# Johnson v. United States

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · April 12, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10200206

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** April 12, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10200206

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a district court decision requiring the Commission to begin the parole process was “a usurpation of authority vested in the Commission”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

TYRONE JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. 20-11986-MBB

FMC DEVENS WARDEN A. BONCHER,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(DOCKET ENTRY # 1)

April 12, 2022

BOWLER, U.S.M.J.
Pending before this court is a petition seeking a writ of
habeas corpus (the “petition”) filed by Tyrone Johnson
(“petitioner”). (Docket Entry # 1). Petitioner seeks a
judicial declaration naming his address in Saint Matthews, South
Carolina as his approved, permanent address upon release from
custody. (Docket Entry # 1). The United States of America, on
behalf of A. Boncher, Warden at the Federal Medical Center in
Devens, Massachusetts (“FMC Devens”), opposes the petition.
(Docket Entry # 18).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 16, 2020, petitioner filed the petition pro se
in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina. (Docket Entry # 1). The petition is entitled
“Request to Retain Permenent [sic] Residency Status in Saint
Matthews, South Carolina Area” and asks that, upon petitioner’s
release on probation or for compassionate release, he be
permitted to “‘retain’ [his] Saint Matthews, South Carolina
address as [his] ‘[p]ermanent’ approved address.” (Docket Entry
# 1, p. 2) (emphasis omitted). Because petitioner’s request was

“construed as a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” the petition was transferred to
this district, where petitioner is housed. See (Docket Entry #
7) (report and recommendation); (Docket Entry # 9) (order
adopting report and recommendation). This court ordered that
the action proceed against FMC Devens Warden A. Boncher
(“respondent”), “who was [petitioner]’s immediate custodian at
the time [he] commenced this action.” (Docket Entry # 11, p.
2).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native of Washington, D.C. and is an inmate

housed at FMC Devens in Ayer, Massachusetts. (Docket Entry # 1,
p. 1). At the time he filed the petition on October 16, 2020,
he was 61 years old and had a motion for compassionate release
pending. (Docket Entry # 1, pp. 1-2).
According to petitioner’s parole file with the United
States Parole Commission (the “Commission”), he “was convicted
in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 1993 . . .
for Assault with Intent to Commit Rape, Taking Indecent
Liberties (3 counts), Sexual Performance Using a Minor (2
counts)[,] and Rape While Armed (2 counts).” (Docket Entry #
18-1, p. 1). Petitioner received an indeterminate, parole
eligible sentence of up to 75 years imprisonment. (Docket Entry
# 18-1, p. 1).

The Commission granted petitioner parole in October 2009.
(Docket Entry # 18-1, p. 2). After he violated the terms of his
parole, the Commission issued a warrant for his arrest on
January 19, 2012, which was executed on January 26, 2012.
(Docket Entry # 18-1, p. 2). At that time, the Commission
revoked petitioner’s parole and ordered that he be presumptively
paroled on March 25, 2024. (Docket Entry # 18-1, p. 2).
Although petitioner is from Washington, D.C., he has not
resided there for more than 30 years and no longer has family
there. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 1). His only relatives are in
South Carolina, where petitioner lived and worked prior to his

probation violation and subsequent incarceration. (Docket Entry
# 1, pp. 1-2).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner requests a judicial declaration that he is a
permanent resident of South Carolina so that he be permitted to
reside there, rather than Washington, D.C., upon his release
from custody. (Docket Entry # 1, p. 2). Respondent opposes the
petition on the basis that there is no present case or
controversy. (Docket Entry # 18).
I. The Parole Process
The Commission has “authority over District of Columbia
Code offenders” such as petitioner, who was convicted in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See 28 C.F.R. §

