# Goings v. Lopinto

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · March 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189196

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** March 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TYLER GOINGS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 22-2549

JOSEPH P. LOPINTO, III DIVISION “5”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant, Joseph P.
Lopinto, III. (Rec. doc. 6). Plaintiff, Tyler Goings, opposes the motion (rec. doc. 10), and
Defendant filed a reply. (Rec. doc. 13). Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the
CI.o urt rBulaecsk agsr fooullnodws.

Tyler Goings initially began working for the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”)
as a Deputy in or around October of 2017, and he resigned effective January 1, 2019. (Rec.
doc. 1 at p. 3). Goings rejoined JPSO in or around April of 2019 and remIadi.ned employed until
he resigned effective May 6, 2021 due to alleged sexuaIld h. arassment. ( ). As of the date of
his separation, he was classified as a Deputy Level 3. ( ).
Goings’ Complaint alleges the following: Goings began to suffer from a pervasive
pattern of unwelcome, explicit comments, suggestions, and questioning by his supervisor,
Sergeant Edward Lee Hardy, after Hardy vieIwd.ed a photograph of a shirtless Goings wrestling
with another male coworker from 2018. ( ). Hardy perceivIde.d and believed Goings to be
homosexual and targeted him with harassment as a rIeds.ult. ( ). After obtaining a copy of
the photograph, Hardy published it to other officers. ( ). Hardy referred to Goings and the
male coworkeIdr . shown in the subject photograph as “gay,” “fags,” “butt pirates,” and
“husbands.” ( ). More offensive and explicit remarks followed.
Goings wIda.s to be married in October 2019, and he invited some of his co-workers to

the wedding. ( ). At the time of his wedding, GoinIdg.s was assigned to the night watch but
wanted to be transferred to the morning shift. ( ). Hardy found out that a SergeIadn. t
Voorhies was invited to Goings’ wedding and began to pressure Goings for an invite. ( ).
Hardy told Goings tIhda.t he would get him transferred to the morning shift if he was invited to
Goings’ wedding. ( ). Goings acquiesced aIdn.d invited Hardy to his wedding, which resulted
in additional harassment and bullying. ( ). While at Goings’ wedding, Hardy sexIuda.lly
harassed Goings, going so far as to grab Goings’ buttocks, which was photographed. ( at
pp. 3-4).

After his wedding, Hardy micromanaged Goings and questioned his work in additioIdn.
to subjecting Goings to homophobic and sexually explicit comments and text messages. (
at p. 4). GoinIdg.s eventually approached his supervising Lieutenant to complain about Hardy’s
behavior. ( ). Goings was advised that he would be punished for breakinIgd .the chain of
command, which discouraged Goings from filing a complaint against Hardy. ( ).
The events ultimately escalated and in or about December 2020 to January 2021,
Goings lodged an anonymous complaint to Internal AffairsI do.f the JPSO about the sexual
harassment and discrimination he received from Hardy. ( ). Internal Affairs failed to

respond to Goings’ request to investigate his complIadin. t but put out a blanket statement to all
supervisors advising against sexual harassment. ( ). Goings also repeatedly complained
about the harassment to his supervisors, Captain Larry Dyess (“Capt. Dyess”) and Lt.
Id.
Geautreaux. ( ). NIedit.her superior attempted to remedy the situation or correct the alleged
conduct by Hardy. ( ).
Hardy learned of GoinIdg.s’ anonymous complaint and intensified his pattern of

harassment and retaliation. ( ). Hardy’s retaliatory behavior was in response to Goings’
protected reports and was deIsdig.ned to dissuade Goings, and any other deputies, from lodging
further protected reports. I(d. ). After being subjected to this work environment, Goings
submitted his resignation. ( at p. 5)I. d G.oings alleges that he left due to harassment, a hostile
work environment, and retaliation. ( ).
Goings further alleges that he was treated Idle.ss favorably than other comparable
employees that are outside of his protected class. ( ). He maintains that Deputy Brandon
Savage, a heterosexual male who was not perceived as homosexual, committed several actual

vIido.lations of policy similar to those for which Goings was disciplined, without reprimand.
( ). Moreover, he alleges that Deputy Melissa Elliot, a heterosexual female, had a romantic
relationship with Hardy, and ultimately receIdiv.ed a transfer after making a report of sexual
harassment and retaliation against Hardy. ( ).
On or about October 12, 2021, Goings filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On May 9, 2022, the EEOC issued Goings a
Notice of Right to Sue.
On August 7, 2022, Goings filed this lawsuit against Joseph P. Lopinto, III in his

capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson Parish. Goings seeks a declaratory judgment, equitable relief,
and monetary damages to secure the protection against and to redress unlawful
discrimination on the basis of gender and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
et. seq.
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e , as amended (“Title VII”), and the Leotu siesiqa.na Employment
DIIi. scrimSitnaantidoanr Lda owf Rcoedviifeiewd: aRsu Lloeu 1is2i(abn)a( 6R)e vised Statutes §§ 23:332 and 51:2256.

