# Campbell v. Sims

> District Court, D. Maryland · September 23, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10206075

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** September 23, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10206075

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating, where the State filed a motion to stay the district court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus pending appeal, that “[s]ince the traditional stay factors contemplate individualized judgments in each case, the formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules”
- noting that the four factors must be “viewed together” and the “interests of the movant balanced against the interests of the other parties and the public” (citation omitted)
- explaining that a stay may be warranted based on other factors if the appeal “raises serious and difficult questions of law in an area where the law is somewhat unclear” (citation omitted)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

BRYCE CHEROY CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
PFC THOMAS SIMS, in his official and
individual capacities, Civil Action No. TDC-20-2590
OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF THE
TAKOMA PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF TAKOMA PARK,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Bryce Cheroy Campbell filed this civil action against Defendant Private First
Class (“PFC”) Thomas Sims (“Officer Sims”), sued in his official and individual capacities, Other _
Unknown Officers of the Takoma Park Police Department (“the John Doe Officers”), and the City
of Takoma Park (“Takoma Park’) in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland asserting
federal and state constitutional claims and state tort claims stemming from his seizure on April 8,
2017 for purposes of an emergency mental health examination and his subsequent involuntary
commitment. Officer Sims filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting, in part, that he had
qualified immunity to Campbell’s federal constitutional claims. The Court denied summary
judgment, in part on the grounds that that at the time of the events at issue, it was clearly
established, based on Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 740-41 (4th Cir. 2003), and related cases,
that individuals have a right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution not to
be seized for purposes of a mental health examination unless the seizing law enforcement officers

have probable cause to believe both that they have a mental health condition and that they pose a
danger to themselves or others, and that such probable cause cannot be based on a report that the
individual may pose a danger if the officers’ first-hand observations upon encountering the
individual do not support such a conclusion. Campbell v. Sims, No. TDC-20-2590, 2021 WL
2685706, at *8 (D. Md. June 30, 2021). The Court also concluded that there remained, at a
minimum, a genuine issue of material fact on whether the information available to the officers
established probable cause to seize Campbell for purposes of a mental health examination. See id.
at *9-10. Officer Sims has filed an interlocutory appeal of that denial of summary judgment based
on qualified immunity, see ECF No. 36, and has also filed a Motion to Stay All Proceedings
Pending Appeal (“Motion to Stay”), ECF No. 44. Campbell opposes the Motion. The Court has
reviewed the briefs and submitted materials and finds no hearing necessary. See D. Md. Local R.
105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Officer Sims’s Motion to Stay will be GRANTED, and
this case will be stayed pending resolution of his interlocutory appeal.
DISCUSSION
“TT]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and
for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). In determining whether to stay a
case pending appeal, courts consider four factors: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing of a likelthood of success on the merits; (2) “whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay”; (3) “whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding”; and (4) “where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481
U.S. 770, 776 (1987). It is not necessary that all four factors weigh in favor of a stay; rather the
court may balance the factors to determine whether a stay is warranted. See St. Agnes Hosp. of

City of Balt., Inc. v. Riddick, 751 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D. Md. 1990) (noting that the four factors must
be “viewed together” and the “interests of the movant balanced against the interests of the other
parties and the public” (citation omitted)). See also Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777 (stating, where the
State filed a motion to stay the district court’s issuance of writ of habeas corpus pending appeal,
that “[s]ince the traditional stay factors contemplate individualized judgments in each case, the
formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules”); Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc.,729 F.3d
370, 375 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that the power of a district court to stay trial proceedings is
discretionary and calls for the balancing of “the various factors relevant to the expeditious and
comprehensive disposition” of a case (citation omitted)). The Court discusses each factor in turn.
L Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Officer Sims offers two arguments as to why he is likely to succeed on the merits of his
appeal. First, he asserts that this Court erroneously failed to apply or misapplied the collective
knowledge doctrine when assessing whether, upon consideration of the facts in the light most
favorable to Campbell, Officer Sims had probable cause to seize Campbell for a mental health
examination. In particular, Officer Sims argues that the collective knowledge doctrine shields him
from liability to the extent that he acted reasonably in relying on a fellow officer’s determination
that probable cause existed. Officer Sims also argues that the asserted right to be free from seizure
for a mental health evaluation was not clearly established at the time of the events at issue. In
opposing the Motion to Stay, Campbell asserts that Officer Sims is unlikely to succeed on the
merits of his appeal because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit lacks
jurisdiction to hear it and because, even if the appeal is heard, Officer Sims is unlikely to succeed
on the merits.