2.70(a); see also (Docket Entry ## 1, 18-1). It has the “sole
authority to grant parole[] and [] establish the conditions of
release[] for all District of Columbia Code prisoners who are
serving sentences for felony offenses[] and . . . eligible for
parole by statute, including offenders who have been returned to
prison upon the revocation of parole . . . .” 28 C.F.R. §
2.70(b). Additionally, “[t]he Commission, in its discretion,
may parole any prisoner to live and remain in a jurisdiction
other than the District of Columbia.” 28 C.F.R. § 2.84.
A prisoner’s presumptive parole date is “contingent upon an
affirmative finding by the Commission that the prisoner has a

continued record of good conduct and a suitable release plan . .
. .” 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(d). As such, “[a]ll grants of parole
[are] [] conditioned on the development of a suitable release
plan and the approval of that plan by the Commission.” 28
C.F.R. § 2.83(a). “[T]he proposed release plan [must] be
submitted to the Commission 30 days prior to the prisoner’s
parole or mandatory release date.” 28 C.F.R. § 2.83(c). The
Commission considers the following to determine whether a
release plan is suitable:
(1) [e]vidence that the parolee will have an acceptable
residence;
(2) [e]vidence that the parolee will be legitimately
employed as soon as released; provided, that in special
circumstances, the requirement for immediate employment
upon release may be waived by the Commission;
(3) [e]vidence that the necessary aftercare will be
available for parolees who are ill, or who have any other
demonstrable problems for which special care is
necessary, such as hospital facilities or other
domiciliary care; and
(4) [e]vidence of availability of, and acceptance in, a
community program in those cases where parole has been
granted conditioned upon acceptance or participation in
a specific community program.

28 C.F.R. § 2.83(e).
Petitioner’s presumptive parole date is March 25, 2024, and
there is no indication that the Commission has yet determined
where he will reside upon release. See (Docket Entry # 18-1, p.
2). The requested judicial declaration is therefore premature
at this time and would usurp the Commission’s sole authority to
establish the conditions of petitioner’s release. See Alexander
v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 514 F.3d 1083, 1091 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a district court decision requiring the Commission
to begin the parole process was “a usurpation of authority
vested in the Commission”). Petitioner should instead, at the
appropriate time, indicate in his release plan that he wishes to
return to South Carolina. The Commission would then determine
the suitability of his request in accordance with the
regulations referenced above.
II. Lack of Justiciable Case or Controversy
In addition, for the reasons set forth below, petitioner
lacks standing to bring the petition because he has not shown
any actual or imminent injury and therefore has not shown that

there is any case or controversy before this court.
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’
jurisdiction to certain ‘[c]ases’ and ‘controversies.’” Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (quoting U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). As such, a district court may
make judicial declarations only “[i]n a case of actual
controversy within its jurisdiction. . . .” 28 U.S.C. §
2201(a). “‘One element of the case-or-controversy requirement’
is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have standing to
sue.’” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). “Article III standing requires an injury

that is (i) concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent,
(ii) fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (iii)
redressable by a favorable ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 130 (2010); see Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he plaintiff must have
suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”
(citations omitted)). To determine if a case presents an actual
controversy, “district courts must examine ‘whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the

issuance of a declaratory judgment.’” In re Financial Oversight
and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 919 F.3d 638, 645 (1st
Cir. 2019) (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co.,
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
Petitioner alleges that, if he is not released to South
Carolina, he “will become [h]omeless during [the] COVID-19
pandemic.” (Docket Entry # 1, p. 2). As respondent notes,
however, “there is no reason to believe that [petitioner] will
not be allowed to reside in South Carolina upon his release.”
(Docket Entry # 18). According to respondent, the Commission
“strongly prefers parolees to be released to districts where

they have the best chance of succeeding on parole” and
“recognizes the importance that family and community support
plays in the success of a parolee.” (Docket Entry # 18, p. 2)
(Docket Entry # 18-1, p. 4). Because petitioner has a support
network in South Carolina, respondent contends that his release
thereto is “highly likely.” (Docket Entry # 18, p. 3).
Furthermore, petitioner has not alleged any facts suggesting
that the Commission intends to release him anywhere other than
South Carolina. Petitioner’s assertions in the petition are
therefore speculative and not ripe for review. See Texas v.
U.S., 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for
adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’”

(quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473
U.S. 568, 580–81 (1985)).
Furthermore, because petitioner has yet to be released on
parole and the Commission has yet to decide where he should live
upon release, he has not suffered any injury in fact. He also
does not face an imminent injury, as his presumptive parole date
is March 25, 2024, a little less than two years from now and
more than three years from the time he filed the petition.
As such, there is no actual controversy to merit a judicial
declaration. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408; U.S. Const. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition (Docket Entry # 1)
is DENIED.

/s/ Marianne B. Bowler
MARIANNE B. BOWLER
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10200206. Public record. Not legal advice.