# Collins v. Marquette Transportation Company, LLC

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · May 4, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189343

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** May 4, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189343

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding under similar circumstances that injuries which occurred on the wharf could be proximately caused by the vessel’s unseaworthiness

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CLOVIS BRAXTON COLLINS : NO: 22-1204
VERSUS ' SECTION: L
* JUDGE ELDON E. FALLON
MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION * MAGISTRATE: 3
COMPANY, LLC AND AMERICAN * JUDGE DANA M. DOUGLAS
RIVER TRANSPORTATION CO, LLC *
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ORDER AND REASONS

The Court has before it Defendant Marquette’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs claims for negligence and unseaworthiness, R. Doc. 37, Defendant Marquette’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims for maintenance and cure, R. Doc. 36;
Defendant ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claim for unseaworthiness,
R. Doc. 35, and Defendant ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claim for
general maritime negligence, R. Doc. 38. Having considered the parties’ briefing and the
applicable law, the Court rules as follows.

I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of alleged negligence claims by Plaintiff Clovis Braxton Collins, an
employee of Marquette Transportation Company, LLC (“Marquette”), who sustained injuries
while aboard a vessel owned by Marquette moving barges maintained by American River
Transportation Company, LLC (““ARTCO”). R. Doc. 14 at 1-2. Plaintiff slipped on cargo
previously transported on the barge, which allegedly was not adequately removed or cleared off
the deck. R. Doc. 14 at 2. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his back, neck, and other body

parts from the fall on ARTCO’s barge. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff was and remains
unfit and incapable of returning to his job as a seaman. R. Doc. 1 at 4.
Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) breach of duty of reasonable care, (2) failure to
provide a reasonably safe place to work, (3) failure of ARTCO to ensure barges were adequately

cleaned after cargo had been removed, (4) creation and maintenance of an unseaworthy vessel
and barge, (5) failure to properly train and supervise plaintiff, and (6) failure to provide
minimum safety requirements, adequate equipment, or adequate personnel. R. Doc. 14 at 3.
In their answer, Defendant Marquette generally denies liability and asserts affirmative
defenses, including (1) improper venue due to a valid and enforceable forum selection
agreement, (2) failure to state a claim, (3) Plaintiff sustained no accident, (4) Marquette is not
liable for Plaintiff’s failure to exercise reasonable or ordinary care for his own safety, (5)
Marquette is not liable, (6) Plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages or follow doctor’s orders, (7)
Plaintiff’s medical, physical, and mental conditions pre-existed the alleged accident, (8)
awarding punitive damages would be a violation of U.S. Constitution, (9) limited liability under

Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C § 30501, (10) any injuries sustained were the
fault of a third party, and (11) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by prescription, preemption, statute of
limitations and/or latches. R. Doc. 15 at 1-7.
For their part, Defendant ARTCO likewise generally denies liability and asserts
affirmative defenses, including (1) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by latches and/or statute of
limitations, (2) Plaintiff is not a seaman rather a longshoreman or shoreside worker, (3)

Plaintiff’s injuries are his own fault and caused by an open and obvious condition, (4) ARTCO
was not negligent, (5) potential unseaworthiness of the vessel did not proximately cause
Plaintiff’s injuries, (6) Plaintiff’s injuries predated the alleged accident, (7) Plaintiff is not
entitled to prejudgment interest on future damages nor punitive damages, (8) any injuries
sustained were the fault of a third party, (9) Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, and (10) limited
liability under Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501. R. Doc. 20 at 16-17.

Plaintiff seeks damages including, but not limited to: (1) compensatory, special, and punitive
damages; (2) attorney’s and expert fees; and (3) any other relief appropriate. R. Doc. 1 at 4; R.
Doc. 16 at 1-4.
II. PRESENT MOTIONS