Turning first to the question whether the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear the appeal,
United States Courts of Appeals generally have jurisdiction only over “final decisions of the
district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). However, “[t]o the extent that an order of a district
court rejecting a governmental official’s qualified immunity defense turns on a question of law, it
is a final decision within the meaning of § 1291 ... and therefore is subject to immediate appeal.”
Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 528 (4th Cir. 1997); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985). This rule allows for interlocutory appellate review of a denial of qualified immunity when
the appeal is based on a “purely legal issue” such as “what law was clearly established,” but not
when the appeal is of a matter of “evidence sufficiency,” such as whether qualified immunity was
properly denied based on the conclusion that there was “a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Johnson
v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 319-20 (1995). The fact that an appeal includes both types of
arguments does not necessarily deprive an appellate court of jurisdiction. Instead, it is job of the
appellate court to “parse[]” the intermingled assertions of error and consider only the legal
arguments. /ko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 234-35 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur first task on appeal is to
separate the district court’s legal conclusions regarding entitlement to qualified immunity, over
which we have jurisdiction, from its determinations regarding factual disputes, over which we do
not.”’).
Here, Officer Sims’s appeal, even if addressing certain factual issues, includes a challenge
to this Court’s legal determination on the contours of clearly established law at the time of
Campbell’s seizure on the circumstances under which an individual may be seized for a mental
health examination. As a result, the Court is sufficiently satisfied that the Fourth Circuit has
jurisdiction over at least some elements of Officer Sims’s appeal that it does not conclude that
Officer Sims is unlikely to succeed on that appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction.

On the likelihood of success on the merits of his appellate claims, Officer Sims advances
two primary arguments. First, Officer Sims asserts that this Court misapplied the collective
knowledge doctrine, which generally provides that a court may “substitute the knowledge of the
instructing officer or officers for the knowledge of the acting officer” when determining if there
was probable cause for a search or seizure. United States v. Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 691 (4th Cir.
2015). Officer Sims argues that the collective knowledge doctrine also shields an arresting officer
from a civil suit if that officer conducted the arrest in reasonable reliance on another officer’s
conclusion that there was probable cause. He argues that based on this principle, he was entitled
to qualified immunity because he participated in the seizure of Campbell based on Acting Sergeant
Kristian Pederson’s determination that there was probable cause to do so.
Officer Sims points to no controlling authority in support of this principle. He instead
relies on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Zellner v.
Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344 (2d Cir. 2007), a case Officer Sims did not cite in his Motion for
Summary Judgment briefing, in which the Second Circuit described the concept of “arguable
probable cause,” which allows for qualified immunity to civil liability for an illegal seizure when
“a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the
officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well
established law.” Jd. at 369 (citation omitted). Although the doctrine ostensibly allows an officer
to be shielded from civil liability based on a reasonable belief that probable cause existed, the court
emphasized that “probable cause remains the relevant standard,” and “[i]f officers of reasonable
competence would have to agree that the information possessed by the officer at the time of the
arrest did not add up to probable cause, the fact that it came close does not immunize the officer.”
Id. at 370 (quoting Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2007)). Zellner does not

broadly hold, as Officer Sims suggests, that arresting or seizing officers are immune from civil
liability simply if they acted in reliance on a fellow officer who vouched for the existence of
probable cause. That proposition instead comes from an unpublished district court case which
extended traditional collective knowledge doctrine principles to reach this conclusion. See
Golphin v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ. 1015(BSJ), 2011 WL 4375679, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
19, 2011). Where Officer Sims advances a theory to extend the collective knowledge doctrine to
be used as a shield as part of an argument for qualified immunity that has not been accepted by the
Fourth Circuit, and Officer Sims has not shown that any other circuit has accepted it, the Court
finds that Officer Sims has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal based on
his collective knowledge doctrine argument.
Officer Sims’s second argument on appeal is that while it was clearly established that in
order to seize a person for purposes of a mental health evaluation, police officers need probable
cause to believe both that the individual has a mental disease or defect and that the individual poses
a danger to self or others, tt would not have been clear to reasonable officers that on the issue of
danger, they could not rely solely on the reports of others if, upon encountering the individual,
they did not see or hear anything that would indicate that the individual posed such a danger. As
discussed in the Court’s prior memorandum opinion, this proposition is clearly established by
Bailey, and the facts in that case are sufficiently similar to those present here to put a reasonable
officer on notice that, based on the facts available on summary judgment as viewed in the light
most favorable to Campbell, the seizure of Campbell violated the law. See Campbell, 2021 WL
2685706, at *8—9. Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that Officer Sims is likely to succeed
on the merits of his appeal on this theory. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges that in effectively
arguing that Bailey is insufficient to put officers on notice of clearly established law, Officer Sims

has presented a non-frivolous, colorable argument for appeal that raises a serious question of law
that may be sufficient to permit a stay. See Krell v. Queen Anne’s Cnty., No. JKB-18-0637, 2020
WL 416975, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2020) (granting a stay of a qualified immunity appeal based in
part on the conclusion that while the appeal was unlikely to succeed, it raised “serious questions
of law”); U.S. Home Corp. vy. Settlers Crossing, LLC, No. DKC 08-1863, 2015 WL 3973071, at
*6 (D. Md. June 29, 2015) (granting a stay pending an interlocutory appeal where the moving party
had not shown a “strong likelihood of success on appeal” but had “identified specific legal findings
that raise serious questions of law” on appeal, where the remaining factors weighed in favor of the
stay); St. Agnes Hosp., 751 F. Supp. at 76 (explaining that a stay may be warranted based on other
factors if the appeal “raises serious and difficult questions of law in an area where the law is
somewhat unclear” (citation omitted)).
Il. Irreparable Injury
Officer Sims asserts that he will be irreparably injured absent a stay because requiring him
to litigate Campbell’s claims would entirely undermine the right to be free from the burdens of
litigation that qualified immunity is meant to secure.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that qualified immunity is “an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. See Gray-Hopkins y. Prince
George’s Cnty., 309 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[QJualified immunity is an immunity from
having to litigate.”). ‘This immunity is thus “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Further, “even such pretrial matters as discovery are to be
avoided if possible.” /d. In particular, government officials should not be subjected to “the costs
of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery in cases where the legal norms the officials
are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time.” Jd.

