# Robinson v. Ardoin

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · April 19, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192228

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 19, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PRESS ROBINSON, et al
CIVIL ACTION
versus
22-211-SDD-SDJ
KYLE ARDOIN, in his official
capacity as Secretary of State
for Louisiana

consolidated with

EDWARD GALMON, SR., et al
CIVIL ACTION
versus
22-214-SDD-SDJ
KYLE ARDOIN, in his official
capacity as Secretary of State
for Louisiana

RULING
Before the Court are two motions: the Motion of the Presiding Officers of the
Louisiana Legislature to Intervene1 filed by Clay Schexnayder, Speaker of the Louisiana
House of Representatives, and Patrick Page Cortez, President of the Louisiana Senate
(collectively, “the Legislators”), and the Motion to Intervene2 filed by Louisiana Attorney
General Jeff Landry (“the Attorney General”). Both Motions are opposed,3 though the
Robinson Plaintiffs specify that they take no position on the Legislators’ Motion.4 For the
reasons that follow, both Motions shall be GRANTED.

1 Rec. Doc. No. 10.
2 Rec. Doc. No. 30.
3 The Galmon Plaintiffs filed a combined opposition to both motions (Rec. Doc. No. 36), and the Robinson
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Attorney General’s motion (Rec. Doc. No. 37).
4 Rec. Doc. No. 37, p. 2, n. 2.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 30, 2022, Robinson v. Ardoin5 and Galmon v. Ardoin6 were filed in the
Middle District of Louisiana. Both suits challenge Louisiana’s new congressional
districting plan. In the interest of efficiency and judicial economy, Galmon, which had
initially been allocated to Judge Brian A. Jackson, was reassigned to this Court, and on

April 14, 2022, Robinson and Galmon were consolidated.7 Now seeking to join the
consolidated cases as parties are Clay Schexnayder, Speaker of the Louisiana House of
Representatives, Patrick Page Cortez, President of the Louisiana Senate, and Louisiana
Attorney General Jeff Landry. All of the putative intervenors assert that they are entitled
to intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), or, in the
alternative, permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Plaintiffs oppose the interventions,
arguing, inter alia, that the would-be parties have no independent interests to assert and
that whatever interests they do have are already adequately represented by Defendant
Kyle Ardoin, the Louisiana Secretary of State. The Court will address the parties’

arguments in turn.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Intervention of Right Under Rule 24(a)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides that, on timely motion, the Court
must permit anyone to intervene who is given an unconditional right to intervene by a
federal statute; or who claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical

5 3:22-cv-211.
6 3:22-cv-214.
7 Rec. Doc. No. 34.
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest. The movant bears the burden of establishing his
right to intervene, but Rule 24 is to be liberally construed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit instructs that “[f]ederal courts should allow intervention
where no one would be hurt and the greater justice could be attained.”8 “The inquiry is a

flexible one, and a practical analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case is
appropriate.”9
Although “[t]here is not any clear definition of the nature of the interest ... that is
required for intervention of right,”10 the Fifth Circuit has previously interpreted Rule
24(a)(2) to require a “‘direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings.’”11
The Fifth Circuit has held that, ultimately, the “inquiry turns on whether the intervenor has
a stake in the matter that goes beyond a generalized preference that the case come out
a certain way.”12
As for representation, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that the movant's burden of

proving inadequate representation is a “minimal” one that is met if the movant shows that
“‘representation may be inadequate.’”13 “Although the applicant's burden of showing
inadequate representation is minimal, “it cannot be treated as so minimal as to write the
requirement completely out of the rule.”14 The Fifth Circuit has held that “‘[w]hen the party

8 Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)(quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,
1205 (5th Cir.1994)).
9 Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 2014)(internal quotations omitted).
10 7C Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1908.1 (3d ed. 2007) [Wright & Miller]
(internal quotation marks omitted).
11 Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996).
12 Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015).
13 Brown v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., No. CV 21-40, 2021 WL 949679, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 2021)(quoting
Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1994)).
14 Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. Gulf States Utilities, Inc., 940 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir.1984)).
seeking intervention has the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a presumption
arises that its interests are adequately represented, against which the petitioner must
demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance.’”15
B. Permissive Intervention Under Rule 24(b)

