# Doe v. Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · March 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192611

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192611

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JANE DOE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA
SYSTEM, ET AL. NO. 22-00338-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff initiated this action in May 2022. For eight months, it proceeded
without any question that this District is the appropriate venue. Now, however, after
this Court has entered a 48-page Ruling and Order denying Defendant Lafayette
City-Parish Consolidated Government’s (LCG) motion to dismiss, LCG contends in a
Motion To Transfer Venue (Doc. 54) that it would be “inconvenient … for the
parties and witnesses” to continue here, in Baton Rouge. Instead, LCG prefers that
this action should be transferred 60 miles west to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana, in downtown Lafayette. (Doc. 54-1 at p. 7). Notably,
Defendant Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System (ULS)—whose
authority extends to University of Louisiana Lafayette (in Lafayette) and Louisiana
Tech University (in Ruston)—does not join LCG’s Motion. Plaintiff opposes transfer,
arguing that LCG’s request is purely self-serving, and that, in fact, the balance of
relevant factors weigh against transfer. (Doc. 58 at p. 6).
“[D]istrict courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to order a
transfer.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2008)
(Volkswagen II). Still, in exercising this discretion, the Court is limited by the text of
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and controlling precedent interpreting and applying the text of
§ 1404(a). Id. The first factor the Court must consider “is whether the judicial district
to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the claim could have

been filed.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (Volkswagen I). If
“yes,” then the Court weighs the “private concerns” at issue—i.e., “the convenience of
parties and witnesses”—against the “public concerns” at stake—i.e., “the interest of
justice.” See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
The private concerns include: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. The public concerns include: (1) the administrative
difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having
localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with
the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems of conflict of laws of the application of foreign law.
Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n. 6 (1981)).
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff could have pursued her action in the
Western District of Louisiana. (Doc. 58 at p. 11). But that merely opens the door to
the possibility of transfer, requiring the Court to balance the relevant private and
public concerns.
First, the relative ease of access to sources of proof. LCG strains to show that
this factor favors transfer to Lafayette, because “relevant Lafayette Police
Department files and documentation are located in Lafayette,” and “files related to
Plaintiff’s complaint of Silva to authority figures at Louisiana Tech are located in
Ruston.” (Doc. 54-1 at p. 10). The Court is not so easily swayed. First, additional
relevant files and documentation are located here, in Baton Rouge, where ULS is
domiciled, where now-dismissed Defendant Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (LSU) is domiciled, and where
Plaintiff’s assailant, Victor Daniel Silva, began his college career (at LSU). Second,

LCG need not be concerned with ease of access to documents in Ruston, because it is
ULL’s responsibility to produce such documents. Notably, ULL does not join LCG’s
Motion. Third, the reality of modern discovery is that most (if not all) relevant files
and documentation are already in electronic format, minimizing (if not eliminating
entirely) any inconvenience. In sum, this factor weighs neither for nor against
transfer.
LCG concedes that the second factor—the availability of compulsory process—

is also neutral because this Court and the Lafayette Division of the Western District
of Louisiana are merely 60 miles apart, and thus enjoy “coextensive subpoena power”
for all practical purposes. (Doc. 54-1 at p. 10).
Third, the cost of attendance for willing witnesses. LCG posits “that fact
witnesses will primarily reside in the Western District.” Yet, again, however, LCG
ignores that Silva, Plaintiff’s assailant, began his college career at LSU; that Silva

was arrested and charged with second degree rape in Baton Rouge; and that a LSU
administrator warned ULL of Silva prior to Plaintiff’s assault. LCG also ignores that
Plaintiff resides in Indiana. Certainly, Plaintiff’s travel to Baton Rouge would be less
expensive than to Lafayette. At best, this factor weighs minimally in favor of transfer.
Last among the private factors—all other practical problems that make trial
of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Here, LCG merely restates its arguments
as to the other private factors, adding nothing new. The Court determines that this
factor is neutral.
First among the public factors is court congestion. Here, LCG concedes that

“the Western District is much more congested than the Middle District based on the
figures such as pending cases per Judgeship.” (Doc. 54-1 at p. 11). Still, LCG
encourages the Court to disregard the Western District’s caseload, because much of
this congestion results from “insurance lawsuits filed in Lake Charles following the
devastation of Hurricanes Laura and Delta.” (Id. at p. 12). Again, the Court is not so
easily persuaded. Having recently labored under the strain of high caseloads
resulting from the 2016 flood in Baton Rouge, this Court is well aware of the

administrative difficulties resulting from the influx of insurance disputes that
inevitably follows any natural disaster. Currently, caseloads are lower in this District
than in the Western District. This factor weighs against transfer.
Second, the interest in having localized interests decided at home. This action
involves alleged malfeasance at three Louisiana public universities: LSU, UL
Lafayette, and Louisiana Tech. All citizens and taxpayers of Louisiana have an equal

interest and stake in the administration of their public universities. This factor is
neutral.
Third, familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case.
Certainly, this Court’s brethren in the Western District are fully capable of
addressing the federal and state law issues presented in this case. At the same time,
however, this Court has already invested considerable judicial resources into this
matter, which have resulted in multiple procedural orders, and a substantive order
denying LCG’s and ULL’s motions to dismiss on January 10, 2023. (See Doc. 52). The
Court’s January 10 Order, in particular, spanned 48 pages, and required detailed

consideration of the operative allegations underpinning this action, and substantial
legal analysis. It would be decidedly inefficient at this time to transfer this action,
thereby requiring the receiving Court to spin its wheels getting up to speed. This
factor weighs decidedly against transfer. See Copeland's Cheesecake Bistro of Bossier
City, LLC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-1679, 2010 WL 4810840, at *4 (W.D. La.
Oct. 28, 2010) (denying motion to transfer where movant/defendant delayed seeking
transfer until after the district court ruled on a substantive motion to dismiss); Doe

v. St. Stephen's Episcopal Sch., No. 08-cv-299, 2009 WL 1835155, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
June 26, 2009) (same).
Finally, conflict of laws. LCG concedes that no conflict of laws issues are
presented here, and that this factor is neutral. (Doc. 54-1 at p. 13).
In sum, LCG has identified one private factor—cost of attendance for willing
witnesses—that arguably might favor transfer. On the other hand, two public

factors—relative docket congestion and this Court’s familiarity with the case—
strongly favor keeping this action here. All other factors are neutral. On balance, the
Court determines that LCG has failed to show that the public and private interests
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and controlling precedent favor a transfer of this
action to the Lafayette Division of the Western District of Louisiana.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that LCG’s Motion To Transfer Venue (Doc. 54) be and
is hereby DENIED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 31st day of March, 2023

_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192611. Public record. Not legal advice.