# Sosa v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · March 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201906

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** March 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201906

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding plaintiff lacked standing to enjoin city police officers from illegally restraining plaintiff in the future

## Opinion text

United States District Court
District of Massachusetts

)
Che Blake Sosa, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No.
) 18-12223-NMG
Massachusetts Department of )
Corrections et al., )
)
Defendant. )
)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GORTON, J.
Che Blake Sosa (“Sosa” or “plaintiff”) filed this suit in
October, 2018, when he was an inmate incarcerated at
Massachusetts Correctional Institute (“MCI”) Cedar Junction. He
brings constitutional and statutory claims concerning the
conditions of his confinement and the purported failure of
numerous prison and medical officials to accommodate his request
for modified handcuffing procedures due to his osteoarthritis.
After counsel was appointed at his request to assist Sosa
in this civil case, he filed several amended complaints and
conducted extensive discovery. The Department of Corrections
defendants (“DOC Defendants”) and medical provider defendants
(“Medical Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment on all
counts (Docket Nos. 205, 218, 221) and, for the reasons that
follow, those motions will be allowed.1

I. Background
Three counts, which have not previously been disposed of,
remain to be considered at summary judgment: 1) alleged

deliberate indifference to a serious medical issue in violation
of the Eighth Amendment by individual DOC and Medical Defendants
(Count I), 2) alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment for
imposition of conditions of confinement by individual DOC
Defendants (Count III) and 3) alleged violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 by the Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) and DOC Commissioner Carol Mici in her
official capacity (Count IV). Sosa seeks both monetary and
injunctive relief.
Sosa has been convicted of multiple counts of aggravated

rape and related offenses and is currently serving the
equivalent of a life sentence. He has been in the custody of
the DOC since 2001, when he was a pretrial detainee. During

1 The Department of Corrections defendants include the Department itself and
Stephanie Collins (“Collins”), Michael Rodrigues (“Rodrigues”), Joann Lynds
(“Lynds”), James O’Gara (“O’Gara”), Carol Higgins O’Brien (“Higgins O’Brien”)
and James Saba (“Saba”) in their individual capacities and Carol Mici
(“Mici”) in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of
Corrections. The Medical Defendants are Vanessa Rattigan (“Rattigan”), Dr.
Aysha Hameed (“Dr. Hameed”) and Jenny Vieira (“Vieira”).
that time, he has been found guilty of several disciplinary
infractions for which he has served extensive time in the
Department Disciplinary Unit (“DDU”). Sosa was housed in the
DDU from June, 2003 until March, 2020 and thereafter, was moved
to the Behavioral Management Unit (“BMU”). Since September,
2021, Sosa has been housed at the Souza-Baranowski Correctional

Center (“SBCC”). He asserts that he was held in what amounted
to solitary confinement for 23 or 24 hours each day from June,
2003 until April, 2022. The DOC Defendants respond that housing
in the DDU is not solitary confinement but rather, is a form of
segregation.
Sosa has suffered from degenerative bilateral joint disease
in his shoulders for over 20 years. Because his right shoulder
pain did not respond to cortisone, he underwent surgery in
January, 2005 for right shoulder impingement syndrome and
osteoarthritis of the AC joint. Based on his shoulder
condition, medical officials at MCI Cedar Junction issued a

medical restriction against behind-the-back cuffing.
In July, 2006, Sosa stabbed two guards in an attempt to
obtain their cell keys in an on-going altercation with another
inmate. The medical restriction prohibiting cuffing behind the
back was discontinued and other security precautions were
imposed, including the use of the MCI Cedar Junction tactical
response team whenever Sosa was allowed to leave his cell.
In September, 2019, after a hearing on Sosa’s pro se motion
for a preliminary injunction, this Court ordered DOC to retain
an independent doctor to examine plaintiff. After that
examination, an analysis of Sosa’s severe osteoarthritis
(detailed in the so-called “Elman Report”), subsequent hearings
and DOC participation, a modified handcuffing procedure was

implemented.
In March, 2020, plaintiff filed another motion which this
Court treated as a motion for a preliminary injunction, and
which ultimately resulted in the manufacture and use by the DOC
of double-length handcuffs for Sosa.
In September, 2020, a physician’s assistant, retained to
make an independent assessment, concluded that the custom cuffs
alleviated Sosa’s pain to a certain extent.
This Court found that the custom-designed cuffs represented
a reasonable accommodation of plaintiff’s medical condition.
Accordingly, it denied the motion for a preliminary injunction

