# Thomas v. Gautreaux

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · March 11, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192898

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 11, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192898

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ANDRE THOMAS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS
23-1541-BAJ-SDJ
SID J. GAUTREAUX, ET AL

ORDER
The pro se Plaintiff, an inmate confined at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, filed this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Sid J.
Gautreaux, III, Roderick Brown, Dennis Grimes, and the E.B.R. Parish Prison Mail Department,
complaining that his constitutional rights are being violated due to retaliation, interference with
his access to the courts, and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff’s
Complaint (R. Doc. 1) is largely conclusory and does not indicate how each Defendant is allegedly
personally involved. As such, Plaintiff will be ordered to amend his Complaint as set forth below.
Personal Involvement
In order for a prison official to be found liable under § 1983, the official must have been
personally and directly involved in conduct causing an alleged deprivation of an inmate's
constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the actions of the official and
the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir.
1983). Any allegation that the defendant is responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or
co-employees under a theory of vicarious responsibility or respondeat superior is alone
insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), citing
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston,
356 F. App’x. 715, 716–17 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable
for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). Further,
in the absence of direct personal participation by a supervisory official in an alleged constitutional
violation, an inmate plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred
as a result of a subordinate's implementation of the supervisor's affirmative wrongful policies or
as a result of a breach by the supervisor of an affirmative duty specially imposed by state law.

Lozano v. Smith, supra, 718 F.2d at 768.
Retaliation
It is prohibited for prison officials to act against an inmate in retaliation for the inmate’s
exercise of his constitutional rights. See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995). The
purpose of allowing retaliation claims under § 1983 is to ensure that prisoners are not unduly
discouraged from exercising their constitutional rights. Morris v Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 686 (5th
Cir. 2006). Claims of retaliation by prison inmates, however, are regarded with skepticism, lest
the federal courts potentially embroil themselves in every adverse action that occurs within a penal
institution. Woods v. Smith, supra, 60 F.3d at 1166. Accordingly, to prevail on a claim of

retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) that he was exercising or attempting to exercise a specific
constitutional right, (2) that the defendant intentionally retaliated against the prisoner for the
exercise of that right, (3) that an adverse retaliatory action, greater than de minimis, was undertaken
against the prisoner by the defendant, and (4) that there is causation, i.e., that “but for” the
retaliatory motive, the adverse action would not have occurred. Morris v. Powell, supra, 449 F.3d
at 684. See also Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999). An inmate must allege more than his mere personal belief that he is
the victim of retaliation, Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1997), and inasmuch as
claims of retaliation are not favored, it is the plaintiff’s burden to provide more than conclusory
allegations of retaliation:
To state a claim of retaliation an inmate must ... be prepared to establish that but
for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident ... would not have occurred.
This places a significant burden on the inmate.... The inmate must produce direct
evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario, allege a chronology of
events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.

Woods v. Smith, supra, 60 F.3d. at 1166.
Denial of Access to the Courts
A substantive right of access to the courts has long been recognized. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 347 (1996), citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Specifically, access to the
courts is incorporated into the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. Driggers v. Cruz, 740 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2014) citing Bill Johnson's Rests.,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731 (1983). In its most obvious and fundamental manifestation, this right
protects an inmate's physical access to the courts. Thus, for example, prison officials may not block
or refuse to transmit, through procedural devices or otherwise, the transmission of legal documents
that prisoners wish to send to the courts. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (striking down a state
regulation prohibiting prisoners from filing petitions for habeas corpus without the approval of a
state official); Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 310–11 (5th Cir. 1986) (prison officials may
not deliberately delay mailing legal papers when they know that such delay will effectively deny
a prisoner access to the courts). Nor can they take other actions—such as confiscating or destroying
legal papers—that would have a similar effect. See Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425,
429 (5th Cir. 1994), citing Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 811 (5th Cir.1 989). The fundamental
constitutional right of access to the courts also requires that prison authorities assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
828 (1977). This right extends to pretrial detainees as well as to convicted inmates. Boyd v.
Nowack, 2010 WL 892995, *2 (E.D. La. March 11, 2010), citing United States v. Moya–Gomez,
860 F.2d 706, 743 (7th Cir. 1988).
The right of access to the courts, however, “guarantees no particular methodology but

rather the conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, supra, 518 U.S. at 356.
Further, in order to prevail on a claim of interference with access to the courts, an inmate claimant
must be able to show that has he suffered some cognizable legal prejudice or detriment as a result
of the defendant's actions. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996). In addition, the
plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant had an intent to interfere with the plaintiff's right
to submit pleadings to the courts or was otherwise deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's wish to
do so. See Herrington v. Martin, 2009 WL 5178340, *2 (W.D. La., Dec. 23, 2009) (recognizing
that “[a]n ‘access to courts' claim is actionable only if the deprivation stemmed from intentional

conduct on the part of the defendant; ‘access to courts' claims premised on a defendant's mere
negligence or inadvertence are not cognizable under § 1983’'). Finally, an inmate's right to seek
access to the courts is limited to the making of non-frivolous claims involving the assertion of
legitimate constitutional rights. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 1997).
Therefore, because the right to access to the courts “rest[s] on the recognition that the right is
ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being
shut out of court,” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002), “the underlying cause of
action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint.” Id.
Deliberate Indifference
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment if the official shows deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–06 (1976). The official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ] an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety” and “be aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists”. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). The official also must draw that inference. Id.
Failed treatments, negligence, and medical malpractice are insufficient to give rise to a
claim of deliberate indifference. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). A prisoner
who disagrees with the course of treatment or alleges that he should have received further treatment
also does not raise a claim of deliberate indifference. Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice,
239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). Instead, an inmate must show that prison officials denied him
treatment, purposefully provided him improper treatment, or ignored his medical complaints. Id.
A delay in treatment may violate the Eighth Amendment if the delay was the result of the prison

official's deliberate indifference and substantial harm—including suffering—occurred during the
delay. Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall, within 21 days from the date of this Order, amend
his Complaint by:
(1) Stating facts showing retaliation, denial of access to the courts, and deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, health, or safety; and
(2) Stating how each named defendant was personally involved.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that failure to amend the Complaint, as ordered, may result
in dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 11, 2024.

S

SCOTT D. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192898. Public record. Not legal advice.