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must cAonshtacrino fat
“vs. hIqobrat land plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). “[T]he pleading standard Rule
8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but Iidt .demands more Bthealln A atnl.
Cuonrapd.o vr. nTewdo, mthbel-ydefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” at 678 (citing
, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
If a defendant perceives a plaintiff’s complaint to be deficient under Rule 8(a)(2), Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows that party to move for dismissal of a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which rSeeliee Lf ocwanr ebye v g. rTaenxt. eAd .& SMu cUhn aiv .m Soytsi.on is
rarely granted because it is viewed with Kdiasifsaevro Ar.l u minum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avon, d1a1l7e
FSh.3ipdy 2ar4d2s,, 2In4c7. (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting
, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] alSl ewe eTlhl-opmlepasdoend v f.a Ccittsy aosf
tWruaec oa,n Tde xv.iew[s] all facts in the light most favorable tDoo teh eex p rleali.n Mtiaffg.”e e v. Covington Cnty. Sch.
Dist. ex rel,. 7K6e4y sF.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing
, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). But, in deciding whether

dismisIdsa. l is warranted, thIeq Cboaulrt will not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as
true. at 502-03 (citing , 556 U.S. at 678).
To survive dismissal, “‘a complaint must contain sufGfiocnieznalte fza cvt. uKaaly matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to reIlqibefa tlhat is plausible on its face.’” , 577 F.3d 600, 603
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting , 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
aTswsoummbpltyion that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the courItq tboa ldraw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” , 556 U.S. at 678 (“The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). This is a “context-specific taskI dth. at
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” at

679. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liabIidli.ty,
it stops short of the line between possibility aTnwdo mplbaluysibility of entitlement to relief.” at
678 (internal quotations omitted) (citing , 550 U.S. at 557). “[A] plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’” thus “requires more than
labelsT wanodm cbolnyclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” , 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Finally, “[w]hen reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court ‘must consider the
complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources ordinarily examined when ruling on Rule

12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporatFeudn ikn tvo. Stthrey kceorm Cpolrapi.nt by
reference, and matters of which a courTt emllaaby st,a Iknec. jvu. dMicaikaol rn Iostsiucees.” & Rights, Ltd. , 631
F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 551 U.S. 308,
322 (2007)). If the Court considers materials outside of the pleadings, thSee em Coatiuosne yt ov d. iSsemwieslsl
mCaudsitll abce- Ctrheeavtreodle ta,s Ian cm. otion for summary judgment under RPuhleo e5n6i.x on behalf of S.W. v.
Lafourche Par. Gov't , 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004); see

also , No. CV 19-13004, 2021 WL 184909, at *3-4 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2021);
III. FedL.a Rw. Cainvd. P A. n12a(lyds).i s
A. Prescriptio n – Federal Claims

In Louisiana, an EEOC charge of disCcorinmnienra vt.i Loan. Dmeups'tt obfe H feilaeldth w &i tHhoinsp 3s.00 days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice. , 247 F. App'x
480, 481 (5th Cir. 2007). Defendant contends that Goings has not alleged any harassing or
discriminatory conduct within the 300 days before his filing of the EEOC charge. Defendant

argues that Goings’ claims for hostile work environment and discrimination are untimely
because his EEOC charge of discrimination was filed on October 12, 2021, and Goings alleges
no discriminatory or hostile behavior after December 16, 2020, the 300th day before he filed
his EEOC charge.
"A statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is
evident from the plaintiff's pleadingsJ othnaest tvh. eA alccotiao, nI nisc .barred and the pleadings fail to raise
some basis for tolling or the like." , 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003).
When a defendant moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim, the statute of

limitations may suTpuptourst vd.i JsLmGi sInsadlu “sw. here it is evident from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the
action is barred.” Clea, nC iEvn. Aer. gNyo v. .4 T:2ri0ll-icuvm-4 T2r3a1n, s2p0. 2F1u eWlsL, L 2.L9.5C4. 423, at *4 n. 4
(S.D. Tex. June 21, 2021) (citing , CV H-19-244,
report and recommendation adopted
2020 WL 7049143, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2020)), , Civ.
A. No. 4:20-CV-4231, 2021 WL 2954067 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2021). Courts have found that
the issue of a statute-of-limitations bar is more appropriately resolved on summary

judgment when the complaHinStB dCo Beasn nko Ut ScoAn, Nclauts'ilv Aeslys' ne sftoarb Olipshti othna Ot nthe eM colaritmg. sL aoraen b Tarr.r 2e0d0 b7y-
HthLe1 s, tAastsuette-B oafc lkimedi tCaetriotinfisc.a tes, Series 2007-HL1 v. TFHSP, L.L.C.
, Civ. A. No. 4:17-CV-542-ALM-
CAN, 2017 WL 8727601, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2017) ("Where a statute of limitations
defense raised in a motion to dismiss requires factual determinations and the evidence
concerning those determinations is unclear, such an affirmative defense is properly
considered at the summary judgment stage, when the parties' arguments can be considered
along with competent summary judgment evidence.").

