# Jones-Bell v. Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · September 22, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10195824

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 22, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10195824

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, where defendant was employed to “run” cases for a law firm, the arrangement whereby he received a percentage of the attorney fees for each case he brought in was unenforceable at law

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

RHONDA A. JONES-BELL : CASE NO. 2:22-CV-03494

VERSUS : JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

IMPERIAL FIRE & CASUALTY
INSURANCE CO. : MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is a Motion for Leave to File Intervention Complaint, filed by McClenny
Moseley & Associates law firm (“MMA”), former counsel of record for plaintiff Rhonda A. Jones-
Bell. Doc. 18. The Motion is opposed by plaintiff Rhonda A. Jones-Bell. Docs. 27, 43. The
motion was referred to the undersigned for resolution.
Having considered the arguments raised in brief and at hearing, the motion is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Attorneys associated with MMA caused to be filed approximately 1,600 lawsuits in the
Western District of Louisiana in 2022, most just prior to the prescriptive date for claims related to
Hurricane Laura, which impacted the Southwest Louisiana area in August of 2020. These “MMA
Cases” asserted claims for damages related to Hurricanes Laura and Delta, which made landfall
on August 27, 2020, and October 9, 2020, respectively, causing extensive damage to many areas
in this district. MMA filed this case on Mrs. Jones-Bell’s behalf on August 24, 2022. Doc. 1.
The sheer number of MMA cases filed in a very short period caused Judge James D. Cain,
Jr., to take note. Early review of the cases by the court raised multiple issues including duplicate
filings, cases filed against insurers who had no policy in place with the plaintiff, and cases filed on
behalf of plaintiffs who had already settled their hurricane claims with the insurer. Hearings were
held in the Lake Charles Division of the Western District of Louisiana on October 20 and
December 13, 2022, at which Judge Cain reviewed submissions by MMA attorneys, testimony
from several MMA clients, and others. Doc. 5.1

On October 21, 2022, Judge Cain issued an order staying all MMA Cases pending further
review. Doc. 4. The Commissioner of the Louisiana Department of Insurance issued a cease and
desist order to MMA on February 17, 2023, having concluded that the firm was in violation of
multiple provisions of the Insurance Code. On March 4, 2023, Judge Cain issued an order
temporarily suspending MMA and anyone affiliated with the firm—including attorneys R.
William Huye, III, Claude Favrot Reynaud, III, Cameron Sean Snowden, Grant P. Gardner, John
Zachary Moseley, and James McClenny—from practice in the Western District of Louisiana. Doc.
9. In other MMA cases where new counsel had not yet sought to enroll, former MMA attorney R.
William Huye, III, successfully moved the court on March 30, 2023, to lift the stay to allow him

to withdraw as counsel due to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s order suspending him from the
practice of law on an interim basis. See, e.g., Franks v. Dover Bay Specialty Ins. Co., No. 2:22-
cv-03495, docs. 12, 14 (W.D. La. 3/30/23). Around the time that Judge Cain temporarily
suspended MMA and its affiliates from the practice of law in this district, former MMA attorneys
Snowden, Reynaud, and Gardiner resigned from MMA, leaving MMA with no attorneys licensed
to practice law in Louisiana.2

1 Minutes of the 12/13/2022 hearing were not made part of this proceeding.
2 See In re: McClenny Moseley & Associates PLLC, doc. 3 (2:23-mc-00064-JDC) (Notice of consent of former
MMA Counsel to termination of their representation of plaintiffs in all MMA cases pending in the Western District
of Louisiana); In re: McClenny Moseley & Associates PLLC, No. 3:23-mc-00062-JDC, doc. 35, p. 34:17-24; 82:9-
17, Official Transcript (W.D. La. 8/11/23).
Mrs. Jones-Bell and her husband, Terrone Bell, hired new counsel of record, who moved
to enroll on her behalf on March 16, 2023, in place of MMA. Doc. 10. When the court granted
the motion to substitute counsel, the court ordered that “[a]ny terminated counsel or anyone on
behalf of McClenny Moseley & Assoc, who believes he/she/it has a claim on any funds as a result
of this litigation is [to] assert that claim within 14 days of the date of this order.” Doc. 14. This

motion by MMA followed.3
II.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In the motion to intervene, MMA seeks to “enforce their lien right for attorneys’ fees and
out-of pocket expenses pursuant to La. R.S. 37:218.”4 Doc. 18. MMA asserts that this is an
intervention of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and they alternatively seek permissive
intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). Id.
Defining the property interest it seeks to protect, MMA asserts that the Jones-Bells and
MMA “entered into a written contingency fee agreement pursuant to Louisiana Rules of

