# Sampy v. Unknown

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · July 13, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10195663

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 13, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10195663

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the district court ordered the complaint served upon the agents that arrested the plaintiff according to the records of the United States Attorney

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

LEROY SAMPY, JR. DOCKET NO. 6:23-cv-0686 SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE AYO

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is a civil rights complaint (Rec. Doc. 5) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 by plaintiff Leroy Sampy Jr., who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this
matter. Sampy is a prisoner in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections,
currently incarcerated at the Lafayette Parish Correctional Center (LPCC) in Lafayette,
Louisiana. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and
recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this court.
I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that on or about June 21, 2022, he reported to the LPCC floor deputy,
sergeant, lieutenant, and captain that he overheard inmates saying they were going to “jump
me because of my charge.” Doc. 5, p. 3. He was then put back in his cell and jumped by a
“bunch of guys.” Id. He was taken to medical and told he had a broken shoulder. He
complains that after a year, he is still in pain and has a missing tooth. Sampy asks to be put
in protective custody, to be given medical treatment, and awarded monetary compensation.
II. Law & Analysis

A. Frivolity Review
Sampy has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter.
Accordingly, his complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which
provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or any portion thereof if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Gonzalez v. Wyatt,
157 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted if it is clear the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998).

When determining whether a complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true. Horton v. Cockrell, 70
F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1995) (frivolity); Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d at 1025 (failure to state
a claim).
B. Section 1983
Federal law provides a cause of action against any person who, under the color of law,
acts to deprive another person of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in order to hold the
defendants liable, a plaintiff must allege facts to show (1) that a constitutional right has been
violated and (2) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color
of state law; that is, that the defendant was a state actor. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988).
C. Rule 8 Considerations
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 8, the complaint must allege “sufficient facts from which the court
can determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and from which the defendants
can fairly appreciate the claim made against them.” Bynum v. Terrebonne Parish Consol.
Gov’t, 2011 WL 6654985, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2011) (citations omitted).
Sampy makes the conclusory allegation that he was denied due process but fails to
provide sufficient details for the court. He must amend his complaint to state:
(1) the name(s) of each person who allegedly violated plaintiff’s constitutional
rights;

(2) a description of what actually occurred or what each defendant did to
violate plaintiff’s rights;

(3) the place and date(s) that each event occurred; and

(4) a description of the alleged injury sustained as a result of the alleged
violation.

1. Defendants
a. Supervisory officials
Sampy names as a defendant an individual who appears to have a supervisory role,
the Lafayette Parish Sheriff. Plaintiff is hereby advised: “Supervisory officials may be held
liable only if: (i) they affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional deprivations;
and (ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff’s injuries.”
Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
(1993). “Vicarious liability does not apply to § 1983 claims.” Pierce v. Texas Dept. of Crim.
Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1107 (1995).
“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.” Thompson v.
Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 897 (1983). In other words, to the
extent that plaintiff seeks to name a supervisory official as a defendant, he must allege facts
sufficient to demonstrate either personal involvement or the implementation of
unconstitutional policies by the Sheriff.
b. Unknown defendants
A civil rights action may be initiated against unidentified defendants when their true
names are not yet known but may be learned. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390 n. 2 (1971) (noting that the district court ordered the complaint
served upon the agents that arrested the plaintiff according to the records of the United
States Attorney). In certain circumstances, a plaintiff should be given the opportunity
through discovery to discover the identities of unnamed defendants. Murphy v. Kellar, 950