As noted above, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a court “must accept all well-pleaded
facts alleged in the complaint as UtrSuTe- Manadm miyau,s Itn cco. nvs. tTrruuee t Shpeo arltlse, gIantci.ons in the light that is
most favorable to the plaintiJf&f.J” S ports Prods., Inc. v. Live Oak Cnty. Pos,t 4N4o1. 6F1. 1S9u pVpe.t e3rda n3s8 o2f,
3Fo8r7e (igNn.D W. Taresx. 2020) (citing
Cent. Laborer,s 'C Pive.n Asi. oNno F. Cun-0d8 v-.2 I7n0te, g2r0a0t9e dW ELle 4c8. S3e1r5v7s., at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2009) (quoting
, 497 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 2007)).
While the parties make much about what constitutes a discrete act, what does not
constitute a discrete act, and what constitutes a continuing violation for purposes of a sex

discrimination and/or hostile work environment claim, this Court finds that it is all much
ado about nothing. Goings alleges specific allegations of harassment as late as February
2021, when Hardy forced him to stand in the cold for a vehicle inspection while allowing all
other officers to remain in their vehicles. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 4). While Defendant argues that
this harassment – if indeed it was harassment – must be based on sex to satisfy Goings’
claims, this Court cannot state at this stage of the litigation that this “harassment” was not

based on the sexual animosity that Hardy had displayed toward Goings in the past. Goings
did not resign due to hIdar.assment until May 6, 2021, consistently alleging harassment by
Hardy until that date. ( at p. 3). October 12, 2021 is within 300 days of May 6, 2021. This
is a motion to dismiss – resolved solely on the pleadings – and not a motion for summary
judgmeBn.t . DisHmoissstaille o fW thoerske Ecnlavimirso nonm tehnet basis of prescription is unwarranted at this stage.

Defendant also argues that Goings has failed to state a claim for a hostile work
environment under federal and state law. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits

an employer from discriminating “against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish a
violation of Title VII bSye pe rMoveirnitgo trh Saat vd.i sBcarnimk,i nFaStBio vn. bVainsseodn on sex created a hostile or Bablaucski vve.
wZaorrikn ge Hnvoimroens,m Inecn.t. , 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986);
1
, 104 F.3d 822, 825 (6th Cir.1997). Sex discrimination in this form occurs
McDonnell Douglas Cicalese
1v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch
For purposes of a motion to dMismcDiossn,n tehlils D Coouugrlta dsoes not employ the framework.
Raj, 9v.2 L4a F. S.3tadt 7e 6U2n,i v7.66 (5th Cir. 2019). “[A] plaintiff need not make out a prima facie
case of discrimination [under ] in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
Ifadi.lure to state a claim.” , 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013). A district court therefore errs
by requiring “a showing of each prong of the prima facie test for [sexual harassment] at the pleading stage[.]”
But the Fifth Circuit has also explained that, although plaintiffs do not “hCahvheim to v s.u Ubnmivi.t oefv iTdeexn. caet tAou esstitnablish
a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage, [they must] plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate
elements of a [sexual harassment] claim to make [their] case plausible.” , 836
F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016).
“[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to altHera rthries cvo. nFdoritkiloifnts S oyfs t.,h Ien cv.ictim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.” , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)

(citations and internal quotations marks omitted). In same-sex sexual harassment cases, the
Fifth Circuit has held that a two-step inquiry must be applied: (1) whether the alleged
conduct was sex discrimination andN (e2w)b wuhrye tvh. eCrit tyh oef aWlleingdecdr ecsotn, dTuexc.t meets the standard for
a hostile work envEir.Eon.Om.Ce. nvt. Bcloahim B.r others Constr. Co. , 991 F.3d 672, 676 (5th
Cir. 2021) (citing , 731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013) (en
banc)). The Supreme Court has noted that “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity
to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or
roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which Ha arreraissonable person in

the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive.” , 510 U.S. at 21
(citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
Defendant maintains that Goings cannot maintain a claim for a hostile work
environment because his allegations do not reveal that Hardy was hoNmguoyseenx uva. Bl ourc hmaortti-vHaotrend,
bInyc a. sexual desire towards him. This argument misses the point. In
, this Court held “that the Supreme Court did not foreclose the poOssnicbailleityv o. Sf usnadmoew-sneexr
Ohaffrsahsosrme eSnert vws.here the harasser is not homosexual. There is nothing in [
, 523 U.S. 75 (1998)] to prevent a plaintiff from claiming same-sex harassment

where the harassment is motivated by hostility based on the victim's sexual orientation.
‘[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on theO bnacsaisle of sex.’” No. Civ. A. 02-1998, 2003 WL 21674461, at *3 (E.D. La.
July 15, 2003) (citing , 523 U.S. at 80).
NewburAy vp. lCaiitnyt iofff Wmianyd csreusptp, Toertx .a harassment claim with evidencCea mofm saecxk- svt. eLrae.o Dtyepp'itn ogf.

Health , 991 F.3d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 2021);
, No. CV 18-3614, 2018 WL 6831103, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 28, 2018) (“Actionable sex
discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination against those who do not conform to
sex or gender stereotypes.”). Discrimination on the basisB oofs tsoecxku va. lC olaryietnonta Ctinotny,. including
perceived sexual orientation, is prohibited under Title VII. , 140 S. Ct.
1731, 1754 (2020). Goings explicitly alleges in his complaint that Hardy perceived and
believed that he was homosexual. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 3). Additionally, Goings alleges that
Hardy directed language and slurs Ida.t Goings, specifically slurs and derogatory terms

targeting homosexual individuals. ( ). These terms were obviously targeted at Goings
perceived sexual orientation and sex-stereotyping. Taking these allegations as true and
construed in a light most favorable to Goings, he has adequately pleaded that the basis of the
harassment by Hardy was his perceived sexual orientation.
Defendant argues that Goings must pursue one of three evidentiary paths to establish
sex discrimination. Defendant maintains that a plaintiff in a same-sex sexual harassment
case may establish discrimination because of sex by showing: (1) “the alleged harasser made
‘explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity’ and [by] provid[ing] ‘credible evidence that

