# Saxena v. University of Massachusetts Medical School

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · September 28, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201436

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** September 28, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201436

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding plaintiff responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process when she “failed to cooperate in such a process”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

____________________________________
)
VISHAL SAXENA, PH.D, )
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 19-40007-TSH
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS )
MEDICAL SCHOOL, )
Defendant. )
____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
September 28, 2023

HILLMAN, S.D.J.
This action arises out of the former academic relationship between Defendant, University
of Massachusetts Chan Medical School (the “Medical School” or “the School”), and its former
student, Vishal Saxena (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff’s Complaint – first filed on January 7, 2019 and
later amended on May 15, 2019 – asserts four remaining claims against the Medical School:
Counts IV & VI allege disability discrimination in violation of Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“the
“Rehabilitation Act”) and Counts V & VII allege retaliation in violation of Title V of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act.1 This Memorandum and Order of Decision addresses: (1) the Medical
School’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 124); (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Docket No. 127); (3) the Medical School’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Statement of

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint originally contained eight counts. See Docket No. 1. However, upon a Partial Motion to
Dismiss by the Medical School (Docket Nos. 9-10), this Court dismissed Counts 1, 2 and 3, alleging age
discrimination, race/national origin discrimination, and retaliation, respectively, all in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B.
See Docket No. 23. On March 24, 2022, the parties stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of Count 8 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleging invasion of privacy. See Docket No. 92.
Material Facts (Docket No. 139); (4) the Medical School’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s
Opposition (Docket No. 147) to its Motion; and (5) Plaintiff’s Motion to Accept Affidavit in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 154).2
MOTIONS TO STRIKE

The Medical School seeks to strike Exhibits A and B attached to Plaintiff’s Opposition to
the Medical School’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 142-2 and 142-3), as well as
portions of Plaintiff’s Affidavit (Docket No. 142-1) on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to comply
with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. This rule states, in relevant part, that “[m]otions for
summary judgment shall include a concise statement of the material facts of record as to which
the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried, with page references to
affidavits, depositions, and other documentation.” L.R. 56.1 explicitly provides that “[f]ailure to
include such a statement [with references to affidavits, depositions, and other documents]
constitutes grounds for denial of the motion.” The Medical School further contends that Exhibits

A and B constitute inadmissible hearsay, that parts of Plaintiff’s Affidavit are not based on his
own personal knowledge, and contain argument or conclusory assertions.
The Court agrees with the Medical School that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the
requirements of L.R. 56.1 in that many of the factual assertions contained in Plaintiff’s
supporting memorandum are not cited in his statement of facts; do not cite to record support for
many factual averments; and Plaintiff mischaracterizes or miscites record evidence on numerous
occasions. The Court appreciates the efforts on the part of the Medical School to organize each
statement of fact and its argument. It is inefficient, however, for the Court to parse through each
factual averment in this Order. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to the extent

2 The Plaintiff has also filed two pro se motions (Docket No. 180 and 182) seeking interlocutory appeal of this
Court’s denial of his motion to recuse and a pro se motion for leave to file electronically (Docket No. 186).
that it will not consider factual averments that have no support in the record, and those factual
averments that miscite or mischaracterize the record evidence.3 In such instances, the Court has
accepted the Medical School’s asserted facts as true.
MOTION TO ACCEPT LATE-FILED AFFIDAVIT
Plaintiff seeks to have the Court accept the late filing of his affidavit in support of his
motion for summary judgment on April 11, 2023, nearly two months after he filed for summary

judgment. Plaintiff filed for summary judgment on February 17, 2023, and failed to file a
supporting affidavit. Counsel for the Medical School emailed counsel for the Plaintiff on
February 21, 203, advising him of the deficiency, but no attempt was made to rectify the issue.
Plaintiff was further noticed about the missing affidavit in the Medical School’s motion to strike
filed on March 10, 2023, and again, during the summary judgment hearing on March 16, 2023.
Plaintiff contends that his prior counsel who filed the summary judgment motion “failed to file
the affidavit” and suggests that the affidavit had been prepared around the time of the summary
judgment motion. However, the affidavit references arguments made by the Medical School at
the summary judgment hearing and raised by the Medical School’s motion to strike.
Furthermore, the Court allowed the parties two extensions of time to file their dispositive

motions, leaving Plaintiff amply opportunity to submit an affidavit or cure the deficiencies.
Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

3 Exhibits B, C, F, G, H, O, P, Q to Plaintiff’s Statement were not provided to the Medical School. See the Medical
School’s Response, Docket No. 140. Given that these exhibits were not provided to the Medical School, the Court
will not consider them for the purposes of the evaluating whether the Medical School failed to accommodate
Plaintiff.
Background
University of Massachusetts Medical School
The Medical School is the Commonwealth’s only public medical school and is part of the
University of Massachusetts education system. The Medical School’s policies as they apply to its
students are spelled out in the Medical School Student Handbook (the “Student Handbook”),

which was in effect during the 2014-2015 academic year. The Medical School has a policy that
states it does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, gender, age, sexual
orientation, gender identity and expression, genetic information, national origin, covered veteran
disability, disability, ancestry or any other characteristics protected by law in the participation in
its programs, services and activities, and has established a procedure by which medical students
may request an academic accommodation for their disabilities. A copy of the Student Handbook
is provided to all medical students. The Medical School expects all of its students to read and be
familiar with the Student Handbook and all medical students are held to the policies and
procedures of the Student Handbook, regardless of whether they ultimately choose to read the

document.
The Student Handbook contains the Medical School’s policies and regulations, including
those relating to monitoring the academic performance of its students. The Medical School has
also adopted Guidelines for Professional Behavior to which it expects its students to adhere (the
“Guidelines”). The Student Handbook (and subsequent student handbooks from later years)
provides a link to the Guidelines, which require, in part, that students “demonstrate[e]
dependability and appropriate initiative” including “complet[ing] tasks in a timely fashion
without needed reminders” and being “appropriately available for professional responsibilities”
including “attend[ing] required classes and activities.” These Guidelines were in effect
throughout Plaintiff’s tenure with the Medical School.
At the Medical School, students’ academic records are monitored by two Academic
Evaluation Boards, a Basic Sciences Academic Evaluation Board (“BSAEB”) and a Clinical
Sciences Academic Evaluation Board. The BSAEB monitored Plaintiff’s academic performance

during his tenure at the Medical School. The BSAEB is responsible for periodically reviewing
student academic records, recommending students to the Progress Board for academic
advancement, remediation, dismissal, considering any extenuating circumstances which may
have contributed to academic performance, and determining the nature and process of academic
makeup and remediation, if possible, for students who have not satisfactorily completed all
academic requirements. The Progress Board is a standing subcommittee of the Educational
Policy Committee that meets only when a recommendation of the BSAEB is made that is
considered an “adverse recommendation.” An “adverse recommendation” by the BSAEB is a
recommendation to the Progress Board to have a student (1) repeat a whole semester or an entire

year; (2) enter a less than full-time or other program which will delay the student’s time of
graduation; (3) take a leave of absence at the initiative of the Progress Board rather than of the
student; or (4) be dismissed.
The curriculum of a first-year medical student (“FOM1”) includes the course
Development, Structure and Function (“DSF”). DSF consists of anatomy, physiology, histology,
and embryology. DSF is a year-long course during FOM1, and consists of both a classroom
component and a lab component.
Plaintiff’s Enrollment in the Medical School
Plaintiff was accepted at the Medical School in May 2014 and received an Acceptance
Letter, which among other things, identified how to begin the process of applying for academic
accommodations. The Acceptance Letter also instructed students requesting a reasonable
accommodation for a disability to reach out to Dr. Deborah Harmon Hines (“Dr. Hines”), co-
Chair of the Academic Accommodations Committee (“AAC”). and contained Dr. Hines’ contact
information.
Plaintiff testified that he considered himself as having a disability at that time and

conceded that it would have been reasonable form him to reach out to Dr. Harmon-Hines prior to
starting at the Medical School concerning the accommodation process. Plaintiff did not contact
anyone at the Medical School following his acceptance or during the summer of 2014 to notify
the Medical School of his alleged reactivity to formaldehyde or to request an academic
accommodation. On September 25, 2014, Plaintiff contacted his instructor of the DSF course,
Associate Professor Anne Gilroy (“Prof. Gilroy”), to notify her about his alleged reactivity to
formaldehyde. Plaintiff testified that he knew that Prof. Gilroy was not the correct person he
should have contacted, per the Acceptance Letter.
At the time Plaintiff contacted Prof. Gilroy, she was out of the country and would not be

return until October 6, 2014. Given that the first anatomy lab of DSF was scheduled for October
1, 2014, Prof. Gilroy contacted her colleagues, Dr. Susan Gagliardi, Vice Chair of Medical
Education, Department of Cell Biology, and Chair of the FOM1 Curriculum Committee and
Michael Doyle, Lab Manager at the Medical School, for assistance. At the time Prof. Gilroy was
not aware that, in order for Plaintiff to pursue an academic accommodation for DSF, Plaintiff
needed to contact the AAC. Prof. Gilroy did know, however, that she did not have the ability or
authority to grant academic accommodations for students. Dr. Gagliardi was aware of the
timeliness of her response to give Plaintiff the best opportunity to participate in the anatomy lab
on October 1, 2014.
At the time Dr. Gagliardi made her inquiries on September 25, 2014, she was not aware
that, in order for a medical student to receive academic accommodations at the Medical School,
the student needed to go through the AAC. That same day, Dr. Gagliardi was told that Plaintiff
would need to be evaluated by the Medical School’s Student Health Services (“Student Heath”)
and conveyed this information to Plaintiff the same day. Dr. Gagliardi was under the impression

that the Medical School’s Office of Environmental Health & Services (“EHS”) would work with
Student Health to implement any action needed and told this to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was evaluated in Student Health by Dr. Joseph DiFranza (“Dr. DiFranza”) on
September 30, 2014. Dr. DiFranza’s conclusion based on his evaluation was that Plaintiff has
“irritant symptoms when exposed to formaldehyde (watery eyes, burning nose, throat, lungs,
dizzy, headache). Nothing life threatening…” Dr. Gagliardi shared Dr. DiFranza’s conclusion
with Deborah Campbell, the Medical School’s Environmental Health and Safety Manager (“Ms.
Campbell”), on October 1, 2014. Dr. Gagliardi notified Ms. Campbell to give her the opportunity
to make suggestions concerning how to help Plaintiff, including fitting him with protective gear.

Dr. Gagliardi learned that Plaintiff’s takeaway from his evaluation by Dr. DiFranza was that he
could not enter the anatomy laboratory, even with protective equipment in place, which Dr.
DiFranza denied. Dr. Gagliardi believed at the time that Plaintiff was not medically prohibited
from entering the anatomy lab. Plaintiff did not attend the anatomy lab on October 1, 2014.
On October 2, 2014, Dr. Gagliardi learned from Dr. Hines that in order to be
accommodated for working in the gross anatomy lab, Plaintiff needed to contact Dr. Hines. Dr.
Gagliardi also learned, for the first time, that Plaintiff’s request for an academic accommodation
fell under the purview of the AAC. Upon learning of the Medical School’s process for applying
for academic accommodations, Dr. Gagliardi immediately notified Plaintiff. In reply, Plaintiff
thanked Dr. Gagliardi for her “kind email” and wrote that he “really appreciate[d] [her] help.”
The Academic Accommodations Committee (AAC)
The Medical School established the AAC to receive and review all requests for
accommodations and appropriate supporting documents. The AAC then designs,

implements, and monitors individual accommodation plans for students with disabilities in
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The AAC is chaired by one or two individuals who are Medical School employees,
each of whom also serve as voting members of the AAC. The AAC is further comprised of
individuals from the Medical School, the Tan Chingfen Graduate School of Nursing, and the
Morningside Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences. The AAC generally meets once a
month to review requests for accommodations made by students, to approve, deny or request
additional information from students in support of requests for accommodation, and to
monitor the status of students approved for accommodations. Between the 2014 and 2018

academic year, the AAC provided academic accommodations to an average of 38 students
per year at the Medical School, the Tan Chingfen Graduate School of Nursing, and the
Morningside Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences.
The AAC has adopted a policy governing a student’s request for academic
accommodations. Pursuant to that policy, students seeking an academic accommodation are
required to submit appropriate documentation of their disability when the disability and/or
need for accommodation is not known or obvious. As of 2014, it had also been the
longstanding practice of the AAC to request additional documentation from a student
beyond that which he or she may have submitted if the AAC determined that the
documentation submitted was insufficient to rule on their request. It had also been the long-
standing practice of the AAC to request permission from a student to speak directly with the
student’s treating provider to gain additional information when necessary, including
historical documentation relating to the asserted disability, or to seek clarification on the
information the student had provided.

