# Doe v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · July 10, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189657

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** July 10, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189657

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that a court may seal documents that contain confidential business information
- noting that Rule 60(b)(3) relief is distinct from a motion alleging fraud upon the court
- recognizing that a court may seal documents that contain confidential business information
- recognizing that a court may seal documents that contain confidential business information
- stating orders denying permissive intervention are reviewed for clear abuse of discretion and will only be reversed in extraordinary circumstances

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JW DOE * CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS * NO. 20-1321
ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW ORLEANS * SECTION “H” (2)
INDEMNITY, INC., ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Pending before me is a Motion to Intervene to Address Access Issues filed by the
Associated Press and Guardian News and Media. ECF No. 93. The motion is opposed by The
Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans (the “Archdiocese”). ECF No. 118.
No party requested oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 78.1, and the Court agrees that oral
argument is unnecessary.
Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the
applicable law, the motion to intervene (ECF No. 93) is DENIED for the reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff JW Doe filed suit in state court alleging that he was sexually abused by Father
Lawrence Hecker in 1968. He asserted negligence claims against the Archdiocese for allowing
the sexual abuse to happen. ECF No. 1-1. The case was automatically stayed after removal in
light of the Archdiocese’s bankruptcy filing. ECF Nos. 1, 18.
By Order and Reasons dated November 2, 2020, United States Bankruptcy Judge Meredith
Grabill held that the § 362(a) automatic stay did not extend to non-debtor defendant priests (i.e.,
Hecker) and declined to exercise her discretion to stay the state court actions pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a). Judge Grabill further ordered that Plaintiff JW Doe could proceed with limited written

discovery to and the depositions of non-debtor priests to the extent that the Archdiocese’s interests
in those proceedings are not impaired. ECF No. 18-2 at 5-19. Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion
to Reopen the Case for Limited Discovery, opposed by the Archdiocese. ECF No. 19. Chief
United States Magistrate Judge Michael B. North held a hearing on December 1, 2020, during
which he declined to limit the scope of the examination; he did, however, order that parties enter
into a protective order under which the depositions, or portions thereof, could be designated as

confidential. ECF No. 25 at 3-5, 11-12.
Almost immediately after conducting the deposition, Plaintiff moved to unseal the
deposition and re-designate documents (i.e., documents previously produced and marked as
confidential pursuant to protective orders issued by the state and/or bankruptcy courts) as non-
confidential. ECF No. 29. During a lengthy hearing on January 27, 2021, Judge North denied
Plaintiff’s motion, finding it premature given that, contrary to the court’s prior order, the parties
had not executed a protective order in this case nor had they made confidential designations as to
deposition testimony. ECF No. 57; see also ECF No. 58 (sealed transcript). Based on his review
of the deposition transcript, Judge North found that Plaintiff’s inquiry related to the claims against

Hecker were so intertwined with issues impacting the Archdiocese that they were insusceptible of
meaningful disentanglement, which he found required by Judge Grabill’s limited lift-stay order.
ECF No. 57 at 1-2. As to the documents attached to the deposition, Judge North found that
disclosure would violate the automatic stay and Judge Grabill’s limited lift-stay order, particularly
given that the 1,500-plus documents marked confidential were attached in globo to the deposition
while the witness was only questioned about a small fraction of the documents. Id.
On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Motion to Unseal Deposition and Exhibits,
which is currently pending before Judge Milazzo. ECF No. 79. Several weeks after that filing,
movants AP and Guardian filed this motion to intervene so that they may participate in the
argument of that matter. ECF No. 93. Movants argue that their intervention would not violate the
automatic stay because they seek to intervene for the limited purpose of asserting the public’s right
of access to the Hecker deposition and its exhibits. ECF No. 93-1 at 5-6. Movants argue they are
entitled to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a) because their motion to intervene is timely, they
have an interest in challenging orders that permit secrecy in court proceedings, and the existing

parties do not adequately protect their interest. Id. at 7-9. Alternatively, movants argue the court
should exercise its discretion to permit them to intervene under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) because members
of the news media are allowed to assert the public’s right of access to documents. Id. at 9-10.
In Opposition, the Archdiocese argues that movants will not be prejudiced by denial of
their motion because they seek the same relief as that sought by Plaintiff in the first and second
motions to unseal. ECF No. 118 at 6. Further, movants’ request is untimely because (1) it was
not filed in 2021 when Judge North heard Plaintiff’s first motion to unseal the deposition; (2) it
was filed only one day before Judge Milazzo’s hearing on Plaintiff’s second motion to unseal,
which has since been argued and taken under advisement; and (3) it is an improper, delinquent

