# WNAC, LLC v. VERIZON CORPORATE SERVICES GROUP, INC.

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · February 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201768

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** February 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

*
WNAC, LLC, *
*
Plaintiff, *
*
v. *
*
Civil Action No. 21-cv-10750-ADB
VERIZON CORPORATE SERVICES *
GROUP, INC. and NEXSTAR MEDIA *
GROUP, INC., *
*
Defendants. *
*
*

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BURROUGHS, D.J.

Plaintiff WNAC, LLC (“WNAC”) brought this action against Verizon Corporate
Services Group, Inc. (“Verizon”) and Nexstar Media Group, Inc. (“Nexstar”) (collectively,
“Defendants”), alleging that Defendants conspired to wrongfully retransmit the signal from
WNAC’s television broadcast station, WNAC-TV, in violation of the Copyright Act, and also
asserting various state law claims. See [ECF No. 84 (“Second Amended Complaint”)]. Verizon,
in turn, counterclaims alleging that WNAC violated Massachusetts General Law Chapter 93A
(“Chapter 93A”) by breaching the duty to negotiate in good faith imposed by the Federal
Communication Commission (“FCC”) rules relating to retransmission consent negotiations. See
[ECF No. 88 (“Counterclaim Complaint” or “CC”)]. Currently before the Court is WNAC’s
motion to dismiss Verizon’s counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
[ECF No. 89]. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 325 (the “Act”),
[n]o . . . multichannel video programming distributor shall retransmit the signal of
a broadcasting station, or any part thereof, except

(A) with the express authority of the originating station;
(B) under section 534 of this title, in the case of a station electing, in
accordance with this subsection, to assert the right to carriage under such
section; or
(C) under section 338 of this title, in the case of a station electing, in
accordance with this subsection, to assert the right to carriage under such
section.

Id. § 325(b)(1). “[T]elevision stations . . . every three years . . . , [must] make an election
between the right to grant retransmission consent under this subsection and the right to signal
carriage under section 534 of this title.” Id. § 325(b)(3)(B). Verizon is a multichannel video
programming distributor (“MVPD”) and WNAC is a broadcasting station within the meaning of
§ 325. [CC ¶¶ 1, 19].
Pursuant to its statutory rule-making authority under the Act, see 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3),
the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) promulgated rules (“FCC Rules”) that
mandate that “[t]elevision broadcast stations and [MVPDs] shall negotiate in good faith the
terms and conditions of retransmission consent agreements,” 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(a).
B. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from Verizon’s Counterclaim Complaint and assumed to be
true. See Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014).
Prior to January 2017, Verizon retransmitted WNAC’s broadcast signal in the
Providence, Rhode Island–New Bedford, Massachusetts market (“Providence–New Bedford
Market”) through a February 6, 2015 retransmission-consent agreement between Verizon and
LIN Television Corporation (“LIN”) (“February 2015 LIN Retransmission-Consent
Agreement”). [CC ¶¶ 9, 11]. Prior to 2017, LIN was authorized, as WNAC’s local marketing
agent, to negotiate retransmission consent on WNAC’s behalf. [Id.]. In exchange for the right to
retransmit WNAC’s signal, Verizon paid fees to LIN, a portion of which LIN “presumably

passed along” to WNAC. [Id.]. The February 2015 LIN Retransmission-Consent Agreement
provided that it would remain in place through August 5, 2017, unless the parties opted to
terminate it. [Id. ¶ 10]. In early 2015, LIN merged with Media General, Inc. [Id.]. The merged
entity, also named Media General, Inc. (“Media General”), succeeded to the February 2015
Retransmission Agreement. [Id.].
On December 30, 2016, Nexstar entered into a retransmission-consent agreement with
Verizon for the term January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019 (“December 2016 Nexstar
Retransmission-Consent Agreement”). [CC ¶ 12]. On January 13, 2017, Nexstar informed
Verizon that, effective on or around January 17, 2017, it was merging with and acquiring Media
General. [Id. ¶ 13]. Pursuant to the December 2016 Nexstar Retransmission-Consent