3 After plaintiff opposed the motion to intervene [doc. 27], MMA moved to withdraw the motion. Doc. 29. The court
denied MMA’s motion to so that the court could formally address the legal issues raised by the motion to intervene.
Doc. 36. In denying the motion to withdraw, the court allowed MMA additional time to reply in support of the motion;
that period lapsed without additional briefing by MMA. Doc. 39. After a hearing on the motion, the court ordered
plaintiff to file an affidavit into the record and ordered MMA to provide plaintiff’s file materials to his current counsel
of record. Doc. 38. Thereafter, plaintiff and MMA supplemented the record as instructed. Docs. 42, 43. The
undersigned recently granted plaintiff leave to file an additional memorandum addressing the proposed intervention
of MMA’s passive lenders in a related proceeding. Because the district court in that proceeding denied the lenders’
motion to intervene and assigned reasons, In re: McClenny Moseley & Associates PLLC, No. 3:23-mc-00062-JDC,
doc. 43 (W.D. La. 9/19/23), this opinion does not address the issues raised by the plaintiff’s most recent supplemental
memorandum.
4 Insofar as this is an action by Louisiana homeowners filed in a federal court sitting in Louisiana under Louisiana
law, MMA moves to enforce its lien rights under La. R.S. § 37:218, a Louisiana statute allowing an attorney to acquire
as his fee a lien right in the interest of the subject matter of the suit. The court’s analysis is therefore limited to whether
MMA has any protectable interest under Louisiana law. But cf., e.g., Cheatham v. Pohl, No. 01-20-00046-CV, 2022
WL 3720139, at *7 (Tex. App. Aug. 30, 2022) (discussing potential extraterritorial reach of Texas anti-barratry statute
and determining that the anti-barratry statute applies to Texas lawyers if the prohibited acts take place in Texas,
regardless of the location of the clients or runner).
Professional Conduct rule 1.5(c)” and that this contract gives rise to a lien and privilege in MMA’s
favor on the proceeds of this matter. MMA also asserts that MMA “performed meaningful and
substantial legal work for the client on the matter for which they are entitled to a quantum meruit
recovery in an amount to be proved at trial. McClenny Mosley & Associates also expended costs
in this matter for which they are entitled to recover.” Doc. 18, att. 1, p. 3.

A. MMA must have a legally enforceable interest to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
MMA asserts that it is entitled to intervene in this matter under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
As a party asserting intervention as of right, MMA must satisfy four requirements:
(1) The application must be timely; (2) the applicant must have an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3)
the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its interest; and (4)
the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by the existing
parties to the suit.”

Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,
1204-05 (5th Cir. 1994)). As movant, MMA bears the burden of establishing these elements, but
the court is to construe Rule 24 liberally. Id. “Failure to satisfy any one requirement precludes
intervention of right.” Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 999 (5th Cir. 1996).
MMA’s intervention request fails as to the second prong, which requires the applicant to
have an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action. The
touchtone of the inquiry is whether the interest alleged is alleged to be “legally protectible.”
Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 343; New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 732 F.2d
452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984). “An interest is sufficient if it is of the type that the law deems worthy of
protection, even if the intervenor does not have an enforceable legal entitlement or would not have
standing to pursue her own claim.” Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 659 (5th Cir. 2015).
B. MMA has no legally protectible interest in the lawsuit

MMA has no legally protectible interest in Mrs. Jones-Bell’s lawsuit. The contingency fee
contract between MMA and Mrs. Jones-Bell is unenforceable because it violates a rule of public
order, and the gravity of MMA’s lapses from sound professional conduct outweigh the value of
any services the firm may have provided to Mrs. Jones-Bell.
1. The contingency fee contract is null and unenforceable because procured by a
modern-day case runner.

