# Griffin v. United States

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · December 11, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10190251

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** December 11, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10190251

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming the district court’s finding the boat’s occupants did not exercise reasonable care under the circumstances by boating in an unfamiliar area

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

STACEY GRIFFIN, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO: 22-CV-3694

VERSUS JUDGE DARREL JAMES PAPILLION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MAGISTRATE JUDGE JANIS VAN
MEERVELD

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Affirmative Defense
of the Comparative Fault of Eric ‘Josh’ Williams” filed by Plaintiff Kimberly Williams
(“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of the estate of her deceased husband, Eric Joshua
Williams. R. Doc. 51. The Government opposes the motion. R. Doc. 64. For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This suit arises from the November 29, 2021 deaths of Joseph Newby (“Mr. Newby”) and
Eric Joshua Williams (“Mr. Williams”) (collectively, “Decedents”). R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 1. Decedents
died during a boating accident on the Pearl River near Bogalusa, Louisiana, after they unknowingly
traveled over a low sill dam constructed and maintained by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers. Id. at ¶ 9. Following the accident, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging the Government was
negligent for failure to adequately warn Decedents of the dangers of the dam.1 Id. at ¶ 13. On
January 13, 2023, the Government filed its Answer and raised comparative fault as an affirmative

1 Mr. Williams’s daughter, Emily Williams, also filed suit, but does not join in the instant motion. See Williams, et
al. v. United States of America, No. 22-CV-3825 (E.D. La.). Separately, Stacey Griffin, Mr. Newby’s wife, and
Courtney Braswell, Mr. Newby’s daughter, filed this lawsuit. On January 19, 2023, Chief Judge Nannette Brown
granted the Government’s motion to consolidate the cases, and Plaintiff and Emily Williams’s case was consolidated
with the instant case. All citations to Plaintiff’s Complaint and the Government’s Answer refer to record documents
in Williams, et al. v. United States of America, No. 22-CV-3826 (E.D. La.).
defense. R. Doc. 9 at ¶ 5. On September 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for partial
summary judgment urging the Court to find Mr. Williams was not comparatively at fault for the
accident.
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before the Court shows “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would
affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is
such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The party
seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact by pointing out the record contains no support for the non-moving party’s claim.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
Thereafter, if the nonmovant is unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim,

summary judgment is appropriate. Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir.
2002).
“Ordinarily, ‘credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences are jury functions, not those of a judge.’” Fleming v. Bayou Steel BD
Holdings II, LLC, 83 F.4th 278, 293 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.
Ct. 2505)). In a bench trial, however, where the judge is the trier of fact, ‘“the district court has
somewhat greater discretion to consider what weight it will accord the evidence”’ when
considering a motion for summary judgment. Id. (quoting In re Placid Oil Co., 932 F.2d 394, 398
(5th Cir. 1991)). “Specifically, ‘even at the summary judgment stage a judge in a bench trial has
the limited discretion to decide that the same evidence, presented to him or her as trier of fact in a
plenary trial, could not possibly lead to a different result.’” Id. But, even with this somewhat
greater discretion, a district judge cannot grant summary judgment in the face of a genuine dispute
of material fact.

ANALYSIS
In her motion, Plaintiff urges the Court to find Mr. Williams was not at fault for the
accident. Initially, Plaintiff argues the Government did not properly plead comparative fault in its
Answer and, thus, the Court should disregard it as an affirmative defense. Plaintiff then argues,
regardless of whether the Government properly pleaded comparative fault, Mr. Williams cannot
be found comparatively at fault because he was merely a passenger on Mr. Newby’s boat, and
under Louisiana law, boat passengers cannot be held at fault for accidents except under very
limited circumstances. R. Doc. 51-1 at 4-5.
In its opposition, the Government argues it properly pleaded comparative fault, and even
if it did not, Plaintiff was put on notice of the affirmative defense throughout this litigation. The

Government also argues Mr. Williams’s status as a boat passenger does not absolve him from
being found comparatively at fault because general maritime law, which the Government argues
controls in this case, does not recognize this exemption. The Government argues that under
general maritime law, a finding of comparative fault requires only a showing that Mr. Williams
failed to use “reasonable care under the circumstances,” and argues there is, at a minimum,
summary judgment evidence showing Mr. Williams did not exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances. R. Doc. 64 at 7.
I. Whether the Government Pleaded Comparative Fault
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a party responding to a pleading to
“affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). While an
affirmative defense “need not be accompanied by extensive factual allegations,” it must “provide