As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not oppose Marquette’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
his claims for maintenance and cure, R. Doc. 36, nor ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on his claims for unseaworthiness, R. Doc. 35. His only opposition arguments are to Marquette’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on his claims for negligence and unseaworthiness, R. Doc 37,
and ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on his claim for general maritime negligence, R.
Doc. 38. Accordingly, Marquette’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for
maintenance and care, R. Doc. 36, and ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s

claim for unseaworthiness, R. Doc. 35, are GRANTED as unopposed.
As for the opposed motions, Defendant Marquette now moves this Court to grant summary
judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s claims against Marquette for negligence and unseaworthiness.
Marquette argues that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s claim against it for
unseaworthiness because Plaintiff’s injury did not occur aboard a vessel of which Plaintiff was a
crewmember and, in the alternative, because Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to the unseaworthiness of the M/V PARACLETE, the vessel of which he was a

crewmember. Marquette also argues that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s claims
against it for negligence because Plaintiff was adequately trained, admitted to noticing the
condition of the barge on which he slipped before he fell and did not report it, and because
Plaintiff cannot show that Marquette knew or should have known about the allegedly unsafe
condition.

In response, Plaintiff argues that he has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the M/V PARACLETE itself was unseaworthy, and whether the M/V PARACLETE’s
unseaworthiness caused his accident on the barge. As to his claim against Marquette for
negligence, Plaintiff argues that he has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any
negligence on Marquette’s part was a cause of his injury because discrepancies of fact exist in
the record as to whether Marquette’s slip and fall training was adequate and whether Marquette
knew or should have known that failing to ensure that the M/V PARACLETE had access to

Fleetcom, a barge tracking system, rendered Plaintiff’s work on the barge unreasonably
dangerous.
Additionally, Defendant ARTCO moves this Court to grant summary judgment in its favor
on Plaintiff’s claims against ARTCO for general maritime negligence. ARTCO argues that
Plaintiff has failed to show that an unsafe condition existed on the barge at the time of his
accident. In response, Plaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the

condition of the barge at the time he fell which preclude summary judgment.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, and
admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). Although the Court must consider the
evidence with all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the
nonmovant must produce specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue exists for trial. Webb
v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assocs. of N. Texas, 139 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 1998).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant must point to “portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits' which it
believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56). If the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and
use affidavits, depositions, interrogatory responses, admissions, or other evidence to establish a
genuine issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

“[W]here the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an
absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent
summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Lindsey v. Sears
Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION

The Court will first consider Marquette’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims against it for negligence and unseaworthiness, R. Doc. 37, then continue to consider
ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against it for negligence, R. Doc.
38.
A. Marquette’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Marquette moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against it for
negligence and unseaworthiness. The Court will first address the question of unseaworthiness,
then continue to address the question of negligence.

i. Unseaworthiness
First, Marquette asserts that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s claim against it
for unseaworthiness because Plaintiff’s injury did not occur aboard a vessel of which Plaintiff
was a crewmember. It is uncontested that Marquette did not own the barge on which Plaintiff
was injured, and that Plaintiff therefore cannot bring an unseaworthiness claim against Marquette

for the unseaworthiness of the barge. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the M/V PARACLETE, the
vessel of which it is undisputed that he was a crewmember, was itself unseaworthy due to its lack
of access to Fleetcom, and that the unseaworthiness of the M/V PARACLETE was a cause of his
injuries. Thus, Plaintiff argues that he may bring a claim against Marquette for unseaworthiness.
Marquette argues that a Plaintiff may bring a claim against it for the unseaworthiness of the
M/V PARACLETE only for any injury which occurred on the M/V PARACLETE. In support of

this argument, Marquette points to Coakley v. Sea River Marine, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 712 (E.D.
La. 2004), aff'd, 143 Fed. App'x. 565 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). In Coakley, the plaintiff was a
crewmember of a tugboat which was towing a barge. The plaintiff slipped on ice on the barge
and was injured. The court granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s claim of
unseaworthiness, reasoning that under Smith v. Harbor Towing & Fleeting, Inc., 910 F.2d 312
(5th Cir.1990), because the barge was not owned by his employer, and plaintiff was not a
crewmember of the barge, plaintiff could not bring an unseaworthiness claim against his
employer for the unseaworthiness of the barge.
This case is distinguishable on its face: here, Plaintiff does not seek to bring a claim against
Marquette for the unseaworthiness of the barge on which he fell, but for the unseaworthiness of
the M/A PARACLETE itself, which he alleges was a cause of his accident on the barge. The
Coakley court did state in dicta that “[u]nder Smith, the plaintiff was required to establish that he