but directed the DOC to continue using the modified restraints
indefinitely. Plaintiff appealed the order to the First Circuit
Court of Appeals (“First Circuit”) which ultimately affirmed it
in August, 2023.
In July, 2023, the Court allowed plaintiff to file a second
amended complaint. Both the DOC and Medical Defendants answered
the complaint and now move for summary judgment.
II. Motions for Summary Judgment
A. Deliberate Indifference
In Count I of the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff
alleges that individual Medical and DOC Defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by requiring him to wear behind-the-back
handcuffs.2 He contends that the maintenance of such a cuffing

procedure until 2020 constitutes deliberate indifference to his
osteoarthritis.
Plaintiff seeks both injunctive and monetary relief. This
Court and the First Circuit have, however, sufficiently
considered the propriety of Sosa’s modified restraints that have
been used since February, 2020. See Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep’t
of Corr., 494 F. Supp. 3d 37, 38-39 (D. Mass. 2020) (“Sosa II”)
aff’d, 80 F.4th 15 (1st Cir. 2023). Accordingly, insofar as
plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the modified restraint
procedure in place since February, 2020, his claim is without
merit. To the extent Sosa seeks to require defendants to

continue using the custom-designed cuffs permanently, that
motion has already been allowed.
Now, the Court is asked to decide whether Sosa is entitled
to monetary damages for the conduct of the individual defendants
in restraining Sosa in behind-the-back cuffs from October, 2015,

2 All individual defendants except for Saba and Mici are included in Count I.
the earliest date within the limitations period, until February,
2020.
The Eighth Amendment, as made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, proscribes the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain...repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)

(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, states have an
obligation to provide inmates with adequate medical care. See
Wittkowski v. Levine, 382 F. Supp. 3d 107, 113 (D. Mass. 2019)
(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103).
To prove a state actor has failed to comply with that
obligation, an inmate must establish both an objective and
subjective prong. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st
Cir. 2014) (en banc).
To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate
must establish that he had a serious medical need[ ]
for which the defendants provided inadequate care.

Lazarre v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL 111996, *5 (D.
Mass. Jan. 9, 2024) (quoting Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474,
494-95 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration
in original)). However, “a serious medical need does not
require that an inmate receive the best possible treatment that
money can buy.” Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015)
(quotations and citations omitted).
The subjective prong requires a showing that prison
administrators were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s
serious medical need. Such indifference comprises a “narrow
band of conduct...and requires evidence that the failure in
treatment was purposeful.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83. The obvious
case of deliberate indifference is denial of treatment to punish

an inmate. Id. However, wanton disregard of a medical issue may
also constitute deliberate indifference if it is “akin to
criminal recklessness, requiring consciousness of impending
harm, easily preventable.” Id. (quoting Watson v. Caton, 984
F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted)).
In addition, security interests which are fundamental to the
operation of a prison facility are accorded significant weight.
Id. (citing Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir.
2011)).
Here, the First Circuit has noted that the restraint
procedures in dispute in this case debatably “qualify as medical

care.” Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., 80 F.4th 15, 26
(1st Cir. 2023). Nonetheless, that Court determined to proceed
under the deliberate indifference standard for medical care
because it found Sosa’s claim for injunctive relief was
deficient even taking the “framing on its own terms.” Id.
This Court will do likewise. It will assume without
deciding that plaintiff’s osteoarthritis in his shoulder
constitutes a serious medical condition. Nonetheless, the Court
finds that no genuine issue of material fact remains because
defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that they did not act
with wanton disregard of plaintiff’s medical needs.
The parties only briefly discuss the second component of
the objective prong, namely, whether the care provided was

objectively inadequate. The Court recognizes that the question
is difficult to answer because restraint procedures are not, in
fact, a form of medical care at all.
1. Vanessa Rattigan
During the events at issue, Vanessa Rattigan was the
administrator in charge of running the prison’s medical unit.
One of her duties was to advocate on behalf of inmates before
medical providers but, even though she is a registered nurse by
trade, she did not provide medical care to inmates.
Plaintiff blames Rattigan for 1) the denial of his ADA
accommodation request and 2) providing insufficient

documentation to ADA Coordinator James O’Gara, who reviewed her
denial.
At some point, Sosa submitted an ADA accommodation request
to modify his cuffing procedure. He claims that “in
consultation” with a medical provider, Rattigan “opined” there
was no medical basis for his request which is contrary to her
deposition testimony that she believed, from a medical
standpoint, it was “probably not” reasonable to deny the
accommodation request.
Rattigan retorts that, as an administrator, she had no
responsibility for any medical decisions related to Sosa. He
partially concedes that point but maintains that she had “the
ability to at least influence” the accommodation decision.