fair notice to the plaintiff of the nature of the defense.” Schlosser v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. 12-CV-1301, 2012 WL 3879529, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2012). A failure to properly plead
an affirmative defense, however, is not necessarily fatal. Notably, “[a] defendant does not waive
a defense if it was raised at a ‘pragmatically sufficient time’ and did not prejudice the plaintiff in
its ability to respond.” Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2008). In determining
whether a defendant waived an affirmative defense, the court “look[s] at the overall context of the
litigation” to determine whether there is evidence of prejudice and whether the plaintiff had
“sufficient time to respond to the defense . . . before trial.” Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566
F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).
The Government alleges in its Answer that “[t]he plaintiffs or the plaintiffs’ decedent are

comparatively at fault for the claimed injuries and damages,” but fails to provide any factual basis
to support this defense. R. Doc. 9 at 5. Indeed, this almost surely falls short of the Government’s
burden under Rule 8. Nevertheless, a review of the litigation in this case shows Plaintiff had fair
notice of the Government’s potential comparative fault defense throughout the pendency of this
lawsuit. Regarding Plaintiff’s knowledge, in February 2023, Plaintiff served discovery on the
Government asking for evidence establishing fault on the part of Mr. Williams, and listed in the
deposition notice of the Corps’s corporate representative “[k]nowledge and information
concerning any witness, facts, photographs, documents, or things supporting, refuting, or
pertaining to any contention of comparative fault of Eric Joshua Williams.” R. Docs. 64-2 at 3,
64-4 at ¶ 20. And perhaps most important to the issue of whether Plaintiff knew of the defense
with sufficient time to defend against it is that it was raised on summary judgment by Plaintiff
more than seven months before trial. See Motion Med. Techs., LLC v. Thermotek, Inc., 875 F.3d
765, 772 (5th Cir. 2017) (the Fifth Circuit has “repeatedly rejected waiver arguments when a

defendant raised an affirmative defense for the first time at summary judgment—or even later”);
see also Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 512 F.Supp.2d 463, 468 (E.D. La. 2007) (finding plaintiff was
put on sufficient notice of affirmative defenses raised in a motion for summary judgment nearly
two months before trial). The Government’s defense has been prevalent throughout this lawsuit
and, for this reason, the Court finds the defense was pragmatically raised and that Plaintiff cannot
reasonably claim to be unfairly surprised or prejudiced in responding to it. The Court therefore
finds the Government’s comparative fault defense is properly before it, and now turns to whether
Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.
II. Whether Plaintiff Is Entitled to Summary Judgment
At the outset, the Court must first decide whether general maritime law or Louisiana law

is the applicable substantive law in this case. The Court must then decide, under the applicable
substantive law, whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Mr. Williams
bears fault for the accident. The Court will consider each in turn.
A. Whether Louisiana or General Maritime Substantive Law Governs
Plaintiff, in her Complaint, specifically invokes admiralty jurisdiction by alleging “[t]his
is an admiralty and maritime action brought pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §
30901, et seq., and Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 4. A litigant’s
decision to file suit under admiralty jurisdiction has “[n]umerous and important consequences,”
including that the substantive law applied in maritime cases is federal common law. T.N.T. Marine
Serv. Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 586 (5th Cir. 1983); E. River S.S.
Corp. v. TransAm. Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986) (“With admiralty
jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”) (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiff brings claims for negligence, and because “general maritime law has recognized the tort

of negligence for more than a century,” the Court must apply general maritime law to Plaintiff’s
negligence claims. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydocking Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820, 121
S. Ct. 1927 (2001).
The application of general maritime law does not necessarily exclude state law, however.
Indeed, courts may apply “state law where it serves to supplement, but not contravene, the general
maritime law by filling a ‘gap’ therein.”2 Parekh v. Argonautica Shipping Invs. B.V., No. 16-CV-
13731, 2017 WL 3456300, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2017) (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. USA v.
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996)). General maritime law may be supplemented
with state law when: “(1) it does not conflict with an applicable act of Congress; (2) it does not
work material prejudice to a characteristic feature of general maritime law; or (3) it does not

interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of the general maritime law in its international
and interstate relations.” Cole v. Oceaneering Int’l, Inc., No. 21-CV-1348, 2023 WL 5411307, at
*9 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2023) (citing In re Antill Pipeline Const. Co., Inc., 866 F.Supp.2d 563, 567
(E.D. La. 2011)).
The guest passenger status doctrine cited by Plaintiff does not properly supplement general
maritime law. Although it does not appear that the guest passenger doctrine conflicts with an act
of Congress, the Court finds it would materially prejudice a feature of general maritime law and
interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of general maritime law. As the Fifth Circuit