was a seaman with regard to the vessel on which he sustained his injury.” Coakley, 319 F. Supp.
2d at 714. But this was not the reason for that court’s decision, nor the ground upon which the
Fifth Circuit affirmed it; and in fact, is not what Smith held. Similarly to the circumstances of
Coakley, in Smith the plaintiff, a crewmember of a tugboat, slipped and fell on a barge while
rigging it for towing. There, the court held that a Jones Act seaman cannot assert an
unseaworthiness causse of action against a vessel on which he is not a crewmember. Smith, 910
F.2d at 312. In dicta, the court noted that Smith retained a variety of possible remedies as a Jones
Act seaman, including “an unseaworthiness claim against his employer as vessel owner for any
injury on the M/V TODD G,” the tugboat of which he was a crewmember. But even if this
language were not dicta, the fact that Smith might still have such a claim against his employer

for an injury on the M/V TODD G does not thereby preclude Smith from bringing a claim
against his employer injury caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V TODD G but which
actually occurred on a different vessel.
Precedent indicates the opposite: that there are in fact circumstances where a Jones Act
seaman may hold his employer liable for an injury caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel of
which the seaman is a crewmember, but which did not occur on the vessel itself. For example, in

Burrage v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 431 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970), the plaintiff
slipped on coffee beans which had spilled onto the wharf from the bags in which they had been
transported after being unloaded from defendant’s vessel. The Fifth Circuit approved plaintiff’s
claim against the vessel owner for unseaworthiness, reasoning that the coffee bags were not fit
for the purpose for which they were intended—properly containing coffee beans—and that they
therefore constituted defective cargo and rendered the vessel unseaworthy; thus, that the
plaintiff’s injury, while it occurred on the wharf, could have been caused the unseaworthiness of

the vessel of which the plaintiff was a crewmember. See also Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,
83 S. Ct. 1185 (1963) (holding under similar circumstances that injuries which occurred on the
wharf could be proximately caused by the vessel’s unseaworthiness).
Therefore, the fact that Plaintiff in this matter was not injured on the M/V PARACLETE
does not preclude him from bringing a claim against Marquette for his injuries on the separate
barge allegedly caused by the unseaworthiness of the M/V PARACLETE. Summary judgment
on this claim based on the location of Plaintiff’s injury is thus DENIED.

In the alternative, Marquette argues that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the M/V PARACLETE was unseaworthy. Plaintiff argues that the
M/V PARACLETE was unseaworthy because it lacked access to Fleetcom, a barge tracking
system. Plaintiff asserts that Fleetcom, to which other Marquette vessel did have access, provides
information about the barges that tugs like the M/V PARACLETE are tasked with towing,
including information about the condition of the barge such as whether it has gone to the wash

dock after being emptied of cargo. Plaintiff argues that had the M/V PARACLETE had access to
this information, the captain of that vessel would have been able to warn him that the barge had
not been washed before he boarded it, and thus his injury as a result of slipping on the remnants
of the cargo, discarded grain, might have been avoided.
In opposition, Marquette argues that there is no evidence that the M/V PARACLETE’s lack
of Fleetcom rendered it unseaworthy, or that, if it did, the alleged unseaworthiness of the M/V
PARACLETE caused Plaintiff’s accident.

A vessel owner is responsible for the injuries of a seaman that result from the
unseaworthiness of its vessel when that unseaworthy condition was a proximate cause of the
injuries. See, e.g., Luwisch v. American Marine Corporation, 2018 WL 3031887 at *3 (E.D.La.
2018). Proximate cause requires the unseaworthy condition to play “a substantial part in bringing
about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the unseaworthiness.” Id. Vessel owners have a duty to provide a vessel
that is reasonably fit for its intended use. Drachenberg v. Canal Barge Co., 571 F.2d 912, 918
(5th Cir. 1978). This duty requires that the vessel, its gear, appurtenances, and operation to be

reasonably safe. Id. A vessel is deemed unseaworthy if a condition on the vessel presents an
unreasonable risk of harm. Id. An unseaworthy condition can exist by virtue of defective gear,
appurtenances in disrepair and an unfit crew. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494
(1971).
At the summary judgment stage, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
the Court holds that Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the M/V