Rule 24(b) provides that the Court may permit anyone to intervene who (1) is given
a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute or (2) has a claim or defense that
shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. This rule gives district
courts discretion to allow intervention when “(1) timely application is made by the
intervenor, (2) the intervenor's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common, and (3) intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”16 “Permissive intervention is ‘wholly
discretionary’ and may be denied even when the requirements of Rule 24(b) are
satisfied.”17
III. ANALYSIS

I. The Legislators’ Motion

Clay Schexnayder and Patrick Page Cortez (“the Legislators”) aver that they
clearly satisfy the elements of intervention of right, which, again, are:
(1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must
have an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the
action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest; (4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by
the existing parties to the suit.18

15 Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984).
16 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 189 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1989).
17 Turner v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 9 F.4th 300, 317 (5th Cir. 2021).
18 Miller v. Vilsack, No. 21-11271, 2022 WL 851782, at *2 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022).
On the first point, the Court agrees; there is no dispute that the Motion is timely,
since it was filed only one week after the Complaints and before anything meaningful
transpired in the case. Thus, the Legislators’ entitlement to intervention of right hinges on
the nature and magnitude of the interest articulated, as well as their ability to demonstrate
that their interest is not already adequately represented. The Legislators assert a laundry

list of interests in this case.19 In the Court’s view, many of these interests do not satisfy
the requirements for intervention of right under Rule 24(a). Several of the assertions boil
down to the Legislators’ desire to avoid having their maps undone by an order of this
Court or to be forced to redraw them; this strikes the Court as nothing more than a
“generalized preference that the case come out a certain way.” Other alleged interests
are too ineffable, such as the Legislators’ interest in defending “the injury to the legislative
department of Louisiana, and the State itself.”20
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Legislators have articulated a legitimate
interest where they cite their desire to defend the merits of the redistricting plans passed

by the Legislature. In League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v.
Clements,21 the Fifth Circuit signaled that parties who play a “part in creating or revising
the election scheme” meet the “real party in interest” test. And, as the Legislators note,

19 “[T]o respond to allegations regarding the actions of the Legislature”; defending the redistricting plans
passed by the Legislature; “an interest in seeking to prevent their votes in favor of the challenged plans
from being nullified by an order deeming the plans violative of the Voting Rights Act”; “defending the injury
to the legislative department of Louisiana, and the State itself, that would result from an injunction against
the challenged plans”; preventing the Court from “transfer[ing] redistricting authority from the Legislature
and to the court”; “avoiding a second redistricting process,” which would divert time and resources from
other pressing legislative issues; “a compelling and justiciable interest in defending and advancing
legitimate legislative policies”; “an interest in ensuring that [] a remedy implements legitimate legislative
policies”; “an interest in ensuring that [the Legislature’s] policy choices guide redistricting overseen by a
court”; “an interest in advocating their understanding of the legal requirements applicable to redistricting
plans”; and “a compelling interest that Louisiana citizens’ equal protection rights are honored in any future
redistricting plan” (See Rec. Doc. No. 10).
20 Rec. Doc. No. 10, p. 5.
21 884 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1989).
the participation of legislators is a not-uncommon feature of recent redistricting litigation
across the country.22 Moreover, as a matter of common sense, the Court finds that the
leaders of the legislative bodies that enacted the challenged maps have an interest in
participating in a process where the various policy choices and judgments that went into
creating the maps will be scrutinized. Especially in light of the liberal and flexible standard

prescribed for Rule 24, the Court finds that the Legislators have established an interest.
The argument that the Legislators’ interest will be impaired or impeded without
their participation is heavily intertwined with their argument regarding adequacy of
representation. Essentially, the Legislators argue that the only named Defendant in this
suit, Secretary of State Ardoin, “did not enact the challenged plans, lacks constitutional
authority to do so, has no knowledge of the policy considerations underpinning them, has
no particular interest in defending those policy choices, and will not be tasked with
enacting new plans if they are enjoined.”23 Therefore, they argue, their interest in
defending the plans will be impaired if Secretary of State Ardoin, whose function is one

of implementation, not development or defense of maps, is the sole Defendant. The Court
credits this argument as persuasive.
As for adequacy of representation, the Fifth Circuit instructs that “‘[w]hen the party
seeking intervention has the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a presumption
arises that its interests are adequately represented.’”24 The Court is persuaded by the