Applying for Academic Accommodations with the AAC
Plaintiff met with Dr. Hines on October 2, 2014, to discuss his request for an academic
accommodation. Dr. Hines was a Professor of Cell Biology at the Medical School and, in
addition to that role, served as Chair of the AAC from 1999 until approximately 2012, and then
served as Co-Chair of the AAC from approximately 2012 until her retirement in 2016. After
Plaintiff’s initial meeting with Dr. Hines, he was referred to Dr. Deborah DeMarco, Co-Chair of
the AAC at the time. Dr. DeMarco primarily handled Plaintiff’s request for an academic
accommodation from that point forward.
Plaintiff understood that meeting with the AAC was part of the process of applying for an
academic accommodation.4 He was responsible for all DSF requirements, including quizzes,

labs, and exams, while his request for an academic accommodation was pending. Prof. Gilroy
advised Plaintiff of this fact. Plaintiff testified that he understood that he was fully responsible
for any anatomy coursework in the absence of being granted an academic accommodation.
Plaintiff met with Dr. DeMarco on October 7, 2014. The purpose of this meeting was to
discuss the process of applying for academic accommodations in light of the fact that Plaintiff
had disclosed to the Medical School that he previously had a reactivity to formaldehyde. At this
meeting, Dr. DeMarco explained the academic accommodations process at the Medical School to

4 It is disputed whether Plaintiff believed that the anatomy course directors could have provided academic
accommodations until he completed the process with the AAC.
Plaintiff. Plaintiff informed Dr. DeMarco that he was exposed to formaldehyde at Boston
University School of Medicine (“BU”).
At this meeting, Plaintiff informed Dr. DeMarco that he tried a face mask and a
“respirator-type mask” at BU in response to his reactions. Plaintiff informed Dr. DeMarco that
he purchased these personal protective devices on his own, and that they were not purchased and

professionally fitted by BU. At the same meeting, Plaintiff briefly showed Dr. DeMarco a note
he received from Dr. Michael Reyes, a family medicine practitioner who evaluated Plaintiff on
October 2, 2014. The note was based on what Plaintiff verbally conveyed to Dr. Reyes about his
prior reactions to formaldehyde and was not based on treatment of Plaintiff following his
reactions to formaldehyde at BU or first-hand knowledge of Plaintiff’s reactions. Dr. DeMarco
did not believe that the Reyes’ Note was sufficient to support Plaintiff’s request for an academic
accommodation because it did not comply with the requirements of the Policy, and contained a
number of other deficiencies.
Dr. DeMarco advised Plaintiff that Dr. Reyes’ Note was insufficient for the AAC to rule

on his request reasonably and fairly. The Reyes’ Note was not signed by Dr. Reyes, nor did it
contain a diagnosis. The Reyes Notes was also missing Plaintiff’s prior medical history related to
formaldehyde, discussion about the symptoms Plaintiff experienced, or a conclusion as to
whether Plaintiff’s reactivity to formaldehyde is inhalant-based or contact-based. Plaintiff
conceded that it would have been reasonable for the Medical School to have this information. Dr.
Reyes’ Note did not include any discussion about possible accommodations nor suggest that
Plaintiff should not enter the anatomy lab at the Medical School. Dr. Reyes referred Plaintiff to
an allergist “for further workup and evaluation to determine proper treatment strategy,” which
Plaintiff recalls Dr. DeMarco also suggesting to him when they met. Plaintiff informed Dr.
DeMarco that he would see an allergist.
The Plan for Handling Plaintiff’s Request for Academic Accommodations
Dr. DeMarco developed the following action plan at the end of the October 7, 2014,
meeting with the Plaintiff:

a. Plaintiff would make an appointment to see an allergist as soon as
possible.
b. She would discuss options for accommodations with Dr. Gagliardi and
Prof. Gilroy.
c. She would discuss potential protective gear with the EHS for use by
Plaintiff during his anatomy lab.
d. After discussing potential accommodations, Dr. DeMarco would
determine whether the AAC would agree to provide Plaintiff with temporary
accommodations until he has had the opportunity to meet with, and obtain the
necessary documentation from an allergist.
The AAC had the authority to provide Plaintiff with temporary accommodations while it waited
for Plaintiff to provide additional documentation. After meeting with Plaintiff, Dr. DeMarco
spoke with Prof. Gilroy and Dr. Gagliardi on October 14, 2014, regarding possible
accommodations for Plaintiff for when he provided required documentation to the AAC. Based
on that conversation, Dr. DeMarco came to the following conclusions:
a. There was no “fresh tissue” available at the Medical School for dissection.
If fresh tissue was obtained, the Medical School would need to purchase a freezer
large enough to accommodate big sections of the cadaver.
b. Once a section of the cadaver was unthawed, the fresh sections would
need to be dissected within a few days, which would require extra time on the part
of the student as well as additional faculty time.
c. The Medical School would need to designate a different room in which the
fresh cadaver could be dissected, separate from the anatomy lab.
d. The Medical School could consider purchasing a “down-draft” table upon
receipt of the necessary medical information from Plaintiff.
e. The Medical School could provide hazmat gear to Plaintiff.
f. For the October 23rd lab, the Medical School could accommodate Plaintiff
by allowing him to dissect a fresh calf heart in a room separate from the anatomy
lab with a faculty member overseeing the process who had not had contact in the
anatomy lab.
On October 9, 2014, Dr. DeMarco spoke with Ms. Campbell from EHS. Dr. DeMarco
learned that as a temporary accommodation for Plaintiff, EHS could provide full hazmat gear
and a professionally fitted respirator for Plaintiff. That same day, Dr. DeMarco provided Plaintiff
with a copy of the safety data sheets for the materials used in the embalming cadavers at the
Medical School and suggested that Plaintiff bring these sheets to his appointment with an
allergist. Dr. DeMarco also recommended to Plaintiff that he obtain safety data sheets from BU
because the components used by BU to embalm cadavers might be different.
On October 9, 2014, the AAC approved Plaintiff for temporary accommodations, while
Plaintiff’s request for an academic accommodation was pending. Specifically, the AAC
approved Plaintiff for: (1) full hazmat gear, including a respirator fitted to his head; and (2) a
separate room for a calf heart dissection on October 23, 2014, which was the next scheduled
anatomy lab.5 The calf heart was a fresh specimen, meaning that Plaintiff would not be exposed
to any offending chemicals. The AAC also gave Plaintiff the opportunity to enter the anatomy
lab in protective gear for the first time outside of regular class time, with a physician present to
monitor Plaintiff’s wellbeing.
The AAC provided these temporary accommodations because it did not know the nature
of Plaintiff’s allergic response and put them in place through the end of November 2014, and
was prepared to modify or extend them, if shown to be necessary, based on any documentation it

5 Prof. Gilroy volunteered to work with Plaintiff for the calf heart dissection. When Prof. Gilroy volunteered, she
informed Dr. Gagliardi that she would like to “get a good read on [Plaintiff’s] attitude.” Plaintiff felt that Prof.
Gilroy’s comment was discriminatory but he did participate in the dissection of the fresh calf heart with Prof. Gilroy
on October 25, 2014.
received following Plaintiff’s appointment with his allergist. The AAC directed Plaintiff to
contact EHS as soon as possible to make an appointment for respirator fit testing. Plaintiff never
contacted EHS.
In response to the AAC’s offer of temporary accommodations, Plaintiff wrote that he had
“used both a respirator and a respirator with a full-face mask and [that] his reactions continued to

get worse … I am assuming the hazmat gear for my head is the same type of protection that I
have previously used.” At the same time, however, Plaintiff admitted that he did not know what
equipment the Medical School’s EHS had. Dr. DeMarco believed that the AAC’s offer of
temporary accommodations was a reasonable and supportable plan that Plaintiff should try and
advised Plaintiff of her belief. Plaintiff stated that he believed Dr. DeMarco’s position was
discriminatory.
Christiani and Zheng Notes
On November 13, 2014, Plaintiff hand-delivered two letters to Dr. DeMarco’s mailbox in
her office. One letter was from Dr. David Christiani (“Dr. Christiani”), and the second was from
Dr. Weihong Zheng (“Dr. Zheng”). After receiving the Christiani Note and the Zheng Note, Dr.
DeMarco spoke with Dr. Oren P. Schaefer (“Dr. Schaefer”), a physician in the UMass Memorial

system. Dr. DeMarco contacted Dr. Schaefer in particular because he specializes in pulmonary
disease, critical care medicine, and allergy & immunology. It was the regular practice of the
AAC to contact outside experts when evaluating a student’s request for an accommodation. The
purpose of Dr. DeMarco’s contact to Dr. Schaefer was to obtain additional information
concerning allergic reactivity to formaldehyde, whether or not it could be tested for, and how it
may be accommodated.
Based on Dr. DeMarco’s conversation with Dr. Schaefer, she learned that it would be
appropriate for Plaintiff to use a professionally fitted PAPR (positive air pressure respirator) to
mitigate and avoid exposure. Dr. DeMarco also learned that reactivity to formaldehyde is irritant
in nature, and was not damaging, life threatening, nor would it cause anaphylaxis and that
reactivity to formaldehyde could be mitigated. After Dr. DeMarco received the Christiani Note
and the Zheng Note, she and Plaintiff scheduled a meeting for November 14, 2014, at 3:30 p.m.
to discuss this documentation. At 3:13 p.m. that day, Plaintiff canceled the meeting with Dr.

DeMarco.
After reviewing the Zheng and Christiani Notes, the AAC determined that it was
necessary to speak with Dr. Zheng and Dr. Christiani to obtain additional information, as well as
get clarification on certain aspects of their notes. Needing his permission to do so, Dr. DeMarco
notified Plaintiff that the AAC needed his written permission to speak with Dr. Zheng and Dr.
Christiani.
Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Christiani on October 23, 2014. However, the Christiani
Note did not contain the date on which he saw Plaintiff nor did provide the date it was written.
The Christiani Note incorrectly states that Plaintiff suffered “formalin exposures in the anatomy

lab at UMASS Medical School.” Plaintiff had not been exposed to formaldehyde in the anatomy
lab the Medical School. Plaintiff conceded that this was a “pretty big misunderstanding by Dr.
Christiani.” The Christiani Note otherwise lacks the date of service, Plaintiff’s prior medical
history, a diagnosis, the symptoms Plaintiff experienced, the severity of his symptoms, the nature
of his reactivity and whether Plaintiff’s reactivity is contact based or inhalant based. In his note,
Dr. Christiani opined that Plaintiff “cannot do usual dissection on cadavers treated with formalin,
even with respirator in place,” but did not indicate provide an explanation as to why he believed
that to be true. The Christiani Note invited the Medical School to contact him with questions.
The Zheng Note
The historical documentation referenced by Dr. Zheng in the Zheng Note were letters
prepared in 2014 at Plaintiff’s request by two physicians, Dr. Ravi Nath and Dr. Akansha Jha,
concerning their evaluations of Plaintiff’s asserted reactivity to formaldehyde in 2011. Dr. Nath
was Plaintiff’s uncle, and lived in England. Dr. Jha was a distant relative of Plaintiff, and lived in
India. Plaintiff initially testified that Dr. Nath and Dr. Jha would evaluate him through Skype

calls or phone calls. Plaintiff testified that he understood that the Medical School requested
copies of the notes from Drs. Nath and Jha but declined to do so, feeling that it was
“unreasonable.”
The AAC determined that Dr. DeMarco needed to follow up with Dr. Christiani with
questions about the Christiani Note that were necessary for the AAC’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s
request for an academic accommodation. This included when Plaintiff was evaluated, what the
diagnosis was, whether he had reviewed the safety data sheets for the materials used in the
embalming process at the Medical School, as well as myriad others related to Plaintiff’s alleged
reactivity to formaldehyde and the accommodations the Medical School had offered. Dr.