appeal of Judge North’s denial of the first motion to unseal. ECF No. 118 at 5-7. The Archdiocese
further argues that this second motion essentially seeks to vacate Judge North’s order denying the
motion to unseal without any legal basis for that request and without showing the extraordinary
circumstances required to justify reopening Judge North’s order. Id. at 7-8. Finally, the
Archdiocese argues that movants’ motion is invalid and violates the automatic stay because Judge
Grabill granted only limited relief from the automatic stay to Plaintiff; movants have failed to
obtain relief from the automatic stay. Id. at 9-11. The Archdiocese also indicate that movant has
already obtained access to confidential documents. Id. at 4 n.2.
In Reply, movants argue that their motion is not untimely as a result of their failure to seek
intervention in 2021 because movants are asserting the public’s right of access, which is different
from plaintiff’s own interests in unsealing the documents, and the interest has grown stronger since
they learned that the Archdiocese’s disclosure of Heckler’s misconduct was limited. ECF No. 127
at 2-3 & n.1. Movants also argue that they are prejudiced by the denial because same would

negatively impact “the public’s interest in open court proceedings and access to the Hecker
documents, documents which bear directly on alleged criminal conduct,” whereas Plaintiff has
asked for limited relief to enable him to provide the documents to law enforcement. Id. at 3-4.
Movants argue that Judge North’s denial of the first motion to unseal is not a final order as Judge
North recognized when denying the motion “at this time” as premature. Id. at 4-5. Movants also
argue that Judge North failed to establish good cause to support the sealing of the documents. Id.
at 5-6. Finally, movants argue that their motion does not violate the automatic stay, and the
bankruptcy code does not preclude members of the news media from asserting the public’s interest
in the Hecker documents. Id. at 6-7.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. The Parties Fail to Address the Differing Standards Applicable to Substantive, Court-
Filed Documents Versus Discovery Documents

The parties ignore the differing legal standards governing protective orders versus sealing
orders. Protective orders apply to discovery and require a finding of “good cause,” whereas sealing
orders involve blocking public access to court-filed documents under a stricter balancing test.1
A civil litigant gains information through the discovery process as a matter of legislative
grace.2 The First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access

1 June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512, 521 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990
F.3d 410, 419 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1))).
2 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984).
to information not available to the public generally.3
[C]ontinued court control over the discovered information does not raise the
same specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in other
situations.
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public
components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not open to the public at
common law, and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern
practice. Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore,
restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a
restriction on a traditionally public source of information.
. . . [A] protective order prevents a party from disseminating only that
information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may
disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the
information is gained through means independent of the court's processes. In sum,
judicial limitations on a party's ability to disseminate information discovered in
advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a
far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different
context. . . .
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression. [Civil Discovery Rules] enable parties to litigation to
obtain information “relevant to the subject matter involved” that they believe will
be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed
in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the
preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the
liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the
trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c).
It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories
has a significant potential for abuse. This abuse is not limited to matters of delay
and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants
and third parties. The Rules do not distinguish between public and private
information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant
information in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery.4

The prevention of the abuse that can attend coerced production of information in discovery
is sufficient justification for the authorization of protective orders. Thus, when a Rule 26(c)
protective order issued on good cause is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery and does
not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend

3 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978).
4 Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 32-36 (citations and footnotes omitted).
the First Amendment.5 Even a news agency has no First Amendment right of access to pretrial
information made available only for purposes of trying his suit.6
In contrast, “[j]udicial records belong to the American people; they are public, not private,
documents”, and “[t]he public's right of access to judicial records is a fundamental element of the
rule of law.”7 Independent of the parties’ interests, the public has an interest in transparent court

proceedings, which promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, curb judicial abuses, and
provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better
perception of its fairness.8 Thus, “the working presumption is that judicial records should not be
sealed.”9 Litigants do, however, sometimes have good reasons to file documents under seal.10
While there is a presumption of public access to judicial records, courts have recognized that this
access is not absolute.11 “In exercising its discretion to seal judicial records, the court must balance
the public’s common law right of access against the parties’ interests favoring nondisclosure.”12
Movants assert a right of access to the sealed deposition transcript along with the exhibits
attached thereto. To date, the deposition and related exhibits have not been the subject of any

substantive motion, and these materials have not been placed into the court record or relied upon

