# Jackson v. Carin

> District Court, D. Maryland · March 2, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10203235

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maryland
- **Decided:** March 2, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10203235

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
- holding that to establish a constitutional violation based on malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that s/he was seized pursuant to a legal process unsupported by probable cause

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division

*
ANGELO LAMONT JACKSON, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Case No.: 8:19-cv-00564-PWG

MICHAEL CARIN, OFFICER, *

Defendant. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Angelo Lamont Jackson (“Jackson”) filed this lawsuit against Detective Michael Carin of
the Montgomery County Police Department, claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,
and asserting a Maryland State claim for gross negligence in connection with Detective Carin’s
alleged application for an arrest warrant for Jackson without probable cause. Compl., ECF No 1.
Detective Carin has filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the Complaint does not state any
claims upon which relief can be granted because the warrant was based on probable cause, and if
not, he is entitled to qualified immunity because his actions were objectively reasonable. Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 11. For the reasons that follow, I will deny the motion to dismiss.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2017, two men were stabbed to death during a conflict at the Westfield
Wheaton Mall in Wheaton, Maryland.1 Compl. ¶ 9. Part of the conflict was captured on the Mall’s
security surveillance video system. The footage shows one man (the “assailant”) who is black,
has a dark complexion, appears six feet tall, is in his twenties, and is physically strong. Id. ¶¶ 13-
21. This man got into an altercation with four other men, two of whom he stabbed. Id. ¶¶ 27, 31.

The man then absconded. Id. ¶ 29.
At the time of the murders, Jackson was in Germantown, Maryland, about forty minutes
away from Wheaton, Maryland. Id. ¶ 32. Had Detective Carin checked, Jackson’s location would
have been corroborated by multiple witnesses and cell phone records. Id. ¶¶ 34-35.
Detective Carin was assigned as the lead investigator for the two murders. Id. ¶ 36. As
part of his investigation, he obtained the surveillance footage and from which he captured a still
picture of the assailant’s face. Id. ¶ 46. In an effort to identify the assailant, the picture was
circulated to the public and the surveillance video was circulated to other Montgomery County
Police officers. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. At least one officer communicated to Detective Carin that the

assailant “resembled” Jackson, but “did not make a confirmed positive identification.” Id. ¶¶ 49,
51. And at least one other officer disagreed that Jackson resembled the assailant. Id. ¶ 54. No
person from the public identified Jackson as the man in the still. Id. ¶ 47.
Detective Carin obtained a photograph of Jackson for comparison purposes. Id. ¶ 55. The
photograph of Jackson depicts a black man, who appears younger than the assailant, with a slighter
build, a significantly smaller nose, lighter skin, and is shorter than the assailant. Id. ¶¶ 56-58.

1 The facts of the case are taken from the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and are assumed to be true for
purposes of ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc.
v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012).
“[W]hen all the differences were taken together, it was, or should have been apparent to Carin that
the picture of [Jackson] did not match the perpetrator on the surveillance video.” Id. ¶ 59.
Lastly, part of Detective Carin’s investigation before writing and affirming under oath the
accuracy of the facts supporting the Application for Statement of Charges (“Application”) was
interviewing eyewitnesses to the incident, two of whom were the two survivors of the attack. Id.

¶¶ 40-41. The two eyewitnesses were never shown the picture of Jackson or an in-person lineup
of Jackson for identification purposes, and neither of them identified Jackson as the perpetrator.
Id. ¶¶ 43-45.
Detective Carin wrote in the Application the following concerning Jackson:
The suspect was identified by Montgomery County Police officers who have had
prior law enforcement contacts with the suspect. The officers identified the suspect
as Angelo Lamont Jackson (B/M; DOB 03/26/1999). Investigators obtained a
photograph of Angelo Lamont Jackson. That photograph matched the suspect
depicted in the video.

