 403
(alteration in original). Rejecting BPD’s argument that these allegations were conclusory, the
Fourth Circuit held that these “assertions as to ‘reported and unreported cases’ and numerous
‘successful motions’ are factual allegations, the veracity of which could plausibly support a

Monell claim.” Id. at 403. The court reasoned that the existence of these prior cases and
successful motions, “if true, would buttress his legal conclusion” regarding BPD’s deliberate
indifference. Id. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that Owens’s “brief, but non-conclusory,
allegations” were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 403–04.

As the Fourth Circuit made clear in Owens, a plaintiff need not allege prior instances in
great detail at this early stage. Corbitt likewise relies on prior cases against BPD for fatalities
of innocent civilians from vehicular pursuit practices. As in Owens, the existence of these cases
are factual allegations, which, if true, would bolster Corbitt’s Monell condonation claim.
Although these allegations may be devoid of detail, they provide sufficient factual content to
survive a motion to dismiss. See Garcia v. Montgomery Cty., No. JFM-12-3592, 2013 WL 4539394,

at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2013) (quoting Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 339–40 (4th Cir.
1994)) (“[A] Monell plaintiff need not ‘plead the multiple incidents of constitutional violations
that may be necessary at later stages to establish the existence of an official policy or custom
and causation.’”). Moreover, these claims are supported by his reference to the DOJ Report’s
findings, which have previously provided a valid predicate for a Monell claim against BPD. See,
e.g., Jones, 2017 WL 4122795, at **9–10 (sustaining condonation claim where plaintiff relied on

DOJ Report to allege widespread pattern of stops without reasonable suspicion and arrests
without probable cause).
BPD also contends that the DOJ Report cannot serve as the basis for Plaintiff’s Monell
claim because Policy 1503 was not the subject or even in effect when the Report was released.
(Defs’ Mem. 14.) This argument is inapposite. Under the “condonation” theory, unlike the
“express policy” theory, a plaintiff need not reference any specific written policy when making

their claim—instead, it is sufficient to plead sufficient facts that demonstrate the existence of
a widespread pattern or practice. See Spell, 824 F.2d at 1386–91. Accordingly, as Judge
Hollander noted in Grim v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. ELH-18-3864, 2019 WL 5865561 (D. Md.
Nov. 8, 2019), the relationship between the DOJ report and Policy 1503 is not relevant to the

condonation theory of Monell liability. Cf. 2019 WL 5865561, at *19 (finding that the timing of
the DOJ Report was “besides the point,” and that the report was evidence that BPD was
aware of ongoing constitutional violations). Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately pled facts to
establish the elements of the condonation theory of Monell liability under § 1983. With respect
to Count VII, BPD’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is DENIED.
II. Supervisory Liability Claim Against Defendants Davis and Smith

In Count V, Plaintiff asserts a claim of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against former BPD Commissioner Kevin Davis and former Police Chief T.J. Smith. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 116–33.) Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint fails to state a supervisory
liability claim because it does not allege sufficient facts to show that the officers were
deliberately indifferent. (Defs.’ Mem. 15.) Additionally, Defendants claim that to the extent
Plaintiff seeks to hold them liable in their individual capacities, he fails to plead sufficient facts

to overcome the officers’ qualified immunity. (Id. at 19.)
“Qualified immunity shields government officials ‘who commit constitutional
violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their
actions were lawful.’” Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011)). The doctrine “protects government officials
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Livingston
v. Kehagias, 803 Fed. App’x 673, 678 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009)). Qualified immunity “balances two important interests—the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Wilson
v. Prince George's Cty., 893 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231); accord
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (observing that the doctrine “gives government
officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments”).
“To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must
examine (1) whether the facts illustrate that the officer violated the plaintiff's constitutional

right . . . , and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged event such
that ‘a reasonable officer would have understood that his conduct violated the asserted right.’”
Humbert v. Mayor & City Council, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Miller v. Prince
George’s Cnty, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007)). Qualified Immunity may be raised in a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, but “when asserted at this early stage in the proceedings, ‘the defense faces a
formidable hurdle’ and ‘is usually not successful.’” Owens, 767 F.3d at 396 (quoting Field Day,

LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2006)). “This is so because dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if a plaintiff fails to state a claim that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (emphasis in original).
Corbitt alleges that Davis and Smith are liable for failing to address their subordinate
officers’ alleged unconstitutional conduct during vehicular pursuits. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116–33.)
Defendants maintain that Corbitt has not stated a plausible claim of supervisory liability.
(Defs.’ Mem. 15.) Additionally, Defendants argue that that clearly established law did not
render the alleged conduct unconstitutional:
[They] had no reason to question the binding legal precedent that upholds
Policy 1503’s firearm provision, [and] it was reasonable for them to limit an
officer’s use of his or her firearm only to circumstances in which they have
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm or
death to themselves or others.