22 See, e.g., Caster v. Merrill, No. 2:21-CV-1536-AMM, 2022 WL 264819, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022),
cert. granted before judgment sub nom. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879 (2022)(granting legislators’ motion
to intervene to defend the redistricting plan); Carter v. Chapman, 270 A.3d 444, 453 (Pa. 2022) (granting
intervenor status to the Speaker and Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and
the President Pro Tempore and Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania Senate); Harper v. Hall, 2022-NCSC-
17, ¶ 3, 868 S.E.2d 499.
23 Rec. Doc. No. 10, p. 10-11.
24 Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1984)
Legislators’ assertion that their interest in defending House Bill 1 and Senate Bill 5 is not
adequately represented by the Secretary, since his ultimate objective is “administering
whatever election rules may apply by law, not in administering the specific plans
challenged in this case.”25 Although the Secretary’s interest in “orderly elections” may, in
this case, mean that he disfavors any attempt to defeat the already-existing maps, the

Legislators point out that ultimately, the Secretary may be disinterested in the merits as
long as any remedy “were to occur in time to administer the next scheduled legislative
elections.”26 This divergence of interests is evidence of inadequate representation.
Finding that the Legislators have demonstrated their entitlement to intervene as of
right under Rule 24(a), the Court orders that their Motion shall be GRANTED.
II. The Attorney General’s Motion

Attorney General Jeff Landry’s Motion is timely, coming only two weeks after the
Complaints and before any significant developments in the case. Though he cites a
number of state statutes giving him authority to represent the state and to intervene in
civil suits,27 he points to no federal statute giving him a right to intervene under Rule 24(a).
Therefore, to intervene as of right, he must satisfy the now-familiar factors under Rule
24(a)(2).28
As an initial matter, the Court is underwhelmed by the Attorney General’s assertion
that his interest in this suit is “to protect the interests of the State.”29 This is an overly
general statement by the standards of Rule 24(a), which requires a particularized interest.

25 Rec. Doc. No. 10, p. 11 (citing La. R.S. § 18:18).
26 Id. at p. 13.
27 Rec. Doc. No. 30, p. 4-5.
28 See supra, p. 4.
29 Rec. Doc. No. 30, p. 6.
The Attorney General further asserts that “[t]he State has unique sovereign interests not
shared by the other parties,” but, at his most specific, he describes that interest as the
need “to defend the State’s congressional plan.”30 This interest is not unique – it is
explicitly shared by the Legislators who also moved to intervene. Also unavailing is the
Attorney General’s argument that he is entitled to intervene in this suit because he is

charged with various election-related responsibilities under state law.31 Intervention of
right requires a direct and substantial interest in this proceeding; the Attorney General
does not explain how being designated as statutory counsel for each Parish Board of
Election Supervisors, for example, is relevant to congressional redistricting.
That being said, the Court is mindful of the United States Supreme Court’s recent
instruction that “a State’s opportunity to defend its laws in federal court should not be
lightly cut off.”32 In Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., decided March
3, 2022, the high Court, in a Ruling affirming the Kentucky attorney general’s intervention
to defend a Kentucky abortion law, wrote as follows:

Paramount among the States' retained sovereign powers is the power to
enact and enforce any laws that do not conflict with federal law. Therefore,
a State “clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its
own statutes,” and a federal court must “respect ... the place of the States
in our federal system”. . .Respect for state sovereignty must also take into
account the authority of a State to structure its executive branch in a way
that empowers multiple officials to defend its sovereign interests in federal
court.33

The Supreme Court also relied upon provisions of Kentucky law that mirror Louisiana law
with respect to the role of the attorney general:

30 Rec. Doc. No. 30, p. 5.
31 Id. at p. 7.
32 142 S. Ct. 1002, 1011 (2022).
33 Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 142 S. Ct. 1002, 1011 (2022)(internal citations omitted).
In this case, although the secretary for Health and Family Services
apparently enjoyed the authority under state law to defend the
constitutionality of HB 454, the secretary shared that authority with the
attorney general. Indeed, it is the attorney general who is deemed
Kentucky's “chief law officer” with the authority to represent the
Commonwealth “in all cases.”34

