# Mattei v. Medeiros

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · June 13, 2018

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10196743

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** June 13, 2018
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

___________________________________
)
ALEXANDER MATTEI, )
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 17-10869-WGY
SEAN MEDEIROS, )
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________)

YOUNG, D.J. June 13, 2018

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Alexander Mattei (“Mattei”) is a state prisoner
at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Norfolk.
Mattei was convicted of assault with intent to rape and assault
and battery in the Massachusetts County Superior Court sitting
in and for the County of Essex on September 16, 2011. Mattei
has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts two claims: (1) his rights to
confrontation were violated by restrictions on the cross-
examination of a substitute DNA analyst, and (2) the trial judge
erred in restricting defense counsel’s cross-examination of a
police witness. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (“Pet’r’s Pet.”), ECF
No. 1. The respondent, Sean Medeiros (“Medeiros”) opposes the
petition, arguing that the Massachusetts Appeals Court decision
did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law.
Resp’t’s Mem. Opp’n Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (“Resp’t’s Opp’n”),
ECF No. 13. For the reasons discussed infra, this Court DENIES

Mattei’s request for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
A. Procedural History
On May 20, 2002, Mattei was charged with home invasion,
breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, assault
with intent to rape, indecent assault and battery, two counts of
assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery.
Resp’t’s Further Supplemental Answer (“Supp. Answer”) at 179,
ECF No. 14. On April 2, 2004, Mattei was convicted of six out
of seven of the offenses. Id. at 180. Mattei appealed the
convictions, and in 2008, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
affirmed the convictions. Id. In 2010, the Supreme Judicial

Court granted further appellate review. Id. The Supreme
Judicial Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for
a new trial on two grounds: (1) that expert testimony ought not
have been admitted without accompanying statistical
explanations, and (2) that the judge improperly limited defense
counsel’s cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass.
840, 862 (2010).
After a second jury trial in 2011, Mattei was convicted of
assault with intent to rape and assault and battery, and was
acquitted of the remaining charges. Supp. Answer at 181. On
appeal from that conviction, Mattei raised three claims: (1) he
was deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine a substitute DNA

analyst, (2) the trial judge improperly restricted defense
counsel’s cross-examination of a police witness and refused to
give a Bowden1 instruction, and (3) the prosecutor made several
errors in her closing argument. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 90
Mass. App. Ct. 577, 578 (2016). The Massachusetts Appeals Court
affirmed the convictions on October 27, 2016. Id. at 584. The
Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review on March
6, 2017. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 476 Mass. 1112 (2017). On May
15, 2017, Mattei filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for
writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. Pet’r’s
Pet. 1.
II. ANALYSIS

Mattei argues that (1) his confrontation rights were
violated when a substitute DNA analyst was not sufficiently
cross-examined, and (2) the trial judge erred in restricting
defense counsel’s cross-examination of a police witness.

1 Under Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1980), in
appropriate circumstances a defendant is permitted to argue
inadequacies in a police investigation. In Bowden, the Supreme
Judicial Court reversed and remanded defendant Bowden’s
convictions because, among other things, “[t]he failure of the
authorities to conduct certain tests or produce certain evidence
was a permissible ground on which to build a defense.” Id. at
485-86.
Pet’r’s Pet. 6-8. This Court concludes that neither of these
arguments are meritorious and DENIES Mattei’s request for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) governs petitions for habeas corpus seeking relief
from convictions in state court. See Hyatt v. Gelb, 142 F.
Supp. 3d 198, 202 (D. Mass. 2006). A district court may
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Habeas relief may be granted only if the
petitioner is able to show that the state adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established
federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if “the state court
confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result
opposite to ours.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405
(2000). In addition, a state court decision may be an
unreasonable application of federal law if it identifies the
applicable governing legal rule, “but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407.
State court decisions are given substantial deference; the
incorrectness of a state court decision does not alone warrant
relief for a petitioner. Instead, relief may be granted only if
the state court decision in question features “‘some increment
of incorrectness beyond error’ that is ‘great enough to make the
decision unreasonable in the independent objective judgment of
the federal court.’” Evans v. Thompson, 465 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67
(D. Mass 2006) (quoting Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 8 (1st
Cir. 2003)), aff’d, 518 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). Put simply, if
a state court’s decision “was reasonable, it cannot be
disturbed” on habeas review. Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 72