5 Id. at 37.
6 Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 32; see also United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 914 (5th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that,
while news agencies are entitled to receive, investigate and report on all public proceedings involved in a trial, the
right to gather news does not guarantee journalists access to sources of information not available to the public
generally) (citations omitted).
7 June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512, 519–20 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).
8 BP Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. Claimant ID 100246928, 920 F.3d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
9 Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 419 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
10 Id. at 419.
11 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
597 (1978)); North Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 203-04 (5th Cir. 2015)
(recognizing that a court may seal documents that contain confidential business information) (citations omitted); Ruby
Slipper Cafe, LLC v. Belou, No. 18-1548, 2020 WL 4897905, at *9 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2020) (noting that courts have
recognized “parties’ strong interest in keeping their detailed financial information sealed” because the public has a
“relatively minimal interest in [that] particular information”) (citations omitted); Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc.
v. Chrysler Corp., Inc., No. 97-3012, 1998 WL 186728, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 1998) (maintaining exhibit under
seal because the document contained sensitive and proprietary financial information about individual dealerships that,
if unsealed, could cause commercial and competitive harm to such dealers).
12 Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 848 (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599).
in connection with any substantive matter. Rather, that discovery material has only been placed
into the court record by Plaintiff as an attachment to the Motion to Unseal the Deposition and Re-
Designate Documents as Non-Confidential. ECF Nos. 29, 79. Merely attaching discovery
materials to a Motion to Unseal does not convert discovery material into public records as would
occur when a document is introduced into evidence or used for some substantive purpose.

B. Intervention to Modify Protective Order or Unseal Documents
“The purpose of intervention is to admit, by leave of court, a person who is not an original
party into a proceeding. The intervening party then becomes a ‘party’ for the purpose of protecting
some right or interest alleged by the intervenor to be affected by the proceeding.”13 “[T]he
procedurally correct course” for a nonparty to seek modification of a protective order in an action
is to obtain the status of intervenor through Rule 24.14 The Fifth Circuit has recognized that
nonparties routinely access documents and records protected by a protective order or filed under
seal in a civil case through permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2).15
1. Intervention of Right
Movants bear the burden of establishing its right to intervene.16 To be entitled to intervene

as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), movants must demonstrate that (1) they timely applied for
intervention;17 (2) they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of

13 Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 525 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
14 See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig, 589 F.2d 786, 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1979).
15 Newby v. Enron Corp., 443 F.3d 416, 424 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 187 F.3d 1096, 1100
(9th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Nat’l Child.'s Ctr., 146 F.3d 1042, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also Weiss v. Allstate Ins.
Co., No. 06-3774, 2007 WL 2377116, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2007) (recognizing that Rule 24 intervention is “the
procedurally correct course” for nonparties to seek to challenge or modify protective orders) (citing In re Beef Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 589 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1979)).
16 See Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alc. Bev. Comm’n, 834 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2016).
17 In determining whether a motion to intervene as of right is timely, the court considers four factors: (1) how long the
potential intervener knew or reasonably should have known of its stake in the case; (2) the prejudice, if any, the
existing parties may suffer because from the delay; (3) the prejudice, if any, the potential intervener may suffer if
denied intervention; and (4) any unusual circumstances that weigh in favor of or against a finding of timeliness. John
Doe No. 1 v. Glickman, 256 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
the case; (3) disposition of the case may practically impair or impede their ability to protect that
interest; and (4) they are inadequately represented by the existing parties.18
Although the burden to establish inadequate representation may be minimal, when the
movant has the same ultimate objective as an existing party, the movant must establish adversity
of interest, collusion or nonfeasance on the part of the existing party.19 Adversity of interest

requires that the movants’ interests diverge from the existing party’s interest in a manner germane
to the case, not simply a difference of opinion regarding litigation strategy or tactics.20 “In the
absence of any of these elements, intervention as of right must be denied.”21
2. Permissive Intervention
Permissive intervention is authorized upon timely motion when a federal statute provides
for a conditional right to intervene or the intervenor has a claim or defense that shares with the
main action a common question of law or fact and intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice
the existing parties. Rule 24(b). In determining whether to grant permissive intervention, the court
must first decide whether, as a matter of law, the applicant's “claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common.”22 Courts liberally construe the “claim or defense”

requirement of Rule 24(b), as the rule “plainly dispenses with any requirement that the intervenor
shall have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of litigation.”23

18 Adam Joseph Res. v. CNA Metals Ltd., 919 F.3d 856, 865 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a); Sierra Club
v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1204–05 (5th Cir. 1994)).
19 Guenther v. BP Ret. Accumulation Plan, 50 F.4th 536, 543 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
20 Id. (citations omitted).
21 Graham v. Evangeline Par. Sch. Bd., 132 F. App’x 507, 511 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Franklin Par.
Sch. Bd., 47 F.3d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1995)).
22 Newby, 443 F.3d at 421 (quoting Howse v. S/V “Can. Goose I”, 641 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir.1981) (internal citation
omitted)); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 269 (5th Cir. 1977).
23 See In re Estelle, 516 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310
U.S. 434, 459 (1940)).
Next, the court must exercise its discretion to determine whether intervention should be
allowed.24 Courts are directed to consider such factors as whether the intervenors' interests are
adequately represented by other parties, whether they will significantly contribute to full
development of the underlying factual issues of the suit, the nature and extent of the intervenors'
interests, the standing of the intervenors to raise relevant legal issues, and whether the intervention

will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.25 Courts have
broad discretion in allowing intervention. 26
C. Analysis
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for specified reasons, including fraud
(whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party. Rule 60(b) relief applies to a “final” judgment or order; hence “interlocutory orders and
judgments are not within the provisions of 60(b), but are left within the plenary power of the court
that rendered them to afford such relief as justice requires.”27 Discovery orders in civil litigation
are interlocutory orders,28 not final decisions.29 Moreover, Judge North expressly denied the first