Under Louisiana law, the Attorney General is the “chief legal officer,” charged with “the
assertion or protection of any right or interest of the state.”35 Overall, Cameron suggests
that the Attorney General’s desire to represent Louisiana as a sovereign state is a
legitimate interest in this proceeding.
As to adequacy of representation, the Attorney General claims that he does not
share the same ultimate objective as Secretary of State Ardoin, because Ardoin’s
objective is “the orderly implementation of whatever election rules are in force,” while the
Attorney General is “tasked specifically with defending the laws and sovereign interests
of the State of Louisiana.”36 This argument seems to elide that “whatever election rules
are in force” are, of course, set forth in those very state laws that the Attorney General is
bound to defend, but the Court credits the distinction that the Secretary of State’s focus
is the implementation of laws, not defending their legality.
Lastly, the Attorney General’s argument that the State’s interest would be impaired
in his absence is lacking. He maintains that “the Court’s determination could have long
lasting impacts on the State,”37 but that would be the case regardless of Landry’s
presence or absence as a party to this suit. Primarily, the Attorney General argues that
the State’s interest would be impaired if he is not allowed to intervene and is thus

34 Id.
35 La. Const. art. IV, § 8.
36 Rec. Doc. No. 30, p. 9.
37 Id. at p. 8.
prevented from “providing a defense to Plaintiffs’ challenge to the method of electing
members to Congress.”38 But, as Plaintiffs point out, Attorney General Landry is fully
empowered to represent Secretary of State Ardoin;39 Landry never articulates why he
must mount a defense by becoming party to the suit himself instead of, in his capacity as
“chief legal officer,” representing the existing state Defendants.

The Court finds that Attorney General Landry has failed to establish that he is
entitled to intervention of right. But, in light of Cameron, the Court will allow permissive
intervention for the Attorney General to defend the enforceability of Louisiana law, here,
the existing maps. There is no doubt that Landry’s Motion is timely or that his proposed
defense shares questions of law or fact in common with the claims in the underlying
litigation. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to grant permissive intervention,
finding that “no one would be hurt and the greater justice could be attained.”40
III. Plaintiffs’ Concerns

Plaintiffs worry that allowing additional defendants to intervene will “unnecessarily
duplicate” efforts, “effectively doubling or even tripling page limits and argument time.”41
The Court shares this concern, but finds that it can be mitigated by careful management
of the briefing process and the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, “[f]ederal courts have inherent
powers necessary to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of their dockets.”42

38 Id. at p. 8.
39 See La. R.S. 49:257 (“Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the attorney general, at his
discretion, shall represent or supervise the representation of the interests of the state in any action or
proceeding in which the constitutionality of a state statute or of a resolution of the legislature is challenged
or assailed”).
40 Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)(quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,
1205 (5th Cir.1994)).
41 Rec. Doc. No. 36, p. 8.
42 Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1996). See also, e.g.,
Federal Rule of Evidence 611.
In the Court's view, the greater threat to the expedient adjudication of this case would be
the delays associated with a potential appeal from this Court’s denial of a motion to
intervene as of right, which is immediately appealable in the Fifth Circuit.‘
lil. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion of the Presiding Officers of the Louisiana
Legislature to Intervene“ filed by Clay Schexnayder, Speaker of the Louisiana House of
Representatives, and Patrick Page Cortez, President of the Louisiana Senate and the
Motion to Intervene*> filed by Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry are hereby
GRANTED and the movants permitted to intervene as Defendants in the consolidated
cases.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on April 19, 2022.

JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

43 Sommers v. Bank of Am., N.A., 835 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2016)(“Under our precedents, ‘[t]he denial of
a motion to intervene of right is an appealable final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,’ but ‘we have only
provisional jurisdiction’ to review the denial of permissive intervention”); Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 960 F.2d 550, 555 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[A] denial of intervention is immediately appealable
as a collateral order”); Edwards v. City of Hous., 78 F.3d at 992 (“The denial of a motion to intervene of
right is an appealable final order....”)
44 Rec. Doc. No. 10.
45 Rec. Doc. No. 30.
11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10192228. Public record. Not legal advice.