The Court concludes that plaintiff’s allegation is too
attenuated to suggest that Rattigan wantonly disregarded his
medical need at the first level of ADA review. There is no
genuine issue of material fact that Rattigan was not acting in a
medical capacity and that she relied on the advice of medical
providers in denying the request.
Nor does Rattigan’s purported deficient transfer of medical
documents to O’Gara rise to the level of deliberate
indifference. Sosa appealed the denial of his ADA request to
the DOC’s ADA Coordinator, O’Gara. He contends that the appeal
was denied because Rattigan sent O’Gara only the latest medical

record from his most-recent evaluation.
Rattigan rejoins, and plaintiff does not deny, that she
advocated for plaintiff to O’Gara by suggesting that further
evaluations were warranted and that she would send along
additional information related to “x-rays, MRIs, etc.,” if
requested.
Far from constituting evidence of indifference, the
undisputed facts suggest that Rattigan appropriately carried out
her administrative role by providing O’Gara with the relevant
information concerning Sosa’s recent medical history and offered
to provide more documentation upon request. Even taking as true
his contention that Rattigan should have initially provided more

medical documentation, her actions fall far short of
demonstrating “criminal recklessness, requiring consciousness of
impending harm, easily preventable.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83.
2. Dr. Ayesha Hameed
Dr. Ayesha Hameed was the Medical Director of the facility
and was responsible for an array of patient care functions as
well as for the supervision of other providers. Sosa contends
that she was deliberately indifferent to his osteoarthritis by
not recommending a change in cuffing procedures despite her
awareness of his condition.
Dr. Hameed responds that she made a reasonable evaluation

in April, 2016 that Sosa did not need front handcuffs based upon
a “bilateral gross exam” during which Dr. Hameed observed no
muscle atrophy, erythema or tenderness on palpitation. She did
observe “normal reflexes bilaterally” and she learned that
plaintiff engaged in a number of exercises, including push-ups
and pull-ups. Nonetheless, in April, 2016, she ordered x-rays
and referred plaintiff to an orthopedist, but plaintiff refused
to keep the appointment.
Sosa contends that 1) Dr. Hameed’s medical assessments were
irrelevant to treating his osteoarthritis, 2) his push-ups and
pull-ups are not valid indicators of his pain while in behind-
the-back restraints and 3) he refused the orthopedist consult

because it would have required him to use the rear restraints
while traveling to and from the consultation.
His contentions are unavailing. The case law establishes
that
prison officials are not required to render ideal
care, let alone cater to an inmate’s preferred
healthcare regimen.

Snell, 998 F.3d at 495. The propriety of Dr. Hameed’s response
is not based on an objective analysis of medical necessity but
rather, on “what was known and understood by prison officials in
crafting their policy.” Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91.
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Hameed took
affirmative measures to aid Sosa in his medical condition. She
evaluated him and made observations that, in her medical
judgment, rendered a change in cuffing procedure unnecessary.
Sosa’s insistence that the Court second-guess her medical
judgment is rejected. He has produced no evidence suggesting
Dr. Hameed subjectively believed her response to plaintiff’s
condition was insufficient nor that she acted with wanton
disregard in light of her evaluation of plaintiff, her order of
x-rays and her offer to refer plaintiff to an orthopedist.
3. Jennifer Vieira
Jennifer Vieira was a nurse practitioner at the prison
facility who evaluated Sosa’s shoulder pain. The thrust of his
claim against Vieira is that she, like Dr. Hameed, did not

prescribe a change in cuffing procedure in light of Sosa’s
osteoarthritis and complaints of pain.
In moving for summary judgment, Vieira contends that she 1)
reviewed plaintiff’s most recent medical records, 2) offered an
evaluation in which Sosa refused to participate, 3) ten months
later, evaluated plaintiff beside his cell and 4) post-
evaluation, offered plaintiff an orthopedist referral and
ordered x-rays.
Sosa insists that the evaluation was insufficient because
Vieira purportedly did not review his entire medical record and
that, in any event, his subjective complaints of pain more than