F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1992); Hittle v. City of Garland, 1 F.3d 1236 (5th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished opinion) (same). Discovery is warranted when it is possible that a plaintiff could
identify unknown defendants by physical descriptions, partial names or nicknames, position,
date, time and/or specifics of the incident, or from duty rosters and personnel records, records
available to the defendants' representative, or known defendants who were participants in
the same incident as the unknown defendant. See Murphy, 950 F.2d at 293 (identities of
unknown defendants for whom plaintiff provided physical descriptions, partial names and
positions, could be determined from duty rosters and personnel records); Green, 260 Fed.
Appx. 717, at *2 (identity of unknown correctional officer could be determined based on
physical description of officer on duty at time and place of incident); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390
n. 2 (identities of officers who arrested defendant could be determined from U.S. Attorney's
records).
Plaintiff should amend to provide some way to identify the unknown defendants,
including physical descriptions, partial names or nicknames, positions, date, time and/or
specifics of the incident(s), or from duty rosters and personnel records, records available to
the defendants' representative. Once identified in some way, plaintiff should amend to
comply with Rule 8 to provide a description of what actually occurred or what each defendant
did to violate plaintiff’s rights, the place and date(s) that each event occurred, and a
description of the alleged injury sustained as a result of the alleged violation.
2. Claims
a. Failure to Protect
Prison officials have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of their fellow inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). Prison
officials are not, however, expected to prevent all inmate-on-inmate violence. Id. at 834.

Prison officials can be held liable for their failure to protect an inmate only when they are
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. A prison official is
deliberately indifferent if he knows of an “excessive risk to inmate health or safety” and
disregards that risk. Id. at 837. A prison official “knows of” an excessive risk only if: (1) he is
aware of facts from which he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and
(2) he draws the inference. Id. In other words, in order to be deliberately indifferent, a prison
official must be subjectively aware of the risk. Id. at 839-40.
“Actions and decisions by officials that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or
negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference.” Alton v. Tex. A & M Univ., 168 F.3d 196,
201 (5th Cir. 1999). To reach the level of deliberate indifference, official conduct must be
"wanton," which is defined to mean “reckless.” Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th
Cir. 1985); Alderson, 848 F.3d at 420.
To the extent that plaintiff is suing governmental officials in their individual
capacities, he must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation. Oliver v.
Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184
F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999)). This standard requires more than conclusory assertions. The
plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to a constitutional violation. Id. (citing Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff must amend to state:
1. Which defendants he contends had specific knowledge that he faced a substantial
risk of harm,
2. Facts indicating that each named/identified defendant had specific knowledge that
he faced a substantial risk of harm by the inmate or inmates that attacked him,

3. Facts which indicate that each named/identified defendant acted wantonly or
recklessly and with deliberate indifference,
4. What was happening just prior to the attack?
5. Did each named/identified defendant have prior knowledge of the attack?
6. How long did the attack last?
7. What prompted the attack to end?
b. Medical Care
Sampy also claims that he has been denied prompt and adequate medical attention
following the physical altercation. The federal constitutional rights of an incarcerated
person, whether he is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, are violated only if his
serious medical needs are met with deliberate indifference on the part of penal authorities.
See Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001); Harris v.
Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999). On that point, the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has explained:
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. It is
indisputable that an incorrect diagnosis by prison medical personnel
does not suffice to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Rather, the
plaintiff must show that officials refused to treat him, ignored his
complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any
similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any
serious medical needs. Furthermore, the decision whether to provide
additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical
judgment. And, the failure to alleviate a significant risk that the official
should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate
indifference.

Domino v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). “Deliberate indifference encompasses only
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Stewart v. Murphy, 174
F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff’s allegations herein are insufficient. He should amend his complaint to
provide the following:
1. the type of treatment he was being given;
2. the medication he was given;
3. the date each medication was stopped;
4. the treatment and medication he claims that he is entitled to;
5. the injuries and the harm sustained as a result of the defendant’s fault;
6. facts which tend to establish deliberate indifference on the part of the
defendant.
3. Conclusion

Sampy must amend his complaint to address the deficiencies described above, and to
dismiss the claims that cannot be cured through amendment.
Accordingly,
THE CLERK IS DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to Sampy at his last address
on file.
IT IS ORDERED that Sampy amend his complaint within thirty (30) days of the
filing of this order to cure the deficiencies as outlined above. Failure to comply with this order
may result in dismissal of the claims above under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 82 8. Ct. 13886 (1962). Sampy is further required to
notify the court of any change in his address under LR 41.3. Failure to do so will result in a
recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 13th day of July, 2023.

David J. Ayo
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10195663. Public record. Not legal advice.