Agreement’s “after-acquired” provision, in the event that two conflicting retransmission-consent
agreements could apply to the same station, the December 2016 Nexstar Retransmission-Consent
Agreement “would govern ‘any additional television broadcast station’ of which ‘Nexstar
becomes the direct or indirect owner, operator, licensee, programmer, or manager.’” [Id. ¶ 14].
After Nexstar’s January 2017 acquisition of Media General, Verizon continued to
retransmit WNAC’s signal in the Providence–New Bedford Market, but stopped paying fees to
Medial General, pursuant to the February 2015 LIN Retransmission-Consent Agreement. [CC
¶ 15]. Instead, Verizon began paying fees to Nexstar for WNAC’s signal, and continued to do so
through December 2019, the end of the term for the December 2016 Nexstar Retransmission-
Consent Agreement. [Id.]. “At all times, Verizon believed in good faith that [the December
2016 Nexstar Retransmission-Consent Agreement] . . . properly authorized its retransmission of
WNAC’s signal from 2017 to 2019.” [Id. ¶ 16].
In or around November 2019, Verizon commenced direct negotiations with WNAC to

obtain retransmission consent for 2020 through 2022. [CC ¶ 17]. In December 2019, Verizon
and WNAC reached an agreement, through which WNAC consented to Verizon retransmitting
WNAC’s signal in the Providence–New Bedford Market for the term January 1, 2020 to
December 15, 2022. [Id.].
“At all times, Verizon had a significant number of subscribers in the [Providence–New
Bedford Market] . . . to whom it retransmitted WNAC’s signal.” [CC ¶¶ 11, 23].1 Likewise,
“WNAC was benefiting from [Verizon’s] retransmission [of its signal] by leveraging higher
advertising fees based on the station’s distribution on Verizon’s system.” [Id. ¶ 24]. Verizon
asserts that WNAC “knew throughout the 2017–2019 cycle [and through Verizon and WNAC’s
negotiations in late 2019] that Verizon was retransmitting [WNAC’s] signal.” [Id. ¶¶ 23–24].

Verizon further avers that “WNAC [also] knew that Nexstar acquired Media General in January
2017 and succeeded to its role as programmer for the WNAC station.” [Id. ¶ 22].
Finally, Verizon asserts that if, in 2017–2019, “WNAC believed – as it now alleges – that
Nexstar was not authorized to negotiate with or grant consent to Verizon on WNAC’s behalf in
2017–2019, FCC rules required it to commence retransmission-consent negotiations with
Verizon on its own,” as well as to “designate[] a representative to negotiate with Verizon who

1 At the time of the February 2015 LIN Retransmission-Consent Agreement, Verizon had nearly
150,000 subscribers in the Providence–New Bedford Market and had transmitted WNAC’s
signal for years before that. [CC ¶¶ 11, 23].
was authorized to make binding representations on its behalf.” [CC ¶ 25]. Verizon states that
WNAC did neither. [Id.].
C. Procedural Background
WNAC filed its original complaint on May 6, 2021, [ECF No. 1], and an amended

complaint on February 10, 2022, [ECF No. 40]. After the Court granted in part and denied in
part Defendants’ motions to dismiss WNAC’s state law claims, [ECF No. 60], Verizon filed its
answer and counterclaim to WNAC’s first amended complaint on January 24, 2023, [ECF No.
69]. WNAC then filed the Second Amended Complaint on March 2, 2023. [Second Amended
Complaint]. In turn, Verizon filed its Answer and Counterclaim to WNAC’s Second Amended
Complaint on March 16, 2023. [CC].
On March 24, 2023, WNAC moved to dismiss Verizon’s counterclaim, which Verizon
opposed on April 24, 2023. [ECF Nos. 89, 97].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all

well-pleaded facts, analyze those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d
74, 76, 80 (1st Cir. 2019). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but the counterclaim
must set forth “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). The alleged facts must be sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. “To cross the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable, but it
must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability.” Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682
F.3d 40, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The
plausibility standard invites a two-step pavane.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d
77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Grajales, 682 F.3d at 45). First, the Court “must separate the
[counterclaim’s] factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal
allegations (which need not be credited).” Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d
220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). Second, the Court “must determine whether the remaining factual

