# Saint-Vil v. Alves

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · June 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201157

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** June 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201157

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing right to counsel is right to effective assistance of counsel

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

___________________________________
)
JOHNAVON SAINT-VIL, )
)
Petitioner, )
) CIVIL ACTION
v. ) No. 22-10574-WGY
)
NELSON ALVES, )
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________)

YOUNG, D.J. June 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C § 2254

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Procedural History
Following a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court of
Massachusetts sitting in and for the County of Suffolk, Johnavon
Saint-Vil (“Saint Vil”) was convicted of two counts of mayhem,
three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child, and
five counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous
weapon. Resp’t’s Supplemental Answer to Pet. (“SA”) 8-11, 297,
ECF No. 25. On Counts one and two, Saint-Vil was sentenced to
seven-to-ten years in prison. Id. at 11. On Counts eleven,
twelve, and thirteen, Saint-Vil was sentenced to ten-to-twelve
years in prison. Id. at 10. On Counts three through seven,
Saint-Vil was sentenced to eight years of probation to run after
the sentence. Id. at 11.

Saint-Vil appealed his conviction -- filing multiple
motions for a new trial claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel. Pet. Relief Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) 6-8, ECF
No. 10. The motions were denied in May 2018 and October 2019.
SA 11-15. On January 18, 2022, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
(“Appeals Court”) affirmed the denial of the motions and upheld
Saint-Vil’s conviction. Commonwealth v. Saint-Vil, 100 Mass.
App. Ct. 1120 at *1 (2022). On August 4, 2021, Saint-Vil was
denied further state-appellate review with the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”). SA 19, 300, 326.

On August 10, 2022, Saint-Vil filed this petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pet., ECF
No. 10. The parties have briefed the issues. See Resp’t’s
Answer to Pet’r’s Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 24;
SA, ECF No. 25; Pet’r’s Mem. Law Supp. Pet. for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (“Pet’r’s Memo”), ECF No. 30; Resp’t’s Mem. Law in Opp’n
to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Resp’t’s Opp’n”), ECF. No.
33; Reply Br. Supp. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Reply”),
ECF. No. 34.
B. Factual Background

The relevant facts below come from the Appeals Court’s
opinion in the criminal appeal. Saint-Vil, 100 Mass. App. Ct.
at *1. Under section 2254, this Court will presume the State
court’s factfinding to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).1 The
petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. “If the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, the Commonwealth’s highest court, has declined to
review the conviction, then we can rely upon the ‘”the last
reasoned decision” issued by the Massachusetts Appeals Court’
(MAC) in crafting the factual and procedural narrative.”
Strickland v. Goguen, 3 F.4th 45, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting
King v. MacEachern, 665 F.3d 247, 252 (1st Cir. 2011)).

The children involved, named Marco and Andrea for the
purposes of the case, lived with their mother in their maternal
grandparents’ home. Saint-Vil, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at *1. The
mother began dating Saint-Vil and moved her children into an
apartment with Saint-Vil in 2012. Id. In 2013, Marco informed
his grandfather that Saint-Vil had whipped him and his sister,

1   This, of course, is not a “true” presumption at all.
See WILLIAM G. YOUNG, INFERENCES, PRESUMPTIONS AND PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE, IN REFLECTIONS OF A TRIAL JUDGE: A COLLECTION OF LECTURES BY
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM G YOUNG 30, 31-33 (MCLE, 1998). Rather, it
shifts to the petitioner the full burden of proof, indeed a
heightened burden of proof.
Andrea, with a belt. Id. After confronting Saint-Vil, and
noticing additional disturbing injuries, the grandfather and
mother decided to move Marco and Andrea back to their maternal
grandparents’ home. Id. The grandfather, however, did not
report Saint-Vil to the authorities. Id.