established his need for a cuffing modification. Furthermore,
plaintiff contends that requiring him to wear behind-the-back
restraints while being transported to and from the evaluation
presented an unfair Hobson’s choice.
Sosa’s contentions are once again unavailing. Vieira has
adduced undisputed evidence that she took affirmative steps to
treat his medical condition appropriately. The Court will not
second-guess Vieira’s medical judgment and notes that the
parties do not dispute that the 2012 record stated that rear-
cuffing would not cause further damage to plaintiff’s shoulder
despite causing him some pain. Because any description of pain
is subjective, it was not unreasonable for Vieira to recommend
an orthopedic evaluation before recommending a cuffing

modification.
While the evaluation itself was delayed for an extended
period of time following plaintiff’s purported refusal to submit
to rear-cuffing, that delay was understandable based on
plaintiff’s history of violence against members of the facility
staff. See Battista, 645 F.3d at 454 (“security considerations
also matter at prisons...and administrators have to balance
conflicting demands.”).
Ultimately, Vieira evaluated Sosa, referred him to an
orthopedist and purportedly ordered x-rays. The Court concludes
that, far from displaying deliberate indifference toward Sosa,

Vieira afforded sufficient care to plaintiff’s medical
condition.
4. DOC Defendants
The DOC Defendants also move for summary judgment on Count
I, asserting a defense of qualified immunity. In assessing the
application of qualified immunity, a court must determine
whether 1) “the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out
a violation of a constitutional right” and if so, 2) whether
that right was clearly established at the relevant time.
Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2024).
The DOC Defendants collectively assert that they
had not been informed by any medical professional that
Sosa had a condition for which modification to cuffing
was needed

until the January, 2020, issuance of the Elman Report. They
also contend that, as a general matter, they rely on the
opinions of medical professionals in making modification
decisions. Finally, the DOC Defendants explain that there were
strong penological reasons for Sosa’s cuffing procedure prior to
2020.
Sosa asserts that each of the DOC Defendants was, at a
minimum, aware of his shoulder condition and did nothing to
alleviate his pain or modify his cuffing procedure. It is well
established, however, that prison officials “are entitled to
defer to medical personnel on medical questions.” Snell v.
Descoteaux, 2022 WL 813831, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 16, 2022)
(internal quotations omitted).
There is no genuine issue of material fact that DOC
Defendants acted reasonably in deferring to the judgment of
medical professionals that Sosa had not established a sufficient
medical need for modification of his cuffing procedure prior to
the Elman Report. Plaintiff contends that O’Gara misrepresented
Rattigan’s position as to there being no medical necessity for
the modification and erroneously relied on that
misrepresentation in denying plaintiff’s appeal. Rattigan was
not, however, a medical provider, and the record suggests that
DOC medical providers did not recommend a modification prior to
the Elman Report.

Notably, DOC Defendants acted promptly to accommodate
plaintiff following issuance of that report, which provided an
independent and objective basis for an accommodation. The
undisputed facts establish that the DOC Defendants did not act
with an intent to punish plaintiff or with a mental state akin
to criminal recklessness in denying his request for
accommodation prior to the issuance of the Elman Report.
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 83.
Furthermore, DOC Defendants were aware that plaintiff posed
a serious security risk following multiple acts of violence
against DOC personnel. Because of those security concerns, any

pain plaintiff experienced while in rear restraints was not
“easily preventable.” Id.
Accordingly, DOC Defendants did not violate plaintiff’s
constitutional rights and thus are entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment on Count I.
B. Conditions of Confinement
Sosa alleges § 1983 claims against the DOC Defendants as
well as Rattigan arising out of his isolation in the DDU. He
contends that, in addition to exacerbating his shoulder issues,
his isolation caused severe psychiatric symptoms, including
suicidal ideation. Accordingly, he was frequently placed on

mental health watch in the DDU’s “D Wing” adjacent to the Health
Services Unit.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement
that lack any penological justification. See Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). A condition of confinement claim
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment requires plaintiff to
demonstrate that 1) objectively he was treated in a manner that
risked excessive harm to his health or safety and 2)
subjectively defendants showed deliberate indifference to those
risks. See Feijoo v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 62 F.Supp.3d
198, 201 (D. Mass. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