(2011) (per curiam).
The relevant law necessary for an analysis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) is limited to the holdings of Supreme Court cases
existing at the time of the state court decision, and does not
include the dicta in such cases. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
B. Confrontation Clause
Mattei first argues that his “confrontation rights were
abridged” when the Commonwealth called crime lab analyst Brian
Cunningham to provide opinion testimony based on original DNA
test results from tests completed by the initial DNA analyst,
Stacey Edward. Pet’r’s Mem. Supp. Pet. Writ. Habeas Corpus
(“Pet’r’s Mem.”) 9, ECF No. 12. Medeiros explains that,

according to precedent, “the second analyst’s opinion was
admissible even if it was based on work conducted by the first
analyst.” Resp’t’s Opp’n 8. This Court agrees with Medeiros as
well as the Massachusetts Appeals Court’s holding; Mattei’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the
DNA analyst’s opinion testimony.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
specifically the Confrontation Clause, provides that “the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme
Court noted that this right prohibits testimonial statements by
a person who does not testify at trial “unless he was

unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 54 (2004). A testimonial statement is a statement that
the declarant would reasonably expect to be used in a
prosecution. See, e.g., id. at 51-52; Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (victim statement to 911 operator was not
testimonial and not barred by Confrontation Clause, but victim’s
written affidavit to a police officer was testimonial and
therefore barred by Confrontation Clause).
The Supreme Court has expanded Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence since Crawford to apply to scientific reports.
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345 (2009);

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 669 (2011). In
Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held that certificates of
analysis from a forensic laboratory that tested a substance
found in the defendant’s bag were testimonial. Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S. at 345. The Court compared the certificates to live
testimony because they were “quite plainly affidavits,” id. at
310, and did “precisely what a witness does on direct
examination,” id. at 311 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).
Since the certificates of analysis were made to establish or
prove “that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-
Diaz . . . was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine,” the Court
held they could not be introduced unless the authors of the

certificates were subject to cross-examination. Id. at 310-11.
Similarly in Bullcoming, the Supreme Court specifically held
that the “testimonial certification” of a blood alcohol analysis
report was an out-of-court testimonial statement of the forensic
analyst who certified the report. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 657.
While it is true that the test results were generated by a
machine, “[the analyst’s] certification, however, reported more
than a machine-generated number.” Id. at 659-60. Because the
certified report was received in evidence through the in-court
testimony of a different surrogate analyst, the evidence
violated the defendant’s rights to confrontation. Id. at 652.
The Court explained in Bullcoming that “surrogate testimony . .

. could not convey what [the original analyst] knew or observed
about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the
particular test and testing process he employed.” Id. at 661.
Then came Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012)
(plurality opinion), a decision about which Justice Kagan
remarked, “I call Justice Alito’s opinion ‘the plurality,’
because that is the conventional term for it. But in all except
its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five justices
specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every
paragraph of its explication.” Williams, 567 U.S. at 120
(Kagan, J., dissenting). Despite this, the plurality opinion
appears to hold that an expert analyst could offer an opinion on

a Cellmark DNA report because such a report is “very different
from the sort of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits,”
and thus not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 58
(plurality opinion). At the very least, this ruling relaxes the
standards of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming if it does not
overrule them sub silentio, at least in the DNA context.2 See