the harasser was homosexual;’” (2) “the harasser was ‘motivated by general hostility to the
presence of [members of the same sex] in the workplace;’” or (3) “‘direct, comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
Williams v. Waffle House
workplace.’” Love v. Motiva, N Eon.t Ceirvs.. AL..L 1.C0.-357-ME, 2010 WL 4512819, at *3 (M.D.
La. Nov. 2, 2010) (citing , 349 F. App’x 900, 902 (5th Cir. 2009)).
But this is a summary judgment “evidentiary” staSnedea Nrde,w nboutr yth ve. Csittayn odfa Wrdi nudscerde stto, Tdeexc.ide a

Rule 12 motion to dismiss at the pleadings stage. , 991
F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 202 L1o)v e(citing the aforementioned evidentiary requirements at the
summary judgment stage); , 349 F. App’x at 902 (same).
Defendant also argues that Goings fails to allege whether the alleged discprirmiminaa ftaocriye
conduct meets the standard for a hostile work environment claim. To establish a
case under Title VII for a hostile work environment claim based on harassment and
discrimination, Goings must eventually prove five elements: (1) that he belongs to a
protected class or was engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he was subject to unwelcome

harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex or sexual orientation; (4) that the
harassment affected a ‘term, condition or privilege of employment;’ and (5) that the
employeDre kAnnegwel iosr v s. hEol uPlads oh aMvuen k. nPoowlicne oOf ftfhicee rhsa Arasss'snment and failed to take prompt remJeodnieasl
av.c tFiloang.s hip Int'l , 51 F .3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995);
, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986). To determine whether a workplace
constitutes a hostile work environment, courts consider the following circumstances: the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive uLtytleersa vn.c Tee; xaansd A wlchoehtohle Br eivt eurnargeea Csoonmambl'ny interferes with an

employee's work performance.” , 379 F. App'x 380,
384 (5th Cir. 2010). Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious), however, are not enough to establish a hostile work environment claim.
Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr.
, 476 F.3d 337, 347-48 (5th Cir. 2007). The conduct at
issue must not merely be tinged with oEf.fEe.nOs.Civ. ev . sBeoxhu aBlr ocso. nCnoontsattri.o Cnos., Lb.uLt.C m. ust actually
constitute discrimination because oLf as eDxa. y v. Catalyst Tech. Inc. , 768 F. Supp.

2d 883, 890 (E.D. La. 2011) (citing , 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir.
2002)).
Defendant maintains that Goings’ allegations of harassment are vague and conclusory
and cannot satisfy the pleading requirement for a hostile work environment claim. This
Court finds otherwise. Goings sufficiently pleads that he is a member of a pBroostteocctked class
based on Hardy’s perception of his sexual orientation. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 3); , 140 S.
Ct. at 1754. The first element is thus satisfied. As to the second element, Goings alleges he
has suffered unwelcome harassment throughout his employment with Defendant. Goings

need only allege that he has suffered continuous incidents of discrimination and harassment
based on Hardy’s perception of his sexual orientation. (Rec. doc. 1 at pp. 3-4).
The third element is also properly pleaded. Goings claims that Hardy targeted his
harassment and discriminIadt.ory conduct at him based on his perception and belief that
Goings was homosOexnucaall.e ( at p. 3). As noted above, this Court has held that the Supreme
Court’s holding in does not preclude a plaintiff from claiming same-sex harassment
wNghueyne nthe harassment is motivateds ebey a lhsoos Btiolisttyo cbkased on the victim’s sexual orientation.
, 2003 WL 21674451, at *9; , 140 S. Ct. at 1754. “Harrassing conduct

need not Obnec maloetivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis
of sex.” , 523 U.S. at 80. Hardy allegedly and consistently used specific derogatory
language and slurs referring to homosexual individuals. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 3). In addition to
these comments, Goings has alleged that the adverse employment actions materially affected
his conditions of employment. Goings was transferred to a less desirable shift, given falsified
wIdri.tten reprimands, suspended and lost pay, and was denied a promotion to the vice unit.

( at pp. 4-5). Moreover, Defendant knew of this harassment because Goings complained
about it to his supervising LieuteIdn.ant, Captain Larry Dyess, Lieutenant Geautreaux, and to
the Internal Affairs of the JPSO. ( at p. 4). None of these entities or individuals took action
based on Goings’ complaints. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court finds the
allegatiCo.n s in tSheex c Domiscprlaiminitn saattiiosfnactory to support a claim for hostile work environment.
prima face
To state a case of sex discrimination, Goings must allege that he (1) is a
member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) suffered an

adverse employment action by Defendant; and (4) was replaced by someone outside of his
protected group or was treaHteadir ele vs. sB dfa. voof rSaubpleyr vtihsaonrs ootfh Lear. Sstiamteil aUrnlyiv .s Aitguraitce. d& Memecphlo. Cyoelels.
outside the protected group. ,
719 F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013). Defendant contends that Goings merely recites the
aforementioned elements of a discrimination claim without alleging any specific facts that
would arguably render his claim plausible on its face. Specifically, Defendant notes that
Goings vaguely refers to discrimination in his come.pgl.aint without providing any details to
establish that he can plausibly allege such claims, , “. . . Hardy began discriminating and

harassing Goings. . .;” “Defendant also discriminated against Goings on the basis of his sex
because he was treated differently than other similarly situated employees outside of his
protected class;” and Goings “was treated more harshly, targeted, scrutinized, and/or
disciplined more severely than other similarly situated employees whom JPSO did not
perceive to be homosexual.” (Rec. doc. 1 at pp. 3, 6). Defendant maintains that the law
rAesqhucriroefts “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