24 See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 470-71 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting 7C
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1913, at 376–77 (2d ed. 1986)) (“Permissive
intervention ‘is wholly discretionary with the [district] court ... even though there is a common question of law or fact,
or the requirements of Rule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied.’”); Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 269 (citation omitted).
25 See id. at 472; see also Mac Sales Inc., et al. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, No. 89-4571,1995 WL 581790, at *4 (E.D.
La. Sept. 29, 1995).
26 Mac Sales Inc., 1995 WL 581790, at *4; see also Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 332
F.3d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating orders denying permissive intervention are reviewed for clear abuse of discretion
and will only be reversed in extraordinary circumstances); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 732 F.2d at 470-71 (stating
permissive intervention is wholly within the discretion of the district court).
27 Zimzores v. Veterans Admin., 778 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation and quotation omitted). See also Rozier v.
Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that Rule 60(b)(3) relief is distinct from a motion alleging
fraud upon the court).
28 See, e.g., In re Tullius, 500 F. App’x 286, 288-91, 2012 WL 6101863, at *2-*4 (5th Cir. 2012) (dismissing appeal
of discovery orders as both were interlocutory hence not appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1));
Pride Centric Res., Inc. v. LaPorte, No. 19-10163, 2021 WL 2579798, at *4 (E.D. La. June 23, 2021) (citation omitted)
(“Discovery orders are interlocutory rulings. . . .”); see also In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332, 342 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted) (noting that discovery orders are inherently interlocutory).
29 Piratello v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 360 F.3d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
motion “at this time” and based on prematurity because the parties had not entered into a protective
order and designated specific portions of the deposition as confidential, as he had instructed. ECF
No. 57; see also ECF No. 58 at 25-26. To the extent that the Archdiocese contends that the filing
of this motion violates the automatic stay, Judge Grabill is the appropriate person to address
whether this filing violates her limited lift stay order.

With regard to the intervention, movants cites the public’s right of access in seeking to
intervene solely to obtain access to documents in their news gathering capacity. ECF No. 127 at
1. As the Supreme Court explained, pretrial discovery materials (e.g., depositions and
interrogatories) are not public components of a civil trial, were not open to the public at common
law, and, in general, are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.30 Thus, movants
have no greater rights to pretrial discovery materials than the general public. In this case, the
protective order does not prohibit disclosure of the information at issue if legitimately obtained
through some other source. ECF No. 56. Rather, it only prevents disclosure of information
obtained through the regulated pretrial discovery process.

Contrary to movants’ assertion, Plaintiff does not seek to modify the protective order only
to make a criminal referral. (ECF No. 127 at 4). Instead, Plaintiff’s motion explicitly seeks to
unseal the deposition and exhibits and authorize criminal referral to the appropriate local, state, and
federal authorities. ECF No. 79 at 1. Further, this is not a situation where the existing parties have
jointly filed documents under seal, and a proposed intervenor seeks to unseal documents contrary to
the wishes of all existing parties, as in Ford31 and Hood.32 Indeed, Plaintiffs have already twice sought
to modify the protective order to remove the deposition and related exhibits from the protections of the

30 Rhinehart, 467 U.S. (1984)
31 Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2001) (newspaper sought access to settlement documents filed
under seal by joint motion of existing parties).
32 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hood, 266 F.R.D. 135, 143 (S.D. Miss. 2010) (newspaper allowed to intervene to
unseal confidential settlement agreement filed under seal at request of all parties).
governing protective orders. While movants’ desire to obtain the information for additional or
somewhat different reasons (1.e., publication versus personal use), there can be no dispute that Plaintiff
and movants seek the same relief: removal of the confidential designations over the deposition and
related exhibits.
Movants have failed to establish that they are inadequately represented by the existing
parties, and they do not address adversity of interest, collusion or nonfeasance on Plaintiff’s part.
Thus, movants cannot establish that they are entitled to intervene as of right to obtain access to the
discovery deposition and confidential exhibits attached thereto. For the same reasons, the exercise of
the court’s discretion likewise requires denial of the request for permissive intervention.
Il. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has twice sought to remove the confidentiality designations over the Hecker
deposition and related exhibits, with the second motion currently under submission by Judge Milazzo.
Movants seek the same relief: removal of the protective order protections over the deposition and
exhibits. Because movants have not established inadequate representation by the existing parties,
intervention is Improper.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that’s Motion for Intervention (ECF No. 93) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of July, 2023.
Loarnllaty [unau
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189657. Public record. Not legal advice.