2 Plaintiff does not argue Louisiana’s guest passenger doctrine supplements admiralty law, but the Court is obliged to
consider whether it does to properly adjudicate the issues presented.
has explained, “comparative fault has long been the risk-allocating principle under the maritime
law.” Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1428 (5th Cir. 1983). The guest passenger status
doctrine would change the general maritime law fault allocation landscape by potentially absolving
Mr. Williams of liability, and would thereby frustrate comparative fault under admiralty law. In

re Antill, 866 F.Supp.2d at 569 (“Because the effect of the state [law’s] application could be to
totally shield one party from all liability to another party . . . , the doctrine of pure comparative
fault would be frustrated and materially prejudiced.”).
Application of the guest passenger status doctrine would also interfere with the proper
harmony and uniformity of general maritime law. This consideration requires balancing the
interests in uniformity of maritime law against the state law at issue. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at
213-16, 116 S. Ct. 619. A number of courts have found “the uniformity concerns . . . regarding
the governance of liability between parties in wrongful death actions by nonseamen in state
territorial waters . . . are rather strong.” In re Antill, 866 F.Supp.2d at 569 (citing Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, 216 F.3d 338, 351 (3d Cir. 2000)). And while states enjoy significant

latitude to create their own maritime safety standards, courts have distinguished between true
safety standards and frameworks “governing fault allocation and denying all recovery to a party
who falls within its ambit,” finding the latter does not outweigh concerns of uniformity. Id. The
effect of Louisiana’s guest passenger status doctrine is to completely absolve a potentially
negligent party from fault merely because that party was not operating a boat. The Court does not
interpret this framework as a safety standard, and surely not one that outweighs the need for
uniformity of the application of liability in wrongful death actions by nonseamen. Accordingly,
the Court finds the guest passenger status doctrine cannot apply in this case.
B. Whether There Is a Genuine Issue of Material Fact that Mr. Williams Is Comparatively at
Fault for the Accident

Having found that general maritime law applies to the comparative fault analysis in this
case, the Court now turns to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr.
Williams exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. Derouen, 141 F.Supp.3d at 667
(citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630, 79 S. Ct. 406
(1959)) (“The test and standards for a finding of fault or negligence under general maritime law is
reasonable care under the circumstances.”); Theriot v. United States, 245 F.3d 388, 400 (5th Cir.
1998) (“We agree that the appropriate standard of care in an allision case is reasonable care under
the circumstances.”).
Considering the record, the Court finds there is at least a genuine issue of fact as to whether
Mr. Williams acted reasonably under the circumstances. Notably, the Government offers evidence
Mr. Williams and Mr. Newby went boating near the Pool’s Bluff dam although they were
unfamiliar with the area. See Theriot v. United States, 245 F.3d 388, 401 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming
the district court’s finding the boat’s occupants did not exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances by boating in an unfamiliar area). Decedents never visited the Pool’s Bluff boat
launch or dam, and in the ten years leading up to the accident, neither Decedent had driven a boat
on the Pearl River. R. Docs. 64-8 at 3, 64-9 at 3. Plaintiff testified she learned the Decedents
stopped at a gas station and convenience store on their way to the Pool’s Bluff boat launch to ask

for “directions because they didn’t know where it was.” R. Doc. 64-12 at 13. The Government
also produces evidence that no maps, charts, or other directional aids were found with either
Decedent or their belongings. R. Doc. 64-10 at 3, 64-11 at 3-4.
There is also summary judgment evidence showing the conditions under which Decedents
were boating were not ideal for safety. For example, the Government shows Decedents may have
launched the boat at or near sunset. Larry Edward Gill, whose home overlooks the Pool’s Bluff
boat launch, described hearing and seeing Mr. Newby’s boat launch and then begin moving
towards the canal. Mr. Gill testified he began hearing Mr. Newby’s boat engine around 4:00 p.m.,
which was shortly before sunset that day. R. Docs. 64-14 at 6, 10, 64-6 at 17. Furthermore, there

is evidence Decedents may have acted unreasonably by not using life jackets. Karl Kingery, one
of Plaintiff’s experts, for example, testified to the prudence of wearing a life jacket while boating.
R. Doc. 58-1 at 28. Plaintiff argues it is of no consequence that neither Decedent was found with
a life jacket because, like Mr. Newby’s pants, the life jackets could have come off during or after
the accident. The Court recognizes Mr. Williams could certainly have been wearing a life jacket,
but finds the lack of a recovered life jacket could have also been the result of Mr. Williams not
wearing a life jacket on the day of the accident. Finally, the Government offers photographic
evidence of two signs reading “Danger Dam 100 Ft. Ahead,” and diagrams of the Pool’s Bluff
canal and river showing the Decedents would have passed both signs before reaching the dam. R.
Doc. 64-6 at 6-8. There is, therefore, evidence Mr. Williams, who Plaintiff testified was an

experienced boater, may have noticed up to two signs on the banks of the river and ignored them.
Or, the existence of these signs shows that had Mr. Williams not gotten into a boat, in unfamiliar
water, close to sunset, he might have been saved by signs designed to prevent the tragedy that
claimed his life. Taken together, this evidence creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mr.
Williams acted reasonably under the circumstances. For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Record Document 51) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 11th day of December 2023.

DARREL. JAMES Lopith
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10190251. Public record. Not legal advice.