A contract that violates a “rule of public order” is unenforceable under Louisiana law. “A
contract is absolutely null when it violates a rule of public order, as when the object of a contract
is illicit or immoral. A contract that is absolutely null may not be confirmed. Absolute nullity may
be invoked by any person or may be declared by the court on its own initiative.” La. Civ. Code.
art. 2030. “‘No principle of law is better settled than that a party to an illegal contract or an illegal
transaction cannot come into a court of law and ask it to carry out the illegal contract or to enforce
rights arising out of the illegal transaction.’” Vidrine v. Abshire, 558 So. 2d 288, 292 (La. App. 3
Cir. 1990) (quoting Bergeron v. Mumphrey, 38 So. 2d 411, 414 (La. Ct. App. 1949)).
Louisiana has strong public policies against runner-based solicitation of clients, a practice
sometimes known as “case running,”5 and against the practice of law by non-attorneys. Louisiana
law makes it “unlawful for any attorney to pay money or give any other thing of value to any
person for the purpose of obtaining representation of any client.” La. Stat. Ann. § 37:219(A). “No
person, firm, or entity shall solicit employment for a legal practitioner.” La. Stat. Ann. §
37:219(B)(1). Because “[t]he legal system and the profession suffer actual injury when a lawyer

5 See, e.g., In re Cuccia, 752 So. 2d 796, 796 (La. 1999) (concluding that disbarment was appropriate sanction for
attorney who admitted to numerous violations of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, including minimal
supervision of employees, neglecting client communications, and paying approximately two dozen “runners” $500
for each personal injury client solicited, and employing nearly a dozen non-attorney staff members to process the 90-
100 clients obtained monthly).
engages in runner-based solicitation, a felony under state law,” the Louisiana Supreme Court has
confirmed a “strong public policy” against case running. In re O'Keefe, 877 So. 2d 79, 85 (La.
2004). Louisiana law also makes it unlawful for a non-attorney to practice law. La. R.S. § 37:213.
Louisiana courts have declared contracts confected in violation of these strong public
policies null and unenforceable. A contract to pay a third party for client contacts in violation of

the “case running” rule is null and unenforceable. Vidrine, 558 So. 2d at 292 (holding that, where
defendant was employed to “run” cases for a law firm, the arrangement whereby he received a
percentage of the attorney fees for each case he brought in was unenforceable at law). A
contingency fee contract between an attorney and client procured via a non-attorney case runner
found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law was likewise unenforceable. Gray v.
Atkins, 331 So. 2d 157, 164-66 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1976)(holding that private investigators engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law when they advised plaintiff “that she had legal claim” and
conspired with attorney to prosecute her claim, such that contingency fee contract between
attorney and plaintiff was null and void).

Mrs. Jones-Bell attests in her affidavit that her husband, Terrone, clicked on a Facebook
advertisement that advertised lawyers who could help with hurricane claims. Doc. 43, att. 2, p. 2-
3. Mr. Jones-Bell attests that the advertisement led him to a form that he filled out, after which he
received a telephone call in which he was “provided additional information about filing a claim”
Doc. 43, att. 1, p. 3. Shortly afterward, he received a document for electronic signature stating that
MMA would pursue Mrs. Jones-Bell’s claim. Id.
Combined with what we know from the documentary record, it is clear Mr. Jones-Bell’s
first point of contact was with a third-party marketing firm, Tort Network LLC, d/b/a Velawcity.6
MMA has previously explained that it obtained signed client retainers via a call center:
If someone reaches out to MMA asking for a contract it would get directed
to the advertiser who may manage the incoming call center, they would
answer questions, they would collect some information and send the
DocuSign contract to the client which the client would then review, decide
if they do want to sign on, and if it signs on, then they would come to
[MMA].

Hatch v. Allstate Vehicle & Property Ins. Co., No 1:22-cv-03228-DDD-KK, Doc. 8, p. 101-02
(W.D. La. 12/19/22)(transcript of 12/13/22 Motion Hearing). Among the items in Mrs. Jones-
Bell’s MMA file was an intake survey marked with the Velawcity logo [doc. 43, att. 3] and a
contingency fee contract created the same day, e-signed with the name Terrone Bell. Doc. 27, att.
2-3. An Order and Reasons issued by Magistrate Judge North of the Eastern District of Louisiana
describes, among other things, the contractual relationship between MMA and Velawcity and
satisfies this court that MMA had an arrangement whereby it agreed pre-pay Velawcity a fixed
rate of $3,000 or $3,500 for each pre-screened and signed contingency-fee agreement Velawcity
provided to MMA. Doc. 22, att. 6, p. 18-23 (Franatovich v. Allied Trust Ins. Co., No. 2:22-cv-
02552-LMA-MBN, Doc. 76, Order and Reasons (E.D. La. 3/16/23)); doc. 22, att. 7, Marketing
Services Agreements.
MMA obtained its contingency fee contract with Mrs. Jones-Bell through a third-party
marketing firm, Velawcity, a modern-day case runner that MMA pre-paid for client contacts. In
its motion to intervene, therefore, MMA seeks to enforce a contingency fee contract between an
attorney and client procured via a non-attorney case runner that may have engaged in the

6 See doc. 43, att. 14, p. 14, Marketing Services Agreement.
unauthorized practice of law. Any contracts arising out of this illegal relationship violated
Louisiana law prohibiting payment in exchange for procuring clients and prohibiting the practice
of law by those not licensed to do so. Contingency fee agreements like the one signed by Plaintiff
are thus absolutely null and unenforceable.
2. Even if valid, the contract would result in no recovery for MMA under
Louisiana law governing the apportionment of fees among successive counsel.