, 556 U.S. at 677.
This Court has already concluded that Goings is a member of a protected class. In
addition, Defendant does not appear to dispute that Goings was qualified for the promotion
to the vice unit.
Defendant does dispute, however, that Goings has alleged an adverse employment
action. An “adverse employment action” under TiTtlheo VmIpI siosn “ avn. C eitmy polfo Wymaceon,t T deexc.ision that
affects the terms and conditions of employment.” , 764 F.3d
500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014). “[A]dverse employment actions consist of ‘ultimate employmeIndt.

decisions’ such as hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, granting leave, and compensating.”
at 503. Transfers, reassignments, oIrd a. material chAalnlegne vi.n H jaomb mreosnpdo nCsitiby iPliotileicse m Daeyp 'qtualify if
they are equivalent to a demotion. at 303-05; , No. CV
19-12117, 2020 WL 433359, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2020). But the Fifth Circuit “has
recognized that the mTehroe m‘lopssos nof some job responsibilitiesW’ idlloiaesm ns ovt. Uco.Sn. sDteitpu'tte o fa Nn aavdyverse
employment action.” , 764 F.3d at 504 (quoting , 149
F. App'x 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2005)). While Defendant maintains that the numerous
reprimands issued to Goings are not adverse employment actions, “[i]t is equally well

eAslvtaabralidsho evd. T. e. x. .t Rhaatn gtheers denial of a promotion is an actionableee aadlsvoe rBsree aeumxp vl.o Cyimtye onft G aacrtliaonnd.”
, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 2007); s ,
205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Adverse employment actions are discharges, demotions,
refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.”). Goings explicitly alleges that Hardy
informed him that he would not receive a promotion to the vice unit if he “ha[d] anything to
do with it.” (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 5). And, indeed, Goings never in fact received the promotion.

That is sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage to plead an adverse employment action.
Goings also alleges that “[a]fter being subjected to a work environment that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure, Goings submitted his resignation. Goings
submits that he left due to the harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation
detailed above.” (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 5). ThisS dimespcsroibne vs. Aal ccoornns tSrtuacttei vUen idvi.scharge, which also
qualifies as an adverse employTmhoemnta as cvt.i oAntm. os Energy Corp. , 27 F. Supp. 3d 711,
718 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (citing , 223 F. App’x 369, 376 (5th Cir.
2007). Defendant contends that based on his allegations, Goings cannot establish that he

was constructively discharged in order to satisfy the essential element to state a sex
discrimination claim. To establish constructive discharge, Goings must allege facts
demonstrating that working conditions would have been so difficultJu orrg eunnsp vle. Eas.Ea.nOt. Ct.hat a
reasonable person in his shoes would hBaovuer fqeulte cvo. mPopweelllel dE lteoc .r Mesfigg.n C. o . , 903
F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting , 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th
Cir. 1980)). To determine whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign,
the Fifth Circuit considers the relevancy of the following events: (1) demotion; (2) reduction
in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading

work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or
humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (7)
offers of early retirement (or continued employment on terms less favorable than the
Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp.
employee's former status). , 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001).
Having reviewed Goings’ complaint and the facts outlined above, the Court must, at this stage
of the litigation, find that he has pleaded sufficient allegations to satisfy this burden. Goings’

allegations as outlined above are sufficient to plead badgering, harassment, or humiliation
by Hardy calculated to encourage Goings’ resignation, and further discovery may reveal just
that.
Defendant also maintains that Goings has failed to allege that he was treated less
favorably than other comparable employees outside of his protected class. The Fifth CLireceu vit.
Khaasn .c oCnitsyid Se.r eRdy .t hCeo r.equirement for one employee to be similarly situated to another.
, 574 F.3d 253, 259-61 (5th Cir. 2009). Employees with different
supervisors, who work for different divisions of a company, or who were the subject of

adverse employment actions too remote in timWey vfrilol mv. Uthnaitte dta Ckoesn. Laigfea iInnsst. Ctoh.e plaintiff
generally will not be deemed similarly situated. , 212 F.3d
296, 302 (5th Cir. 2000) (considering sufficiency of evidence sustaining jury verdict).
Likewise, employees who have different work responsibilities or who are Ssumbitjehc vt.e Wd atlo-
aMdavretr Ssteo erems p(Nlooy.m 47e1n)t action for dissimilar violations are not similarly situated.
, 891 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir. 1990). This is because the courts require
that an employee who proffers a fellow employee as a comparator demonstrate tLhiatttl eth ve.
Remeppulbolyicm Reenft. aCcot.,i oLntds .at issue were taken “under nearly identical circumstances.”

, 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The employment actions being compared will be deemed to have been taken place under
nearly identical circumstances when the employees being compared held the same job or
responsibilities, shared the same supervisor, or had their employment sLteaetus determined by
the same person, and have essentially comparable violation histories. , 574 F.3d at 260.