Appl. For Statement of Charges (“Appl.”) 2, ECF No. 1-4. Neither the still from the surveillance
video nor the picture of Jackson was included in the Application. Compl. ¶ 61.
A Commissioner approved the arrest warrant and on Wednesday, January 11, 2017,
Detective Carin arrested Jackson. Id. ¶ 80. Jackson communicated to Detective Carin that he did
not commit any crimes at the Wheaton Mall, however Detective Carin charged Jackson with two
counts of first-degree murder. Id. at 83. After further investigation, Detective Carin “obtained
cell phone records, witness statements confirming [Jackson]’s alibi, and other exculpatory
evidence confirming that [Jackson] was not the suspect depicted on the video.” Id. ¶ 91. Detective
Carin did not communicate this exculpatory information to the Prosecutor, and as a result, Jackson
was detained for approximately sixty-five days. Id. ¶¶ 93-94. A grand jury returned an indictment
against Jackson for murder.2 Def.’s Mem. 3 n.1, ECF No. 11-1. In March 2017, prosecutors
dropped all charges against Jackson, because there was insufficient evidence to proceed “in part
based on the determination that the suspect shown on the surveillance video was not [Jackson].
Jackson filed this lawsuit against Detective Carin asserting five claims: (1) violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, i.e. unlawful pretrial detention, (2) violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983 based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, i.e. unlawful detention, (3) violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, i.e. malicious prosecution, (4)
violations of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (5) gross negligence.
See Compl. at 11-18.
Defendants seek to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Mot. to Dismiss 1. The parties have fully briefed their arguments. See ECF Nos.
11, 12, 13. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. Because Jackson has alleged facts
sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the warrant for his arrest was not based on
probable cause, and that Detective Carin’s actions were not in accordance with clearly established

law, the motion to dismiss is denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint if it fails
“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion pursuant to this rule “tests the
sufficiency of a complaint; it does not, however, ‘resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.’” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir.

2 This fact is not included in Jackson’s complaint, however, as Fed. R. Evid. 201 allows, I take
judicial notice of the fact that on January 27, 2017, a grand jury indicted Jackson for murder.
Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most
frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the contents of court records.’”) (quoting 21 C. Wright
& K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5106 at 505 (1977)).
2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome
the motion, the “complaint ‘must contain sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its
face.’” Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir.
2012) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.
2011)). The court, in reviewing the motion, “‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the complaint’ and ‘draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.’”
Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 684 F.3d at 467 (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 572
F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)). Additionally, “[a] court passing on a motion to dismiss may
consider attachments to a complaint or the motion to dismiss if ‘integral to the complaint and
authentic.’” Leichling v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 842 F.3d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 2016).
DISCUSSION
Detective Carin argues that Jackson’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted for four reasons: (1) Jackson did not suffer a violation of
his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful detention because his arrest was based on probable

cause, (2) even if the warrant was not based on probable cause, Detective Carin is nevertheless
entitled to qualified immunity, (3) because the federal claims should be dismissed, so should the
state constitutional claims, and (4) Jackson did not allege sufficient factual support to sustain a
gross negligence claim. See Mot. to Dismiss 1-2.
Detective Carin argues that Jackson’s first three claims center around one issue: whether
he had probable cause to seek an arrest warrant for Jackson. Def.’s Mem. 6. This is because
Jackson’s first count is for a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful detention
and the second and third counts are for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on violations of the
Fourth Amendment. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (holding that when a plaintiff
asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an officer asserts qualified immunity, the court
must determine whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right,” and “whether the right asserted was clearly established”); see generally Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (eliminating the requirement that a court must answer these
questions in a particular order). Therefore, the first three counts all rely on establishing a violation

of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and more specifically, establishing that the
arrest warrant for Jackson was not supported by probable cause. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137
S. Ct. 911 (2017) (holding that pretrial detention violates the Fourth Amendment when detention
is unsupported by probable cause); Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding
that to establish a constitutional violation based on malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show
that s/he was seized pursuant to a legal process unsupported by probable cause). I agree with
Detective Carin that the viability of the first three counts turns on whether Jackson’s arrest was
based on probable cause, then on whether Detective Carin is entitled to qualified immunity, and
lastly whether Jackson’s state claims survive.

