# 910 E Main L L C v. Edwards

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · March 1, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10194066

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 1, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION

910 E. MAIN LLC d/b/a CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-00965
QUARTER TAVERN, ET AL.

VERSUS JUDGE SUMMERHAYS

GOVERNOR JOHN BEL EDWARDS, MAGISTRATE JUDGE HANNA
ET AL.

MEMORANDUM RULING

Currently pending is the motion for new trial and/or for reconsideration of this
Court’s order allowing the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint (Rec. Doc.
69), which was filed by the defendants, Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards and
Louisiana Fire Marshal H. “Butch” Browning, Jr. CJD III LLC is the single plaintiff
remaining in this lawsuit, and it did not oppose the motion. For the following
reasons, the motion is denied.
Background
The seventeen original plaintiffs in this lawsuit were bar owners who sued
Louisiana’s governor and fire marshal, objecting to the governor’s emergency
proclamations regarding Covid-19. The suit was filed in July 2020. In December
2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss,1 which has not yet been decided. In

1 Rec. Doc. 60.
January 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file their second amended
complaint,2 which this Court granted.3 In support of the motion to amend, the

plaintiffs stated that the second amended complaint would withdraw the plaintiffs’
damages claims and related claims for declaratory relief, that the surviving claims
were on appeal, and that the plaintiffs had filed their state-law damages claims in
state court.4 When the motion for leave was filed, the plaintiffs had presented the

proposed amended complaint to the defendants and had asked the defendants for
consent to file the amended complaint, but the defendants had neither consented to
nor expressed any opposition to the filing of the proposed second amended

complaint.5 Subsequently, sixteen of the original plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
their claims, leaving CJD III LLC as the sole plaintiff.
Law and Analysis

A. Motion for New Trial
A motion for new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) is appropriate for cases that
have been tried to a jury or to the court. But there was no trial on the subject motion

2 Rec. Doc. 64.
3 Rec. Doc. 67.
4 Rec. Doc. 64-1 at 1-2. The appeal was resolved. A mandate (Rec. Doc. 76) was issued by
the Fifth Circuit on February 4, 2021.
5 Rec. Doc. 64 at 1.
for leave to amend the complaint. Instead, this Court resolved the plaintiffs’ motion
by way of an order without a trial or oral argument. Therefore, a motion for new

trial is not the correct procedural vehicle for seeking review of this Court’s ruling
allowing the second amended complaint.6 Accordingly, to the extent that the
defendants are seeking a new trial, their motion will be denied.

B. Motion for Reconsideration
The plaintiffs alternatively styled their motion as a motion for reconsideration
of this Court’s ruling. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize
a motion for reconsideration,7 such a motion may be treated as a motion to alter or

amend under Rule 59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)8
when a final judgment is at issue.9 When a party seeks reconsideration of an order
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims among all of the parties, however, Rule

6 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:10-CV-1684-D, 2011 WL
1870279, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2011), aff'd, 459 F. App'x 424 (5th Cir. 2012) (when
reexamining a summary judgment ruling, the “motion is not properly considered a motion for ‘new
trial’ because there was no trial”); see, also, Jones v. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280,
282 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982) (motion for reexamination of an order disposing of an action prior to trial
was presumed to be a motion for reconsideration rather than a motion for new trial).
7 St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997); Teal
v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1991).
8 Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d at 347.
9 See James v. Sadler, 909 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1990). See, also, Cormier v. Turnkey
Cleaning Servs., L.L.C., 295 F.Supp.3d 7117, 719 (W.D. La. 2017).
54(b) controls.10 Here, this Court's order granting leave to amend the complaint11 is
not a final judgment, but rather is an interlocutory order that addresses fewer than

all the claims asserted in the suit. Consequently, Rule 54(b) governs.
Rule 54(b) states that an order adjudicating fewer than all the claims among
all the parties may be revised at any time before the entry of a final judgment. Under

this rule, a district court has the inherent power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an
interlocutory order.12 A “trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for
any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening
change in or clarification of the substantive law.”13 The court has broad discretion

to modify an order pursuant to Rule 54(b), but should exercise its discretion
“sparingly in order to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders and the
resulting burdens and delays.”14