content allows a ‘reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz, 676 F.3d at 224).
III. DISCUSSION
Verizon alleges that despite WNAC’s knowledge that Verizon was retransmitting its
signal while paying elevated rates to Nexstar, and WNAC’s “stated belief that Verizon lacked
consent to retransmit [that] signal, WNAC failed to engage in negotiations with Verizon for its
consent to retransmit.” [CC ¶ 37]. Additionally, according to Verizon, “WNAC did not
designate an authorized representative to negotiate on its behalf; did not approach Verizon about
a retransmission-content agreement; and did not ever suggest that Nexstar lacked authority to
collect retransmission-consent fees on its behalf.” [Id.]. Verizon asserts that through these

inactions or omissions, WNAC violated the FCC Rules, or at least the spirit of the Rules, and
therefore engaged in unfair and/or deceptive acts or practices within the meaning of Chapter
93A. [Id. ¶ 38]. Verizon further alleges that WNAC’s conduct caused Verizon a “loss of money
or property,” by “necessitating Verizon’s defense of its interests in this litigation, entailing
significant litigation costs, including but not limited to its attorneys’ fees, and by causing the
inflated retransmission-consent fees that Verizon ultimately paid to Nexstar from 2017-2019.”
[Id. ¶ 41].
[Massachusetts] General Laws c. 93A, § 11, states, in relevant part: “[a]ny person
who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers any loss of
money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another
person who engages in any trade or commerce of an unfair method of competition
or an unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . may . . . bring an action in the superior
court . . . for damages and such equitable relief . . . as the court deems to be
necessary and proper.”
Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 887 N.E.2d 244, 258–59 (Mass. 2008) (quoting Mass.
Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 11). “To be successful, a plaintiff bringing a claim under § 11 must
establish (1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair method of competition or committed an
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as defined by G.L. c. 93A, § 2, or the regulations promulgated
thereunder; (2) a loss of money or property suffered as a result; and (3) a causal connection
between the loss suffered and the defendant’s unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice.” Auto
Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 17 N.E.3d 1066, 1074–75 (Mass. 2014).
WNAC asserts that its conduct, or inaction, was neither unfair nor deceptive, although its
arguments in its opening brief focus exclusively on unfairness. [ECF No. 90 at 15–23].
Specifically, it argues that its conduct was not unfair because the FCC Rules impose no duty on
WNAC to initiate negotiations with Verizon, and, “it is not within ‘the penumbra of some
established concept of unfairness’ for a commercial party to wait until a business relationship
ends before asserting its legal rights in court.” [Id. at 15–20 (quoting Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v.

Watts Regulator Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D. Mass. 2011))]. Additionally, WNAC asserts
that it never refused to negotiate or appoint an authorized representative, and in fact, it sent
letters to Verizon and other MVPDs informing them of its retransmission consent election and
identifying a point of contact for negotiations. [Id. at 20–23]. WNAC requests that the Court
take judicial notice of these letters. [Id. at 21–23].
In opposition, Verizon responds that WNAC offers a cramped reading of the FCC Rules,
and even if WNAC has not actually violated the regulations, it violated their spirit. [ECF No. 97
at 11–21]. Verizon asserts that the Rules “embody” “unfairness principles” because the FCC
Rules were “promulgated . . . to ensure that negotiations over retransmission consent ‘are
conducted in an atmosphere of honesty, purpose and clarity of process,’” and “impos[es] on
broadcasters a general ‘[d]uty to negotiate in good faith.’” [Id. at 12–13 (first citing PMP
Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1975); then citing
Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Retransmission

Consent Issues, First Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5445 ¶ 24 (2000) (“Good Faith Order”),
recon. granted in part, 16 FCC Rcd 15599 (2001); and then citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(a), (b)(1))].
As such, WNAC’s conduct falls “‘within at least the penumbra,’ of th[ose] unfairness
principles.” [Id. at 13]. Finally, according to Verizon, several of WNAC’s arguments, including
those related to WNAC’s alleged failure to designate a negotiation representative, contest
Verizon’s factual allegations, which is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss. [Id. at 21–22].
“Chapter 93A does not define what constitutes an ‘unfair or deceptive act or practice.’”
Kattar v. Demoulas, 739 N.E.2d 246, 257 (Mass. 2000) (citation omitted). Instead, “Chapter
93A liability is decided case-by-case, and Massachusetts courts have consistently emphasized the
‘fact-specific nature of the inquiry.’” Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 147 F.3d 47, 55