When a client with a contingency fee arrangement discharges one attorney and hires a
successor, the Louisiana Supreme Court instructs courts to apply two slightly different analyses to
apportion the fee among initial and successor counsel, depending on whether or not the first
attorney was discharged for cause. O'Rourke v. Cairns, 683 So. 2d 697, 702-04 (La. 1996).
When the first attorney is dismissed without just cause, courts apply the rule announced in
Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., whereby the court is instructed to divide among the lawyers
the highest ethical contingency fee to which the client agreed, apportioning it according to their
contributions to the case as judged by prescribed factors:
we conclude that only one contingency fee should be paid by the client, the
amount of the fee to be determined according to the highest ethical
contingency percentage to which the client contractually agreed in any of
the contingency fee contracts which he executed. Further, that fee should in
turn be allocated between or among the various attorneys involved in
handling the claim in question, such fee apportionment to be on the basis of
factors which are set forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Saucier, 373 So. 2d 102, 118 (La. 1978), on reh'g (June 25, 1979). The factors by which the
apportionment of the fee is made are now codified in the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct,
at Rule 1.5(a).7 See Melancon v. Great S. Dredging, Inc., No. 12-2455, 2015 WL 3851585, at *2
(E.D. La. June 22, 2015).

7 The factors listed at Rule 1.5(a) are:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
When a client discharges an attorney for cause, the analysis includes an additional step that
reduces the allocation to discharged counsel consistent with the “nature and gravity” of the conduct
leading to his discharge:
in cases of discharge with cause of an attorney retained on contingency, the
trial court should determine the amount of the fee according to the Saucier
rule, calculating the highest ethical contingency to which the client
contractually agreed in any of the contingency fee contracts executed. The
court should then allocate the fee between or among discharged and
subsequent counsel based upon the Saucier factors. Thereafter, the court
should consider the nature and gravity of the cause which contributed to the
dismissal and reduce by a percentage amount the portion discharged counsel
otherwise would receive after the Saucier allocation.

O'Rourke, 683 So. 2d at 704. The O’Rourke court referred to this as a “modified quantum meruit
analysis.” The goal of the rule announced in Saucier and O’Rourke is
to confine client exposure to no more than one contingency fee in both with
and without cause situations. Furthermore, it allows courts to properly
analyze the intricacies which invariably arise in contingency fee litigation,
while also taking into consideration the conduct of attorneys which mar the
profession and client confidence by requiring dismissal for cause.

Id.
The court finds that Rhonda A. Jones-Bell dismissed MMA for cause. In opposition
briefing, plaintiff recounts that after retaining MMA, the Jones-Bells never heard from MMA.
Doc. 27, p. 6. Although the Jones-Bells knew that an inspector came to their home shortly after
Mr. Bell contacted MMA, neither of them received a copy of the estimate itself or status updates

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
La. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5 (2018).
specific to their case. Id. They state that they were unaware that MMA filed a lawsuit on their
behalf until after they engaged new counsel of record. Doc. 27, p. 7.
Because Mrs. Jones-Bell dismissed MMA for cause,8 to determine the fee owed to MMA
in this or any other MMA case, a court would need to divide the “highest ethical” contingency fee
to which plaintiff agreed among MMA and new counsel according to their contributions to the

case, and then reduce the percentage of that fee owed to MMA by an amount consistent with the
nature and gravity of MMA’s misconduct that lead to it being discharged for cause.
Having reviewed the materials MMA submitted in response to the court’s order [doc. 42],
and having become aware of MMA’s conduct through other hearings conducted by this and other
courts, we find that the nature and gravity of MMA’s misconduct in this matter entirely negates
any percentage of the fee to which it might otherwise be entitled.9 In other words, MMA is entitled
to 0% of any attorneys’ fees collected in this matter because MMA has done Mrs. Jones-Bell more
harm than good.