(Id. at 21.) We address each argument in turn.
A. Plaintiff States a Claim Against Defendants Davis and Smith for Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff claims that Davis and Smith are liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of supervisory liability. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116–33.) The Fourth
Circuit has held that a supervisor may be held liable for the constitutional injuries inflicted by
their subordinates in narrow circumstances. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed. App’x 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citing Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782–83 (4th Cir. 2004). “A supervisor’s continued
inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses . . . provides an independent basis” for
§ 1983 liability against that official by evincing deliberate indifference to “the constitutionally
offensive conduct of [their] subordinates.” Slakin v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984).
However, public officials “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “Because vicarious
liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Id.
A supervisor may be held liable on a theory “that supervisory indifference or tacit
authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional
injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235
(4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372). To state a claim for supervisory liability under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege three elements:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his
subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable
risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;

(2) that the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to
show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices,’; and

(3) that there was an ‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisor’s inaction
and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). “Establishing a pervasive
and unreasonable risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is widespread.” Wilkins v.
Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226–27 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799) (alterations
omitted). Additionally, “a plaintiff ‘may establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating a
supervisor’s continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses.’” Id. (quoting
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799). As to the third element, “proof of causation may be direct . . . where
the policy commands the injury of which the plaintiff complains . . . or may be supplied by the
tort principle that holds a person liable for the natural consequences of his actions.” Id.
(quoting Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799).
First, Corbitt alleges that Davis and Smith were “responsible for implementing and
enforcing BPD policy regarding the termination or continuation of emergency vehicular
pursuits.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 130.) He claims that these Defendants “had actual and constructive
knowledge that officers failed to abide by the discretionary mitigating factors and Policy 1503
and knew that officers had routinely ignored the factors when initiating emergency pursuits.”
(Id. ¶ 127.) This allegation rests on the same claims as Plaintiff’s condonation theory: Plaintiff
cites five prior instances in which innocent bystanders were killed as a result of BPD’s practice
of engaging in unreasonable vehicular chases. (Id. ¶ 121.) He points to six prior lawsuits against
BPD for fatalities resulting from BPD’s vehicular pursuit practices. (Id.) And he alleges that

Davis and Smith were “on notice of BPD officers’ failure to consider the risks posed to
civilians when initiating emergency pursuits by virtue of the findings of the [DOJ Report].”
(Id. ¶ 122.) At this stage of the litigation, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim that
Defendants had knowledge of the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
Second, Corbitt plausibly claims that Davis and Smith’s response to this conduct was
so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference. Plaintiff contends that, despite their

knowledge, Defendants “failed to correct the behavior of their subordinate officers,” and that
those officers were not “disciplined for their failure to consider factors indicating heightened
risk to Baltimore citizens.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 123.) He also claims that Davis and Smith failed to
train their officers on how to properly apply the factors listed in Policy 1503 and thereby
“permitted the trainings to include patently reckless conduct.” (Id. ¶ 124.) Although these
allegations are insufficient to state a “failure to train” Monell claim, they are sufficient to allege

the inaction necessary to establish deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has adequately alleged that,
by failing to discipline their officers or correct their conduct during vehicular pursuits,
Defendants showed deliberate indifference to the alleged offensive practice.
Third, Plaintiff claims that as a result of the Defendant’s failure to act, he suffered a
constitutional deprivation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 133.) This element is supported by the nature of
Plaintiff’s injury: He was shot in the head during a high-speed police chase. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 42, 49.)

Defendants’ alleged failure to control officers’ conduct during vehicular pursuits, if true, is
doubtlessly “a causative factor” in this injury. Baynard, 268 F.3d at 235. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has sufficiently pled a supervisory liability claim to survive the motion to dismiss stage.
Defendants argue that Corbitt has not alleged facts to show deliberate indifference, as

five of the six examples that Plaintiff cites “occurred before or after Davis’s tenure as BPD
Commissioner,” and “a single isolated incident alone does not suffice.” (Defs.’ Mem. 16–17.)
Further, Defendants argue that the prior cases did not occur under Policy 1503. (Id. at 17–18.)
These arguments fail. Although the frequency and timing of the conduct needed to establish
a “widespread” practice has not been definitively established, the incidents alleged need not
occur during the Defendants’ tenure. See Lee v. Queen Anne’s Cty Office of Sheriff, RDB-13-672,

2014 WL 476233, at *9 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2014); see also Chestnut v. Kincaid, No. RDB-20-2342,
2021 WL 1662469, at *16 (D. Md. Apr. 28, 2021) (noting that the fact that some of the
examples of BPD officers suppressing exculpatory evidence occurred after the Plaintiffs’
convictions was “besides the point”) In Lee v. Queen Anne’s Cty Office of Sheriff, the plaintiff cited
to three prior instances in which Queen Anne’s County police officers violated individuals’
constitutional rights during traffic stops. 2014 WL 476233, at *9. This Court held that each

