# Spriggs v. Hancock Holding Company

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · September 20, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10191094

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** September 20, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL L. SPRIGGS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS 18-726-SDD-RLB

HANCOCK WHITNEY CORPORATION

RULING
This matter is before the Court on the cross Motions for Summary Judgment1 filed
by Plaintiff, Michael Spriggs (“Spriggs”), and Defendant, Hancock Whitney Corporation
(“Hancock”). Hancock filed an Opposition2 to Spriggs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
Spriggs has also filed an Opposition3 to Hancock’s Motion for Summary Judgment, to
which Hancock has filed a Reply.4 For the following reasons, the Court finds that
Hancock’s Motion for Summary Judgment5 shall be GRANTED, and Spriggs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment6 shall be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this unpaid wage claim against Hancock under the Louisiana Wage
Payment Act (“LWPA”), La. R.S. 23:631 and La. R.S. 23:632. Spriggs worked for Harrison
Finance Company from March 23, 2006, to March 9, 2018.7 Harrison Finance Company

1 Rec. Doc. 11; Rec. Doc. 13.
2 Rec. Doc. 17.
3 Rec. Doc. 18.
4 Rec. Doc. 21.
5 Rec. Doc. 13.
6 Rec. Doc. 11.
7 Rec. Doc. 13-1, ¶ 1.
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was owned by Defendant Hancock’s banking subsidiary, Whitney Bank.8 Whitney Bank
sold Harrison Finance Company to First Tower Finance Company, LLC, on March 9,
2018, and, on that date, informed Spriggs that his employment would no longer be
associated with Hancock.9 During Spriggs’ employment with Hancock’s subsidiary,
Harrison Finance Company, Hancock offered Spriggs employment benefits including

Vacation and Sick leave.10
This dispute arises out of the discharge of Spriggs’ employment with Harrison
Finance. Spriggs alleges that, at the time that his employment terminated with Hancock,
Hancock failed to pay him his accrued leave and vacation pay as required by law.11
Spriggs alleges that he is entitled to be paid for 1,020 hours of Accrued Leave and 144
hours of Vacation, ninety days of wages at his daily rate of pay, as well as attorney fees.
Hancock argues that Spriggs has already been paid for all earned, but unused
Vacation pay. Additionally, Hancock contends that there is no statutory authority that
requires Hancock to pay Spriggs the cash value of his unused Sick Leave, and Spriggs

cannot point to a policy or procedure requiring them to do so. Hancock argues that its
policies expressly provide that unused Sick Leave is not payable upon termination of
employment.12

8 Rec. Doc. 13-1, ¶ 1; Rec. Doc. 11-1, ¶ 1; Rec. Doc. 11-3 (Declaration of Michael L. Spriggs).
9 Rec. Doc. 13-3, ¶ 4 (Affidavit of Steven Smith, Director of Total Rewards for Hancock Whitney Bank);
Rec. Doc. 11-1, ¶ 7 (Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts).
10 Rec. Doc. 13-1, ¶ 2; Rec. Doc. 13-3, ¶ 3.
11 Rec. Doc. 11-1, p. 2.
12 Rec. Doc. 17, pp. 1-2.
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II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”13 “When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all

of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”14 A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s
case.”15 If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that
summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.’”16 However, the
non-moving party’s burden “is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a
scintilla of evidence.”17

Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”18 All reasonable factual
inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.19 However, “[t]he Court has no

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
14 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008).
15 Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home, 246 F. Supp .2d 488, 494 (M.D. La. 2003)(quoting Little
v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc).
16 Rivera v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Morris v. Covan World
Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).
17 Willis v. Roche Biomedical Lab, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995)(quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
18 Pylant v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2007)(quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
19 Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985).
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duty to search the record for material fact issues. Rather, the party opposing the summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate precisely
how this evidence supports his claim.”20 “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific
facts … will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his
allegations … to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint.'’”21
B. The Louisiana Wage Payment Act
The LWPA is designed to compel prompt payment of earned wages upon an
employee’s discharge or resignation.22 The LWPA provides in part:
Upon the discharge of any laborer or other employee of any kind whatever,
it shall be the duty of the person employing such laborer or other employee
to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the
employment is by the hour, day, week, or month, on or before the next
regular payday or no later than fifteen days following the date of discharge,
whichever occurs first. 23

To state a claim under the LWPA, the employee must allege “i) that [the defendant] was
her employer, ii) that the employee/employer relationship ceased to exist, iii) that at the
time that the employee/employer relationship ended she was owed wages, and iv) that
[the defendant] failed to submit the owed wages within the statutorily mandated 15
days.”24