Jackson has alleged facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could find his arrest was
unsupported by probable cause
Probable cause for an arrest “exists where the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed
by the person to be arrested.” Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n.9 (1979) (citations,
quotation marks, and original brackets omitted). It has long been settled by the Supreme Court
that, ordinarily, “an indictment, ‘fair upon its face,’ returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury,’
conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189
(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.3 (1975)). However, “a grand
jury’s decision to indict will not shield a police officer who deliberately supplied misleading
information that influenced the decision.” Id. (citations, quotation marks, and original brackets
omitted). Therefore, because Jackson was indicted, he must—and does—allege that Detective
Carin, in applying for the warrant, “deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made

material false statements in his affidavit” or “omitted from that affidavit material facts with the
intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.”
Miller v. Prince George’s Cty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Reckless disregard with respect to false statements is established “‘when viewing all the
evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had
obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v.
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)). Reckless disregard for omissions is established by
evidence that “a police officer ‘failed to inform the judicial officer of facts he knew would negate

probable cause.’” Id. (quoting Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Inc., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.
2003)). The false statements or omissions must be material, in that if the facts that were omitted
were included and if the facts that were false were corrected, the warrant affidavit would not
establish probable cause. Id. at 628.
Jackson alleges that Detective Carin intentionally, or with reckless disregard, made the
following false statements in the Application: (1) Jackson “matched the suspect depicted in the
video,” (2) officers had positively “identified the suspect as Angelo Lamont Jackson.” Compl. ¶¶
110, 113; Appl. 2. Jackson alleges that Detective Carin intentionally, or with reckless disregard,
omitted the fact that other officers disagreed that Jackson resembled the suspect in the video, and
omitted the photo of Jackson and the still from the surveillance video. Compl. ¶¶ 112, 114.
Jackson alleges these false statements and omissions were material because they “caused the
commissioner to approve the request for an arrest warrant of [Jackson].” Id. ¶ 117. Detective
Carin argues that his use of the word “identified” instead of “resembled” is an issue of semantics,
Reply 3, ECF No. 13, and that his statement that Jackson “matched” the suspect in the video was

not made with reckless disregard for its falsity because “[Jackson] has no factual evidence that
Detective Carin knew that [Jackson] was not the person depicted in the video.” Id. at 2.
But at this stage of the proceedings, Jackson is not required to “prove” anything, merely to
allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. And he has alleged facts sufficient to allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find that he intentionally or recklessly made materially false assertions
or material omissions in his affidavit, without which, it would not support probable cause. In
McPhearson v. Anderson, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
denied an officer’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged an officer provided materially false information leading to the plaintiff’s arrest.

873 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758 (E.D. Va. 2016). The officer had incorrectly provided the plaintiff’s
(Antonio Demond McPhearson’s) information on a warrant, instead of the alleged assailant’s
(Antonio Roshawn McPherson’s) information, leading to the arrest of the plaintiff. Id. at 757. The
court manifested its skepticism that the defendant officer “did anything more than make an
‘innocent mistake’ confusing two nearly identical names,” but because the plaintiff alleged that
the officer “procured the prosecution of Plaintiff falsely. . . and with full knowledge that the charge
was without any reasonable or probable cause whatsoever,” the court had to assume the pleaded
facts as true and deny the motion to dismiss. Id. The same is true here. As pleaded, “Detective
Carin acted with reckless disregard when he wrote that [Jackson] ‘matched the suspect in the
video,’” and “recklessly misrepresented and overexaggerated [sic] the extent to which MCDEP
officers identified [Jackson].” Compl. ¶¶ 110, 113. Furthermore, Jackson alleges that Detective
Carin’s “failure to provide material exculpatory information [was] made with reckless disregard.”
Id. ¶ 115. And that “it was, or should have been apparent to Carin that the picture of [Jackson]
did not match the perpetrator on the surveillance video.” Id. ¶ 59. A reasonable fact finder could