1. Injunctive Relief
It is unclear whether Sosa seeks injunctive relief as to
the conditions of his confinement. He was removed from the DDU
to the BMU, a unit specifically created to provide an
alternative placement for DDU inmates who suffer from a severe
mental illness (“SMI”). He was then moved from the BMU to SBCC
in September, 2021, where he now has “access to a window,
canteen [and] a computer tablet for reading.” Because plaintiff
suggests he is no longer under the conditions that form the
basis of Count III, injunctive relief is unwarranted and summary
judgment on Count III will be entered in favor of Commissioner
Mici who is sued only in her official capacity. As already
discussed, however, the DOC is obligated pursuant to the Court’s

October, 2020, order, to use the custom-designed cuffs on
plaintiff indefinitely in lieu of standard behind-the-back
restraints.
2. James Saba
Defendant James Saba contends that he left his position as
Superintendent of MCI Cedar Junction in October, 2015, for
medical leave and never returned. Thus, he did not participate
in any of the alleged relevant events. While Sosa does not
dispute that Saba began medical leave in October, 2015, he
asserts that Saba was still in contact with DOC administrators
during his absence and that, in any event, the statute of

limitations should be equitably tolled.
Accepting plaintiff’s version of events for the sake of
argument, merely communicating with and advising staff while on
leave is insufficient to raise a triable issue concerning
liability for Sosa’s conditions of confinement. Critically,
plaintiff does not assert that Saba specifically advised on
Sosa’s conditions of confinement while on leave.
Furthermore, there is no basis for tolling the limitations
period. Equitable tolling is only available in exceptional
circumstances. See Martin v. Somerset Cty., 86 F.4th 938, 944
(1st Cir. 2023). There is an open question of law as to whether
equitable tolling of § 1983 cases is governed by federal or
state law, see id. at 944-45, however, plaintiff’s attempt to

avail himself of that doctrine fails in either event.
Under both state and federal law, equitable tolling is a
rare exception, not the rule. On Sosa’s telling of events, he
was incapacitated and in isolation at the DDU from 2015 until at
least 2019 or 2020. He filed this suit, pro se, in 2018 under
the same conditions. This is not an extraordinary case where
tolling is warranted and accordingly, Saba is entitled to
summary judgment.
3. Stephanie Collins
During the relevant time period, Stephanie Collins was
Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Clinical Services. In that

capacity, she asserts she was only generally aware of the DDU
and did not know the specifics of Sosa’s conditions of
confinement. Rather, her role was to ensure continuity of
health services for Sosa when he was transferred to the DDU.
The undisputed evidence reveals that Collins had no role in
determining or maintaining the conditions of Sosa’s confinement
that form the basis of Count III. Accordingly, Collins has
sufficiently demonstrated that she did not wantonly disregard
excessive risks to Sosa’s health. She is entitled to summary
judgment.
4. Michael Rodrigues
Michael Rodrigues was Superintendent of the prison facility
from March, 2016 to November, 2017. He contends that 1) Sosa

was appropriately placed in the DDU during that time due to a
continued pattern of infractions and 2) Sosa was at times placed
in the “D Wing” of the DDU on the advice of medical experts.
The undisputed evidence establishes that Sosa was in the
DDU when Rodrigues became Superintendent and that during his
short stint as Superintendent, Sosa incurred 32 disciplinary
actions for which he was found guilty and faced sanctions.
While the misconducts varied in severity, at least some involved
acts or threats of violence.
Furthermore, evidence that Rodrigues had frequent
discussions with Sosa about his behavior but that Sosa self-

sabotaged his progress suggests that Rodrigues was not
deliberately indifferent to Sosa’s conditions. Finally, the
Court finds that Rodrigues appropriately deferred to medical
personnel concerning mental health issues arising from Sosa’s
placement in the “D Wing.”
5. Carol Higgins O’Brien
Former DOC Commissioner Carol Higgins O’Brien, who was
commissioner from September, 2014, to April, 2016, contends that
she was not personally aware of Sosa’s shoulder pain or his
mental health diagnoses. Furthermore, she asserts that she
never received correspondence from Prisoners’ Legal Services

concerning Sosa, and that, as is customary at DOC, any such
correspondence was processed by administrative staff.
The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to adduce
evidence demonstrating that Higgins O’Brien had any personal
involvement in the alleged events. Accordingly, summary
judgment will enter as to Higgins O’Brien on Count III.
6. Vanessa Rattigan
As discussed above, Rattigan was the administrator in
charge of the prison’s medical unit. She contends that she had
nothing to do with Sosa’s conditions of confinement and he has
proffered no evidence to the contrary.