2 Williams v. Illinois is a confusing decision. Here’s my
attempt to explain it, together with a suggestion for trial
judges having to apply it:
In Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), the
Supreme Court reviewed a “petitioner’s bench trial for
rape, [where] the prosecution called an expert who
testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside
laboratory, Cellmark, matched a profile produced by
the state police lab using a sample of petitioner’s
blood. On direct examination, the expert testified
that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and that
Cellmark provided the police with a DNA profile. The
expert also explained the notations on documents
admitted as business records, stating that, according
to the records, vaginal swabs taken from the victim
were sent to and received back from Cellmark.” Id. at
56 (plurality opinion).
Justice Alito, for the plurality, wrote that even
if the Cellmark report had been introduced for its
truth, it was not testimonial because it was not
prepared for “the primary purpose of accusing a
targeted individual.” Id. at 83-85. This formulation
garnered a total of four votes, as Justice Alito was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy
and Breyer. Id. at 55. Under the plurality’s
definition, a statement is not testimonial unless it
was made to accuse a specific person. Id. at 83-85.
Justice Thomas rejected that definition. Id. at
114 (Thomas, J., concurring). He agreed that for a
statement to qualify as testimonial, it must be made
with a requisite primary purpose, which he described
thusly: “[F]or a statement to be testimonial within
the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the declarant
must primarily intend to establish some fact with the
understanding that his statement may be used in a
criminal prosecution.” Id. at 113-14. He criticized
the accusatory statement concept newly formulated by
the plurality because it “lacks any grounding in
constitutional text, in history, or in logic.” Id. at
114.
Justice Kagan, in a dissent joined by Justices
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, also rejected the
plurality’s definition of the primary purpose test.
Id. at 118 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan
wrote, “Where that test comes from is anyone’s guess.
Justice Thomas rightly shows that it derives neither
from the text nor from the history of the
Confrontation Clause. And it has no basis in our
precedents. We have previously asked whether a
statement was made for the primary purpose of
establishing ‘past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution’ –- in other words, for the
purpose of providing evidence. Davis, 547 U.S., at
822, 126 S. Ct. 2266; see also Bullcoming, 564 U.S.,
at ----, 131 S. Ct. at 2716-2717; Bryant, 562 U.S., at
----, ----, 131 S. Ct., at 1157, 1165; Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S., at 310-311, 129 S. Ct. 2527; Crawford, 541
U.S., at 51-52, 124 S. Ct. 1354. None of our cases
has ever suggested that, in addition, the statement
must be meant to accuse a previously identified
individual; indeed, in Melendez-Diaz, we rejected a
related argument that laboratory ‘analysts are not
subject to confrontation because they are not
“accusatory” witnesses.’ 557 U.S., at 313, 129 S. Ct.
2527.” Id. at 135 (first citation omitted).
. . . .
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced
much the same situation in Commonwealth v. Greineder,
464 Mass. 580 (2013). In this jury trial for murder,
a DNA expert called by the prosecution testified on
direct examination to the details and results of the
nontestifying analyst’s DNA test results. Id. at 582.
Relying on Williams, a unanimous Supreme Judicial
Court held that the testifying expert’s “opinion that
the defendant’s DNA matched the DNA on items recovered
from the crime scene was properly admitted. Expert
opinion testimony, even that which relies for its
basis on the DNA test results of a nontestifying
analyst not admitted in evidence, does not violate a
criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses
against him under either the Sixth Amendment or art.
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.” Id.
at 603. As a matter of Massachusetts evidentiary law,
however, admitting such details and results of a non-
testifying analyst’s DNA tests was error, albeit
harmless in Greineder’s case. The Supreme Judicial
Court was at pains to point out:
[W]e use the present opportunity to
emphasize to judges that the hearsay bases
of expert opinion testimony are inadmissible
on direct examination. As concerns
eliciting only the expert’s opinion, the
prosecutor, as a general matter, may first
ask the expert for an opinion, given the
expert’s background and training and after
review of the underlying data, whether the
defendant, given his or her DNA profile
authenticated by chain of custody evidence
as having originated from the defendant,
could be excluded as a possible source of
DNA recovered from the crime scene,
similarly authenticated by chain of custody
evidence. If the expert opines that the
defendant could not be excluded as a
possible contributor, a prosecutor may then
elicit an expert’s opinion on the
significance of the DNA evidence. R.C.
Michaelis, R.G. Flanders, Jr., & P.H. Wulff,
A Litigator’s Guide to DNA: From the
Laboratory to the Courtroom 297-298 (2008).
The prosecutor may ask the expert for his or
her opinion on the statistical likelihood
that the DNA profile found on the relevant
exhibit would be found in an individual
randomly selected from the population. See
note 9, supra. See also Williams, supra at
2270 n. 2 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(assumptions, framed in hypothetical
question ‘if X is true, then Y follows,’
pass constitutional muster). See generally
P.M. Lauriat & J.F. McHugh, Massachusetts
Expert Witnesses § 6.1.2 (Mass. Cont. Legal
Educ. 2d ed. 2010). Greater detail
regarding specific allelic presence at
various loci is unnecessary and, under our
evidentiary rules, prohibited on direct
examination of a forensics expert who did
not conduct the underlying DNA testing.
Id. at 601-02 (first citation omitted).
In light of all this, while it is appropriate to
jump directly from qualifying an expert to eliciting
that expert’s opinions, see Mass. G. Evid. Ann. 703, a
careful judge may require, as well within her
discretion, that the basis for that opinion first be
admitted in evidence.