DeMarco asked for Plaintiff’s permission so that she could speak directly with Dr. Christiani
concerning the Christiani Note and the questions the AAC had. Plaintiff refused to give
permission to the Medical School.
Plaintiff Meets with the Associate Dean of Student Affairs – Fall of 2014

During the 2014-2015 academic year, Dr. Michael Kneeland served as the Interim
Associate Dean of Student Affairs at the Medical School, working in the Office of Student
Affairs. The major goal of the Student Affairs Office is to provide advocacy for and support to
medical students as they pursue their medical degrees. At Plaintiff’s request, Dr. Kneeland met
with him several times during the fall 2014 semester in his capacity as Interim Associate Dean,
including on October 3, October 7, October 16, and November 14.
As Interim ADSA, one of the primary functions of Dr. Kneeland’s role was to provide
support to, and advocate for, medical students. At the time, Dr. Kneeland was aware that Plaintiff
was pursuing academic accommodations for his asserted reactivity to formaldehyde with the

AAC. Plaintiff generally expressed concerns with this process to Dr. Kneeland, and believed that
some of the information the AAC was requesting was not necessary. Dr. Kneeland explained this
process to Plaintiff, and encouraged Plaintiff to follow the AAC’s requests.
November 2014 AAC Request
On November 26, 2014, Dr. DeMarco sent Plaintiff a letter summarizing the details of,
and updating Plaintiff on, the status of his request for accommodations. Plaintiff had not
contacted Dr. DeMarco since he canceled their scheduled meeting on November 14, 2014. In the
letter, the AAC asked Plaintiff for the following information: 1. medical records referenced in
Dr. Zheng's letter; 2. dates of office visits that you had with both Dr. Zheng and Dr. Christiani; 3.

original letters from these physicians sent directly to me from their offices, and your written
permission for me to speak with these physicians. Dr. DeMarco asked Plaintiff to schedule a
meeting with her “as soon as possible” by calling her office or emailing her directly. Plaintiff did
not contact Dr. DeMarco after receiving the November 26, 2014 letter, nor did he provide any of
the requested information.
On December 10, 2014, Dr. DeMarco received a letter from Attorney Nicholas Gomes,
Esq. on behalf of Plaintiff. Dr. DeMarco responded by sending a letter to Plaintiff, with a
courtesy copy to Attorney Gomes. The December 12th letter reiterated the need for Plaintiff to
provide the information that the AAC had previously requested on November 26th so that it could
rule on Plaintiff’s request for an accommodation. Dr. DeMarco also noted in the December 12th
letter that once the AAC received the documentation it requested and had the ability to consult
with his doctors, it would be able to move forward. Plaintiff did not meet with, call or email Dr.
DeMarco after receiving the December 12th letter.
Plaintiff retained a second attorney, Edward Prisby, Esq. who wrote to the Medical

School on January 6, 2015. Atty. Prisby provided copies of the Zheng and Reyes Notes and a
letter dated October 23, 2014 from Dr. Christiani on different letterhead. On February 12, 2015,
Peter Michelson, Esq., an attorney at the University of Massachusetts Office of the General
Counsel, sent a written response to Attorney Prisby. Plaintiff did not communicate with the AAC
again until November 2016.
Plaintiff’s Academic Performance
Except for the dissection on October 25, 2014, Plaintiff did not participate in any of the
anatomy lab dissections during the 2014-2015 academic year. Because of the time he missed in
the anatomy lab, Plaintiff was unable to achieve a passing grade for DSF for the 2014-2015

academic year. The BSAEB had a regularly scheduled meeting December 8, 2014, which Dr.
Kneeland attended, and discussed Plaintiff’s academic progress. Given that it was impossible for
Plaintiff to achieve a passing grade in DSF for the 2014-2015 academic year, the best possible
outcome for him was to withdraw from DSF to ensure that he did not fail the course. In light of
the fact that Plaintiff was no longer able to achieve a passing grade in DSF, the BSAEB
requested that Plaintiff’s mentor, Dr. Philip Fournier, inform Plaintiff of his academic situation
and advise him that it was in his best interests to withdraw from DSF. Dr. Fournier met with
Plaintiff on December 9, 2014 to discuss it.
As interim ADSA, Dr. Kneeland also wanted to meet with Plaintiff to follow-up on the
discussion that he had with Dr. Fournier about withdrawing from DSF, and to plan Plaintiff’s
academic calendar going forward. Dr. Kneeland emailed Plaintiff on December 29, 2014, and
Plaintiff replied the following day to say he would follow up with him to set up an appointment
after the New Year. As of January 17, 2015, Dr. Kneeland had not yet heard from Plaintiff to

schedule a meeting. Dr. Kneeland emailed Plaintiff again reminding him that they needed to
meet and explained to him the reasons why. Plaintiff responded four days later that he had not
been feeling well, but would follow up as soon as possible.
On January 28, 2015, Plaintiff informed Dr. Kneeland that he had the flu, and would
follow-up when he felt better. As of February 7, Dr. Kneeland had not heard from Plaintiff to
schedule a meeting. As a result, Dr. Kneeland reached out to him once more. Dr. Kneeland
received no response from Plaintiff. Pursuant to the Student Handbook, medical students are
allowed to withdraw from a course in FOM1 up to two weeks before the final exam or end of the
course. As the last day of the DSF course was February 24, 2015, and Dr. Kneeland did not want

Plaintiff to have a failing grade for the DSF course, he emailed Plaintiff again on February 12,
2015 to advise him of the foregoing and to ask Plaintiff to let him know if he would like to
withdraw from DSF, as the decision was ultimately his. Plaintiff withdrew from DSF on
February 12, 2015. After Plaintiff withdrew from DSF, he and Dr. Kneeland still needed to meet
to begin planning how to incorporate DSF into his schedule in the following academic year. Dr.
Kneeland emailed Plaintiff about this on February 14, 2015.
As of March 26, 2015, Plaintiff had not contacted Dr. Kneeland to schedule a meeting.
As a result, Dr. Kneeland sent him another message. Plaintiff informed Dr. Kneeland on March
31 that he would schedule a time to meet but did not do so. On May 11, 2015, the BSAEB held a
regular meeting that Dr. Kneeland attended. Dr. Kneeland advised the BSAEB of his repeated
attempts to meet with Plaintiff.
Pursuant to the Student Handbook, FOM1 medical students must complete all required
FOM1 courses in order to progress to the second year of medical school, FOM2. In light of the
fact that Plaintiff did not complete DSF, the BSAEB voted that Plaintiff would not be allowed to

progress to FOM2. Since the BSAEB’s decision was considered an “adverse recommendation,”
Plaintiff was required to appear before the Progress Board. On May 15, 2015, Dr. Kneeland
prepared and sent a letter to Plaintiff advising him of the BSAEB’s decision, and the fact that this
matter was being referred to the Progress Board for review. Dr. Kneeland’s letter also advised
Plaintiff to review the Progress Board process in the Student Handbook and asked Plaintiff to
schedule a meeting with him to discuss this process.
Dr. Kneeland also knew that Plaintiff had requested, but had not yet completed the
process of applying for, academic accommodations. Dr. Kneeland knew that the AAC was not
able to rule on Plaintiff’s request for an academic accommodation because he had not provided

documentation requested by the AAC. Dr. Kneeland advised Plaintiff that, if the process of
applying for academic accommodations was resolved, he would help him develop an academic
schedule for fall 2015, pending a decision of the Progress Board. To assist in that process, Dr.
Kneeland asked Plaintiff to bring the last correspondence Plaintiff received from the AAC. Dr.
Kneeland met with Plaintiff on May 28, 2015. Plaintiff did not bring the last correspondence
from the AAC. Plaintiff also did not provide Dr. Kneeland with any specifics when Dr. Kneeland
asked him several times what documents the AAC said he was missing. Dr. Kneeland offered to
personally drive Plaintiff to a physician’s office or to pay for any notes Plaintiff needed if he was
lacking financial resources, but Plaintiff did not accept his offers.
Dr. Kneeland’s role as Interim ADSA would end on June 1, 2015, and Dr. Sonja
Chimienti was taking over the position. Plaintiff would need to meet with Dr. Chimienti to
discuss setting up a Progress Board meeting in light of the BSAEB’s vote that Plaintiff would not
be allowed to proceed to SOM2. On June 4, 2015, Dr. Chimienti emailed Plaintiff to introduce
herself and to schedule a time within the next week to meet or speak with Plaintiff via telephone.

Plaintiff and Dr. Chimienti ultimately met on June 19. During their meeting, Dr. Chimienti
advised Plaintiff on the process before the Progress Board. Dr. Chimienti also directed Plaintiff
to the Student Handbook, which outlined the process before the Progress Board in great detail.
Dr. Chimienti informed Plaintiff that she was available several dates at the end of July for
possible dates for the meeting of the Progress Board. Plaintiff replied on June 23 that he would
send Dr. Chimienti an email with a requested time in “the next few days” and that he would also
“in the meantime” try to see if the Progress Board might be requested earlier. As of July 4, 2015,
Dr. Chimienti had not heard from Plaintiff concerning a date for the Progress Board meeting.
Given the fact that Dr. Chimienti had not heard from Plaintiff since June 23, and the fact that she

needed to lock in a date for the Progress Board meeting before the start of the 2015-2016
academic year, she scheduled the Progress Board meeting for July 29, 2015. Dr. Chimienti
advised Plaintiff of the date for the Progress Board meeting on July 4, 2015 via email.
The Progress Board Meeting on July 29, 2015
Pursuant to the Student Handbook, Plaintiff was permitted, but not required, to appear
personally before the Progress Broad. Dr. Chimienti advised Plaintiff of his right to appear
before the Progress Board on July 4, 2015 via email. Plaintiff was required to appear before the
Progress Board, however, in light of the fact that he withdrew from DSF in February 2015.
The Progress Board was not responsible for, nor did it have the authority to, provide
Plaintiff with an academic accommodation for completing DSF. Academic accommodations
could only be provided by the AAC. The Progress Board was responsible only for reviewing the
BSAEB’s recommendation that Plaintiff not be promoted to FOM2 and then making a
recommendation to the Dean of the Medical School, Terrence R. Flotte concerning Plaintiff’s
status as a medical student.
The Progress Board met on July 29, 2015 to discuss the BSAEB’s recommendation. At

the outset of the meeting, Dr. Chimienti summarized for the Progress Board the reason why
Plaintiff was being presented for consideration. Plaintiff appeared for a portion of the meeting
and met with Dr. Chimienti following the meeting. Plaintiff informed Dr. Chimienti that he
found the meeting to be congenial and that the environment was supportive.
The Progress Board Recommends That Plaintiff Be Provisionally Promoted to FOM2
On August 4, 2015, the Progress Board recommended to Dean Flotte that Plaintiff be
provisionally promoted to FOM2, with the additional requirement that he complete the anatomy
lab requirements for DSF by the end of Fall 2015 academic term. In light of the Progress Board’s
recommendation, Plaintiff was permitted to join his FOM2 class on August 6, 2015, and attend

all classes and all components of FOM2, with all second-year students. On August 4, 2015, Dr.
Chimienti advised Plaintiff of the Progress Board’s recommendation and his ability to begin
FOM2 classes on August 6, 2015. Plaintiff responded to Dr. Chimienti’s email on August 5,
2015 acknowledging receipt, and thanking Dr. Chimienti for her “kind email” and “kind
support.”
Following receipt of the Progress Board’s recommendation, Dr. Chimienti needed to
prepare a formal correspondence to Plaintiff outlining the Progress Board’s specific conditions
for his promotion to FOM2. Dr. Chimienti advised Plaintiff in her August 4, 2015 email that she
would be sending him a formal correspondence outlining the specifics of the Progress Board’s
decision. On August 5, 2016, Dr. Chimienti met with the course leaders of the FOM2 classes for
the purpose of preparing Plaintiff’s curriculum plan for the year. For the 2015-2016 academic
year, Plaintiff would be enrolled in all FOM2 classes, as well as the DSF anatomy lab session.
On or about August 6, 2015, Prof. Gilroy was notified that the Progress Board
recommended to Dean Flotte that Plaintiff be provisionally promoted to FOM 2. After reviewing

the Progress Board’s recommendation, Prof. Gilroy was concerned that the requirement that
Plaintiff complete the anatomy lab component of DSF by the end of fall semester 2015 was not
feasible given that the DSF course is regularly scheduled to run from late September through the
end of February. Dr. Chimienti communicated Prof. Gilroy’s concern to Dean Flotte. Dean Flotte
approved Prof. Gilroy’s proposed amendment to the Progress Board’s recommendation, and
permitted Plaintiff until the end of February to complete DSF. However, Plaintiff testified that he
believed that forcing him to take certain aspects of the DSF course as a condition to his
promotion to FOM2 during the fall 2015 academic term was “extra coursework” and considered
it discriminatory.