10 See Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017); Iturralde v. Shaw
Group, Inc., 512 Fed. App’x 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2013).
11 Rec. Doc. 67.
12 Iturralde v. Shaw Group, Inc., 512 Fed. App’x at 432 (quoting Melancon v. Texaco, Inc.,
659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1981)).
13 Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d at 336 (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool
Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994)).
14 Southern Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F.Supp.2d 548, 564-65 (E.D.
La. 2013). See, also, Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004).
Although courts evaluate motions to reconsider interlocutory orders under a
less exacting standard than that used in evaluating Rule 59(e) motions, courts

nevertheless look to similar considerations for guidance.15 Therefore, in determining
whether to grant such a motion, a court should evaluate whether there are manifest
errors of law or fact upon which the judgment was based, whether new evidence is

available, whether there is a need to prevent manifest injustice, or whether there has
been an intervening change in controlling law.16 While Rule 54(b) is more flexible,17
it is not a vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments.18 Similarly,
reconsideration is generally not available to raise arguments that could, and should

have been made earlier.19 Rulings should only be reconsidered when the moving
party has presented substantial reasons for doing so.20

15 Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 259 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475
(M.D. La. 2002)).
16 B.A. Kelly Land Co., LLC v. Aethon Energy Operating LLC, No. 5:18-CV-01243, 2019
WL 6542407, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 2019). See, also, Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d at
479; In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002).
17 McClendon v. United States, 892 F.3d 775, 781 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Austin v. Kroger
Texas, L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2017)).
18 Southern Snow Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp.2d 548, 565 (E.D. La.
2013); Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d at 479.
19 Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d at 159.
20 Magee v. BPX Properties (N.A.), L.P., No. 15-2097, 2019 WL 5957246, at *1 (W.D. La.
Nov. 12, 2019); Louisiana v. Sprint Communications Co., 899 F. Supp. 282, 284 (M.D. La. 1995).
The defendants’ motion did not identify any errors of law or fact underlying
this Court's ruling, did not identify any new evidence, and did not identify a change

in controlling law. Instead, the defendants argued that allowing the plaintiffs to
withdraw some of their claims would prejudice the defendants primarily because
they expect the district court to rule favorably on their pending motion to dismiss.

However, the defendants did not argue that manifest injustice would result if the
complaint was amended, and no extraordinary circumstances were brought to light.
Furthermore, the defendants’ argument could have – and should have – been
articulated in opposition to the motion for leave, but no argument in opposition to

the motion for leave was made known to the plaintiffs before the proposed second
amended complaint was filed. More important, this Court finds that the motion for
leave to amend was properly granted.

C. Analysis of the Motion for Leave to Amend
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give
leave when justice so requires.” Generally, the language of the rule is liberal and

“evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.”21 Whether to grant a motion to

21 Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004); Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am.
Airlines, 283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2002).
amend is entrusted to the district court's “sound discretion,” 22 but the court must
have a “substantial reason” to deny a request for leave to amend23 such as undue

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous
amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility.24
In this case, the plaintiffs explained that they gave the defendants an
opportunity to review the proposed second amended complaint before it was filed.25

The plaintiffs then “made multiple attempts to confer with” the defendants.26
However, at the time the motion for leave to file the second amended complaint was
filed, the defendants had neither indicated that they had no opposition to the motion

nor had they indicated that they opposed the filing of the second amended
complaint.27 Thus, this Court was presented with no substantial reason for denying
the motion for leave. Certainly, this Court had no basis on which to conclude that

the defendants might be prejudiced by the proposed amended complaint, as they now

22 Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, 283 F.3d at 286.
23 Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 246 (5th Cir. 2018); Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014).
24 Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d at 246; North Cypress Medical Center Operating Company,
Limited v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 898 F.3d 461, 477 (5th Cir. 2018).
25 Rec. Doc. 64 at 1.
26 Rec. Doc. 64 at 1.
27 Rec. Doc. 64 at 1.
argue. Acting on the information before it at the time, this Court properly decided
the motion and gave the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.

D. Appeal to the District Judge
The defendants now wish for this Court to reconsider its ruling on the basis of
arguments that were not presented before the ruling was issued. This is the type of

situation in which an appeal to the district court is the dissatisfied party’s best
recourse. Indeed, in addition to filing the instant motion for reconsideration, the
defendants also filed an appeal of this Court’s decision on the motion for leave to
amend.28 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a party may request that the district court

reconsider a magistrate judge's order determining a nondispositive motion if the
party shows that the order is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” The district
court is in the best position to review and evaluate the arguments made by the

defendants in support of their motion. Indeed, those same arguments were reiterated
in support of their appeal to the district court. Accordingly, this Court finds that the
appeal should move forward.
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons,

28 Rec. Doc. 70.
IT IS ORDERED the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration of this
Court’s order allowing the plaintiffs to file their second amended complaint (Rec.
Doc. 69) is DENIED.
Signed at Lafayette, Louisiana, this Ist KE. 2021.

PATRICK J. HANNA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10194066. Public record. Not legal advice.