find that an Application that: included the still, a photo of Jackson that Detective Carin knew or
should have known did not match the still, the fact that officers did not identify Jackson but merely
spoke to a resemblance, and the fact that some officers disagreed about a resemblance, lacked
probable cause.
Jackson also claims that Detective Carin’s failure to investigate contributes to the
likelihood of a reasonable fact finder concluding the warrant was not issued upon probable cause,
and I agree. “A police officer’s failure to pursue potentially exculpatory evidence [is] not in itself
sufficient to negate probable cause.” Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991).
However, the Fourth Circuit has held that evidence of an officer’s failure to investigate, amongst

other indicia of a lack of probable cause, formed a sufficient basis to sustain a jury verdict that an
arrest was not based on probable cause. Clipper v. Takoma Park, MD, 876 F.2d 17, 19-20 (4th
Cir. 1989).
The facts of Clipper are informative. In that case, two armed men held up a bank, and
although Takoma Park police officers were able to capture one of the men and the getaway driver,
one man escaped. Id. at 18. As part of the investigation, officers obtained a detailed description
of the man from the bank manager. Id. Police officers determined the getaway car was registered
to the plaintiff, Clipper, leading police to bring him in for questioning where he told police that he
had been home the afternoon of the robbery and that this could be corroborated by two neighbors.
Id. at 18-19. Officer Starkey thought Clipper “roughly matched the description of the escaped
robber” but the only officer who saw the robber, Officer Wortman, was “unable to make a positive
identification.” Id. Officer Starkey took photographs of Clipper and brought them to the bank
for identification where the bank manager and another employee identified Clipper as the robber.
Id. at 19. Officer Starkey obtained a warrant and arrested Clipper, but charges were dropped when

the bank manager stated Clipper was not the robber. A jury found that Clipper was arrested without
probable cause and the defendant appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed because “there was ample
evidence” supported the verdict because: (1) no officer pursued evidence they could have gotten
from Clipper’s neighbors that would have corroborated his alibi, (2) Officer Wortman could only
say Clipper looked like the robber, but “he was not sure that Clipper was the man,” and (3) Clipper
contends that stills from the bank surveillance cameras “would have conclusively established that
he was not the missing robber.” Id.
Likewise, Detective Carin’s failure to investigate is relevant to the probable cause
determination here. Jackson alleges that Detective Carin failed to show the only two eyewitnesses

a photo of Jackson for identification and that Detective Carin could have learned of Jackson’s alibi
had he interviewed Jackson before the arrest because multiple individuals and information on his
cell phone would have corroborated his location at the time of the incident.3 Just as in Clipper,
the lack of investigation, coupled with statements from officers that did not amount to a positive
identification, and allegations that the photograph of the arrestee and the perpetrator contained so

3 Clipper is distinguishable in that Jackson does not allege that he made Detective Carin aware of
the names of people who could have corroborated his alibi. The Fourth Circuit has since
characterized the actions of the officer in Clipper as having ignored “readily available exculpatory
evidence of which he has been made aware.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 264. However, an officer’s
alleged willful blindness (such as Detective Carin’s) as to the availability of exculpatory evidence,
is a factor that is relevant to the probable cause determination.
many differences that it “was or should have been apparent to Carin” that they did not match, leads
me to conclude that Jackson has alleged facts from which a reasonable fact finder may find the
arrest was not supported by probable cause.
Jackson has alleged facts from which a reasonable trier of fact may conclude that Carin is
not entitled to qualified immunity

Qualified immunity shields police officers and other government officials from liability for
civil damages under § 1983 “when they perform their duties reasonably.” Wilson v. Prince
George’s Cty., 893 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009)). That is to say, it “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
To assess whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, courts must make two
determinations: (1) “whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, establish that the officer’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right,” and (2)

“whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the officer’s conduct.” Wilson,
893 F.3d at 219 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Because I have determined that according to
the facts alleged, a reasonable trier of fact may find that probable cause did not exist to arrest
Jackson, Detective Carin is only entitled to qualified immunity if Jackson’s right was not clearly
established.
Courts conduct this inquiry “by determining whether a reasonable officer would have
understood that his conduct violated the asserted right.” Miller, 475 F.3d at 627. The “salient
question is whether the state of the law at the time gives officials fair warning that their conduct is
unconstitutional.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). “Although earlier cases involving
‘fundamentally similar’ facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law
is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding.” Id. at 741.
“[T]he Supreme Court has long held that a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment
if, in order to obtain a warrant, he deliberately or ‘with reckless disregard for the truth’ makes
material false statements or omits material facts.” Miller, 475 F.3d at 631 (quoting Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). As explained above, according to the facts alleged, a
reasonable trier of fact may find that Detective Carin deliberately, or with reckless disregard for
the truth, made material misrepresentations and omissions in the Application for Jackson’s arrest
warrant. He is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. Smith v. Reddy, 101 F.3d 351, 355
(4th Cir. 1996) (“[A] reasonable officer cannot believe a warrant is supported by probable cause
if the magistrate is misled by statements that the officer knows or should know are false.”).4
Jackson’s claims under the Maryland State Constitution survive
Jackson’s fourth count asserts that his rights under the Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights were violated based on his claims asserting the violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.5 Compl. ¶¶ 153-54.

4 Detective Carin argues that because the Fourth Circuit held in Torchinsky that an officer was
entitled to qualified immunity because “it is difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain
better evidence of probable cause than an identification by name of assailants provided by a
victim,” he is entitled to qualified immunity as well. 942 F.2d at 262. This argument fails for two
reasons: (1) Torchinsky is plainly distinguishable from the facts alleged here, since no victim
identified Jackson as the assailant, and (2) the Torchinsky court did not find that the plaintiff
alleged facts sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the officer intentionally
or recklessly provided misleading information on the warrant application, as Jackson does here;
the warrant in Torchinsky was supported by probable cause.
5 In Maryland, state constitutional claims, such as these, are not defeated by an assertion of
qualified immunity. See Robles, 302 F.3d at 273; Williams v. Prince George’s Cty., 685 A.2d 884,
894 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
Article 26 provides in relevant part: “That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, . . . to
seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive. . . .” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 26.
This article is understood to be in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. See Wilson, 893 F.3d at 224; Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 536 (4th Cir. 2011);
Henderson v. State, 597 A.2d 486, 488 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). I have already explained why

I am declining to dismiss Jackson’s Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983, and for those same
reasons, I decline to dismiss the Article 26 claim.
Article 24 provides: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his
freehold, liberties or privileges . . . or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 24. This provision is
“generally interpreted as being synonymous” with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Branch v. McGeeney, 718 A.2d 631, 642 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); see also Robles
v. Prince George’s Cty., 302 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2002). Because Jackson’s Fourth Amendment
claim, and therefore his claim under Article 26, is not dismissed, neither is his Fourteenth

Amendment claim, and therefore his claim under Article 24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (holding the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Jackson has alleged sufficient facts that would allow a fact finder to conclude that Detective
Carin was grossly negligent
Jackson’s last count alleges that Detective Carin acted with gross negligence. Detective
Carin argues this claim should be dismissed because Jackson “alleges—without factual
substantiation—that Detective Carin acted with wanton negligence in his investigation.” Def.’s
Mem. 24. Detective Carin’s motion to dismiss this count is also denied.
Maryland courts define gross negligence as a “reckless disregard of the consequences as
affecting the life or property of another.” Torbit v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 153 A.3d 847,
856 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 2017); see also Shoemaker v. Smith, 725 A.2d 549, 559 (Md. 1999) (likening
gross negligence to “reckless or wanton misconduct”). Because above I found that Jackson alleged
facts from which a reasonable trier of fact may find that Detective Carin acted either intentionally

or with a reckless disregard in causing a Commissioner to issue an arrest warrant for Jackson not
based on probable cause, by implication, Jackson has also alleged facts from which a reasonable
trier of fact may find he was grossly negligent.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Jackson has alleged facts sufficient to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude
that the Application Detective Carin executed was not based on probable cause, and that it was
clearly established at the time of Detective Carin’s Application that a police officer cannot lawfully
make intentionally or recklessly false material statements or omission to obtain a warrant.
Therefore, at this stage, all of Jackson’s counts survive this motion to dismiss.

ORDER
Accordingly, on this second day of March, by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that Detective Carin’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 11,
IS DENIED.

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10203235. Public record. Not legal advice.