On August 19, 2015, Dr. Chimienti prepared a letter to Plaintiff to inform him that
Dean Flotte had approved the Progress Board’s recommendation concerning Plaintiff’s
advancement to FOM2. This letter was sent to Plaintiff via email on August 21, 2015. The
Progress Board’s recommendation that Plaintiff be promoted to FOM2, as approved by
Dean Flotte, was subject to the following conditions:
a. Plaintiff was granted provisional promotion to FOM2, pending resolution of
his request for academic accommodations as it relates to his successful
completion of the DSF course.
b. Plaintiff was required to complete the DSF anatomy lab requirements. The
details of the requirement needed to be worked out with the DSF Course
Directors, with input of the AAC, as needed. Plaintiff was required to contact
the DSF instructors no later than September 15, 2015 to arrange for his
participation in the anatomy lab coursework.
c. In light of the fact that the AAC had requested additional information and
documentation from Plaintiff, he needed to resolve the issue with the AAC.
The August 19th letter to Plaintiff advised him of these conditions. Plaintiff testified that he
believes that Prof. Gilroy and Dr. Jonassen could have granted him academic
accommodations, and that, in his mind, it was not necessary for him to meet with the AAC.
Neither Prof. Gilroy nor Dr. Jonassen had the authority to grant Plaintiff an academic
accommodation. The August 19th letter makes clear that Plaintiff needed to resolve the issue
with his request for academic accommodations with the AAC. On August 23, 2015, Dr.
Chimienti advised Plaintiff to contact Prof. Gilroy and Dr. Jonassen by September 15, 2015,
and that a quick email to set up a time would be a good idea. In response, Plaintiff informed
Dr. Chimienti that he would “follow up with DSF faculty… as soon as possible.”
Plaintiff did not contact Prof Gilroy and Dr. Jonassen until September 14, 2015 to
schedule a time to meet. Due to previously scheduled professional commitments, Dr. Jonassen
was not able to meet with Plaintiff until September 25. Dr. Jonassen and Prof. Gilroy worked
together to plan Plaintiff’s DSF experience so that he was only responsible for that portion of
DSF involving gross dissection, which is the aspect of DSF that Plaintiff had not participated in

during the 2014-2015 academic year (with the exception of the calf heart dissection on October
23, 2014). Prof. Gilroy and Dr. Jonassen developed a carefully orchestrated, thoughtful plan that
would allow Plaintiff to complete the portions of DSF that he had not completed during the
2014-2015 year but ensure that he would not repeat those aspects of DSF that he already
accomplished. In the absence of being granted an academic accommodation at this point,
Plaintiff was responsible for the curriculum presented to him. Dr. Jonassen and Dr. Chimienti
met with Plaintiff on September 25, 2015 to discuss the DSF curriculum. During their meeting,
Dr. Jonassen presented the curriculum that she and Prof. Gilroy had developed for Plaintiff to
complete DSF.
For the 2015-2016 academic year, Dr. Jonassen and Prof. Gilroy instituted several
changes in the lab component of DSF that they had discussed earlier that spring and summer.6
The changes were intended to give students a fuller experience and focus their study on the most

critical content during the anatomy lab. Plaintiff testified that he believed that Dr. Jonassen and
Prof. Gilroy intentionally made changes to the DSF curriculum for the 2015-2016 academic year
specifically to target him. In reality the changes were made to address a decline in student
attendance in the anatomy lectures and labs due to access to online materials and to bolster the
School’s team-based approach to participating in the anatomy lab.
Dr. Jonassen and Prof. Gilroy adopted a rule that grade points would be subtracted for
more than two unexcused absences in light of the foregoing concerns and to motivate students to
attend the anatomy labs. Although the rules applied equally to all DSF students, Plaintiff
believed Prof. Gilroy held Plaintiff to a higher standard because of these curriculum changes.

Plaintiff testified that before these changes, students were permitted to “skip” the anatomy labs
and simply take the exams.
On September 21, 2015, Dr. Chimienti emailed Plaintiff to remind him that he needed to
follow-up with the AAC, pursuant to the Progress Board’s requirements for his promotion to
FOM2. On September 25, 2015, Dr. Chimienti again advised Plaintiff that he needed to contact
Dr. DeMarco to discuss his request for academic accommodations. On October 15, 2015, Dr.

6The specific changes included: the traditional anatomy lab practical exam would make up only 60% of the lab
grade for each block; the remainder of the grade for each block would be earned through pre-lab quizzes, additional
quizzes focused on dry lab material and interactive functional anatomy and simulation based exercises done in small
group settings; and lab attendance would be required of all students, and although no points were awarded for
attendance, grade points would be subtracted for more than two unexcused absences.
Chimienti asked Plaintiff whether he had met with Dr. DeMarco regarding his accommodation
request. Dr. Chimienti reminded Plaintiff that resolving the issue with his academic
accommodations was a condition for his promotion to FOM2. Plaintiff did not respond.
As October 20, 2015, Plaintiff had not responded to Dr. Chimienti, so she again asked
him whether he had reached out to the AAC. On October 28, 2015, Plaintiff responded that he

was “consulting with [his] family and counsel….” Plaintiff did not contact Dr. DeMarco, or any
other member of the AAC, during the fall 2015 semester. Plaintiff thus failed to comply with the
condition set by the Progress Board for his provisional promotion to FOM2.
As of mid-October 2015, Plaintiff had not attended the two dissection labs, nor had he
taken either of the first two pre-lab quizzes. Prof. Gilroy advised Plaintiff via email on October
15, 2015 of her concern and the consequences of him not attending the dissection labs. Dr.
Chimienti contacted Plaintiff after learning from Prof. Gilroy about Plaintiff’s non-participation.
Dr. Chimienti wanted to meet with Plaintiff to help him through the process. Plaintiff missed
another pre-lab quiz and lab on October 18, 2015 and October 19, 2015, respectively. Given that

Plaintiff had not attended any of the anatomy labs, nor taken any of the pre-lab quizzes, Prof.
Gilroy added Plaintiff to the list of students to discuss at the next BSAEB meeting, which was
scheduled for October 26, 2015. Given Plaintiff’s non-participation in the DSF anatomy labs,
Prof. Gilroy believed that it was very unlikely Plaintiff would be able to pass DSF during the
2015-2016 academic year.
On October 26, 2015, the BSAEB met for its regular meeting and discussed Plaintiff,
among other students. The BSAEB concluded that Plaintiff was not meeting the conditions it
placed on Plaintiff’s promotion to FOM2. In particular, the BSAEB determined that Plaintiff had
not contacted the AAC to resolve his request for academic accommodations relating to
completing DSF, nor was he successfully completing the anatomy lab component of DSF. In
light of its findings, the BSAEB unanimously voted that Plaintiff should not continue in FOM2.
The BSAEB’s decision was considered an “Adverse Recommendation” and therefore would go
to the Progress Board. Plaintiff believed that being required to go before the Progress Board was
discriminatory and retaliatory.

On October 29, 2015, Dr. Chimienti sent Plaintiff a letter apprising him of the BSAEB’s
decision and the notifying him of the need to schedule a meeting to discuss the timing of the
Progress Board meeting. Dr. Chimienti’s letter further advised Plaintiff to review the Progress
Board process in the 15/16 Student Handbook.7 Plaintiff and Dr. Chimienti met on November 9,
2015. At this point, Plaintiff still had not contacted the AAC pursuant to the Progress Board’s
directive earlier in the summer. Dr. Chimienti strongly encouraged him to meet with the AAC
and to do so prior to the Progress Board meeting.
Dr. Chimienti also needed to know Plaintiff’s availability for a meeting of the Progress
Board in the few weeks after November 9. Dr. Chimienti was sensitive to Plaintiff’s academic

obligations, including his exam schedule, so she asked Plaintiff via email on November 9 to send
her 3-4 dates and asked Plaintiff to respond no later than November 13, 2015. Dr. Chimienti and
Plaintiff met on November 9 and also discussed the possibility of taking anatomy at a different
medical school. While Plaintiff felt that Dr. Chimienti held him to a higher standard because she
told him that he should try to find his own accommodation, it was Dr. Chimienti’s opinion that it
could not hurt to research what other medical schools have available, and, if Plaintiff found
something, to propose an alternative.

7 The process of the Progress Board in the 2015-2016 Medical School Student Handbook (the “15/16
Handbook”) was the same as the Student Handbook (i.e. the 2014-2015 Medical Student Handbook.
On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff indicated that he preferred to have the Progress Board
meeting held in early January, despite Dr. Chimienti’s request. The Progress Board could not be
held in January because the BSAEB’s recommendation needed to be resolved before the start of
the 2016 spring semester. Moreover, a January date for the Progress Board would have been
nearly two months after their initial meeting on November 9, 2015. As a result, on November 18,

2015, Dr, Chimienti informed Plaintiff that the Progress Board needed to meet in December, and
asked him to provide her with a few dates for the meeting in December and gave him two days to
reply. Plaintiff did not respond to Dr. Chimienti with any dates by November 20, so on
November 25, 2015, Dr. Chimienti identified five possible dates at various times during the day
between December 10 and December 22 for the Progress Board meeting. Dr. Chimienti informed
Plaintiff of these dates via email and asked him to rank these dates in order of priority.
After emailing Plaintiff with these dates, Dr. Chimienti also provided these dates to
members of the Progress Board on November 25, who ultimately selected December 16th for the
meeting. Dr. Chimienti notified Plaintiff of the date for the Progress Board meeting on Friday,

November 27. Plaintiff asked that the meeting be delayed until December 22, however the
members of the Board chose not to extend the date because such a late date would not give them
ample time to meet and provide a decision to Plaintiff prior to the start of the spring term.
Dr. Chimienti wanted to meet with Plaintiff to help him prepare and to support him
through the upcoming Progress Board meeting. Dr. Chimienti set aside 10 blocks of times in
December to meet with Plaintiff and offered the dates to Plaintiff on December 3, 2015. Plaintiff
did not respond to Dr. Chimienti’s offer to meet with him.
Second Meeting of The Progress Board
The Progress Board meeting was held on December 16, 2015. Plaintiff was offered
several options for the timing of the meeting, and testified that he believed that setting the
Progress Board meeting for December 16, 2015 was discriminatory because it caused him to
miss time studying for his exams. At the Progress Board meeting, Dr. Chimienti reviewed the

BSAEB’s Adverse Recommendation that Plaintiff not be permitted to continue with FOM2 in
light of the fact that he had not complied with the conditions set by the Progress Board in July
2015; provided members with background information regarding the Adverse Recommendation,
including information about the DSF course; Plaintiff’s progress in FOM2; and the prior
Progress Board Recommendation from July 29, 2015. Plaintiff appeared before the Progress
Board for a portion of the time and was given the opportunity to address the members.
On January 5, 2016, the Progress Board recommended to Dean Flotte that Plaintiff not
continue with the FOM2 coursework/curriculum. The following reasons were cited:
a. Plaintiff did not fulfill the Progress Board’s prior stipulation that he
successfully complete the DSF anatomy lab requirement, working with the AAC
and the DSF course directors.
b. Plaintiff did not work with the AAC to resolve the AAC’s outstanding
requests in connection with his request for a reasonable accommodation.
The Progress Board further decided that when Plaintiff had fulfilled the requirements set
for him in August 2015, with accommodations as granted by the AAC, he would have the
opportunity to appear before the Progress Board again to confirm that he had met the criteria for
readmission. Dr. Chimienti informed Plaintiff of the Progress Board’s decision on January 6,
2016. Dr. Chimienti met with Plaintiff on January 7, 2016. During their meeting, Plaintiff
requested that Progress Board’s decision be overturned by Dean Flotte. Plaintiff requested a
meeting with Dean Flotte, and asked that Dr. Chimienti be present for that meeting.
On January 14, 2016, Plaintiff met with Dean Flotte to discuss the Progress Board’s
decision, with Dr. Chimienti present at this meeting. Dean Flotte ultimately approved the
Progress Board’s recommendation. On January 15, 2016, Dr. Chimienti sent Plaintiff a letter
informing him of Dean Flotte’s decision and offered Plaintiff the opportunity to meet with her to
discuss it. Plaintiff informed Dr. Chimienti that he would follow up with her as soon as possible.