8 Mrs. Jones-Bell’ attestations alone are sufficient to satisfy the court that Mrs. Jones-Bell dismissed MMA for cause
due to her personal experience and knowledge of MMA’s lapses from the professional standards prescribed by the
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, for the reasons stated herein, the undersigned would have no
trouble finding that any MMA client could have dismissed MMA for cause.
9 MMA’s submissions include receipts supporting MMA’s payment of $402 initial filing fee, a $50 additional fee
associated with the costs of administering the review of MMA’s stayed cases, a receipt purporting to represent service
fees payable to the Louisiana Secretary of State that does not specifically reference this matter, an endorsed check
from MMA to J.A. Consulting for $51,550, a $1,000 invoice from J.A. Consulting referencing “the Estate of Cynthia
Jones,” a $2,993.00 invoice from Disaster Solutions for “inspection & estimating service,” and a damage estimate
report prepared by Scope Pros, LLC for a property inspection and estimate by Disaster Solutions that MMA asserts it
is “obligated to pay.” Doc. 42. Given her assertion that she did not know a lawsuit had been filed on her behalf, and
given the findings herein regarding the invalidity of the contract between MMA and Jones-Bell, these sums are not
recoverable. Although an argument could be made that MMA is entitled to recoup the court costs for the lawsuit it
filed on Mrs. Jones-Bell’s behalf, unbeknownst to her, recovery of court costs alone is insufficient to support an
intervention of right because it does not give MMA a direct interest in the sums recovered in this litigation. See New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1984) (“an economic interest alone
is insufficient, as a legally protectable interest is required for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)”). With regard to the
property inspection that MMA apparently ordered on Mrs. Jones-Bell behalf, of which the Jones-Bells say they never
received a copy, the record contains no evidence that the estimate was ever paid, would ever be paid in the amount
charged, or added any value to Mrs. Jones-Bell’ claim. See doc. 43, att. 4 (declaration of Austin Marks discussing
“limited value” of this and similar estimates). In the absence of such evidence, the court affords it no value.
The court finds that MMA had no individualized contact with plaintiff and generally made
minimal efforts on her behalf other than filing the lawsuit before the prescriptive deadline.
Assuming that the allegations of the lawsuit were sufficiently correct to state a valid claim for
relief, MMA may have thereby provided non-negligible value to Mrs. Jones-Bell that could—in a
different context—entitle MMA to some percentage of the attorney fee recovery in this matter.

That being said, the conduct that led to MMA’s dismissal is so egregious that it more than
offsets any value it provided to Mrs. Jones-Bell. An attorney's representation must “advance [the]
client's case” and have some “productive value to [the] client” in order for the attorney to recover
any part of the applicable contingency fee. See City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339, 351-
52 (5th Cir. 2014). Recently, the district judge conducted hearings regarding the still-active
suspensions of MMA’s former Louisiana attorneys. In re: McClenny Moseley & Associates PLLC,
No. 3:23-mc-00062-JDC, doc. 35, Official Transcript (W.D. La. 8/11/23). Those attorneys
confirmed that no attorney individually assessed the validity of hundreds of cases that MMA filed
on the eve of the prescriptive deadline. Id., doc. 35 at 25:9 - 30:10; 103:10 - 107:7. The less senior

attorneys testified that they relied on the assertions of the managing attorneys that the information
underlying the lawsuits was accurate. Id. In many cases, it was not.
In short, MMA has acted with so little regard for the rules of ethics and professional
conduct, has been so reckless in the management of its affairs, and has so thoroughly weighed
itself down with claims of dubious validity, that it deprived itself of the ability to provide any
meaningful service to plaintiffs with legitimate claims. This is conduct that “mar[s] the profession
and client confidence.” O'Rourke v. Cairns, 95-3054 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 697, 704.
Considering the foregoing, we find that MMA would be entitled to no percentage of any attorneys’
fee that Mrs. Jones-Bell’ current counsel may recover.!°
Ii.
CONCLUSION
The court finds that the contract under which MMA asserts an interest in this litigation is
invalid under Louisiana law and thus insufficient to support intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P.
24. Accordingly, MMA’s Motion for Leave to File Intervention Complaint [doc. 18] is
DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this day of September, 2023.

ATHLEEN
UNITED STATES MAGIS TE JUDGE

We would not hesitate to make a similar finding with regard to any hurricane claim filed by MMA, unless MMA
could show that the origin and handling of that claim differed significantly from the facts described herein.

-12-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10195824. Public record. Not legal advice.