Later a pediatrician noted multiple burns apparently
inflicted by lit cigarettes. Id. “On November 7, 2013, a
sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) performed an examination of
the children and took photographs of the injuries. Both children
had ‘numerous healed burn marks’ on their bodies, as well as
other marks that appeared to be cuts or puncture wounds.” Id.

At trial, Saint-Vil’s sole defense was that a third party
inflicted the abuse on the children. Id. Importantly for this
case,
Trial counsel consulted with a medical expert prior to
trial in an attempt to determine, from the stage of
healing represented in the photographs, when the burns
had been inflicted. Because the expert “was not able
to offer a helpful opinion that would have excluded
[the petitioner] as the potential source of the
injuries,” trial counsel did not retain the expert for
trial. Instead, trial counsel cross-examined the
Commonwealth’s expert, eliciting from her, in part, an
opinion that the November 7, 2013 SANE photographs
“depicted wounds that had been healed -- had been
healing at least for five to seven days.” Trial
counsel argued that this expert testimony established
that the children had been injured after they moved in
with their grandparents on October 4, 2013, and they
no longer had any contact with the [petitioner]. He
highlighted the close relationship between the
grandparents and the children, arguing that the family
was “scapegoat[ing]” the [petitioner] because he was
“expendable.”
Id.
II. ANALYSIS
Saint-Vil’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus ultimately
fails because the Appeals Court’s application of Strickland, an
already general and deferential standard, was reasonable.
Saint-Vil’s petition proceeds from the single theory that
his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to retain an expert witness to testify regarding when
certain burn wounds might have been inflicted. Pet’r’s Memo 1.
Saint-Vil’s argument is that the children were burned after his
last contact with them on October 4, 2013, and an expert could
have testified that the wounds, as photographed on November 7,
2013, were less than 30 days old. Pet’r’s Memo 7-8.

Saint-Vil, however, was neither afforded constitutionally
deficient counsel because his attorney made tactical decisions
regarding expert witnesses nor was he prejudiced by the alleged
errors of his counsel because the “sole theory of the defense”
was introduced at trial through cross-examination and the
prosecution proved their case primarily through victim
testimony. Pet’r’s Memo 1.
A. Standard of Review

Saint-Vil filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pet.
1. This statute outlines the standards a person in state
custody must meet for a writ of habeas corpus to be granted.
The statute states in part,
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States[.]

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Saint-Vil challenges his custody under
section (d)(1) claiming that his custody is in violation of the
Sixth Amendment and its progeny because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. Pet’r’s Memo 1. Specifically,
Saint-Vil argues that by “fail[ing] to retain ‘an absolutely
necessary’ medical expert to support the sole theory of defense”
his attorney violated the standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Id.
The climb Saint-Vil faces is steep –- and indeed proves too
steep to surmount in this case. The burdens created by section
2254 are designed to ensure that “federal habeas relief will be
granted only in cases in which all fairminded jurists would
agree that a final state court decision is at odds with the
Supreme Court’s existing precedents.” Bebo v. Medeiros, 906
F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). A federal court “may not overrule a state

court for simply holding a view different from its own.” Id.
(quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003)). A state
court “decision is contrary to clearly established federal law”
only if it either “announces a rule of law that directly
contradicts Supreme Court precedent or . . . reache[s] a
different result than the Supreme Court on materially
indistinguishable facts.” Cronin v. Comm’r of Prob., 783 F.3d
47, 50 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412-13 (2000)). Habeas corpus is meant to protect petitioners
from a near-total breakdown in the state criminal justice
system. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102 (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 n.5 (1979)). It is not meant as a

“substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id.
at 102-03.
B. The Massachusetts Appeals Court’s application of
Strickland was reasonable.
The Appeals Court’s application of Strickland to the
behavior alleged in the petition was reasonable. Even were this
Court to review under the singularly deferential standard of
Strickland, there was no viable ineffective assistance of
counsel claim because defense counsel was not constitutionally
deficient and, even if counsel was deficient, the petitioner was
not prejudiced because of counsel’s actions. This Court
reviews, however, under the doubly deferential standard set out

by section 2254.
Strickland is the clearly established federal law governing
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“It is past question that the
rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.’”) Strickland instructs that review of “counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential.” 466 U.S. 689. There

is a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound
trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91, 101 (1955)).
Since this case comes to the Court as a section 2254
petition, the question is not whether there was a violation of