William G. Young, John R. Pollets & Christopher Poreda,
Evidence § 800.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2018), in 20 Mass. Prac.
Series 22-24 (Thomson Reuters 2016).
Colleen Clark, DNA Analysis and the Confrontation Clause:
“Special Needs” Category for DNA Testimonial Evidence, 44 Golden
Gate U. L. Rev. 195, 196 (2014).

Constrained by Williams, the First Circuit affirmed in
Barbosa v. Mitchell, 812 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2016), the denial of
habeas relief in circumstances similar to those in the case at
bar. In Barbosa, the Court held that the admission of a senior
criminalist’s expert testimonial opinion on the results of a DNA
test performed by another DNA analyst was proper. Id. at 67.
The First Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court’s plurality
decision in Williams to explain that there is no Confrontation
Clause precedent proposing that “admitting an opinion such as
that offered by [a surrogate DNA analyst] violates the right to
confrontation.” Id.
Under Confrontation Clause precedent, the expert testimony

of analyst Brian Cunningham was properly admitted. Cunningham
provided opinion testimony concerning original DNA test results
from testing completed by an initial DNA analyst. See Mattei,
90 Mass. App. Ct. at 578-79. The holding in Williams indicates
that the admission of an expert opinion based on a scientific
DNA report prepared by another does not violate the right to
confrontation. 567 U.S. at 57.3

3 Charging the jury in these cases presents special problem
as well. See generally Pooja Chaudhuri, A Right to Rational
The Appeals Court thus correctly ruled here that “[a]n
expert may testify as to his opinion, even if it is based on
work conducted by another analyst.” Mattei, 90 Mass. App. Ct.

at 579. The second analyst’s opinion testimony was admissible
even though it was based on testing done by the first analyst.
Id. at 580. Medeiros’ rights under the Confrontation Clause
were not violated by the DNA analyst’s opinion testimony. Id.
A certificate of appealability will issue on this point.4

Juries? How Jury Instructions Create the “Bionic Juror” in
Criminal Proceedings Involving DNA Match Evidence, 105 Cal. L.
Rev. 1807, 1819 (2017).
4 While the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court in
Mattei faithfully reflects Williams’ holding, its formulation of
the rule (quoted above) may well extend Williams’ narrow holding
and almost certainly goes farther than warranted by the decision
of the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Greineder.
Distortions creep into the law when courts fail to
distinguish between a higher court’s holding (which must be
obeyed under the doctrine of stare decisis) and its dicta (which
is only persuasive). See Neal Devins & David Klein, The
Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 620-21
(2017); see also Ryan D. Walters, Fragmenting the Judiciary:
Shifting Implementation of Supreme Court Doctrine from Federal
Courts to State Courts, 42 Cap. U. L. Rev. 951 (2014)
(suggesting state courts more likely than federal to push back
against Supreme Court doctrine). See generally Bryan A. Garner
et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent (Thomson Reuters 2016).
This problem is compounded today by the marginalization of the
American jury (where trial judges must necessarily closely
analyze appellate decisions to craft precise jury instructions).
See William G. Young, Juries Make a Difference, Address to 2017
Forum for State Appellate Court Judges, in Jurisdiction:
Defining State Courts’ Authority 65 (Pound Civil Justice
Institute, 2018). See also Winfield v. Town of Andover, Civil
Action No. 17-11051-WGY, 2018 WL 1627437, at *8 n.5 (D. Mass.
Apr. 4, 2018) (decrying the “over academicization” of our trial
processes). The result of all this is that our jurisprudence
tends ever more toward the “Europeanization” of American courts,
C. Cross-Examination of Police Witness
Mattei next argues that the Appeals Court erred in holding
that the trial judge did not improperly “restrict the defense’s

