# Hilton v. Lake Charles

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · April 19, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10194865

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 19, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
BILLY ANTHONY HILTON CASE NO. 2:18-CV-01048
VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
CITY OF LAKE CHARLES ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY
MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a “Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 26) filed by
Defendants, Don Dixon, City of Lake Charles, (the “City”), the Lake Charles
Police Department (“LCPD”), Officer Kirk Dugas (“Dugas”), Officer Robert
Hammac (“Hammac”) and Officer Tony Magee (“Magee”) who move for summary
judgment in their favor to dismiss the instant complaint. As of this date, no opposition has

been filed and the time for doing so has lapsed.
FACTUAL STATEMENT
On July 14, 2017, Officer Hammac and Cpl. Kirk Dugas were dispatched to 2934
6th St.in response to a 911 caller that reported a kidnapping.1 Kidnapping victim, Shawna
Harrington, advised dispatch that she was hiding inside the business at that address with

her mother, and the perpetrator was inside a black truck in the parking lot blowing his horn;
the caller feared for her safety.2

1 Defendants” exhibits A and B, affidavits of Dugas and Magee, respectively; Defendant’s exhibit C, Incident
Report.
2 Id.
Officer Hammac arrived at the location and parked his patrol unit behind a Black
Silverado truck. The Kidnapping suspect, known as Billy Anthony Hilton (“Hilton”), fled
by driving across the grass of the business property necessitating officers Hammac and
Cpl. Dugas, each in separate vehicles, to purse him with lights and siren.3 After several

blocks, Hilton pulls over on 9th Street.4 Officer Hammac pulls behind Hilton and Cpl.
Dugas stops immediately behind Hammac’s SUV.5
Officers Hammac and Cpl. Dugas repeatedly commanded Hilton to step out of his
vehicle and show his hands.6 Hilton eventually exits the vehicle exclaiming numerous
expletives and making aggressive gesture towards the officers. Hilton yells at the officers

to “shoot me.”7
Hilton finally goes to his knees but refuses to comply with the officers’ commands.8
Shortly thereafter, Cpl. MaGee arrives to assist as Hilton continues to resist and refuses the
officers’ commands.9 Hilton continues to resist after he gets to his feet and as the officers
attempt to search his pockets.10 As Hilton was being escorted to a patrol unit, he attempted

to pull away from the officer’s custody and control, and continues an abusive verbal rant
toward the officers, including encouraging the officer to kill him.11

3 Defendants’ exhibits E and G.
4 Defendants’ exhibits A, B, C, E, and G.
5 Id.
6 Defendants’ exhibits E and G.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Defendant’s exhibit D and F.
10 Id.
11 Defendants’ exhibit F.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the movant shows “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56. The party moving for summary judgment is initially
responsible for identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
The court must deny the motion for summary judgment if the movant fails to meet this
burden. Id.
If the movant makes this showing, however, the burden then shifts to the non-
moving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quotations omitted). This
requires more than mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings. Instead, the
nonmovant must submit “significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State
Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).
A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on
a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v.
Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material
fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

LAW AND ANALYSIS
In his Petition, Hilton alleges excessive force and battery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Defendants maintain that there is no genuine issue of material fact that reasonable
force was used by law enforcement during the July 14, 2017, pursuit and traffic stop.
Section 1983 creates a private right of action for redressing violations of federal law

by those acting under color of state law. Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress provides a
damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights are violated by state officials.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, __U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017). To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States; and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

person acting under the color of state law. Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727 (5th Cir.
1997); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1995); Leffall v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994).
“The use of excessive force violates the Fourth Amendment unless ‘the
officer[s][have] probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical

harm, either to the officer[s] or to others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,11, 105 S.Ct.
1694 (1985)). To prevail on an excessive force claim, plaintiff must show that the force
employed was objectively unreasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct.
1865 (1989). “Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-intensive; whether the force used
is ‘excessive’ or ‘unreasonable’ depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular

case.” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 731 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
City of Forth Worth v. Darden, --- U.S. ---, 139 S.Ct. 69, (2018).
“In the excessive force context, a constitutional violation is clearly established if no
reasonable officer could believe the act was lawful.” Darden, 880 F.3d at 727. “Our case
law makes clear that when an arrestee is not actively resisting arrest the degree of force an