20 RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2010).
21 Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tex., 40 F.3d 698, 713 (5th Cir.
1994)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
22 Slaughter v. Board of Supervisors of Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 2010-
1049 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/2/11); 76 So.3d 438, 446.
23 La. R.S. 23:631(A)(1)(a).
24 Bergeron v. Ochsner Health System, 2017 WL 3648451 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2017) (citing Dillon v. Toys R
Us-Delaware Corp., No. 2016-0983, 2017 WL 2351490, at *2 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. May 31, 2017)).
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1. Sick Leave and Accrued Leave
At the outset, the parties dispute whether Spriggs was an employee of Hancock.
Hancock does not deny that Spriggs worked for its subsidiary but argues that Hancock
was not Spriggs’ employer under the LWPA.25 Louisiana courts consider a variety of
factors in determining whether there is an employee-employer relationship under the

LWPA:
(1) whether there is a valid contract between the parties; (2) whether the
work being done is of an independent nature such that the contractor may
employ nonexclusive means in accomplishing it; (3) whether the contract
calls for specific piecework as a unit to be done according to the
independent contractor's own methods, without being subject to the control
and direction of the principal, except as to the result of the services to be
rendered; (4) whether there is a specific price for the overall undertaking
agreed upon; and (5) whether the duration of the work is for a specific time
and not subject to termination or discontinuance at the will of either side
without a corresponding liability for its breach.26

Hancock does not brief the LWPA employment factors but contends that Spriggs was an
employee of Harrison Finance “not its indirect parent [company] Hancock …”.27 For his
part, Spriggs also fails to address any of the LWPA employment factors but argues that
“Hancock promoted Mr. Spriggs to Senior Vice President of Hancock effective October 1,
2017, and paid him a bonus in the amount of $3,250 in connection with this promotion” to
support his contention that he was an employee of Hancock. It is undisputed that Harrison
was a subsidiary of Hancock, and Hancock paid Spriggs’ promotion bonus as well as
offered the benefits at issue in this case. Despite the lack of briefing on this issue, the
Court finds that, although there may be a genuine issue of fact regarding who was

25 Rec. Doc. 17, p. 5.
26 Mendoza v. Essential Quality Const., Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 680, 686 (E.D. La. 2010).
27 Rec. Doc. 17, p. 6.
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Spriggs’ statutory employer, this fact is not material because, regardless of Spriggs’
employer, it is undisputed that Hancock offered Spriggs the Vacation and Sick leave at
issue in this case, and it is Hancock’s handbook which delineates the leave policies.
Spriggs contends that “Hancock has failed to pay Mr. Spriggs his accrued leave
and vacation pay as required by law upon the discharge of his employment with

Hancock.”28 Spriggs argues that his 1,020 hours of Accrued Leave was an “amount then
due under the terms of employment.” 29 The record demonstrates, and Hancock does not
deny, that Spriggs had a “Current Balance” of 1,020 hours of “Accrued Leave” as of March
9, 2018.30 According to Hancock, however, “Accrued Leave is nothing more than a
subcategory of Sick Leave.”31 As to Sick Leave, Hancock contends that “there is no policy
or procedure or a statutory or jurisprudential authority that requires Hancock to pay
Spriggs the cash value of unused Sick Leave at the termination of his employment.”32 In
fact, Hancock argues that “Hancock’s policy expressly provides that Sick Leave has no
cash value and is not paid out at termination of employment.”33

The record demonstrates that Hancock had an express policy that employees are
not entitled to payment for unused Sick Leave upon termination and that “Accrued Leave”
is a subcategory of Sick Leave. Although Spriggs contends that Hancock “did not have a
clear, written policy establishing that the accrued leave was nothing more than a mere

28 Rec. Doc. 11-2, p. 2.
29 Id.
30 Rec. Doc. 11-7, p. 1.
31 Rec. Doc. 17, p. 8.
32 Id. at 1-2.
33 Id.
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gratuity and was not to be considered an amount due or a wage,”34 Hancock’s policy
handbook explains Accrued Leave and its relationship to Sick Leave as follows:
As of January 1, 2018, eligible Associates with an accrued, but unused Sick
Leave balance at close of business on December 31, 2017 will have these
hours credited to an Accrued Leave balance. This balance is non-accruing,
and no additional hours will be added to it. Sick Leave balances subsequent
to close of business of December 31, 2017 will not be credited to an
Associate’s Accrued Leave balance. Accrued Leave balances will not roll
over to the following year until exhausted.

Accrued leave may be used for purposes consistent with Sick Leave.
Accrued Leave balances must be used prior to receiving Short Term
Disability pay for eligible leaves.