Plaintiff was placed on an administrative leave of absence from the Medical School, effective
January 19, 2016. Plaintiff testified that he believed the Progress Board’s decision to force him
on a leave of absence was discriminatory and retaliatory.
Leave of Absence
The Spring 2016 semester at the Medical School began on January 4, 2016. As Plaintiff’s
administrative leave of absence did not technically begin until January 19, 2016, Plaintiff was
considered to have been actively enrolled at the Medical School during this 15-day period.
According to the Medical School’s policy, when a student enters a leave of absence after the start
of an academic semester, the tuition and fees charged to the student and the federal student loan

disbursed to the student need to be adjusted based on the student’s attendance in the semester.
The Bursar, Yi Chen, was not privy to any of the facts or circumstances relating to the reason
Plaintiff was on an administrative leave of absence and working with the Medical School’s
Office of Financial Aid, calculated that Plaintiff’s outstanding balance owed to the Medical
School was $2,447.49. This amount represented Plaintiff’s tuition and fees between January 4,
2016 and January 19, 2016. A bill reflecting Plaintiff’s outstanding balance was sent to him on
January 22, 2016.
The 2015-2016 Student Handbook contained a “Billing and Policy on Past Due Student
Accounts.” The Past Due Student Accounts Policy provides that a student’s failure to pay his or
her account in full by the due date may result in denial of transcripts. Because as of February 12,
2016, the Medical School had not received payment from Plaintiff of his outstanding $2,447.49
balance, Ms. Chen requested that the Registrar’s Office at the Medical School place a hold on
Plaintiff’s transcript until his account was paid in full. As of this time, Ms. Chen was not aware
of the facts or circumstances relating to the reason Plaintiff was on an administrative leave of

absence. Plaintiff believed that Dr. Chimienti directed Ms. Chen to place a hold on his transcript,
that this action was discriminatory, and that it was done intentionally to prevent him from
transferring.
Email Policy
The 2015-2016 Student Handbook contains an Electronic Mail, Internet Access Policy.
The Email Policy provides that e-mail is considered an official means of communication at the
Medical School and contains certain provisions regarding response times and attention to
accounts for important school-related matters. Although Plaintiff was expected to be familiar
with the E-Mail Policy regardless of whether he decided to read it, Plaintiff was specifically
advised of the Email Policy by Dr. Chimienti on August 21, 2015. Plaintiff’s failure to timely
respond to emails was noted as a concern throughout the accommodation progress.

Attendance at Classes
The 2015-2016 Student Handbook also contains an Attendance, Rescheduling, and
Withdrawing Policy. The Attendance Policy states that “students are expected to meet all course
activities and requirements as scheduled within the medical school curriculum.” As part of
Plaintiff’s FOM2 curriculum, Plaintiff was required to enroll in Determinants of Health 2
(DOH2), which included a Population Health Clerkship. Plaintiff failed to attend the orientation
of the Population Health Clerkship, and his absence was not excused. Plaintiff was advised of his
failure to attend this meeting. As part of Plaintiff’s FOM2 curriculum, Plaintiff was required to
enroll in Organ Systems Disease (OSD). Plaintiff failed to attend 6 of the 7 small group sessions
of OSD focusing on the endocrine system, and he did not remediate these sessions. Plaintiff also
failed to attend a small group session concerning musculoskeletal medicine and dermatology.
Taking Anatomy at a Different Medical School
After their email exchange in late January 2016, Plaintiff did not contact Dr. Chimienti

again until he emailed her on July 29, 2016. Plaintiff informed Dr. Chimienti that he had
received an offer from Dr. Robert Spears, an Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the
University of Texas School of Dentistry to “personally supervise” his anatomy coursework. This
was the first time that a medical student at the Medical School had developed a proposal to take
anatomy at a different medical school, for which he would receive credit at the Medical School.
In light of the fact that this had not been done before, Dr. Chimienti initially determined that the
Medical School would need to develop a process to review and approve Plaintiff’s proposal.
Dr. Chimienti contacted Dr. Melissa Fischer, who at the time worked for the Medical
School as its Associate Dean for Undergraduate Medical Education. Plaintiff believed it was

inappropriate for Dr. Chimienti to contact Dr. Fischer, however Dr. Fischer oversaw the
operations of the undergraduate medical curriculum at the Medical School. Dr. Chimienti did not
provide any information to Dr. Fischer beyond the emails Plaintiff sent to her, and the
communication he received from Dr. Spears and another physician from Columbia University
School of Dentistry had Plaintiff contacted.
After emailing Dr. Fischer, Dr. Chimienti spoke with Dr. Hines concerning Plaintiff’s
proposal. As Co-Chair of the AAC, Dr. Hines believed that Plaintiff’s proposal should be
handled by the AAC because, ultimately, his proposal was a request for an academic
accommodation, to substitute course work for medical reasons. Dr. Hines informed Dr.
Chimienti of her beliefs. Plaintiff testified that he believed Dr. Hines held him to a higher
standard by recommending this approach.
Dr. Chimienti subsequently contacted Dr. Fischer to apprise her of Dr. Hines’ suggestion.
Dr. Fischer agreed that it was appropriate for Plaintiff’s proposal to proceed through the AAC.
On August 6, 2016, Dr. Chimienti advised Plaintiff to contact Dr. DeMarco. On August 12,

2016, Plaintiff instead emailed Dr. Fischer directly about the offer from Dr. Spears, who was
unable provide Plaintiff an accommodation to substitute coursework.
Plaintiff Contacts the AAC in November 2016
Plaintiff did not communicate with the AAC between January 2015 and November 2016.
In November 2016, Dr. Dawn Carpenter, a member of the AAC, received a letter by fax from a
physician on behalf of Plaintiff. Dr. Carpenter checked with Dr. DeMarco in case the letter was
something she needed to see. Dr. DeMarco, after learning that it was documentation from a
pulmonologist at MGH, remarked: “Oh boy- yeah, I need to see that.” Plaintiff testified at
deposition that he believed Dr. DeMarco’s comment was discriminatory. Dr. DeMarco made this

statement because she thought that Plaintiff had finally followed through with the AAC’s long-
standing request for information and documentation.
Plaintiff’s Evaluation by Dr. Harris
In early November 2016, Dr. Chimienti received a fax from Dr. Scott Harris on behalf of
Plaintiff containing documentation supporting Plaintiff’s request for an academic
accommodation. As the OSA did not handle accommodations requests, Dr. Chimienti forwarded
the documentation she received to the AAC on December 1, 2016 (the “Harris Note”). Plaintiff
was seen by Dr. Harris, a family health care practitioner, on October 31, 2016. Dr. Harris is not
an allergist or occupational health physician. Plaintiff testified that he visited Dr. Harris “as a
way to satisfy the Medical School’s accommodation requests.
Dr. Harris incorrectly believed that Plaintiff had a reaction to formaldehyde in the
anatomy lab “about 2 years ago.” Plaintiff believes he showed the letters from Dr. Zheng and Dr.
Christiani to Dr. Harris. Plaintiff does not recall providing Dr. Harris with the chemical data

sheets from BU or the Medical School. Plaintiff’s attorney at the time, Whitfield Larabee , not
Dr. Harris, drafted the second page of the Harris Note before Dr. Harris had the opportunity to
evaluate Plaintiff. The Harris Note does not contain an independent discussion of the
characteristics, symptoms, or duration of Plaintiff’s reactivity to formaldehyde or the severity of
Plaintiff’s symptoms. The Harris Note refers back to the Christiani and the Zheng Notes and
does not indicate whether he reviewed Plaintiff’s historical medical records regarding his prior
treatment for his reactivity to formaldehyde, including records from a treating physician. The
Harris Note does not describe the course of Plaintiff’s reactivity, or any related treatment
Plaintiff may have received since his initial exposure.

After reviewing the Harris Note, the AAC determined, in good faith, that it was necessary
to speak with Dr. Harris to obtain additional information from him. Knowing that she needed
Plaintiff’s permission to do so, Dr. DeMarco advised Plaintiff of her need for Plaintiff’s written
permission to speak with Dr. Harris. The AAC determined that Dr. DeMarco needed to ask
certain questions, which were necessary for the AAC’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s for an academic
accommodation. Specifically, Dr. DeMarco wanted to ask Dr. Harris of his qualifications to
opine on reactivity to formaldehyde, given his status as a family care practitioner, whether he
made a diagnosis of Plaintiff, whether the reaction to formaldehyde was an allergy or an irritant,
whether the reactivity is contact based or inhalant based or both, and whether Dr. Harris had
spoken with Drs. Zheng or Christiani about their evaluations if he was relying on them. The
AAC also had questions about Dr. Harris’s rationale for believing that a hazmat suit and
respirator were not an acceptable option, among other things. Plaintiff testified that it would be
“completely… unreasonable and inappropriate for the Medical School to glean
any…information, other than the letter that… he has given to them.” Plaintiff testified that it was

“unreasonable” for Dr. DeMarco to ask Plaintiff for permission to speak with Dr. Harris so that
she could learn a bit more information concerning Dr. Harris’s evaluation and he refused to
provide the Medical School with permission to speak with Dr. Harris.
Plaintiff Requests an Academic Accommodation
On December 9, 2016, Plaintiff sent a letter to Dr. Carpenter. Plaintiff enclosed with the
December 9, 2016 letter the note he previously sent through Attorney Prisby from Dr. Christiani,
the Harris Note that Dr. DeMarco previously received, and a note from Dr. Zheng (the “2016
Zheng Note”). 8
In the December 9 letter, Plaintiff wrote:
With regard to the requests of the University of Massachusetts Medical School to review
other medical records and history, or to speak directly with my physicians, this goes
beyond what is required of me under state and federal anti-discrimination laws, is a
requirement that violate these laws, and amounts to a request to engage in an unwarranted
invasion of my privacy. The materials that I have provided adequately establish my
disability and my need for accommodation.
On December 21, 2016, the AAC met, in part, to discuss the December 9, 2016 letter
from Plaintiff (along with the enclosed letters from the physicians). The AAC unanimously
agreed that it did not have enough documentation to review Plaintiff’s request for

8 The 2016 Dr. Zheng was slightly different from the first Zheng Note provided in November 2014. Specifically,
2016 Zheng Note did not contain the following language that was included in the 2014 Zheng Note: “I have
reviewed Plaintiffs (sic) previous medical recordin (sic) detail. It was clearly documented that…” The 2016 Zheng
Note also did not identify the date she evaluated Plaintiff.
accommodations. The AAC agreed that it needed records from Plaintiff’s treating physician who
witnessed his original asserted reaction to formaldehyde at BU. The AAC further determined that
the letters provided were based on Plaintiff’s accounting of his reaction, and that none of the
letters he provided on December 9, 2016 stated that they reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records
documenting the asserted reaction from the initial treating physician and that it needed Plaintiff’s

permission to speak to these physicians. The AAC also determined that it needed information
that would identify Plaintiff’s functional impairments and how the Medical School could best
address them.
The AAC Responds to Plaintiff’s Request
On January 6, 2017, Dr. DeMarco sent Plaintiff a letter, in part, to update him on the
AAC’s decision from its meeting on December 21, 2016, and because she wanted to specifically
articulate for Plaintiff the additional information that the AAC determined it needed to rule on
his request. Consistent with the AAC’s prior requests to Plaintiff beginning in October 2014, Dr.
DeMarco, requested Plaintiff provide the following information to the AAC: medical records
from the physician or hospital who treated Plaintiff during the allergic reaction to formaldehyde;
documentation from Plaintiff’s regular allergist or primary care physician of the specific nature

of the allergy and route of exposure (inhalation vs. contact), and the nature and extent of any
follow-up treatment following that acute reaction episode and up through and including the
present time; and Plaintiff’s written permission to speak with Drs. Christiani, Zeng and Harris
concerning the specific nature of your allergy, his prior and current history of medical treatment
for this allergy, the route of exposure, and whether or not our offer of a full hazmat gear would
mitigate the reaction.
Plaintiff testified that he understood that the January 6, 2017 letter informed him that the
AAC needed additional information to rule on his request for an academic accommodation. On
February 3, 2017, James G. Healy, the Associate Vice Chancellor for Management at the
Medical School at the time, sent an email to Plaintiff and Attorney Larrabee. Mr. Healy’s email
was sent in response to a letter the Medical School received from Attorney Larrabee on January
24, 2017 in which he attempted to “appeal” Plaintiff’s ongoing request for an academic
accommodation. Plaintiff’s “appeal” was premature because the AAC had not yet rendered a

decision on Plaintiff’s request for an accommodation. Mr. Healy informed Plaintiff and Attorney
Larrabee of this fact on February 3, 2017. In his February 3, 2017 email, Mr. Healy also
reiterated the requests of the AAC that had been previously made by Dr. DeMarco in her January
6, 2017 letter to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was given until February 17, 2017 to provide the information and permission to
contact his doctors as set forth in the letter of January 6, 2017 from the AAC. If Plaintiff did not
provide the requested information and documentation by Friday, February 17, 2017, the AAC
was prepared to meet to discuss and deliberate on Plaintiff’s accommodation request with the
information and materials that it had in its possession as of that time. Plaintiff did not submit