(1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Linkage Corp. v. Trustees of Bos. Univ., 679 N.E.2d 191, 209 (Mass.
1997)). “Although whether a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or deceptive
is a question of fact, the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a [Chapter] 93A
violation is a question of law.” Id. at 54 (quoting Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 797 (1st Cir.
1996)). “Chapter 93A ‘is a statute of broad impact.’” Anoush Cab, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 8
F.4th 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Att’y Gen., 94 N.E.3d 786, 791 (Mass.
2018)). “The courts are not invited by the statute to punish every departure from ‘the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive,’ but they may enforce standards of behavior measurably higher
than perfidy.” Anoush Cab, 8 F.4th at 17 (quoting Doliner v. Brown, 489 N.E.2d 1036, 1040
(Mass. App. Ct. 1986)).
To determine what conduct rises to the level of an “unfair” act or practice actionable
under G. L. c. 93A, [the Supreme Judicial Court (‘SJC’)] ha[s] consistently looked
to the factors articulated in [PMP Assocs., 321 N.E.2d at 917]: (1) whether the
conduct is within “at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive,
or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers” or
other businesses.

H1 Lincoln, Inc. v. S. Washington St., LLC, 179 N.E.3d 545, 557 (Mass. 2022). “For [a]
practice to fall within the penumbra of a statute’s concept of unfairness, it need not actually
violate the statute.” Cooper v. Charter Commc’ns Ents. I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir.
2014) (quoting Kattar, 739 N.E.2d at 257). “[I]t is neither necessary nor sufficient that a
particular act or practice violate common or statutory law.” Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT
Phototherapeutics, Inc., 552 F.3d 47, 69 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Kattar, 739 N.E.2d at 257;
Renovators Supply Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 892 N.E.2d 777, 787 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008)),
decision clarified on denial of reh’g, 559 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009). Instead, Massachusetts courts
“focus on the nature of challenged conduct and on the purpose and effect of that conduct as the
crucial factors in making a G.L. c. 93A fairness determination.” Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Seven
Provinces Ins. Co., 217 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Mass. Emps. Ins. Exch. v. Propac-
Mass, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Mass. 1995)).
The Court finds that Verizon has adequately alleged that WNAC engaged in unfair acts
or practices. As noted above, the FCC Rules’ plain language imposes a duty on TV broadcast
stations, like WNAC, to “negotiate in good faith the terms and conditions of retransmission
consent agreements.” 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(a). In announcing the FCC Rules, the FCC explained
its understanding that “by imposing the good faith obligation, Congress intended that the
Commission develop and enforce a process that ensures that broadcasters and MVPDs meet to
negotiate retransmission consent and that such negotiations are conducted in an atmosphere of
honesty, purpose and clarity of process.” Good Faith Order ¶ 24. The FCC Rules adopt a “two-
part test for [evaluating] good faith” in this context. See id. ¶ 6. The first part of the test

considers whether a party has engaged in any of several specifically identified actions, id.,
including:
(i) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to negotiate retransmission consent;
(ii) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to designate a representative with authority to
make binding representations on retransmission consent; [and]
(iii) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to meet and negotiate retransmission consent
at reasonable times and locations, or acting in a manner that unreasonably delays
retransmission consent negotiations[.]

47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(1)(i)–(iii). “The second part of the good faith test is based on a totality of
the circumstances standard.” Good Faith Order ¶ 7; see 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(4). Pursuant to the
“broader, totality of the circumstances test,” Good Faith Order ¶ 30, “[parties] may present facts
to the Commission which, even though they do not allege a violation of the objective standards,
given the totality of the circumstances reflect an absence of a sincere desire to reach an
agreement that is acceptable to both parties and thus constitute a failure to negotiate in good
faith,” id. ¶ 32; see 47 CFR § 76.65(b)(4).
A breach of a duty of good faith may serve as the basis for a Chapter 93A claim. See
Lycos, Inc. v. Internet Venture Works, Inc., No. 02-cv-11383, 2003 WL 21146661, at *2 (D.
Mass. May 19, 2003) (denying motion to dismiss Chapter 93A based on alleged breach of a duty
to negotiate in good faith that was imposed by a settlement agreement); see also Martorana v.
Progressive Direct Ins. Co., No. 22-cv-10613, 2023 WL 2465639, at *7 (D. Mass. Mar. 10,
2023) (declining to dismiss a Chapter 93A claim premised in part on conduct breaching the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because such conduct “comes ‘within a[]
recognized or established common law . . . concept of fairness’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting VMark Software v. EMC Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 595 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994))). The
Court likewise finds that where the Rules explicitly identify “[r]efusal by a Negotiating Entity to
designate a representative with authority to make binding representations on retransmission