ability to show bias and incompetence of the officers’
investigation” when the trial judge limited his cross-
examination of multiple officers, thereby limiting his attempted
Bowden defense under state evidentiary law.5 Pet’r’s Mem. 15.
Medeiros correctly argues that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “no
habeas claim exists as to state criminal convictions unless the
alleged errors are violations of the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” Resp’t’s Opp’n 11.
“A necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas
relief . . . is a determination by the federal court that [a
petitioner’s] custody violates the Constitution, laws, or

i.e. a vertical “code” system where identifying the correct
“rule” is all too often the extent of what passes for analysis.
See William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges,
The Federal Lawyer, July 2003, at 30.
Simply put, the role of the Confrontation Clause in this
area needs refinement and explication on a sound analytic base.
Unfortunately, AEDPA says of the “inferior” courts: “Theirs not
to reason why, theirs but” to follow the muddled (in this area,
at least) jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §
2554(d)(1); see Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light
Brigade. Thoughtful voices have raised concerns whether this
statutory restriction on the exercise of the Article III
judicial function is itself constitutional. See, e.g., Evans v.
Thompson, 524 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez, J.).
5 Although state evidentiary law is not subject to federal
habeas review, Mattei makes a due process argument, addressed
infra at 15, on the same state evidentiary grounds.
treaties of the United States.” Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21
(1975). The Supreme Court has held that “federal habeas corpus
relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers,

497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41
(1984). In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), the Court
reemphasized “that it is not the province of a federal habeas
court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is
limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. at
67-68.
Because Mattei complains about issues of state evidentiary
law which are not subject to review under 28 U.S.C § 2254, this
Court declines to review the decision of the Appeals Court
regarding the limitation of further examination into the police

investigation.
D. Due Process
Mattei argues finally that the trial judge’s limitation of
his cross-examination of a second police officer denied him his
right to due process of law. Pet’r’s Mem. 13. Mattei cites
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006), to explain
“[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). Medeiros correctly argues

that because the standard of review for a state court decision
is “reasonableness,” habeas relief is not warranted. Resp’t’s
Opp’n 13.
“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
While the violation of a rule of evidence is not, in itself, a
constitutional violation, “an evidentiary error may result in
such fundamental unfairness to the defendant as to constitute a
due process violation.” Evans v. Verdini, 466 F.3d 141, 145
(1st Cir. 2006). Of importance here, federal habeas review is
not “a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state

courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). At trial,
Mattei was permitted to advance his defense by attempting to
expose the inadequacies of the police investigation. Resp’t’s
Opp’n 10-11. Mattei then proceeded to ask another police
officer the same question. Id. at 11. The trial judge limited
this further examination, and the Appeals Court ruled that the
judge exercised proper discretion “where such testimony would
have been cumulative.” See Mattei, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 581.
The limitation of cumulative testimony, “even if it is
debatable, . . . is not unreasonable.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S.
290, 303 (2010). The limitation of Mattei’s cross-examination
reasonably occurred only after Mattei attempted to ask a

subsequent police officer an identical question. The decision
by the trial judge to limit cumulative testimony was reasonable.
Mattei was provided a meaningful opportunity to present his
whole defense and the limitation of a second cross-examination
in no way resulted in fundamental unfairness creating a due
process violation.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court’s decision “was [not]
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))(1). Mattei’s
request for habeas relief is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Mattei’s

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. A
certificate of appealability will issue as to point II.B above,
but not otherwise as the remaining claims are utterly without
merit.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10196743. Public record. Not legal advice.