PARACLETE was unseaworthy as a result of its lack of access to Fleetcom, and whether that
lack of access was a proximate cause of his injuries. There is ample evidence in the record that
Marquette was aware that, when unwashed, the barges they were tasked with towing often
retained remnants of cargo which could present a fall risk. If the M/V PARACLETE had been
equipped with Fleetcom, as were other Marquette vessels, the captain could have warned the
Plaintiff of the condition of the barge and Plaintiff would have been in possession of the
information that the barge on which he was injured had not been washed, and either avoided that
route or taken extra precautions. This lack of knowledge was arguably a proximate cause of
Plaintiff’s slip and fall on the dirty barge’s grain remnants. Accordingly, Marquette’s motion for
summary judgment on this claim DENIED.

ii. Negligence
Next, Marquette moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against it for general
maritime negligence. Marquette argues that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the barge on which he slipped was unreasonably unsafe or that

Marquette knew or should have known about the unsafe condition. In response, Plaintiff argues
that multiple disputed facts preclude summary judgment on these issues.
As the Fifth Circuit has explained:

[b]ecause of the peculiarly elusive nature of the term ‘negligence’ and the
necessity that the trier of facts pass upon the reasonableness of the conduct in all
the circumstances in determining whether it constitutes negligence, it is the rare
personal injury case which can be disposed of by summary judgment[.]
Gauck v. Meleski, 346 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1965). This reasoning is “particularly
applicable to Jones Act cases[,]” Luwisch, 2018 WL 3031887 at *4, where the vessel owner
owes a crewmember a reasonably safe place to work. “Because of the policy of providing an
expansive remedy for seamen, submission of Jones Act claims to a jury requires a very low
evidentiary threshold; even marginal claims are properly left for jury determination.” Leonard v.
Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Barrios v. La. Construction Materials
Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir. 1972)). “Summary judgment is rarely granted in maritime
negligence cases because the issue of whether a defendant acted reasonably is ordinarily a
question for the trier of fact.” Luwisch, 2018 WL 3031887 at *4 (citing Christensen v. Georgia–
Pacific Corp., 279 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir. 2002)).

In this case, the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
suggests that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Marquette was negligent, and that
Marquette’s negligence contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries. Marquette relies on its arguments that
it provided its workers slip and fall training, and that Plaintiff was an experienced deckhand, to
argue that Plaintiff himself should have recognized the alleged dangers of the dirty barge and
reported them himself. But “[t]he issue of proximate cause turns on whether the employer's
actions contributed even in the slightest degree and is not destroyed merely because the plaintiff
also contributed to his own injury.” Gavagan v. United States, 955 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir.
1992) (emphasis added). As Plaintiff argues, both Plaintiff himself and Wilson, the witness to

Plaintiff’s accident and another Marquette deckhand, testified that dirty or slippery barge
conditions were not conditions which they were trained to report to their captain. Contrary to
Marquette’s argument that Plaintiff was trained and experienced and should have recognized the
dirty barge as a hazard were it indeed so, the fact that neither Plaintiff nor Wilson recognized this
hazard could be reasonably interpreted by a jury as an indication that Marquette’s slip and fall
training was negligently inadequate. Accordingly, Marquette’s motion for summary judgment on
this claim is DENIED.

B. ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant ARTCO also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for negligence,
adopting Marquette’s arguments that Plaintiff failed to show that an unsafe condition existed on
the barge at the time of his accident. However, as explained supra, summary judgment is rarely
granted in maritime negligence cases because the issue of whether a defendant acted reasonably
is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact. Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could determine that ARTCO acted
unreasonably in failing to warn Plaintiff of the dirty condition of the barge and the lack of non-
skid coating, and that this negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries. Accordingly,
ARTCO’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim against it for negligence is also
DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Marquette’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims
for maintenance and cure, R. Doc. 36, and ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff's claims for unseaworthiness, R. Doc. 35, are GRANTED as unopposed. Marquette’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims for negligence and unseaworthiness, R.
Doc. 37, and ARTCO’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claim for general maritime
negligence, R. Doc. 38, are DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 4th day of May, 2023.

United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189343. Public record. Not legal advice.