officer can employ is reduced.” Id. at 731; see Bush v. Strain¸513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir.
2008) (holding that it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to slam an arrestee’s face
into a vehicle when the arrestee “was not resisting arrest or attempting to flee”).
“[A]lthough a de minimis injury is not cognizable, the extent of injury necessary to
satisfy the injury requirement is ‘directly related to the amount of force that is

constitutionally permissible under the circumstances.’” Brown v. Lynch, 524 Fed. Appx.
69, 79 (5th Cir. 2013). “Any force found to be objectively unreasonable necessarily
exceeds the de minimis threshold, and, conversely, objectively reasonable force will result
in de minimis injuries only.” Id. Consequently, “only one inquiry is required to determine
whether an officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Ikerd v.

Blair, 101 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 1996). “As long as a plaintiff has suffered ‘some injury,’ even
relatively insignificant injuries and purely psychological injuries will prove cognizable
when resulting from an officer’s unreasonably excessive force.” Brown, 524 Fed. Appx.
at 79 (quoting Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 434).
Qualified immunity

Defendants defend on the basis of qualified immunity and seeks to have the claims
against them dismissed. “A qualified immunity defense serves to shield a government
official from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary
functions if the official’s acts were objectively reasonable in light of then clearly
established law. Drew v. Town of Church Point, 2018 WL 1973247, *4 (W.D. La. 2018)

(quoting Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2005)). “Qualified
immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986)).
“The bifurcated test for qualified immunity is: (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a
violation of a clearly established constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the Defendant

conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of
the incident.” Id. (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998)).
With respect to the first factor, a constitutional right “is clearly established if, in
light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness is apparent.” Id. To prevail on an excessive
force claim, a plaintiff must show (1) injury, (2) which resulted from the use of force that

was clearly excessive to the need, and (3) the excessiveness which was objectively
unreasonable. Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2011); Hill v. Carroll County,
Mississippi, 587 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2009). In making this determination, the courts
recognized that the reasonableness in these circumstances “must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are forced to make split second judgments – in circumstances that

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in
a particular situation.” Graham v. Conner, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989); Hathaway v. Bazany,
507 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2007).
Defendants argues that Hilton has failed to allege facts that their conduct was
“clearly excessive to the need” or “objectively unreasonable.”

Here, Defendants maintain that they had probable cause to arrest Hilton when they
were responding to a reported kidnapping. Defendants have submitted summary evidence
in support of their motion which clearly reveals that Hilton was given repeated commands
which he initially refused and eventually complied.12 After reviewing the summary
judgment evidence (LCPD body cams), the Court finds that the LCPD used minimal force

to place Hilton under arrest and Hilton has failed to create a genuine issue of fact for trial
as to his excessive force claims.
Municipal liability
Official-capacity suits generally represent another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct.

12 Defendants’ exhibits D, E, F, and G.
3099 (1985). Suits against state officials in their official capacity therefore should be
treated as suits against the State. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. Because the
real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the
named official, “the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of

federal law.” Id.
State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not “persons” for
purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them.
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989).
A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a

tortfeasor. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 98 S.Ct.
2018 (1978). Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be sustained under a theory
of respondeat superior. Id. at 694. Instead, the plaintiff must identify a municipal “policy”
or “custom” that caused the injury. See, e.g., Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-
481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298-1299 (1986). The plaintiff’s burden is a stringent one which

forces the plaintiff to prove the municipality’s inaction was taken with deliberate
indifference so that the municipality disregarded the known or obvious consequence of its
actions. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-389 (1989).
Hilton has failed to meet the jurisprudential criteria to show municipal responsibility
concerning the City, LCPD, or former Chief Don Dixon. Hilton has failed to identify a

policy maker and has only alleged in conclusory fashion that the City’s policies and
practices to train, supervise, or screen were inadequate and a moving force which resulted
in a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. More importantly, Hilton has failed to
submit summary judgment evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to
his allegations of a constitutional violation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment in its entirety and dismiss Hilton’s claims against Defendants with
prejudice.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 19th day of April, 2022.

□ = JAMES D. ) AZO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10194865. Public record. Not legal advice.