Strickland, but rather this Court must review whether the
Appeals Court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable. See
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 87-88. This type of review -- whether
the state court has unreasonably applied the already deferential
standard of Strickland -- has been deemed “doubly deferential”
due to the dual-nature of deference that must be surmounted in
order for a petitioner to have a viable claim. See Cullen v.

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011). The Appeals Court
reasonably applied Strickland, or the state-version thereof¸2 to
the facts alleged.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court articulated a test for
review of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is part and
parcel to the right to counsel itself. See 466 U.S. at 687; see
also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)
(recognizing right to counsel is right to effective assistance

of counsel); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(ruling Sixth Amendment provides criminal defendants with right
to counsel). The Court in Strickland formulated a two-part test
for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 466 U.S.
at 687. First, the petitioner bears the burden of showing that
counsel was constitutionally deficient. See id. Second, the
petitioner bears the burden of showing “that the deficient

2 The Appeals Court applied the standard set out in
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974). This standard
has been recognized by the First Circuit as the “functional
equivalent” of Strickland. Lynch v. Fiacco, 438 F.3d 35, 48
(1st Cir. 2006).
performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. Unless a petitioner
can prove both deficiency and prejudice, there is no cognizable
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.

First, Saint-Vil’s attorney was not constitutionally
deficient. Saint-Vil’s counsel made a tactical decision to focus
resources on cross-examination after investigating, and failing
to find, an expert beneficial to the defense. Second, Saint-Vil
was not prejudiced because the “sole theory” of the defense was
elicited through cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s expert
at trial and the prosecution proved its case primarily through
victim testimony, not expert witness testimony. For these
reasons, the Appeals Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland
to the facts alleged and Saint-Vil’s petition will be denied.

1. The Appeals Court was reasonable in concluding
that counsel’s decisions were not
constitutionally deficient.
The Appeals Court was reasonable in concluding that
counsel’s decision to focus efforts on cross-examination of the
Commonwealth’s expert after a fruitless search for an adequate
witness was a tactical decision that was not constitutionally
deficient. Saint-Vil, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at *2. Saint-Vil
argues that his counsel was constitutionally deficient because
counsel did not find an expert witness that could support the
defense’s theory that the burn marks must have occurred during
the month Saint-Vil did not have contact with the children.
Pet’r’s Memo 7.

Under Strickland, the petitioner must show that counsel’s
performance at trial was constitutionally deficient. See 466
U.S. at 687. The Appeals Court was tasked with reviewing
“whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.’” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263,
272 (2014). Within this prong lies the “duty to investigate.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. In Strickland, the Supreme
Court stated that “strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. More specifically,
“[t]he selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic example

of the type of ‘strategic choic[e]’ that . . . is ‘virtually
unchallengeable.’” Hinton, 571 U.S. at 275 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690). In addition, the Supreme Court has stated
that “[i]n many instances cross-examination will be sufficient
to expose defects in an expert’s presentation. When defense
counsel does not have a solid case, the best strategy can be to
say there is too much doubt about the State’s theory for a jury
to convict.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111.