consent” as a violation of the Rules’ duty of good faith, a failure to identify a point of contact for
negotiations could constitute unfair conduct within the meaning of Chapter 93A. 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.65(b)(1)(ii).
WNAC argues that it did designate a negotiation representative, pointing to letters it
asserts it sent to Verizon and other MVPDs and posted to the FCC’s publicly available website,
and that the Court may take judicial notice of these letters when considering the motion to
dismiss. [ECF No. 90 at 21–22]. These letters state, for example:
[WNAC] hereby notifies you that pursuant to Section 325(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 76.64(f) of the FCC’s
Rules, [WNAC] elects to assert its right, under Section 76.64(a) of the FCC’s rules,
to have the broadcast signal of [WNAC] carried on your multichannel video
programming distribution service in our ‘television market[.]’ . . . This
retransmission consent election is for the [relevant] period.
[ECF No. 91-2 at 7 (letter dated September 23, 2017 and addressed to “Verizon Corporate
Services Group, Inc,” relevant to period “January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2020”)]. They
add: “Please direct any correspondence concerning this election statement to me [President
Timothy G. Sheehan] at the address provided below.” [Id.]. Verizon does not contest that the
Court may take judicial notice of the existence of these letters, but argues that their “legal
effect,” that is whether these letters satisfied WNAC’s obligation under the FCC Rules to
designate a negotiation representative, is disputed, and thus not an appropriate subject for
judicial notice. [ECF No. 97 at 22–24]. The Court agrees. Cf. Gent v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y,
611 F.3d 79, 84 n.5 (1st Cir. 2010) (taking “judicial notice of the relevant facts provided on the
[Center for Disease Control’s] website, . . . ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.’” (citing Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b), (f); Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926–27 (7th Cir. 2003))). At this early stage
of the litigation, the Court declines to adopt WNAC’s reading of these letters, and instead credits
Verizon’s allegation that WNAC failed to designate a representative, which may qualify as

unfair conduct.
Likewise, given the Rules’ broad test for good faith, see July 27, 2016 FCC Letter from
Chairman Tom Wheeler to Representative Bob Gibbs, 2016 WL 4371564, at *1 (July 27, 2016)
(“[O]ur current totality of the circumstances test . . . is intentionally broad”), the Court finds that
not disclosing information and not commencing negotiations, could, depending on the
surrounding facts, show “an absence of a sincere desire to reach an agreement that is acceptable
to both parties and thus constitute a failure to negotiate in good faith,” Good Faith Order ¶ 32.
Even if the Rules are more focused on practices within negotiations rather than practices prior to
negotiations, as WNAC asserts, at least one of the per se violations of the Rules’ duty of good
faith relates to a pre-negotiation practice, that is, refusing to designate a negotiation

representative. It therefore seems that WNAC’s alleged practices fall within at least a penumbra
of the FCC Rules’ concept of unfairness.
The Court declines to address WNAC’s arguments concerning deceptive acts or
practices, which it only raised in its reply brief. See [ECF No. 104]. “The purpose of a reply
memorandum is not to file new arguments that could have been raised in a supporting
memorandum.” Noonan v. Wonderland Greyhound Park Realty LLC, 723 F. Supp. 2d 298, 349
(D. Mass. 2010). “Where, as here, a moving party raises an argument for the first time in a reply
brief, that argument is waived.” Napert v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 13-cv-10530, 2013 WL
3989645, at *2 n.4 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2013); see also Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 27 (1st
Cir. 1999) (“[T]heories offered for the first time in the reply brief are not preserved.” (emphasis
omitted)). WNAC may re-raise its arguments in future motions, but for purposes of the instant
motion to dismiss, they are waived. The Court finds that Verizon has, at this early stage of the
litigation, adequately pleaded potentially deceptive conduct. For the same reason, the Court

finds Verizon has sufficiently alleged injury and causation. Again, WNAC may raise arguments
included in its reply brief in future motions, but for now they are deemed waived.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, WNAC’s motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 89], is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
February 26, 2024 /s/ Allison D. Burroughs
ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201768. Public record. Not legal advice.