Most of plaintiff’s allegations directed against Rattigan
have already been addressed. While Sosa alleges that Rattigan
was aware of his conditions of confinement and took no action,
there is no evidence that she had any control over those
conditions. The undisputed evidence indicates that Rattigan did
not act with wanton disregard towards any purported excessive
risk to Sosa.
C. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claim
Finally, plaintiff seeks relief under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act to enjoin the DOC from 1) employing any
“restraint technique that requires manipulating Mr. Sosa’s
shoulder joints beyond the limitations of their mobility,” 2)
housing Sosa in isolation or 3) limiting his access to

programming, education, recreation and social opportunities.
To the extent that plaintiff seeks to recover damages, the claim
is barred by sovereign immunity. Title II of the ADA (“Title
II”) abrogates state sovereign immunity only to the extent that
state conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See United
States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158-59 (2006). As discussed
above, the Court finds no such violation.
With respect to injunctive relief, Title II provides that

no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12131.
To state a prima facie case under Title II, a plaintiff
must demonstrate he or she 1) is a qualified person with a
disability, 2) was “excluded from participation in, or denied
the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or
activities or was otherwise discriminated against” and 3) was
excluded, denied benefits or discriminated against because of
his or her disability. Snell, 998 F.3d at 499 (quoting Kiman v.
N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir. 2006)).
1. Cuffing Procedures
Sosa’s claim with respect to cuffing procedures is based on
a reasonable accommodation theory. The Court has already
determined that the double-length, custom-designed handcuffs

used on Sosa represent a reasonable accommodation of his
osteoarthritis. That determination is based on the Court’s
assessment that the double-length cuffs “avoid[] a substantial
risk of causing Mr. Sosa undue harm while still allowing the DOC
to maintain safety and security for its officers.” Sosa II, 494
F. Supp. 3d at 38-39. The order and its underlying rationale
were affirmed by the First Circuit.3 Sosa, 80 F.4th at 32-33.
While the Court’s initial determination was made with
respect to a motion for a preliminary injunction, Sosa has not
proffered any further evidence that would withstand summary
judgment. The Court notes, however, that its October, 2020,

order compels DOC to use the custom cuffs indefinitely.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment on Count IV as to
cuffing procedures will be allowed.

3 The First Circuit also noted that plaintiff’s framing of his requested
remedy within the context of ADA reasonable accommodation analysis was a
“poor fit.”
2. Isolation
Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin DOC policies concerning his
isolation and concomitant restriction from programming,
recreation and other social activities on account of his SMI.
The DOC moves for summary judgment, contending that Sosa 1)
never sought a reasonable accommodation to be moved out of DDU

placement, 2) was not identified as having an SMI until July,
2019, after which point he was removed to the BMU and 3) was
provided the same services as other inmates in the DDU.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating
that Sosa was denied access to services by reason of his
disability.
As discussed above, Sosa is no longer housed in the DDU or
BMU but resides, instead, at SBCC. To the extent that he
chooses to pursue a claim for injunctive relief under the ADA,
there is no evidence that the SBCC provides Sosa with inadequate
services on an unequal basis from other inmates housed there.

Finally, the parties do not address in their memoranda
plaintiff’s requests that the Court enjoin defendants from 1)
discriminating against Sosa on the basis of his disabilities, 2)
interfering with the present action or 3) retaliating against
him for bringing the present action. The Court has an
obligation to assess its subject matter jurisdiction and finds
that those requested remedies are not redressable in this forum.
See In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir.
1988). Plaintiff is asking, in effect, for an order directing
defendants to comply with the law. There is no necessity to
enter such an order because the DOC is required to do so in any
event. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108-09 (1983)
(finding plaintiff lacked standing to enjoin city police

officers from illegally restraining plaintiff in the future).

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the motions of defendants
Vanessa Rattigan, Dr. Ayesha Hameed and Jennifer Vieira in their
individual capacities for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 205 and
221) and the motion of defendants the Massachusetts Department
of Corrections, Stephanie Collins, Michael Rodrigues, Joann
Lynds, James O’Gara, Carol Higgins O’Brien and James Saba in
their individual capacities and Commissioner Carol Mici in her
official capacity (Docket No. 218) are ALLOWED.

So ordered.

_/s/ Nathaniel M. Gorton _
Nathaniel M. Gorton
United States District Judge

Dated: March 30, 2024

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201906. Public record. Not legal advice.