“specific instance[] of misconduct adequately supplement[ed] [plaintiff’s supervisory liability]
claim and demonstrate[ed] the requisite constructive knowledge and deliberate indifference.”
Id. Moreover, this Court declined “to insist upon specific instances of past misconduct
involving only [the defendant],” as the presence of other incidents were sufficient to establish
“that the defendants were aware of the unconstitutional practice.” Id. at *9 n.19. Accordingly,
this Court reasoned that one of the prior events raised potential constitutional concerns and

the other two incidents “suggest[ed] that . . . [the defendant] failed to properly supervise and
discipline the deputies because the deputies allegedly remained a part of the Sheriff’s Office
despite their misconduct.” Id.
The same logic is applicable here. The prior instances of excessive force used during

high-speed vehicular chases are sufficient to support Corbitt’s claim of a widespread practice
of unconstitutional police conduct. Corbitt relies on more than just a single isolated incident
of putative constitutional violations, citing to lawsuits and specific instances of misconduct to
provide support for his contention that the alleged misconduct was part of a pervasive pattern.
Much like the cases that the plaintiff provided in Lee, Corbitt’s examples of prior misconduct
also suggest that Davis and Smith had knowledge of this ongoing pattern and failed to take

action to correct it—regardless of whether all of the instances alleged occurred while Davis
and Smith were in office. Accordingly, no less than in Lee, these allegations sufficiently support
his claim that Davis and Smith had constructive knowledge of the issue and were deliberately
indifferent to it.
Defendants assert that Grim v. Baltimore Police Department mandates a contrary result.
(Defs.’ Mem. 16.) In Grim, plaintiff alleged three prior instances of strip searches by BPD

officers to demonstrate that Commissioner Davis “exhibited continued inaction in the face of
documented widespread abuses.” 2019 WL 5865561, at *25. This Court held that because “all
three incidents occurred before Davis began his tenure as Commissioner,” this Court could
not “draw an inference of continued inaction on the part of Davis” nor could it find that there
was an “alleged affirmative causal link between Davis’s alleged inaction and plaintiff’s alleged
constitutional injury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, unlike in Grim,

Defendants Davis and Smith concede that at least one of the instances occurred while Davis
was the Commissioner, and that Corbitt’s examples occurred before and after Plaintiff’s injury.
(Defs.’ Mem. at 17.) Moreover, the fact that some of these instances occurred before Davis
and Smith joined BPD is not fatal to Plaintiff’s ability to state a claim. As this Court noted in

Lee, “the Fourth Circuit has never held that the ‘widespread’ or ‘pervasive’ wrongdoing must
originate from the same source’” as the plaintiff’s alleged injury. 2014 WL 476233 at *9 n.19.
Accepting these well-pleaded facts as true, Plaintiff has plausibly pled that Defendants
were aware of a widespread practice of unconstitutional use of force during vehicular pursuits,
displayed deliberate indifference due to a failure to correct their subordinate’s behavior, and
thereby contributed to the alleged constitutional injury. At this stage, Plaintiff has plead

sufficient facts to establish a supervisory liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. A Determination of Defendants Qualified Immunity Is Not Appropriate at This Stage

Defendants nonetheless claim that they are entitled to a defense of qualified immunity
because the putative misconduct did not violate clearly established law. (Defs.’ Mem. 19).
Having found that Corbitt’s allegations state a plausible § 1983 claim of supervisory liability,
the Defendants’ qualified immunity defense turns on whether Plaintiff can show: (1) that it
was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct that Defendants could be held
liable for the acts of their subordinates; (2) that it was clearly established at the time Defendants
were supervising Officer-Defendants that the officers’ actions were unconstitutional; and (3)
that a reasonable person in Defendants’ positions would have known that their actions were
unlawful. See Lee, 2014 WL 476233, at *13 (citing Shaw, 13 F.3d, at 801). In the Fourth Circuit,
supervisory liability has been firmly established for quite some time. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 801–02.

Therefore, Davis and Smith’s qualified immunity depends upon the more factual questions
surrounding the second and third inquiry: Corbitt’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, and the
reasonableness of Davis and Smith’s actions during a high-speed chase. At this early stage in
litigation, this Court is unable to make any definitive ruling on these fact-specific questions.

Accordingly, with respect to Count V, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is
DENIED.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Davis, Smith, and Baltimore City Police
Department’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
With respect to Defendant Baltimore City Police Department, Counts IV and VI are dismissed
with prejudice. However, with respect to the Count VII Monell condonation claim against the
Baltimore City Police Department, as well as the Count V supervisory liability claim against
Defendants Davis and Smith in their individual capacities, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 30) is DENIED.
A separate order follows.

Dated: March 22, 2022
___________/s/_____________
Richard D. Bennett
United States Senior District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10206741. Public record. Not legal advice.