The Sick Leave policy and eligibility applies to this balance. Associates
hired on or after January 1, 2018 and Commissioned Associates are not
eligible for Accrued Leave.35

Further, the uncontroverted affidavit of Steven Smith, the Director of Total Rewards for
Hancock Whitney Bank who oversees the implementation of benefits that Hancock offers
to associates, explains that:
Prior to January 1, 2018, unused balances of Sick Leave could be rolled
over from year to year. Effective as of January 1, 2018, the policy was
revised such that an unused Sick Leave could not be rolled over into the
next calendar year. Instead of eliminating any unused balances of Sick
Leave that an eligible associate had been allotted before January 1, 2018,
the Company allowed eligible associates to keep their unused Sick Leave.
In order to distinguish any Sick Leave allotted prior to January 1, 2018, from
Sick Leave allotted after January 1, 2018, the Company created a new
category of Sick Leave called “Accrued Leave.”
…
According to the Company’s revised policy, Accrued Leave is to be used for
purposes consistent with Sick Leave. The revised policy further states that
the “Sick Leave policy and eligibility applies to [Accrued Leave].”36

34 Rec. Doc. 11-2, p. 2.
35 Rec. Doc. 17-1, p. 20 (emphasis added).
36 Rec. Doc. 17-1, p. 3.
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Additionally, Spriggs attaches a document from Harrison Finance titled “What Happens
to My Pay & Benefits?” which, next to the heading “Sick and Accrued Leave,” states that
“Sick and/or Accrued Leave are not eligible to be paid upon separation from the
company.”37
Hancock cites Jackson v. Housing Authority for the Parish of St. James38 in support

of its position that Spriggs is not entitled to payment for Sick Leave.39 In Jackson, the
court found that an employee was not entitled to payments for accrued sick leave
following termination because the employer's policy expressly provided that Sick Leave
was not payable upon termination. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the decision
and found that, “although the employer's policy allowed unused sick leave to accrue from
year to year, the employee was not entitled to payment for unused sick leave upon
termination, where the employer's policy manual specifically provided that an employee
would not be entitled to pay for unused sick time.”40
Similarly, the summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Accrued Leave was

a subcategory of Sick Leave to account for accrued, but unused, balances of Sick Leave
which were accrued prior to Hancock changing its Sick Leave accrual policy effective
January 1, 2018. Like Jackson, although Hancock’s revised policy allowed previously
unused sick leave to roll over in to an Accrued Leave category, Hancock’s policies
expressly provide that Accrued Leave balances are to be treated like Sick Leave which
is “not eligible to paid upon separation from the company.”41 Spriggs fails to point to any

37 Rec. Doc. 11-11, p. 1.
38 05-665 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/06); 926 So.2d 606.
39 Rec. Doc. 13-2, pp. 8-9.
40 Calamia v. Core Labs., LP, 17-635 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/18), 249 So. 3d 1038, 1047.
41 Id.
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competent summary judgment evidence that demonstrates a genuine issue of material
fact on the issue of his entitlement to sick leave pay. Accordingly, summary judgment
shall be granted in favor of Hancock on the sick and accrued leave issue.
2. Vacation Pay
The Court agrees with Hancock that it is unclear whether Spriggs is arguing that

he is entitled to Vacation Pay.42 Spriggs does not claim Vacation Pay in his Amended
Complaint but mentions 144 hours of Vacation Pay in his Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment.43 In that Memorandum, however, Spriggs accounts for the money
and hours he is allegedly owed, but that calculation does not include the 144 hours of
Vacation Pay in these calculations.44 Additionally, in Hancock’s Statement of Facts,
Hancock asserts that Spriggs has been paid for all vacation hours.45 In response to that
assertion, Spriggs replies, “[a]dmitted but not material.”46 Thus, even by Spriggs own
admission, he has been paid for all vacation hours. Further, Spriggs failed to address
Vacation Pay in his Opposition to Hancock’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, any

purported claim for Vacation Pay is deemed abandoned. Summary Judgment shall be
granted in favor of Hancock for any Vacation Pay claim.

42 Rec. Doc. 17, p. 1, n. 2.
43 Id. at p. 3.
44 Rec. Doc. 11-2, p. 3.
45 Rec. Doc. 13-1, ¶13.
46 Rec. Doc. 18-1, ¶13.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Hancock’s Motion for Summary Judgment47 is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment48 is DENIED. Plaintiff’s claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
Judgement shall be entered accordingly.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on September 20, 2019.

S
CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

47 Rec. Doc. 13.
48 Rec. Doc. 11.
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10191094. Public record. Not legal advice.