anything to the AAC in response to Mr. Healy’s email beyond what he had previously provided.
The AAC Meets to Discuss Plaintiff’s Request
On March 1, 2017, the AAC met to discuss Plaintiff’s request for an academic
accommodation and the documentation that Plaintiff had submitted to the AAC to date and
decided unanimously that the documentation Plaintiff submitted was insufficient to determine
the specific nature of Plaintiff’s alleged disability and, therefore, what type of accommodation
the Medical School could provide to Plaintiff.
The AAC made its decision because of the following findings:
a. It was not given the opportunity to review the records from Plaintiff’s
initial alleged reaction to formaldehyde, and therefore it did not have firsthand
knowledge of the specific reaction Plaintiff may have suffered.
b. It was not provided the opportunity to speak with any of Plaintiff’s
treating physicians to inquire as to the specific nature and severity of his alleged
allergic reaction, the prior and current history of medical treatment for his allergy,
the route of exposure, and why the AAC’s offer of full hazmat gear with a
respirator specifically fitted to Plaintiff would not mitigate his alleged reaction.
The AAC was concerned that none of the treating physicians apparently examined
him during his reaction, and instead appear to have based their opinion on the
medical history he orally provided.
c. The AAC believed it would have been very helpful to the AAC’s
consideration of Plaintiff’s request if it spoke to Dr. Zheng because the first note
she provided in 2014 (i.e., the Zheng Note) suggested she may have reviewed
Plaintiff’s medical records from his initial reaction, and, thus, could speak to what
the treating provider observed.
The AAC informed Plaintiff of its decision in a letter to him, dated March 15, 2017 (the “Denial
Letter”). Plaintiff testified that, while he doesn’t explicitly recall receiving the Denial Letter, he
believes he “must have” and understood that the AAC denied his request for an accommodation.
Plaintiff Appeals the AAC’s Decision
Pursuant to its Policy, the AAC gave Plaintiff the opportunity to appeal its decision to the
Academic Accommodations Appeals Committee (the “Appeals Committee”), the process for
which was laid out for him in the Denial Letter. Plaintiff timely appealed the AAC’s decision.
On March 27, 2017, pursuant to the appeal process, Dean Flotte appointed Deborah Plummer,
PhD, Jill Terrien, PhD, and Sheldon Benjamin, MD, to the Appeals Committee. All documents
and materials concerning and relating to Plaintiff’s accommodation request, including all
relevant correspondence and emails, were forwarded to the Appeals Committee for its review
and consideration on March 29, 2017.
The Appeals Committee met on April 6, 2017. Prior to commencing deliberations, and
consistent with the Medical School’s practices and protocols, Mr. Healy met with the Appeals
Committee for approximately ten minutes. The purpose of Mr. Healy’s meeting with the Appeals
Committee was to go over the appeal policy and procedures, to make sure they understood the
task before them, and to answer any questions that the Appeals Committee had concerning the
process. Mr. Healy did not engage in any substantive discussion of the matter when he met with
them, and he left the meeting after accomplishing the reason for his attendance.
On April 6, 2017, the Appeals Committee upheld the decision of the AAC to deny
Plaintiff’s request for an academic accommodation. The Appeals Committee determined that the

AAC acted in accordance with its policies and procedures. Mr. Healy advised Plaintiff on April
11, 2017 that the Appeals Committee upheld the decision of the AAC. Plaintiff testified that he
was held to a higher standard than “all medical students” when he was not given an
accommodation.
On December 12, 2017, Dr. Chimienti sent a letter to Plaintiff via registered mail to the
address that the Medical School had on file for him (the “December 12 Letter”). Dr. Chimienti
sent the December 12 Letter to Plaintiff because, at the start of the 2018 spring semester,
Plaintiff was going to reach the maximum 2 year leave of absence from the Medical School.
Pursuant to the 2017/2018 Student Handbook (the “17/18 Student Handbook”), the maximum

leave of absence students may take is two years. The December 12 Letter advised Plaintiff of
this fact. Dr. Chimienti further advised Plaintiff that, pursuant to Section 3 of the 17/18 Student
Handbook, Academic Policies and Regulations:
“A student who… fails to return from a Leave of Absence, in spite of notification by the
Associate Dean of Student Affairs, will be considered to have withdrawn voluntarily
from the Medical School and cannot be reinstated without positive action of the
Committee on Admission.”
The December 12 Letter requested that Plaintiff inform Dr. Chimienti of his intent to return to
his studies, “either with Academic Accommodations granted by the Accommodations
Committee, or without Accommodations.”
The December 12 Letter requested that the Plaintiff contact Dr. Chimienti by December
31, 2017 with his plans. Dr. Chimienti did not hear from Plaintiff by December 31, 2017. As a
result, on January 3, 2018, Dr. Chimienti’s assistant sent Plaintiff a copy of the December 12
Letter via email. Plaintiff responded on January 9, 2018, and informed Dr. Chimienti that he was
“definitely interested in continuing [his] studies at the [Medical School].” To continue with his

studies, Plaintiff needed to communicate with the AAC if he was still seeking accommodations
for DSF, which Dr. Chimienti reminded Plaintiff of on January 9, 2018. Dr. Chimienti once
again advised Plaintiff of this fact on January 9, 2018. Plaintiff requested to meet with Dr.
Chimienti after receiving the December 12 Letter.
On January 9, 2018, Dr. DeMarco learned from Dr. Chimienti via email that Plaintiff
wished to continue with his studies, and that he was directed to her by Dr. Chimienti for his
accommodation requests for DSF. Dr. DeMarco subsequently forwarded Dr. Chimienti’s email
to Mr. Healy and, when she did, stated to him: “Here we go again.” Plaintiff testified that Dr.
DeMarco’s comment was discriminatory.

On February 16, 2018, Plaintiff and Dr. Chimienti met to discuss his plans. At the
meeting, Plaintiff informed Dr. Chimienti that he was considering seeking transfer to another
institution or returning to the Medical School. Consistent with Dr. Chimienti’s December 12
Letter and January 9 email exchange, Plaintiff needed to contact the AAC if he wanted to return
to the Medical School with academic accommodations. Dr. Chimienti advised Plaintiff of this
again during their meeting that day.
If Plaintiff wanted to rematriculate to the Medical School, he needed to request to return
with or without academic accommodations by April 6, 2018. If Plaintiff wanted to return with
academic accommodations relative to the DSF course, he needed to contact the AAC and comply
with its policy. Plaintiff needed to contact the AAC by April 6, 2018 if he wanted to pursue
academic accommodations and needed to complete the process by July 1, 2018 so that there was
sufficient time to bring his request to rematriculate to the Progress Board, consistent with the
Progress Board’s decision from December 16, 2015. If Plaintiff did not satisfactorily conclude
this process (with or without ADA accommodations) by July 1, 2018, he would be considered to

have voluntarily withdrawn from the Medical School pursuant to the 17/18 Student Handbook.
On March 21, 2018, Dr. Chimienti sent a letter to Plaintiff (the “March 21 Letter”) advising him
of this information.
Plaintiff’s Decision to Transfer
On March 16, 2018, Plaintiff informed Dr. Chimienti that he had “received the transfer
application from South Carolina School of Medicine” and he requested that Dr. Chimienti
provide him with a “letter of good standing.” Dr. Chimienti advised Plaintiff by email on March
19 of the process of requesting such a letter. Plaintiff submitted a formal request for a letter of
good standing of March 19, 2018, and several days later, on March 22, 2018, Dr. Chimienti sent

a letter to Dr. Robert Rhinehart at the University of South Carolina.
Plaintiff speculates that Dr. Chimienti spoke with someone at the University of South
Carolina and that, as a result of that alleged conversation, the University of South Carolina was
not “so positive any further” toward him. To the contrary, Dr. Chimienti was not contacted by
anyone from the University of South Carolina School of Medicine in response to her letter and
did not speak with anyone from the University of South Carolina School of Medicine, or any
other medical school, concerning Plaintiff.
Transcript and Tuition Charges
In March 2018, Dr. Chimienti advocated to Dean Flotte to waive Plaintiff’s tuition
charges from the 2016 Spring Semester, given that Dr. Saxena was not enrolled in any
coursework during that two-week period. Dean Flotte waived these charges on March 21, 2018.
On or about March 23, 2018, the hold on Dr. Saxena’s ability to receive his transcript was lifted.

On or about March 26, 2018, Plaintiff requested an official copy of his transcript.
Plaintiff claims that the Registrar prevented him from transferring by not allowing access
to his transcript because of the hold and that this was discriminatory. The Registrar’s Office
provided Plaintiff with a copy of his transcript on or about March 26, 2018. Plaintiff testified that
his transcript has errors, and that this was a deliberate attempt to interfere with his ability to
transfer. Plaintiff believes that his transcript incorrectly lists him as having withdrawn from eight
of the nine courses in which he was enrolled during FOM 2. Eight of the nine courses in which
Plaintiff was enrolled during the 2015-2016 academic year were year-long courses. Six of these
courses ended on March 18, 2016, one ended on May 6, 2016, and the other ended on May 20,

2016. Plaintiff’s transcript correctly shows him having withdrawn from these eight courses in
light of the fact that he was placed on an administrative leave of absence on January 19, 2016,
after he did not comply with the Progress Board’s conditions for his promotion to FOM2.
On April 3, 2018, Plaintiff informed Dr. Chimienti via email that he wished to continue
with his program at the Medical School. Plaintiff also informed Dr. Chimienti that he had
contacted the AAC as well. Dr. Chimienti understood from Plaintiff’s email to her that he was
requesting to come back to the Medical School with accommodations, and that he would be
proceeding through the AAC. Dr. Chimienti responded to Plaintiff’s email on April 3, 2018,
confirming her understanding.
On April 3, 2018, Plaintiff requested an accommodation for his anatomy coursework. To
request an accommodation, Plaintiff needed to take the following steps: request an in-take
meeting with Dr. DeMarco and Dr. Carpenter; submit a completed “Accommodation Request
Form” to Dr. DeMarco and Dr. Carpenter; and produce written documentation of his alleged
disability and its relationship to his accommodation request, which needed to be sent directly

from his health care providers to Dr. DeMarco and Dr. Carpenter. Although Plaintiff had
previously submitted documents to the AAC in connection with his prior accommodation
request, new submissions were required. The AAC remained willing to review the information
Dr. Saxena previously produced, in conjunction with the new material that needed to be
submitted. Plaintiff was aware that he needed to complete this process by deadline of June 30,
2018. Dr. DeMarco advised Plaintiff of the steps he needed to take and the deadline for him to
complete the accommodation process in a letter to him dated April 5, 2018.
On June 11, 2018, Dr. DeMarco received an email from a new attorney representing
Plaintiff, Suzie Herold. Attorney Herold requested an in-take meeting with Dr. DeMarco and Dr.

Carpenter on behalf of Plaintiff. Attorney Herold also informed Dr. DeMarco that Plaintiff
would complete and submit the Accommodation Request Form and that Plaintiff would request
the medical information that the AAC had requested. Dr. Carpenter and Dr. DeMarco were
prepared to meet with Plaintiff on Wednesday, June 20 or Friday, June 22. Dr. DeMarco advised
Plaintiff of her and Dr. Carpenter’s availability via email on June 13, 2018. Plaintiff did not take
accept their offer to meet with him. Further, despite Attorney Herold’s representation that
Plaintiff would be completing and submitting the Accommodation Request Form, Plaintiff did
not do so, nor did he request the medical information. Plaintiff testified that he did not submit the
Accommodation Request Form because he “thought it was discriminatory.” Plaintiff also
testified that he felt that the AAC had changed their Accommodation Request Form to “target”
him. Plaintiff claims that the Medical School changed the accommodation process by requiring
documentation from a medical provider that is no more than six months old, whereas in 2014
when he first applied, the documentation from a medical provider only needed to be from within
the past three years.