Before Saint-Vil’s trial, his counsel,
consulted with a medical expert . . . in an
attempt to determine . . . when the burns had
been inflicted. Because the expert “was not able
to offer a helpful opinion that would have
excluded [the petitioner] as the potential source
of the injuries,” trial counsel did not retain
the expert for trial.
Saint-Vil, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at *1. Instead of spending time
searching for an effective expert, Saint-Vil’s counsel focused
on the cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s expert witness --
and was successful in so doing. Id. In fact, during cross-
examination, the defense was able to elicit from the expert “an
opinion that the November 7, 2013 SANE photographs ‘depicted
wounds that had been healed -- had been healing at least for
five to seven days.’” Id. While this testimony does not
preclude the timeline that Saint-Vil was trying to argue, it
certainly does not forcefully support the Commonwealth’s theory
either. Given that “[t]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that
counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others
reflects trial tactics” it was not unreasonable for the Appeals
Court to conclude that counsel’s tactical decisions not to
present an expert witness and instead focus on cross-examination
was not constitutionally deficient. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 109
(quoting Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)).
2. The Appeals Court was reasonable in concluding
that Saint-Vil was not prejudiced.
The Appeals Court was reasonable in concluding that Saint-
Vil was not prejudiced by his counsel’s decision to find an
expert witness that would testify to the theory of the defense.
Saint-Vil argues that he was prejudiced because had he put on an
expert witness who would buttress the theory already virtually
conceded by the Commonwealth, this would create “a reasonable
probability of a different result at trial.” Reply 4. As
previously stated, the Commonwealth’s expert witness
acknowledged the defense’s theory in their own testimony -- the
proposed expert would not have presented the factfinder with a
new theory. Id. Additionally, the prosecution proved the bulk

of its case through testimony of the victims who directly
inculpated Saint-Vil. Saint-Vil, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at *3.
They did not rely solely on experts to prove Saint-Vil’s guilt.
Id.
To establish prejudice, Saint-Vil must show “that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The chances “of a different result

must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington, 562
U.S. at 111.
Saint-Vil analogizes his case to Commonwealth v. Millien,
474 Mass. 417 (2016) (Gants, C.J.). In Millien, the defendant
appealed a conviction of assault and battery on a child. Id. at
418. At issue was whether certain head injuries sustained by an
infant could only be the result of violent shaking or whether

those injuries could also be the result of an accidental fall.
Id. The SJC held that “where the prosecution’s case rested
almost entirely on medical expert testimony, the defendant was
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel” when his attorney did not retain a medical expert to
present the opposing viewpoint of a “heated debate in the
medical community.” Id.
The Appeals Court reasonably, and correctly, distinguished

Millien from the present case. The Appeals Court held that
Millien “does not stand for the proposition that a defense
attorney must consult expert after expert . . . . Rather,
defense counsel in Millien was ineffective for failing to
consult with any experts.” Saint-Vil, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at
*3. Additionally, in Millien the primary evidence was expert
testimony -- there was no victim testimony as the victim was
six-months old. Id. In this case, the primary evidence was
elicited from the victims themselves. Id. Thus, the Appeals
Court reasonably concluded that an expert would not have
provided substantial grounds of defense or have been necessary
to rebut critical expert testimony. Id. (quoting Commonwealth
v. Jacobs, 488 Mass. 597, 606 (2021)).

Considering the “totality of the evidence before [them]”,
Turner v. United States, 699 F.3d 578, 584 (1st Cir. 2012), the
Appeals Court reasonably concluded that Saint-Vil was not
prejudiced by his attorney’s decision to focus resources on
cross-examining the Commonwealth’s expert and other key fact
witnesses when the key evidence came from direct examination of
the victims rather than an expert’s opinion about burn-tissue
healing time. Saint-Vil, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at *3.

III. CONCLUSION
The Appeals Court reasonably applied Strickland in holding
that the attorney’s failure to retain an expert witness did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel
sought out an expert but made a tactical decision to focus
resources on cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses.
Thus, Mr. Saint-Vil’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young_
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
JUDGE
of the
UNITED STATES3

3 This is how my predecessor, Peleg Sprague (D. Mass.
1841-1865), would sign official documents. Now that I’m a
Senior District Judge I adopt this format in honor of all
the judicial colleagues, state and federal, with whom I
have had the privilege to serve over the past 45 years.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10201157. Public record. Not legal advice.