And, critically, the plaintiff's conduct that drew the adverse employment decision must have
been “nearly identical” tSoe eth idat. of the proffered comparator who allegedly drew dissimilar
employment decisions. If the “difference between the plaintiff's conduct and that of
those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in treatment received from
the employer,” the emploWyeaellsa caer ev .n Moet tshiomdiilsatr Hlyo sspit.u Saytse.d for the purposes of an employment
discrimination analysis. , 271 F.3d 212, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2001).
The FiLftehe Circuit does not, however, interpret “nearly identical” as synonymous with
“identical.” , 574 F.3d at 260. Applied to the broader circumstances of a plaintiff's

employment and that of his proffered comparator, a requirement of complete or total
identity rather than near identity would be essentially insurmountable, as it would only be
iInd .t he rarest of circumstances that the situations of two employees would be totally identical.
For example, it is sufficient that the ultimate decisionmaker as to the employees'
continued employmentI di.s the same individual, even if the employees do not share an
immediate supervisor. Each employee's track record at the company need not compriIsde.
the identical number of identical infractions, albeit these records must be comparable.
The relevaPnetr epze vr.s Tpeexc.t Diveep ’its o tfh Carti mofi ntahle J uesmtipceloyer at the time of the adverse employment

decision. , 395 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2004).
Goings cites to two comparators – Deputy Brandon Savage, a heterosexual male, and
Deputy Melissa Elliot, a heterosexual female. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 5). Goings alleges that Savage
committed several policy violations similarI tdo. those for which Goings was disciplined, but
for which Savage was never reprimanded. ( ). Unlike Goings, Savage was not perceived to
be a homosexual. As discovery may reveal that the violations that Savage allegedly

committed were similar to those allegedly committed by Goings, and if Savage was not
perceived to be a homosexual and treated as a heterosexual male, this Court cannot now
state that Savage is not a valid comparator. And whether Elliott is a comparator remains to
be seen after any potential discovery. Elliot, as a heterosexual female, is outside Goings’
protected class and also reported sexual harassment and retaliation against Hardy. Elliot
received a transfer after her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation, while Goings did
not. Both Savage and Elliot were deputies, and thus, the same rank as Goings. At this stage
of the litigation, the Court finds that Goings has pleaded sufficient allegations to withstand a

motion to dismiss on his claim for sexual harassment. Swierkiewicz
v . Sorem aIn N s.Ao .ruling, the Court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition in
, McDonnell Douglas
The prima facie case under , however, is an evidentiary
standard, not a pleading requirement.
. . . . McDonnell Douglas
This Court has never indicated that the requirements for establishing a
prima facie case under also apply to the pleading standard
that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss. For
instance, we have MrecjDeoctneadl dt hve. S aarngtuam Fee nTtr athila Tt raa nTsiptl.e C Vo.II complaint requires
greater “particularity,” because this would “too narrowly constric[t] the role
of the pleadings.” See, e.g., S,c 4h2eu7e Ur .vS.. R2h7o3d, e2s83, n.
11, 96 S. Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976). Consequently, the ordinary rules for
assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply. , 416
U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (“When a federal court
reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence
either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue
is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is
entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”).
. . . .
Furthermore, imposing the Court of Appeals' heightened pleading
standard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include only “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Such a statement must simply “give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

534 U.S. 506, 510-12 (2002). It is this Court’s impression that Defendant appears to demand
a pleading that delineates in particular all of the requirements of a Title VII prima facie case
to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. That is simply not the standard at this stage.
Having reviewed Goings’ complaint, the Court finds that it puts Defendant on notice of
Goings’D c.l aimsR aentda ltihaet igornounds on which they rest.

“Title VII's antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that ‘discriminate
against’ an employee (or job applicant) because he has ‘opposed’ a practice that Title VII
forbids or has ‘made a charBguer, ltinesgttiofine dN, .a &ss Sisatnetda, oFre pRayr.t Cicoip. va.t eWdh iint’e a Title VII ‘investigation,
proceeding, or hearing.’” , 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The opposition clause of Section 2000e-3(a) requires the
employee to demonstratLeo tnhga vt . hEea shtfaidel da tC olella.st a “reasonable belief” that the practicPeasy hnee
ov.p MpocLseemd woreer'se Wunhloalwesfaulle. & Retail Stores , 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (citPinaygn e
, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981)). In , the
Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the position that proof of an actual unlawful employment
practice is necessary to state a claim for unlawful retaliation. 654 F.2d at 1137-41. An
informal complaint to a supervisor regarding an unlawful emSpeelo Tyumreenaut dp rva. cGtircaem mblaiyn gs aSttiastfye
the opposition requirement of a Title VII retaliation claim.
Univ. Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n
, 294 F. App'x 909, 914-15 (5th Cseire. a2l0so0 8H)e; rtz v. Luzenac Am., Inc. ,
615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5thS Chiarn. 1n9o8n0 v).; B ellsouth Telecomms., Inc. , 370 F.3d 1014, 1015
(10th Cir. 2004) (same); , 292 F.3d 712, 716 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2002) (same). In addition, and as noted above, Goings need noStw eisetrakbileiwshic az prima facie
case of retaliation at the motion-to-dismiss stage of this litigation. , 534 U.S. at
510-12.
Although “a plaintiff need not make out a prima facie case of [retaliation] in order to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” the prima-facie
standard “has some relevance at the motion-to-dismiss stage,” because in order to
sufficiently state a Title VII-retaliation claim, “a plainJetnifkf imnsu vs.t Lpale. Wado srukfffoirccieen Cto fmacmts' non all of
the ultimate elements to make her case plausible.” , 713 F.