The Medical School amended its accommodations policy to require that medical
documentation based on an evaluation that had occurred within the prior six months, or it would
require updates or renewal. After consideration, the AAC amended its policy in this respect in
recognition of the fact that the status of a medical condition might change or evolve over a
period of time. This amended policy was applicable to all students. Plaintiff further claims that
the Medical School also changed the accommodation process by requiring that the medical
documentation to be produced contain an International Classification of Diseases (“ICD”)
diagnosis. Plaintiff believes that in 2014, the Policy only required documentation from a
physician that was based on historical records. The Policy from 2014 did contain a requirement

that the documentation contain an ICD diagnosis; it was not added in 2018.
Plaintiff testified that another example of how the Medical School allegedly changed the
academic accommodations policy in 2018 to “target” him was because there were now two
people involved in the accommodations process, Dr. DeMarco and Dr. Carpenter, where before
it was only Dr. DeMarco. Dr. Carpenter had been a member of the AAC, and eventually became
a Co-Chair. As Co-Chairs, Dr. Carpenter and Dr. DeMarco regularly worked together to handle
student accommodation matters for many months before Plaintiff’s new request for
accommodations in April 2018.
Plaintiff testified that another example of how the Medical School allegedly changed the
academic accommodations policy in 2018 to “target” him was because the Accommodation
Request Form, which had been revised in 2017, stated how the AAC “may require and request
additional documentation beyond what is submitted…,” whereas the Policy did not include such
language. It was the longstanding practice of the AAC, in accordance with applicable law, to

request additional documentation from a student when it reasonably determined the
documentation submitted by the student was insufficient.
Plaintiff did not complete the academic accommodations process by July 1, 2018. As
result, Plaintiff was considered to have withdrawn from the Medical School.
Plaintiff argues that numerous actions that taken by the Medical School constitute
discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his disability, including: asking Plaintiff to try the
temporary accommodations, comments made to Plaintiff by faculty and administrators, requiring
Plaintiff to go to the Progress Board in 2015, allegedly making Plaintiff take extra coursework,
the Medical School allegedly changing the DSF curriculum, requiring Plaintiff to go on

administrative leave of absence, charging Plaintiff for tuition based on his enrollment in January
2016, placing a hold on Plaintiff’s transcript, and changing the academic accommodations
process in 2018. Plaintiff believes that he has a disability and that the Medical School’s conduct
toward him was motivated by a discriminatory and retaliatory animus. Plaintiff asserts that the
Medical School’s motion for summary judgment must be denied and that he is entitled to
summary judgment on his claims because the undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that
the Medical School failed to reasonably accommodate his alleged disability and retaliated against
him for disclosing his alleged disability in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.9

9 Plaintiff’s Motion also claims that the Medical School “regarded him” as disabled simply because they offered him
temporary accommodations. Initially, the Medical School objects to Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a “regarded as”
The Medical School asserts that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment must be denied
and judgment instead entered in its favor because Plaintiff cannot prevail on his claims as a
matter of law as the undisputed fact establish that his claim under ADA fails because his claims
of wrongful conduct that occurred prior to January 7, 2016 are time-barred; that Plaintiff is not
disabled within the meaning of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act; that he is not a “qualified

individual” with a disability; that Plaintiff did not participate in the interactive process in good
faith with the Medical School; and that the Medical School can show legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons underlying its actions, precluding Plaintiff’s claims for pretext and
retaliation.
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is appropriate where, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

“‘A “genuine” issue is one that could be resolved in favor of either party, and a “material fact” is
one that has the potential32 of affecting the outcome of the case.’” Sensing v. Outback

disability discrimination claim. Specifically, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not plead a claim that the
Medical School regarded him as disabled. In the absence of having pled such a claim, Plaintiff cannot proceed on
this theory of liability against the Medical School. See Echevarria v. AstraZeneca, LP, 133 F. Supp. 3d 372, 393 (D.
P.R. 2015) (“Given that the complaint contains no ‘regarded as’ claim, no colorable ‘regarded as’ action has been
properly raised, for ‘[i]t simply will not do for a plaintiff to fail to plead with adequate specific facts to support a
regarded as claim, all-the while hoping to play that card if her initial hand is a dud”).
Notwithstanding this, the “regarded as” prong of the ADA “exists to cover those cases in which myths,
fears, and stereotypes affect the [school’s] treatment of an individual, because Congress has recognized that
society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from the actual impairment.” Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82-83
(1st Cir. 2008). To prove that the Medical School regarded him as disabled, Plaintiff cannot merely show that the
Medical School “perceived him as somehow disabled; rather, he must prove the [Medical School] regarded [him] as
disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Bailey v. Georgia–Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir. 2002).
Steakhouse of Florida, LLC, 575 F.3d 145, 152 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Calero-Cerezo v. U.S.
Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004)).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the record in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and makes all reasonable inferences in favor

thereof. Sensing, 575 F.3d at 153. The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact within the record. Id., at 152. “‘Once the moving
party has pointed to the absence of adequate evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case,
the nonmoving party must come forward with facts that show a genuine issue for trial.’” Id.
(citation to quoted case omitted). “‘[T]he nonmoving party “may not rest upon mere allegations
or denials of the [movant’s] pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to each issue upon which [s/he] would bear the ultimate burden
of proof at trial.” Id. (citation to quoted case omitted). The nonmoving party cannot rely on
“conclusory allegations” or “improbable inferences”. Id. (citation to quoted case omitted).
“‘The test is whether, as to each essential element, there is “sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” ’ ” Id. (citation to quoted case
omitted).
“Cross-motions for summary judgment require the district court to ‘consider each motion
separately, drawing all inferences in favor of each non-moving party in turn.’ ” Green Mountain
Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation to quoted case omitted).
“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic Rule 56 standard, but rather simply
require [the court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of
law on facts that are not disputed.” Adria Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Ferré Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107
(1st Cir. 2001). The Court need only “to determine whether either of the parties deserves
judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.” Id. And while each motion for
summary judgment will be decided on its own merits, because both the Defendants and the
Plaintiff's respective motions for summary judgment were filed simultaneously, the Court will
consider both motions at the same time, applying the same standard to each motion. See P.R.
American Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 133 (1st Cir. 2010).

Discussion
Statute of Limitations
The Court will first address Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims that are based on actions and events that occurred prior to January 7, 2016 are time barred
by the applicable statute of limitations, which the parties agree to be three years, pursuant to
Mass. Gen. L. c. 260 § 2A. Plaintiff filed his Complaint with this Court on January 7, 2019,
therefore claims related to this conduct would therefore appear to be time-barred. However,
“[c]ourts have recognized a narrow exception to the limitations period via the ‘continuing
violation doctrine.’ ” Willitts v. Engie N.A. Inc., 2023 WL 2573344, at *9 (D.Mass. Mar. 20,

2023), citing Ayala v. Shinseki, 780 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Under the
continuing violation doctrine, “a plaintiff may obtain recovery for discriminatory acts that
otherwise would be time-barred so long as a related act [(often called an ‘anchoring act’)] fell
within the limitations period.” Id.
Defendants first contend that Plaintiff’s claims were untimely as he filed suit with this
Court on January 7, 2019, and based on a three-year statute of limitation, any allegedly wrongful
conduct that took place prior to January 7, 2016 would be barred. Plaintiff disagrees and insists
that the continuing violation doctrine saves his claims.
A party alleging employment discrimination may, in appropriate circumstances, file suit
based on events that fall outside the applicable statutes of limitation. Under Massachusetts law,
the continuing violation doctrine serves as an exception to the statute of limitations only if three
prerequisites are satisfied. A plaintiff who seeks to derive the benefit of the continuing violation
doctrine bears the burden of establishing all three of its elements. See Shervin v. Partners

Healthcare System, Inc., 804 F.3d 23, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2015), citing Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop
Supermkt. Co., 434 Mass. 521, 750 N.E.2d 928, 941–42 (2001).
First, the claim must be one that arises from “a series of related events that have to be
viewed in their totality in order to assess adequately their discriminatory nature and impact.”
Shervin, 804 F.3d at 35. Second, the claim must be “anchored” by at least one incident of
discrimination or retaliation transpiring within the limitations period. Id. This anchoring event
must be “substantially relate[d]” to earlier instances of discrimination or retaliation and must
contribute to the continuation of the pattern of conduct that forms the basis of the claim. Id.
Third, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable person in his circumstances would have refrained

from filing a complaint within the limitations period. Id. On this final element, the inquiry
becomes whether the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known within the limitations
period both that his work environment was discriminatory and that the problems he attributed to
that discriminatory environment were unlikely to cease. Shervin, 804 F.3d at 35. “As to the
likelihood [ ] of improvement, the question is whether the plaintiff's ‘delay in initiating the
lawsuit, considered under an objective standard, was unreasonable.’ ” Id. Here, reading the
Complaint generously in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s circumstances could
have thought his situation would improve or the discrimination would cease within the
limitations period. Accordingly, any evidence of alleged wrongful conduct that occurred prior to
January 7, 2016 is not time-barred for the purposes of this motion.
ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
The ADA, which was enacted to protect disabled individuals, provides that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in

or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under the ADA, an educational
institution such as The Medical School is required to make “reasonable modifications,” for a
disabled student unless it “can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35/130(b)(7). Similarly, the
Rehabilitation Act recognizes that “individuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms of discrimination in such critical areas as … education.” 29 U.S.C. § 701. To combat such
discrimination, Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in
the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance ….” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Practically speaking, this
requires federal funded academic institutions to make “academic adjustments” including
“modifications to … academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do
not discriminate or have the effect of discriminating” and may require that certain rules be
suspended for handicap students where application of such rules would “have the effect of
limiting the participation of handicapped students in [such institution’s program or activity.” 34
C.F.R. § 104.44; 45 C.F.R. § 84.44.
Generally, courts construe the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to impose similar
requirements. Thus, despite the different language that these statutes employ, they require a
plaintiff to demonstrate the same elements to establish liability. In the context of a student
excluded from an educational program, to prove a violation of either the ADA or Rehabilitation
Act, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is disabled, (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate

in the defendant’s program, and (3) defendant excluded him from its program based on his
disability. Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). As to the third
element, there are three distinct grounds for relief: (1) intentional discrimination or disparate
treatment; (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make reasonable accommodations. See Nunes
v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Correction, 766 F.3d 136, 144–45 (1st Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s assertion
that he was discriminated against by the Medical School based on his disability relies on theories
of disparate treatment and failure to accommodate and he bears the burden of proving each
element of the claim. See Parker F.3d at 5.
As to the first element, Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled because of his sensitivity to

formaldehyde, a condition he argues has affected him in laboratory settings. Having an
impairment, however, is not enough to claim protection under the ADA. See Whitlock v. Mac-
Gray, Inc., 345 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 2003). In order to be considered disabled under the
definition of the ADA, a person must “(1) have a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more life activity; (2) have a record of having such impairment; or (3)
be “regarded as” having such an impairment.” Cosme-Perez v. Municipality of Juana Diaz, 110
F. Supp. 3d 357, 365 (D.P.R. 2015). Merely alleging impairment is not enough to claim
protection under the ADA. Id. “[E]vidence of impairment which is supported only with a
medical diagnosis or conclusory assertions of disability by a physician are insufficient to show
disability for purposes of the ADA.” Id., (quoting Perez v. Saint John’s School, 814 F. Supp. 2d.
102, 117 (D.P.R. 2011)). Plaintiff’s impairment in this case is supported by notes from three
physicians, Drs. Christiani, Zheng, and Harris. Per its policy with respect to non-obvious
disabilities, the Medical School asked Plaintiff for more information from each respective doctor
in order to decide whether to issue him an academic accommodation. The Medical School was

not able make an informed decision pursuant to its policies because, despite repeated attempts,
the Plaintiff did not allow the AAC to communicate with the doctors about the alleged disability.
Therefore, he fails to establish the first element.
As to the second element, Plaintiff must establish that he is a “qualified individual”
within the meaning of the ADA. Under the ADA, a qualified individual is one “who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices... meets the essential eligibility
requirements for … the participation in a program or activities provided by a public entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12131(2). Plaintiff has the burden to establish that he is a qualified individual. Joseph
M. v. Becker College, 531 F. Supp. 3d 383, 396 (D.Mass. 2021). “In meeting this burden,