Where one basis of Officer Sims’s appeal is that the right he allegedly violated was not
clearly established at the time of the events at issue, and where, for the reasons stated above, the
Court finds that basis for appeal to be non-frivolous, the concerns about an erroneous deprivation
of qualified immunity are at their zenith. If Officer Sims were to prevail on appeal, but this Court
were to have allowed discovery to proceed while that appeal is pending, the right Officer Sims
seeks to vindicate will effectively have been lost. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.3d 309,
317 (D.C. Cir, 1982) (noting that a party seeking a stay from a denial of summary judgment on
qualified immunity should be able to establish irreparable injury).
Campbell nevertheless argues that because he has asserted in the Complaint, in addition to
the § 1983 claim, state constitutional and common law claims against Officer Sims and Takoma
Park, Officer Sims would be subject to the burdens of discovery, either as a defendant or witness
on those state law claims, regardless of the outcome of the appeal. There is, however, no guarantee
that the case will continue to proceed in this Court ifthe § 1983 claim is dismissed. Such dismissal
would deprive the Court of original jurisdiction over this case and would likely result in dismissal
of the remaining state law claims over which the Court presently has supplemental jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting, upon the dismissal of all claims over which a federal court
had original jurisdiction, dismissal of state law claims over which the court had supplemental
jurisdiction). The Court therefore finds that the absence of a stay would irreparably harm Officer
Sims.
II. Injury to the Other Parties
On the third factor, whether a stay will substantially injure the other parties, Campbell
asserts that he will suffer such harm because “[m]Jemories fade.” Opp’n at 10, ECF No. 47.
Although the risk of the loss of evidence is inherent in all stays, in this instance, the interactions

between Campbell and the responding officers were recorded multiple times on the officers’ body
cameras, so concerns about evidence degradation are mitigated. Cf Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
378 (2007) (in a case on interlocutory appeal on the issue of qualified immunity, reversing the
denial of the defendant police officer’s motion for summary judgment based on body camera
footage of the incident).
To the extent that Campbell voices a more general concern about delaying a prompt
disposition of his case, he points to no substantive remedy that he will lose as a result ofa stay. At
this point, the case has been pending for approximately one year, there have been no substantial
delays in the case, and discovery has already begun. Throughout the litigation, Officer Sims has
acted promptly, making no requests to extend any applicable deadlines. Under these circumstances
the harm that a stay would impose on Campbell is limited and does not counterbalance the injury
that a stay would cause to Officer Sims.
IV. ‘Public Interest
On the fourth factor, the public has an abiding interest in the “deterrence of unlawful
conduct” on the part of government officials and in “compensation of victims” of such unlawful
conduct. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). It also has an interest in the prompt
resolution of civil disputes in the courts. At the same time, the public has an interest in having
government officials, when required to take action in circumstances where clearly established
rights are not implicated, proceed “with independence and without fear of consequences.”
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). The public interest therefore may,
at times, lie in avoiding the costs of subjecting government officials to the burdens of litigation,
which include “distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary
action, and deterrence of able people from public service.” /d. at 525-26 (quoting Harlow, 457

U.S. at 816). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has made clear that “there is a strong public interest
in protecting officials from the costs of damages actions” that “is best served by a defense
permitting insubstantial lawsuits to be quickly terminated.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
590 (1998).
Officer Sims’s appeal presents the question whether certain rights were clearly established
at the time of the events at issue, and the viability of Campbell’s federal claim hinges on that
question. In this instance, a stay would prevent government officials from incurring the costs and
burdens of litigation until it is certain that the case may proceed further. It would not prevent any
favorable outcome for Campbell, and the resulting delay would not impose an excessive burden
on Campbell. Under these circumstances, the public interest slightly favors a stay.
V. Balance of the Factors
As discussed above, Officer Sims’s appeal implicates serious questions of law, and the
remaining three factors favor a stay. While a stay will delay resolution of this case for Campbell
to a certain degree, it would also preserve Officer Sims’s right not to be required to litigate a case
if he can establish on appeal that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, upon a
weighing of the four relevant factors, the Court finds that the balance tips in favor of a stay. See
Krell, 2020 WL 416975, at *3 (granting a stay pending an appeal of the denial of qualified
immunity where “the defendant has presented a plausible claim for immunity and the balance of
hardships favors a stay”).

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Officer Sims’s Motion to Stay will be GRANTED, and this
case will be stay pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: September 23, 2021
THEODORE D. CHUANG
United States District Ju

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10206075. Public record. Not legal advice.