App'x 242, 244, 244 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). The prima facie elements for a
retaliation claim require a showing that “(1) [Goings] engaged in activity protected by Title
VII; (2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that there was a causal
connection Sbheatwckeeelnfo trhde vp. aDrteilcoiipttaet io&n Tino uthchee p, rLoLtePcted activity and the adverse employment
dBerociussisoanr.d” v . Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. , 190 F.3d 398, 407–08 (5th Cir. 1999);
, No. 4:21-CV-02359, 2022 WL 19505, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 3, 2022).
Goings alleges in his complaint that he variously lodged complaints with his

supervising Lieutenant, Captain Larry Dyess, LiSeimutse nv.a Fnitr sGt eBaauntkreaux, and to Internal Affairs of
the JPSO, all to no avail. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 4). In , the court held:
However, in evaluating whether plaintiff has asserted a viable retaliation
claim, the question is not whether the conduct of which she complained
amounted to actionable sexual harassment, as defendant contends, but rather
whether Sims could reasonably have believed that it did. The opposition
clause of § 2000e-3(a) does not require the employee to prove that the
practice she opposed waBs yiner fsact unlawful, but rather “reqPuaiyrnees vth. Me ceLmepmlooryee'es
tWo hdoelmesoanles t&r aRteet athila St tsohree shad at least a ‘reasonable belief’ that the practice she
opposed was unlawful.” , 209 F.3d at 427-28 (citing
, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981)).

478 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 (S.D. Miss. 2006). Regardless of whether the allegations concerning
Hardy’s actions could reasonably be found to amount to actionable sexual harassment, the
Court is not prepared to hold that Goings could not reasonably have believed that they did.
Goings lodged complaints about Hardy’s alleged sexual harassment, which in and of itself, is
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.
Goings also alleges that an adverse employment action occurred because of his
complaints. The Supreme Court has clarified what is required at the second step of a
plaintiff's prima facie case in the retaliation context, holding that a retaliation claim may rest
on an action that “a reasonable employee would have found . . . [to be] materially adverse,
which in this context means it well might haAvrey adiinss vu.a Wdeadl- Ma raerat sSotnoraebsl eT wexo. rLkPer from making
or supporting a charge of dBisucrrliimngintoanti oNn. .&” Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 534 F.3d 473,
484 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing , 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Goings specifically alleges that when he approached his supervising Lieutenant,
Dyess, to complain of Hardy’s behavior, Dyess advised him that he would be punished for
breaking the chain of command, ultimately discouraging Goings from filing a complaint
against Hardy. (Rec. doc. 1 at p. 4). Goings also alleges that after Hardy learned of his
anonymous complaintI,d h.e told Goings that he would “get rid of him” after he created a paper
trail against Goings. ( at p. 5). Goings also alleges that Hardy falsified a series of written
reprimands that caused Goings to be transferred to another scheduleId, .to receive a 12-hour
suspension and loss of pay, and to lose a promotion to the vice unit. ( ). He maintains that
Hardy’s response was retaliatory behavior to GoinIdg.s’ protected reports and was designed to

dissuade him from making any further reports. ( ).
As to the third element – causation – “Title VII rUentaivl.i aotfi oTnex c. lSawim. Ms emd.u Csttr b. ve. Npraosvsaerd
according to traditional principles of but-for causation.” ,
570 U.S. 338G,a 3r6ci0a (v2. 0P1ro3f)'.l CHoonwt.e Sveerrv,s t.,h Ien cb.ut-for standard does not apply at the prima facie
case stage. , 938 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2019). Instead, “[a]t
the prima facie case [stage], a plaintiff can meet his burden of causation simply by showinIdg.
close enough timing between his protected activity and his adverse employment action.”
at 243.

Accordingly, Goings may meet his burdeBnr ohwerne v .b Wy apl-leMaadritn Sgt otreems pEo.,r La.lP .proximity
between Hardy’s actions anads rGeoviinsegds’ complaints. , 969 F.3d
571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020), (Aug. 14, 2020). In his complaint, Goings specifically
pleads that the majority of Hardy’s harassment occurred after he learned of Goings’
complaints to his superiors and Internal Affairs in December 2020 or January 2021. (Rec.
doc. 1 at p. 4). He alleges that Hardy’s bIde.havior escalated and became more harassing after
Hardy learned of Goings’ complaints. ( ). While Goings does not provide all dates related
to certain actions by either he or Hardy, there is a prominent temporal progression in the

complaint of Hardy’s escalating behavior in relation to the dates of Goings’ complaints. As
with prescription of Goings’ federal claims, the Court cannot find that the dates as provided
by Goings do not establish temporal proximity to bear his burden here. For these reasons,
this Court cannot definitively state that Hardy’s combined behavior was retaliation meant to
dissuadEe. GoingPsr efrsocmri pmtaioknin -g L oar. sRuepvp. oSrttaint.g § a 5 c1h:a2r2g5e6 o f discrimination.