[Plaintiff] must present sufficient evidence to show (1) that he could satisfy the essential
eligibility requirements of the program, i.e., those requirements that bear more than a marginal
relationship to the [program] at issue. And (2) if not, whether any reasonable accommodation by
the [Medical School] would enable the [P]laintiff to meet these requirements.”. Id. Plaintiff must
prove that he is an individual who is otherwise qualified is able to meet all the program’s
requirements despite his handicap. Id.
The Medical School maintains that Plaintiff was incapable of meeting all of the medical
school program’s requirements and perform the essential functions of a medical school student.
See Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 146 (1st Cir. 2006). While Plaintiff’s request for an
academic accommodation was pending, he was held to the same standards as his fellow medical
students, including participation in anatomy lab sessions. Except for the October 2014 calf heart
dissection, however, Plaintiff did not participate in any anatomy lab dissection during the 2014-
2015 academic year and was informed he would not receive passing grade in the DSF course.
After Plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the course, the BSAEB voted that Plaintiff would not

be allowed to progress to his second year of medical school (“FOM2”) because he did not
complete DSF, and the matter was referred to the Progress Board.10 The Progress Board allowed
Plaintiff to be promoted to FOM2, but required that Plaintiff complete his anatomy lab
requirements by February 2016.11 Plaintiff did not complete all required anatomy lab
requirements in Fall 2015, and the BSAEB voted that Plaintiff should not continue M2.12 See
Joseph M., 531 F. Supp. 3d at 396.
Furthermore, there is evidence on the record that shows that Plaintiff failed to comply
with the Medical School’s email policy, including rules that individually addressed e-mails
should be responded to within 72 hours (excluding weekends and holidays). Plaintiff also failed

to comply with the Medical School's Attendance, Rescheduling, and Withdrawing policy when
he did not attend a M2 course meeting, six out of seven Organ Systems Disease group sessions,
and another group session concerning musculoskeletal medicine and dermatology.
Plaintiff counters that he successfully completed FOM1 coursework with the exception of
DSF and points to a letter from Dr. Chimienti stating this, but did not respond to whether his

10 At the time, the AAC did not rule on Plaintiff’s accommodation because Plaintiff had not provided the AAC with
the documents it requested, and Plaintiff was able to develop an academic schedule pending the decision of the
Progress Board.
11 Plaintiff was advised of these conditions in August 2015, and that he needed to resolve his request for academic
accommodation with the AAC. Two faculty members at the Medical School created a plan for Plaintiff to complete
DSF by participating in the dissections he had not participated in. These included dissection-based labs, exercises,
quizzes, and practical exams. The DSF course for the 2014-2015 school year included grade point deductions for
unexcused absence at anatomy lab sessions.
failure to comply with the email and attendance policies at the Medical School affect his
qualification in the Medical School program. While the weight of the evidence shows that
Plaintiff was having difficulties keeping up with the Medical School’s curriculum, the Court will
assume arguendo that he has presented sufficient evidence to advance to the third element of the
test, which will prove to be pivotal to his discrimination claim.

As to the third element, even if this Court were to recognize Plaintiff’s alleged disability
and that Plaintiff was “otherwise qualified” to participate in the M.D. program, there is no
evidence on the record to show that Plaintiff was excluded from participation in, denied the
benefits of the services, or subject to discrimination while a student at the Medical School
because of that disability. See Parker, 225 F.3d at 5. “A plaintiff can make a threshold showing
on this third element by offering indirect evidence of discrimination.” See el Kouni v. Trustees of
Boston University, 169 F. Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.Mass. 2001); see also Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d
26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 93 S. Ct. 1817. “ … Once the defendant has
articulated a non-discriminatory justification for dismissing the plaintiff from the program, then

the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s proffered justification is a mere pretext concealing
its true discriminatory motive, namely, one motivated by plaintiff's disability and not by his lack
of aptitude as a student.” el Kouni, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 3; see also Wynne v. Tufts University
School of Medicine, 976 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1992). “When pretext is at issue in a
discrimination case, it is a plaintiff’s duty to produce specific facts which, reasonably viewed,
tend logically to undercut the defendant's position . . . The plaintiff may neither ‘rest[] merely
upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation, nor
measurably bolster his cause by hurling rancorous epithets and espousing tenuous insinuations’”
Wynne, 976 F.2d at 796(citing Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st
Cir. 1990)(citations omitted).
In order to overcome the Medical School’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its
decisions and be able to prove discrimination, Plaintiff is “required to show, unassisted by the
original inference of discrimination, that the [Medical School’s] proffered reason(s) [are]

actually a pretext for discrimination of the type alleged.” Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d
816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991). The “[p]retext analysis is more demanding than the assessment of
whether a prima facie case has been established…. It moves the inquiry to a new level of
specificity.” Echevarria v. AstraZeneca, LP, 133 F. Supp. 3d 372, 403 (D. P.R. 2015). Plaintiff
must point to specific facts to support the argument that the stated reasons for the Medical
School’s actions were “not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up [it’s] real… motive of
[disability] discrimination.” Bonefont-Igaravidez v. Int’l Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d 120, 125 (1st
Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim is premised on his belief the Medical School
harbored a discriminatory animus against him.
Here, the record is replete with Medical School’s attempts to engage with Plaintiff over

the course of several years to address his requests and potential need for accommodation. The
Medical School has produced a mountain of credible evidence demonstrating its willingness to
work with Plaintiff and find a solution that would allow him to proceed with his medical
education There is also ample evidence that the Medical School attempted to engage in a good
faith, interactive dialogue with Plaintiff, but its efforts were not reciprocated by him which led to
a breakdown in the interactive process. Being required to participate in an interactive process is
not an adverse action. Moreover, seeking additional information from, and requesting permission
to speak to, Plaintiff’s physicians, was eminently reasonable under the circumstances in light of
the serious deficiencies in the medical information Plaintiff provided to the AAC. E.E.O.C. v.
Kohl's Dept. Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 2014), “[A]n employer cannot be found to
have violated the ADA when responsibility for the breakdown of the ‘informal, interactive
process' is traceable to the employee and not the employer.” (quoting Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of
Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir.1996))). Plaintiff’s refusal to participate in further meetings
with the AAC or to provide the AAC with the required medical documentation is evidence of

him not putting forth a good faith effort to participate in the interactive process. EEOC v. Kohl’s,
774 F.2d at 133, citing Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
plaintiff responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process when she “failed to cooperate in
such a process”). Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that the Medical School’s reasons
were a pretext for disability discrimination, and Plaintiff’s argument of disparate treatment due to
his alleged disability “consist[s] of unsubstantiated conclusions, backed only by a few
uncoordinated evidentiary fragments. More is required to forestall summary judgment.” Wynne,
976 F.2d 791 at 796.
Retaliation Claims

To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he (i)
engaged in protected conduct, (ii) was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and (iii)
there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. D.B. ex rel.
Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012).13 If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the Medical School to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory
explanation for the adverse action. Id. Once the Medical School meets its obligation, the burden
shifts back to the Plaintiff to show that the proffered legitimate explanation is a pretext and that
the Medical School was, in actuality, motivated by a retaliatory animus. Id.

13 The standard for retaliation claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act is the same. Id.
Plaintiff argues that he was subject to retaliation when he was not granted an academic
accommodation, when he was required to provide supplemental medical information in order to
obtain an accommodation, and when he experienced alleged negative encounters with
employees of the Medical School. Plaintiff further contends that the Medical School changed its
requirements for an accommodation each time he requested one, held him to a higher standard

than his fellow medical students, requiring him to waive his HIPAA rights to secure an
accommodation and breaching his privacy, placing him on administrative leave and deliberately
interfering with his ability to complete medical school at the Medical School and other medical
schools across the country. Citing to the First Circuit in Sepulveda-Vargas v. Caribbean
Restaurant, LLC, the Medical School argues that the only action that the Plaintiff claims could
plausibly be considered as “materially adverse” is being placed on an administrative leave of
absence in January 2016 following the Progress Board’s recommendation that Plaintiff would
not continue with FOM2.14
Plaintiff’s request for an accommodation with respect to the anatomy lab sessions

constitutes a protected activity, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff was put on administrative leave
before later withdrawing from the Medical School, so viewed in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, he clears the first two hurdles of the test. To demonstrate the third element, causation,
Plaintiff must proffer evidence that but-for engaging in protected conduct, he would not been
subject to an adverse action. Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F. 3d 66, 74 (1st Cir. 2012). Therefore,
Plaintiff must prove that requesting an academic accommodation (and all of the actions he

14 In that case, the First Circuit held that “[n]ot all retaliatory actions…suffice to meet the ADA’s anti-retaliation
provision. Rather, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable [student] would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable [student] from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” Sepulveda-Vargas v. Caribbean Restaurant, LLC, 888 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir.
2018). For “retaliatory action to be material, it must produce a significant, not trivial harm and actions like petty
slights, minor annoyance, and simply lack of good manners will not [normally] create such deterrence.” Id.
claimed that followed) was the determinative factor in the Medical School’s decision to place
him on administrative leave.
Plaintiff claims that, but for him seeking an academic accommodation and engaging in
protected conduct, he would not have been subject to adverse action by the Medical School. The
Medical School contests that Plaintiff’s dismissal from the program was not an “adverse action”

because it considered the Plaintiff to have voluntarily withdrawn from the Medical School after
he did not return from his leave of absence and did not comply with the Medical School’s
academic accommodations process. Plaintiff’s withdrawal from the school was a result of
reaching the maximum allowed time on administrative leave of absence. Plaintiff was advised of
what he needed to complete in order to rematriculate as a student at the Medical School and did
not complete required procedures by the deadline.
The record does not show that Plaintiff was held to a higher standard than his fellow
students. The changes to the DSF curriculum were equally applicable to all students, and made
for legitimate reasons described at length by Prof. Gilroy. Moreover, Plaintiff was not forced to

find his own accommodation; rather, he was simply asked to comply with the AAC’s requests. In
addition, the fact that the Medical School did not provide Plaintiff an academic accommodation
was not because it held him to a higher standard than fellow students; rather, it was because he
continuously failed to comply with the AAC’s requests and participate in the interactive dialogue
in good faith. Furthermore, the AAC’s request to speak with Plaintiff’s physicians concerning
their respective notes and evaluation of Plaintiff was made as part of its efforts to engage in an
interactive dialogue with Plaintiff. Moreover, Dr. Gagliardi and Dr. DeMarco’s communications
with Dr. DiFranza concerning his evaluation of Plaintiff were reasonable and appropriate under
the circumstances.
The Medical School did not interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to transfer to another medical
school by placing a hold on his student account. The hold placed on his account was done
pursuant to Medical School policy – applicable to all students – because the Plaintiff had an
unpaid balance in spring 2016, which was later waived by the Dean. In addition, the Registrar’s
Office provided Plaintiff with an accurate copy of his transcript in March 2018 when Plaintiff

requested it and Dr. Chimienti provided Plaintiff with a letter in connection with his transfer
application. Plaintiff was required to attend the Progress Board, first in July 2015, and again in
December 2015, not because the Medical School was retaliating against him for requesting an
accommodation, but because he withdrew from DSF in February 2015, and because he failed to
comply with the Progress Board’s requirements for provisional promotion to FOM2. Plaintiff
was placed on an administrative leave of absence in January 2016 because of his failure to
comply with the Progress Board’s conditions. Finally, Plaintiff was considered to have
voluntarily withdrawn from the Medical School as of July 1, 2018 because he failed to return
from his administrative leave of absence, which had reached its maximum length. Although

Plaintiff had been explicitly advised of the steps he needed to take to rematriculate, he did not
comply with the Medical School’s directive to complete the academic accommodations process
by July 1, 2018.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Medical School’s decision
to place Plaintiff on an administrative leave of absence and subsequent withdrawal from the
medical school was not an adverse action causally connected to the protected conduct of
applying for an academic accommodation. Plaintiff has not presented a case of prima facie
retaliation, however his argument must fail even if a prima facie case of retaliation is found in
this case because the Medical School has legitimate reasons for each adverse and discriminatory
action the Plaintiff alleges. The Medical School offered Plaintiff legitimate, temporary
accommodations pursuant to its policies and Plaintiff did not comply with those conditions.
Further, Plaintiff was placed on leave of absence because he did not comply with the
requirements the Medical School set for him to be promoted to FOM2 after he withdrew from
DSF. The reasons for Plaintiff being placed on administrative leave are numerous, attributable to

the Plaintiff and not causally connected to the protected activity of applying for academic
accommodation.
After the Medical School provides a legitimate reason for their action(s), “the ultimate
burden falls on the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reason is pretext masking
retaliation . . .” Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003); see D.B., 675 F.3d
at 41 (“The burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered legitimate explanation is
pretextual, meaning that the defendant was motivated by a retaliatory animus”).15 “Pretext can be
shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in
the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could

rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Gomez-Gonzalez v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 626 F.3d
654, 662-63 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima face case of retaliation, the Medical
School is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

15 “On summary judgment, the need to order the presentation of proof is largely obviated, and a court may
often dispense with strict attention to the burden-shifting framework, focusing instead on whether the evidence as a
whole is sufficient to make out a jury question as to pretext and discriminatory animus.” Gomez-Gonzalez, 626 F.3d
at 662(citing Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir. 1996)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201436. Public record. Not legal advice.