In his complaint, Goings asserts a claim under Section 51:2256 for a conspiracy to
violate human rights. Defendants argue that this claim has prescribed. “A statute of
limitations may support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff's
pleadinJognse tsh va.t Athlceo aac, tIinocn. is barred and the pleadings fail to raisseee s oSmoneg bbayrsdis, fIonrc .t ovl. lBinega orsrv tihllee
lRikeces.”., Inc. , 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003);
, 104 F.3d 773, 775 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1997). Like discrimination claims under
Louisiana's Employment Discrimination LaCwoo (k“ LvE. DPaLr”.) ,O cf lJaeifmfesr suonnder Section 51:2256 are
subject to a one-year prescriptive period. , – F.3d –, Civ. A. No. 21-

719, 2022 WL 3369193, at *8 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2022). Discrimination claims under the LEDL
are suspended during the pendency of an EEOC investigation for a period of up to six months.
La. Rev. Stat. § 23:303(D). Specificalilyn, tthhies s Ctahtauptete prrovides:
Any cause of action provided shall be subject to a prescriptive
period of one year. However, this one-year period shall be suspended during
the pendency of any administrative review or investigation of the claim
conducted by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the
Louisiana Commission on Human Rights. No suspension authorized pursuant
to this Subsection of this one-year prescriptive period shall last longer than six
months.

La. Rev. Stat. § 23:303 (emphasis added). The “Chapter” referred to is Chapter 3-A of Title
23, “Prohibited Discrimination in Employment.”
There is some question as to whether the suspensive period also applies to causes of
action under Section 51:2256, which appears in Chapter 38 of Title 51, not Chapter 3-A of
Roth v. N.J. Malin &
TAistsloec 2ia3t.e sGoIinncg.s argues that it does; Defendant argues that it does not. In
, , Magistrate Judge Wilkinson analyzed the text of the statute in effect at the
time and its statutory history and concluded that the suspensive period in Section 23:303

did not, by its own terms, apply to a plaintiff's claim under Section 51:2256 and that the
legislature, in concurrently amending both the LEDL and the Louisiana Commission on
Human Rights Act, could have specified that the suspensive period in the Louisiana
Employment Discrimination Act applies to causes of action under Section 51:2256, but did
not do so. No. CIV. A. 98-1793, 1998 WL 898367, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 1998). But Section
51:2256 has been amended since that time. In 1998, when Judge Wilkinson considered the
issue, Section 51:2256 contained no reference to the LEDL. The 2014 amendments added
2
several references to the LEDL.
Goings essentially argues that Section 51:2256 incorporates the LEDL and that,
therefore, the suspensive period applies. He cites no case law in support of this conclusion.
Defendant argues that no suspensive period applies, citing a 2020 decision from the Middle
District of Louisiana in which the court applied a one-year prescriptive period to the
plaintiff's claim under Section 51C:2la2r5k6 v, .w Aiutgheoru St earnvasl.,y Iznicn.g whether the suspensive period in
Section 23:3C0l3a(rDk) might apply. Ro, 4th43 F. Supp. 3d 685, 712 (M.D. La.
2020). The court simply cited Judge Wilkinson's decision without consideration
of the intervening statutory amendment.

S2ee
In 2014, Section 51:2256 was amendSeildb yt ov .a Plsaor .a opfp Jleyf fteor svoinolations of LEDL found in “Chapter 3-A of Title 23.”
2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 756 (S.B. 412) (West). It is thus now clear that Section 51:2256 applies in ti.hee.
employment discrimination context. , No. CV 21-662, 2022 WL 3646071, at *5 (E.D. La.
Aug. 24, 2022). Before the 2014 amendments, Section 51:2256 applied only to violations of “this Chapter,” ,
Title 51 and therefore did not include Title 23.
The Court finds that although the 2014 amendments made it unlawful to conspire to
retaliate against an employee for opposing a practice unlawful under the LEDL, this cannot
be interpreted as incorporating all parts Soifl btyh ve. PLaErD. Lo f iJnetfofe rSseocntion 51:2256, including a

prescriptive period that is not referenced. , No. CV 21-662, 2022 WL
3646071, at *7-8 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2022). By its plain terms, Section 23:303(D) does not
apply to claims under Section 51:2256 because such claims are not “provided in” Title 23
Chapter 3-A. Thus, the Court finds that the one-year prescriptive period was not suspended
while Goings’ EEOC charge was pending.
Noting the relevant dates, the parties appear to agree that Goings’ claim under Section
51:2256 was not filed within one year of his constructive discharge. Both parties note that
Goings resigned on May 6, 2021 and did not file suit until August 7, 2022. That is well beyond

the one-year prescriptive period. Accordingly, any claim under Section 51:2256 has
pIVre. scriCbeodn.c lusion

FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons,
that the 12(b)(6) MotGioRnA toN TDEisDm IisNs PfoArR FTai lure tDoE SNtaIEteD a ICNla PimAR UTpon
Which Relief can be Granted (rec. doc. 6) is and as
outlined above. Plaintiff Tyler Goings’ claim under La. Rev. StDatI.S §M 5I1S:S2E2D56 W aIgTaHin sPtR DEeJfUenDdIaCnEt
Joseph Lopinto, III has prescribed, and, as such, the claim is .

All of the other claims remain pending in this lawsuit for now.
30th March
New Orleans, Louisiana, this __________ day of __________________________, 2023.

MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10189196. Public record. Not legal advice.